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Puruṣavāda: A Pre-Śaṅkara Monistic Philosophy as Critiqued by Mallavādin

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Abstract The Advaita literature prior to the time of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is scarce. Relying on the citations of proponents and their opponents, the picture we glean of this early monism differs in many aspects from that of Śaṅkara. While Bhavya's criticism of this monistic thought has received scholarly attention, the chapter Puruṣavāda in *Dvādaśāranayacakra* (DNC) has rarely been studied. Broadly, this conversation will help ground classical Advaita in light of the contemporary discourse on naturalism. In particular, this examination will help contextualize the early Advaita that lacks clear imprint of Mahayana Buddhism. The doctrine of Puruṣa, central to this paper, sidelines the role of *avidyā* or ignorance, and provides a realistic picture of the world. I have relied on the commentary *Vṛtti* upon the *Vākyapadīya* as has been substantially cited in DNC in order to advance the arguments. As a consequence, the examination on Puruṣa also paves the path for advancing arguments on linguistic monism.

Keywords Bhartṛhari · Advaita · Bhavya · Mallavādin · Puruṣavāda · Vedānta · Naturalism

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Introduction

Except for what is found in some Indological research, the era of the Upaniṣadic philosophy prior to the time of Śaṅkara (circa 700 CE) is mostly absent.[1] We learn of differing positions from fragments found in citations, mostly in polemical writings that criticize their predecessors, demonstrating that the Upaniṣadic tradition was vibrant and nuanced, with multiple commentaries and independent treatises extant Even when we simply rely on the available fragments and the citations of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana, we can glean that the early monistic thinking was diverse. After the emergence and popularity of Śaṅkara's school, these early schools lost their prominence, not only because Śaṅkara's school was institutionalized, but also because the dualist philosophers primarily focused on Śaṅkara's writings while criticizing the monistic trend of Upaniṣadic philosophy. Although the Upaniṣadic thinking of this period may never be fully ascertained, citations and critiques of some of these concepts that are available in the texts of rival philosophers from that early time give a glimpse of these otherwise extinguished philosophical schools. The *Dvādaśāranayacakra* (DNC) of Mallavādin,[2] a Jain philosopher (550 CE),[3] is one such source that identifies and argues with numerous contemporaneous positions. Although the analysis of a rival school of thought based on an opponent's critique can be somewhat misleading or insufficient at the very least, this analysis will provide some understanding of what is otherwise an obscure doctrine.

The scope of this essay is the 'doctrine of person' (*puruṣavāda*), as criticized by Mallavādin. While the philosophy presented here is a Vedic philosophy, it cannot be identified with any existing schools. In particular, this monistic philosophy is not identical to the Advaita of Śaṅkara, although one can identify it as proto-Advaita. Remarkably this philosophy is closer to Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. The issue, however, is not the scope of language. Apparently, Bhartṛhari's philosophy, in particular the philosophy found in the *Vṛtti* upon the *Vākyapadīya* (VPvṛ), relied on a philosophical framework that aligns with what we identify as the doctrine of Puruṣa as presented by Mallavādin. I have also utilized the commentary upon DNC to fully examine the scope of the doctrine of Puruṣa, as this monistic model has a potential to engage in the contemporary discourse on naturalism.

Early Tendencies

Mallavādin initiates the discussion upon the single self with citation of a Vedic stanza, 'this all is the very *puruṣa*' (Ṛg X. 90. 2), that explicitly identifies the world with the cosmic being. His criticism of this philosophy is remarkable for two reasons: (1) it helps us unravel one of the lost strands of Vedic thinking, and (2) it helps us ground

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[1] For the study of early Advaita, see Schrader (1902), Sastri 1924, Kane 1930, Lacombe (1937), Hacker (1953), and Nakamura (1983, pp. 369–390). For treatment on Bhavya's presentation of Vedānta, one of the earliest references to comment on Advaita, see Qvarnström 1989. Hacker keenly relates the issue of being with the Upaniṣadic discourse where being here is '*materia prima,'* (Halbfass 1995, pp. 187–210).

[2] I have relied on Muni Jambuvijaya's edition (1966, 1976, and 1988) of the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* (DNC) for this study. For other editions and the problems therein, read Wezler (1981, pp. 359–408).

[3] The actual date of Mallavādin is hard to determine, and scholars have broadly located him between the 5th and 7th Centuries. For discussion on the date of Mallavādin, see Potter (2003, pp. 201–203).

monism in an historical context. Although Bhavya uses the term *Vedāntadarśana* to refer to the Upaniṣadic philosophy, Mallavādin prefers Puruṣavāda as a title.[4] If we compare different designations for the Upaniṣadic philosophy, Puruṣavāda appears a preferred terminology in the early periods, before the time of Śaṅkara.[5] This historical contextualization helps us ground the early philosophical thinking in classical Sanskrit literature, as epitomized in a trialogue among the Hindus, Buddhists, and the Jains.

When describing causality, Upaniṣadic philosophy can be divided in two groups: one that relies on some agency, such as that of *avidyā* or ignorance, to mediate creation with the underlying principle, the Brahman, the Puruṣa, or the Ātman, and the other that follows a direct approach, maintaining that cause and effect are not diametrically different and the world is a mere manifestation of the Brahman. The concept of the Brahman manifesting in the form of the world becomes relevant for contemporary philosophical discourse, as the highest principle, that which manifests, is also identified as consciousness, or in some occasions as the mind. This stream of thought discredits the dichotomy between matter and consciousness as well as mind and the body. The reduction of all manifestation to consciousness in the above passage is explicit with the term 'consciousness' (*vinnu*) that is used to describe this *puruṣa*. This conversation is also historiographically noteworthy, as the centrality of Puruṣa in this conversation does not make this thinking identical to Sāṅkhya, as the Sāṅkhyan way of thinking stresses the plurality of Puruṣas.[6] This study is also significant for the method of philosophical debate in classical India. Mallavādin does not rely on the existing texts such as *Brahmasūtra* in his criticism but instead cites some Upaniṣadic and Vedic passages, in addition to VP and VPvṛ.

The Doctrine of *Puruṣa*

The central element that distinguishes the Puruṣavāda addressed by Mallavādin from the Advaita of Śaṅkara is the model of causation. Following Mallavādin:

> *puruṣo hi jñātā jñānamayatvāt | tanmayañ cedaṃ sarvaṃ tadekatvāt sarvaikatvāc ca bhavatīti bhāvaḥ |*   DNC, 175: 1-2.

> *Puruṣa* indeed is the agent of knowledge, as it is comprised of knowledge. And this whole world is comprised of *puruṣa* {tat}, because it is identical.

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[4] Although Mallavādin does not identify the doctrine under discussion as Advaita, Siṃhasūri, the commentator on DNC, does make this identification, with the application of terms such as *advaita* or *advaitavāda.* See Nakamura (1983, p. 283).

[5] This observation rests on both Buddhist and Jain sources. From the Jain side, for example, *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* (1.1.2, *gā* 76, vol. 1, pp. 112.2–112.3) mentions the doctrine of *puruṣa*: *terāsiyaṃ niyadivādaṃ, viṇṇānavādaṃ saddavādaṃ pahaṇavādaṃ davvavādaṃ purisavādam. . . Sūyagaḍaṅga* critiques the position of *puruṣa* with a presentation that echoes the Hymns of Puruṣa ((Ṛg X. 90): "All existence stems from *puruṣa,* and the cause (*kāraṇa*) of all is that Īśvara. Everything in this world has *puruṣa* as its origin as well as its end. By *puruṣa* they are made; from *puruṣa* they are born; by *puruṣa* they are manifested. All belong to *puruṣa* and exist on *puruṣa*." *Sūyagaḍaṅga* 2.1.25. Cited in Nakamura (1983, pp. 269–270). From the Buddhist side, Śāntarakṣita, for instance, examines the Vedic doctrine of *puruṣa* and the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the self (*ātman*) in two separate sections (Shastri 1981, pp. 96–101, 156–159). These are clear examples, and not the only ones.

[6] For treatment on *Ekajīva* or the concept of single *jīva*, see Timalsina (2009, pp. 34–49).

> Since all is one [in essence], what comes into being is spoken of as *bhāva*. The manifest entity (*bhāva*) is as such due to [the very agent] becoming as such.[7]

Classical theories of causality exploited the example of milk and yoghurt to demonstrate continuity between cause and effect. The passage cited from DNC above grounds causality with this very example, further confirming our reading. This example deviates from those generally used in the Advaita of Śaṅkara: a rope and a snake, or a shell and a piece of silver. Mallavādin expands upon this argument by saying that there is a subject (*jña*) at the end of the chain of causes, as milk is the product of a cow, a living entity. Just as in the case of a wheel spinning even after the potter stops his effort, following this argument, there is actually a conscious subject in the foundation of all the events.[8]

Following the doctrine of *puruṣa* as presented by Mallavādin, unconscious entities are the sleeping state (*suptāvasthā*) of the conscious being.[9] Although this doctrine adopts the Sāṅkhyan concept of origination in describing elements such as earth and water as transformation of the subtle elements such as smell and taste,[10] Mallavādin adds the conscious self in the chain of causation, acknowledging it to be the foundational cause that sequentially transforms into other elements. Further deviating from the Sāṅkhyan model of causation, this doctrine accepts that the *puruṣa*, although assuming manifoldness, is not divided in its essence and is therefore singular in nature. Mallavādin presents this causation as follows:

> *rūpādipravibhaktam apravibhaktasvatattvaṃ yat tad bhavati tad eva tattvaṃ | tat kiṃ? nanu jñānasvatattva ātmeti rūpādibhir eva nirūpitaṃ tat, tad hi rūpaṇaṃ rūpaṃ jñā-nam eva vibhaktāvibhaktaṃ grahaṇam eva, na tu rūpyate tat tena tasmin vetyādi rūpaṃ rasāder guṇagaṇād dravyād vā vibhak-tasyānavasthānād rūpasya puruṣa-bhinnaputratvādivat |*   DNC, 177: 1-5.

That whose self-essence is not divided [even when] divided into [the elements such as] form etc. is what comes into being and that is [what constitutes] being

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[7] This interpretation of *bhāva* follows Patañjali: *kartṛsādhanaḥ | bhavatīti bhāva iti |* (The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali I.3.1). For discussion on *bhāva*, see Ogawa (2005, 67–101, pp. 222–245). The interpretation of *bhāva* is one of the central points for both Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri. The following passage is noteworthy to present Siṃhasūri's exegetical prowess upon the concept of *bhāva*:
bhavatīti bhāvo bhūprakṛtiḥ kartrarthaḥ | prakṛtipratyayau pratyayārthaṃ saha brūtaḥ (Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali III.1.67) iti vacanāt | bhāve ghaño vihitatvād bhūyata iti bhāvaḥ | na bhavati iti kartrartha iti cet tatrāpi yena bhūyate samānena samāno bhavatīti bhāvo ṇaprakaraṇe bhuvaś copasaṅkhyānam iti vā kartā sāmānyam ity evaṃ vyavasthite 'rthe sarvatantrasiddhāntena vyākaraṇena tatra viśeṣāmātravāde deśakāla-bhede parasparavivi-ktadravyadeśakālabhāvabhinne bhavane 'bhede ca dravyāditayā bha-vanamātre sāmānyavāde nānābhāve ca sāmānyaviśeṣayor bhedābhedānānātāsu yathāsaṅkhyaṃ bauddhasāṅkhya-vaiśeṣikamatāsu doṣān na bhāvaḥ | bhavitur abhāvāt tatprakṛtyarthakartur abhāvāt | itiśabdasya hetvarthatāt pañcamīm aprayujya bhavitur abhāva ity uktaṃ prāguktanyāyena bhavitur abhāvāt | bhavatīti bhāvo ghaṭādir iti vyākaraṇadṛṣṭena niruktyarthena samarthito vidhinā vivicyate ca sādṛśyāsādṛśyābhyām | Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī, DNC, 173: 22–174: 8.

[8] *nanu kṣīrarasādi dadhyādeḥ kartṛ, na ca tajjñam, na, tatpravṛttiśeṣatvād gopravṛttiśeṣa-kṣīradadhit-vavad jñaśeṣatvād vā cakrabhrāntivat |* DNC, 175: 4–5.

[9] DNC, 176: 1–2.

[10] Sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparśa*), form (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), and smell (*gandha*) are the five elements identified as '*tanmātrās*' that give rise to the five gross elements: sky, air, fire, water, and earth. This Sāṅkhyan cosmology is also adopted by the Advaitins of Śaṅkara's school.

that.[11] What is that? That the self is of the character of form etc. is determined by the very form etc. *Rūpa* (form) is as such due to the act of determination [based on the root √*rūpa*], and it is mere cognition, or mere grasping as divided or not divided. However, *rūpa* (form) is not as such [following other etymologies] like 'that which is determined,' or 'that by means of which something is determined,' or 'that wherein something is determined.' This is because form is not located in isolation of a group of properties such as taste or of substance, like his son distinct from a person.

The etymological connection of *rūpa* in the discourse of causality in the above passage is noteworthy also in light of the classical Advaita application of the term. In contrast to the terms *saguṇa* (possessing qualities) and *nirguṇa* (free from qualities), early Advaita literature describe the Brahman as 'endowed with form' (*rūpavat*) and 'devoid of form' (*arūpavat*).[12] When providing a new etymology of the term *rūpa,* Mallavādin presents that *rūpa* is due to 'assuming form' (*rūpaṇam*) and not because of 'something that is ascertained through form' (*rūpyate tat tena tasmin veti*).[13] Following this understanding, the very *puruṣa* identical to consciousness is perceived in seeing, tasted in tasting, or touched in touching. Rejecting the contradiction that the *puruṣa* when grasped as form cannot be grasped as taste, Siṃhasūri elaborates in *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* that this entity is of the manifold nature.[14] Rejecting the concept that the highest principle, *puruṣa*, is one and distinct from form etc., Mallavādin argues that something that is not endowed with form etc. is not perceived.[15]

Mallavādin adds another element to this discussion with the argument found in subsequent Advaita, that consciousness in itself is not distinguished even when confirmed through the sense of sight or hearing or touch, as it is one in the sense of consciousness. This concept of *puruṣa* rejects the distinction between the entities of perception (*grāhya*) and the subject of perception (*grāhaka*). The argument given here is that either of these cannot be confirmed in the absence of the other. This argument is used to confirm that the world rests upon the self of the character of consciousness.[16]

The *puruṣa* as described by Mallavādin is omniscient and every composite is made of *puruṣa*.[17] Following the previous arguments, since the material world is the sleeping state of consciousness, and the states of subject and object arise simultaneously, all entities are immediately revealed to *puruṣa*. The commentator Siṃhasūri identifies this as the doctrine that accepts diversity as merely *vivartta,*

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[11] Here again, I am simply reading *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* in explaining the term '*tattva*': *kiṃ punas tasya svatattvam? tasya bhāvas tattvam, svārthiko bhāvapratyayaḥ*   DNC 177: 10.

[12] See Modi (1956–1957, pp. 23–36).

[13] DNC, 177: 4.

[14] *tasya tattvasyānekātmakatvābhyupagamāt | Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC, 177: 27.

[15] *na rūpādibhyo bhinnam idam ekaṃ dravyaṃ eveti, rūpādivyatiriktādarśanāt | DNC, 178:1–2.*

[16] *sa eva tu vyatirekasyānupapatter jñānasvatattvātmaiva grāhyo grāhakaś caiṣitavyaḥ, vyatirekasyānupapatteḥ, abhimatātmapratipattivat | DNC, 178:3–5.*

[17] *evaṃ ca sārvajñam ayatnena labdhaṃ puruṣātmakatvāt sarvasya | DNC, 179:1.*

with consciousness being a singular cause.[18] This understanding follows another argument wherein the *puruṣa* unaware of itself does not exist.[19] Mallavādin further elaborates on this concept, explaining that the self is of the character of consciousness and speech (*śabda*) is the expression of the self.[20] In this context, Mallavādin demonstrates the all-pervasiveness of *puruṣa* through the example of a grain of rice, which, although is one entity in the form of rice, is also earth, water, and so forth, as it is comprised of these elements as well.[21] This follows the position that every entity is comprised of all and that all is merely the manifestation of one entity of the character of consciousness.[22]

Four States of *Puruṣa*

One additional term, *ātman*, is etymologically crucial in order to ground the monistic doctrine as presented by Mallavādin. Based on the root √*ata*, the term *ātman* is understood here as a dynamic entity.[23] Siṃhasūri derives three different meanings of this term: (1) that which constantly moves, (2) that which constantly cognizes, and (3) that which constantly transforms.[24] In this depiction, the term *puruṣa* is generic in the sense that it describes the self that eternally transforms. This transformation of the self is explained both in the subjective terms of shifting from one state of consciousness to the other, as in waking, dreaming, or deep sleep states, and in the cosmic sense of the self transforming into material world. The monism of Puruṣa presented by Mallavādin is primarily based on the analysis of the states of consciousness. While this understanding of the states of consciousness is also crucial to the philosophy of Gauḍapāda, Mallavādin's presentation differs in many regards.[25] Gauḍapāda, for instance, relies primarily on the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* for his elaboration on the states of consciousness. He does not engage the *guṇa* theory for describing the states of consciousness, as does Mallavādin. Moreover, the states such as dream or deep sleep are not essential to the nature of the self. On the contrary, these are the states that one needs to overcome in order to attained the fourth liberating state.

Following Mallavādin's depiction of the states of the self, in three states except for the transcendent (*turīya*), the subject may possess multiple internal conditions

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[18] *jñānātmakaikakāraṇavivarttamātrabhedavāda. Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi*, DNC 179: 12.

[19] *na hi puruṣaḥ kaścid ātmānaṃ na vetti | Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi*, DNC 179: 13.

[20] *. . . jñānātmakatvād ātmanas tadvijṛmbhitavikalpatvāc ca śabdasya. . . |* DNC, 180: 7.

[21] DNC, 185:3–4.

[22] DNC, 187.

[23] *ātmā iti na vastusvarūpaparyāyavācino 'tra grahaṇam, kiṃ tarhi? atati satataṃ gacchati tānstān avasthāvi-śeṣān svarūpāparityāgeneti ātmā, sa eva sāmānyaṃ caitanyalakṣaṇam | evaṃ tarhi viśeṣābhāve kasya sāmānyaṃ? iti sāmānyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, sa mā bhūd iti viśeṣā vaktavyāḥ| ucyate – sāmānyaṃ puri śayanāt puruṣaḥ, viśeṣās tu tasyaivāvasthāvato 'vasthā jāgratsuptasuṣuptaturīyākhyāḥ | tāsāṃ svāvasthānāṃ puruṣaḥ sāmānyam iti| Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī,* DNC, 172: 27–173: 8.

[24] *satatam atati gacchati jānīte pariṇamatīti cātmā | Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* DNC 190: 15.

[25] For the studies on the states of consciousness in the philosophy of Gauḍapāda, see Fort (1980, 1985), Darling (1987, pp. 105–117) and Sharma (2001).

such as dream-infused waking state (*svapna-jāgrat*) or waking-infused dream (*jāgrat-svapna*)[26] Siṃhasūri further adds that even the fourth state can be of various internal divisions due to its own inherent power.[27] Three states are described in terms of pleasure, pain, delusion, and purity, and are aligned with the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, whereas the *turīya* state remains free from these qualities. This fourth state is further explained as 'pure consciousness' (*śuddhaṃ caitanyam*) that illumines all other states.[28] Siṃhasūri describes this state as 'indistinguishable in all [the other states]' (*sarvatrāvibhāgā*).[29] Accordingly, this fourth state grounds the other three and is manifest in them. Although all of these states belong to the self, only the fourth is described in terms of the supreme self (*paramātman*), 'the essential nature of the self' (*ātmasvatattvam*), 'liberated' (*vimukta*), and 'omniscient' (*sarvajña*).[30] This state is considered to be free from limitations and delusion and is free from the condition of sleep.

The apparent contradiction in this position is that the self is not conscious of any objects during the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*). To identify the self as having the character of consciousness, therefore, is not congruent with the sleeping state. The Advaita of Śaṅkara resolves this contradiction with the acceptance of *māyā/avidyā,* where the self does not 'really' transform into those states but only appears as such due to ignorance. Mallavādin presents the doctrine of Puruṣa along the lines that just as someone going to be appointed as a king can be addressed as 'king', so also is the case with the self in the sleeping state, because the self has the potential of consciousness to be revealed in the fourth state. The two different stages of the self, one active and the other the consequence or extension of the first, in particular the waking and deep sleep states of the self, are identified here as *karaṇātman* and *kāryātman*.[31]

The monism presented by Mallavādin proposes that the self in all states is consciousness (*jñāna*) itself in differing degrees. This position also confirms that erroneous cognition and doubt are also the very conditions of consciousness. Following the first argument, although the supreme self (*paramātman*) is of the character of pure consciousness and is all-pervasive, it falls into sleep (*nidrā*), and the term *karaṇātman* refers to the self that is half-awake, like someone in the process of waking from a deep slumber. This doctrine of *puruṣa* considers even the sense organs to be the manifestation (*vivarta*) of consciousness. Three states of waking, dreaming, and sleeping are likewise identified with consciousness itself. Also, the condition of doubt is considered to belong to the *karaṇātman*, as it is aligned with the half-sleeping state.[32] Accordingly, the dynamic states of the self,

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[26] DNC, 182: 1–5, and Siṃhasūri's commentary thereon.

[27] *athavā sāpi svarūpasāmarthyāt sarvātmanaivānekadhā viparivartate | Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC 182-11-12.

[28] *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC, 182: 17.

[29] These are just a few of the terms used in DNC, and the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī,* DNC, 182:21.

[30] These are just a few of the terms used in DNC, and the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* commentary. DNC, 182: 3–5 and *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi* thereon.

[31] DNC, 183–185.

[32] DNC, 185.

including the degrees in which consciousness manifests, are not a fabrication of *avidyā* or ignorance, but rather are based on the central Sāṅkhyan tendencies of *guṇas*. This model of Advaita appears to adopt a radical form of monism that finds no contradiction between a single entity capable of assuming multiple forms and also consciousness as not having its real nature revealed in all modifications.

The World as the Transformation of Consciousness

While summarizing the doctrine of Puruṣa, Mallavādin presents a concept that consciousness encapsulates both veridical knowledge and erroneous cognition alike. Following this argument, even the conditions of uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*) or that of being unconscious (*acetana*), are the very states of consciousness.[33] The argument that cognition and error are essentially the conditions of consciousness is utilized to consolidate the position that the effects of consciousness, earth etc., are essentially consciousness itself. The elements lacking consciousness, such as earth or water, are compared to the sleeping state of consciousness where the function of consciousness, such as cognition, is not found. Along these lines, just as consciousness is existent although lacking its proper functioning in drunken or drugged conditions, so also are the states of earth etc. suffused with consciousness, even though consciousness is not found in its manifest form.[34]

Following Mallavādin, this doctrine of Puruṣa rests on the following argument to establish that the very consciousness transforms into matter:

> *yo 'sau puruṣas tad eva tat, tenātmatvena pariṇamitatvāt taddravyatvād bhūmyabādi-brīhitvavat tatkāryatvāt paṭatantuvat, tena vinābhūtatvāt tadvyatirekeṇābhāvāt taddeśatvāc ca ghaṭasvatattvapratyagrāditvavat* | DNC, 185:3 – 186:1.

> That what is called *puruṣa* is itself [the entities like earth, identified with the term] 'that.' Just because it is the self, [or etymologically the dynamic entity,] it has transformed [into the manifold entities]. Because it is the consolidation [of the fluid form], like the transformation of earth, water, etc. into rice, [it has attained materiality]. [Entities are] the effects of *puruṣa* {tat} like a [piece of] cloth is [a product] of threads. It is because [entities] do not come into being in isolation of *puruṣa* {tena} and do not exist in isolation of *puruṣa* {tat}. It is also because [entities] are the aspects of *puruṣa* {tat}, just like being brand new is the very aspect of a pot.

This passage establishes the relationship between consciousness and matter as cause and effect, with matter being the transformation and modification of consciousness.

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[33] *tathā suptāvasthāpi jñānam eva saṃśayādi īṣatsuptatāvastunas tathātattvāt* | *tathā viparyayo 'pi jñānam eva tathātathātattvāt cetanātmā suptatvād dravyapuruṣavat* | *tathānadhyavasāyo 'pi viśiṣṭasvāpo jñānam eva, cetanātmakatvāj jāgaritavat* | DNC, 183–184.

[34] *yathā caitat tathānadhyavasāyaṃ api dravyendriyapṛthivyādi kāryātmā jñānam eva, suṣuptāvasthātma-katvāt hālāhalānuviddhamadirāpānāpāditanidrāprasuṣuptavad athavānadhyavasāyavat* | DNC, 185: 1–3.

This relationship, however, is kept open to interpretation, as different arguments relate consciousness and matter on different grounds. Central to Mallavādin's depiction of *puruṣa* is that the self, due to it being self-conscious, transforms itself without any external agency and attains states such as deep sleep, or becomes endowed with passion.[35] Siṃhasūri gives an additional example of self-oscillation as in a hammock in order to describe consciousness transforming itself into material forms.[36] In all accounts, there is no suggestion that this doctrine of Puruṣa disregards transformation or supports the agency of *avidyā*, as is found in the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

One explicit problem in this position is that there will be no distinction between matter and consciousness, and bondage and liberation. With an example of chicken and egg, Mallavādin depicts that there actually is no flaw even in accepting matter or form as the essential nature, since there is no real distinction. This position establishes identity between the conscious and unconscious, accepting four states of consciousness including deep sleep.[37] In response to the question, why is the knower described as transformed into matter, rather than matter being transformed into the knower, the response as presented by Mallavādin is that the act of transformation (*bhavana*) is possible only of the conscious subject, and something unconscious cannot be an agent of transformation.[38] If causality is interpreted along the lines that there is a real distinction between cause and effect, as Naiyāyikas would explain this relation, there is no real causation in the doctrine of Puruṣa. What is exactly happening, in the chain of cause and effect, following the Puruṣavāda, is a mere change (*viparivarta*), just like soil in the form of a pot or a piece of pot or dust or atoms (DNC 187: 1–2). At this level, the arguments regarding causation, that matter transforms into sentient beings or that consciousness is the base element for all manifestations, become mere linguistic difference. After all, no real evolution or transformation has occurred, nor has any new entity has come into being. In short, this is an argument against emergentism.

By interpreting Vijñānavāda along the lines of the transformation of *vijñāna* or consciousness, Mallavādin finds this doctrine congruent with the doctrine of Puruṣa. In this depiction, the Vijñānavāda position holds that there is distinction (*bheda*) in terms of space and time in, for instance, a pot having different colors or a pot in different modes of its existence, although ultimately all that exists is only *vijñāna*.[39] This position is said to be parallel to the doctrine of *puruṣa*.[40] One comment upon this position is that if difference is maintained in form, taste, and so forth, they cannot be identical with *vijñāna*, and if they are not identical to *vijñāna,* difference

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[35] DNC, 186: 2.

[36] DNC, 186: 18.

[37] DNC, 187: 3–5.

[38] DNC, 187: 5–6.

[39] DNC, 188: 7.

[40] . . . *tathāsmadupavarṇanavad evābhihitaṃ bhavati* | DNC, 189: 1.

cannot be maintained, and this will not confirm the existence of *vijñāna* only.[41] The Puruṣavāda argument against the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyavāda*) is generic: establishment of emptiness depends upon the means of cognition, and the very act of confirmation or negation is not possible without consciousness. Mallavādin cites a passage from the *Puruṣasūkta* (DNC 189: 4–5), 'puruṣa is all that is here,' as a conclusion of this doctrine.

There is also a problem in this doctrine regarding liberation. Since a single entity cannot be both an instrumental and material cause, how can the self emanate and absorb itself, and how can it undergo bondage and liberation? A finger, for instance, cannot touch itself, nor does a sword cut itself. The response the Puruṣavādins provide, as has been presented by Mallavādin, is that difference in causation is established through the difference in powers.[42] Mallavādin cites an example of a spider weaving a net or silkworm producing silk emanating from its very own body.[43] Mallavādin also cites an Upaniṣadic passage in this context that explains the manifestation of the world as the sparks coming off of a firebrand.[44] Mallavādin cites another Upaniṣadic passage (*Īśa.* 5) to confirm that the *ātman* is both changing and changeless.

This monistic worldview expands its scope by including what Mallavādin identifies as the doctrine of *Niyati*. For instance:

> *yathā loka ity ekatva eva parvatādyākārāvagraho yathā jñānam ekatve 'py anekabodhyākāraṃ bhavati anyathā jñānātmalābhābhāvāt tathā niyamātma-katvāt sā vrīhir ity akasmin vastuny ekā anekā cāṅkurādi bhavati |*   DNC, 197:2-4.

> Just as the cognition of aspects such as [this is] mountain [is possible] in a single entity [otherwise known as] the world or just as consciousness is singular but manifests in distinctive forms of consciousness, or otherwise [even a mode of consciousness] would not count for an instance of consciousness. Since [consciousness] has the character of being conditioned as such, [the conditioning factor] is one in a single entity such as rice, and is manifold in the [entities] such as sprouts.

The Doctrine of *Puruṣa* in Light of Early Advaita

Two Buddhist sources, the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (VTV) chapter of the *Madhya-makahṛdaya* (MH) of Bhavya (500–570 CE), and the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) of Śāntarakṣita (725–785 CE) criticize the Upaniṣadic philosophy that is identical to the *Puruṣa* doctrine under consideration. We will briefly address the pertinent issues

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[41] *rūpādiparasparaviviktatve tu tadvijñānānvayābhāvād rūparasādibhedaparikalpanābhāvas tadaṃśa-kalpanābhāvo nirupākhyatvakalpanābhāva iti vijñānamātratā na bhavati | Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC, 189: 8–10.

[42] *śaktibhedāt kārakabhedopapatteḥ | Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC, 190: 27.

[43] DNC, 191: 1.

[44] *Muṇḍaka* 2.1.1s.

found in Bhavya's presentation in order to contextualize the monistic philosophy identified by Mallavādin as the doctrine of Puruṣa.[45]

VTV uses the terms *puruṣa*, *ātman*, and *īśvara* as synonymous, and whenever causation of the world is discussed, this is assigned to the self, using one of these terms.[46] The world, in this depiction, is an extension of the *puruṣa*, similar to the net a spider spins out of its body (VTV 5). There is a minor shift in terminology, as VTV prefers the term *ātman*.[47] Bhavya identifies this as the doctrine of a single self (*ekātmavāda* VTV 44) and there is no categorical difference with the Puruṣavāda under consideration. Congruent with Mallavādin's depiction, Bhavya also presents the self as 'devoid of form' (*arūpin* VTV 53). Both Bhavya and Mallavādin are silent about the role of *avidyā* in describing causality.[48] There are also minor differences. Instead of the term Puruṣavāda, Bhavya identifies this philosophy as Vedāntavāda. The discussion with regard to multiple selves at the empirical level found in VTV 10–13 is absent in DNC. Absent from DNC, the Vedāntavāda criticized by Bhavya focuses on seeing the self (*paśyan* VTV 2, 3; *paśyataḥ* VTV 8; *taddṛṣṭau* VTV 22), and the practitioner is identified as a *yogin* (VTV 15). Bhavya finds it problematic to identify the self as substance (*dravya*) (VTV 59-60), a concept found primarily in the Vaiśeṣika system. Some of the key arguments regarding the singularity of the self—that pain and pleasure felt by one should be felt by another, and the system of bondage and liberation is not tenable—are missing in DNC, although they are found in VTV 62-64. The terminology such as *aja* and *ajāti* found in MH parallels the language of Gauḍapāda (Nakamura 1983, pp. 200–201), whereas this is absent from the discussion on the doctrine of *puruṣa* found in DNC.

Several aspects of the *puruṣa* doctrine found in *Puruṣaparīkṣā* of Śāntarakṣita align with the doctrine of *puruṣa* discussed in DNC. When explaining the role of *puruṣa*, Śāntarakṣita uses the same example of a spider and its web. *Puruṣa*, in this depiction, is endowed with the powers of creation (Nakamura 1983, p. 233). Kamalaśīla identifies the followers of this Vedic doctrine as '*puruṣavādin*' (Nakamura 1983, p. 239). The terminology used to describe causation is '*pariṇāma*,' and even when the term *pratibhāsa* is applied, no distinction is made between *pariṇāma* and *pratibhāsa*, which is not the case with the scholastic Advaita of Śaṅkara.[49] One significant difference, however, is that Śāntarakṣita treats the doctrine of *puruṣa* and that accepted by the followers of the *Upaniṣads* as two separate doctrines. He addresses these two concepts in two different sections, examining the doctrine of *puruṣa* in section six and treating the doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* in the seventh section of his *Tattvasaṅgraha*. Some of the key arguments found in the doctrine of Puruṣa as presented by Mallavādin are absent in

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[45] While I have utilized both Nakamura (1983, pp. 182–220) and Qvarnström (1989) in this discussion, the citations follow Qvarnström (1989), if not mentioned otherwise.

[46] VTV 3, 5, 19, 38–39, 61.

[47] VTV 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 24–27, 30, 39–41, 44, 49–54, 56, 59–63, 69, 71, 72, 81, 89, 95, 98, 100.

[48] See Nakamura (1983, p. 211).

[49] For instance: *pradhānapariṇāmena samaṃ ca brahmadarśanam* | *Tattvasaṅgraha*, *Śabdabrahma-parīkṣā*, verse 152ab.

Śāntarakṣita's description. For instance, the latter does not assign the concept to the doctrine that the world is the sleeping state of consciousness, or that there actually is no difference between the world and consciousness, or that consciousness is considered as the cause of the world due only to its possible agency, or also that the self is endowed with four states with internal variations in three states.

Before entering into the next section on comparative textual analysis, I would like to summarize the salient features of the monistic philosophy found in DNC and the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* commentary thereon. The most important aspects to be highlighted in this depiction are the relationship between cause and effect and the relationship between parts and the whole. Along these lines, DNC argues that, following the doctrine of Puruṣa, diversity is supposed in a single entity similar to different parts assumed in a single pot, such as the neck or the front part or so on (DNC 173: 1). Accordingly, diversity is imposed in a single entity similar to the colors of a chameleon and the chameleon itself (*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* in DNC 173: 13–14). Noteworthy here is that the change of colors of a chameleon is not erroneously perceived like the bundle of hair or two moons due to defect in the sight. Rather than explaining diversity in terms of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the properties, DNC presents diversity as a transformation of a singular entity, similar to the milk turning into yoghurt or sugarcane juice turning into sugar (DNC, 175: 4). In contrast with an erroneous projection of properties, the concept of transformation of the primal essence into manifold entities is explained in DNC in terms of the base elements assuming the forms of atoms and becoming the earth etc. (DNC, 176: 3–4). The question of what constitutes something as one entity and not the other arises with the text depicting an entity that is at the same time rice and also the earth (DNC, 181: 4). The very earth, water, etc. transform into rice (DNC, 185: 3–4). This position brings to crisis the concept of subjectivity, as the text also argues that the aspects of one person, such as when he moves his limbs, do not constitute difference in the person (*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi* in DNC, 184: 18–20). The *Puruṣavāda,* as presented by Mallavādin and elaborated by Siṃhasūri in his commentary, dismantles the binary of mind and matter in the starkest terms. Following this depiction, consciousness itself becomes materialized and this process is comparable to a subject shifting from the waking state of consciousness to the state of deep sleep (DNC, 185: 1–2). Creation and diversity in this paradigm are similar to that of threads assembling into a piece of cloth (DNC, 185: 4). One further example in the commentary depicts the relationship between matter and mind as similar to that of being drunk or one swinging in a cradle with one's own effort (*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC 186: 17–18). There is no change in essence but only in the form and what we call creation, or a manifestation of new entity, accordingly, is similar to the clay turning into pot, a piece of pot, dust, and atoms (DNC 187: 1–2). What this leads us to, following the commentary, is that the relation of consciousness and matter is similar to that of chicken and egg (*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC 187: 15–16). Mallavādin exploits the example from the *Muṇḍaka* (I.1.7) in explaining this relationship when he presents that the manifestation of a singular entity is comparable to a spider spreading its net or a silkworm spinning silk (DNC, 191: 1). Again, along the lines of Muṇḍaka (II.1.1), Mallavādin explains the manifestation of plurality in the doctrine of Puruṣa as similar to the sparks coming out of a firebrand

(DNC 191: 1–2). In this depiction, what constitutes creation is just a change in names for the same essence, just as the same earth is called by different names such as mountain, etc., the same consciousness becomes manifold (DNC 197: 2–3). This ultimately leads to the position that the properties that are manifest in the effect are inherent in the cause. The commentary explains this with the example that the shape of a tree and its leaves etc. or the colors of flowers and fruits etc., or tastes such as bitter or sour or sweet are as they are supposed to be, determined in the seed (*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, DNC 201: 9–13).

These are just a few of the examples found in DNC and *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* commentary to describe the relationship of cause and effect in the paradigm of Puruṣavāda. All these confirm a monistic worldview, maintaining identity between cause and effect, attributing diversity to the inherent tendencies of the basic element, attributed as the cause.

Puruṣavāda of the DNC in Light of the Vākyapadīya Vṛtti

We can glean from the above discussion that, although there are some differences in the doctrine of *puruṣa* as presented by Mallavādin, Bhavya, and Śāntarakṣita, this can be identified as Vedic monism or proto-Advaita which predates the scholastic Advaita of Śaṅkara. Variations might have come through different sources that they used, or the particular points that they summarized. Since diverse sources present monistic thought, and since all are lacking some key aspects of Śaṅkara's Advaita, we can conclude that this reading of Vedic philosophy prevailed in the early days of classical Advaita. Unfortunately, none of the commentators assign this philosophy to a particular thinker. With regard to the concepts of Brahman as the supreme self (*paramātman*) and its identification with *vijñāna*, it appears that the doctrine of *puruṣa* most closely aligns with the philosophy of Bhartṛprapañca. This philosopher who predates Śaṅkara also appears to hold that both the non-differentiated aspect of Brahman and plurality do not pose any contradiction in Brahman, and both aspects are absolutely real.[50] However, the similarities found in the extant fragmentary literature are not sufficient to identify this monistic doctrine with a single philosopher.

At this juncture, I would like to introduce a text, the Vṛtti commentary upon the *Vākyapadīya* (VPvṛ). The *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari is a text on the philosophy of language, and the first section, the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, provides a metaphysical foundation of linguistic monism. This, however, is not a text on the doctrine of Puruṣa. When we compare some passages found in DNC that present the doctrine of Puruṣa, they are very close to the VPvṛ, leaving one speculating that either Mallavādin is relying on VPvṛ when synthesizing the doctrine of Puruṣa, or that both texts closely represent the same source when presenting their positions.[51] Textual comparison shows that DNC is familiar with VPvṛ itself, and the similarity in passages could not be a mere coincidence due to the reliance on the same source.

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[50] See Nakamura (2004, pp. 136–137).

[51] Regarding the authorship of the *Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti*, see Houben (1999, pp. 167–197).

Mallavādin cites four verses at the end of the discussion on various forms of absolutism and these verses are also cited in VPvṛ.[52] That Diṅnāga, Kamalaśīla, and Utpala also cite these verses confirms their popularity. Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha (10–11th century) cites these verses and attributes them to Bhartṛhari.[53] The VPvṛ was known to Kashmiri philosophers such as Abhinavagupta as having been authored by Bhartṛhari.[54] Pind, based on these and other citations, argues that the VPvṛ is of the authorship of Bhartṛhari himself.[55] I am inclined to argue that Mallavādin borrowed verses from the VPvṛ rather than from their original source. Mallavādin sometimes blends the text VPvṛ with the citations found there. For instance, his citation from *Īśa* 5 duplicates that found in VPvṛ, and is presented with only a slight modification of the passage found in VPvṛ.[56]

The language Mallavādin uses in describing the limitlessness of being (*bhāva*) is almost identical:

> VPvṛ: *na cāsyordhvam adhas tiryag vā mūrtaparivartapratyaṅgānām kvacid avacchedo 'bhyupagamyate* | VPvṛ verse 1. Biardeau 1964, 24: 11-13.

> DNC: na cāsyordhvādhastiryagdikṣu mūrtivivarttapratyaṅgānām ekatvābhimatabheda-vat kvacid avacchedo vidyate | DNC, 239:1-2.[57]

The first sentence of the VPvṛ synthesizes the concept of Brahman as the word principle (*śabda-tattva*), propounding that although Brahman is free from distinctions and is beyond all conceptualization, it attains manifoldness through its own powers. Mallavādin's presentation of the doctrine of *Puruṣa* parallels this, explaining that the subtle elements such as form, taste, and smell attain the gross forms such as earth, water, and so forth, in the same way as the supreme cause, the self, attains the conditions of form and so forth. The similar phrase in these citations, *mūrtatvaprakramān paramāṇūn adhyāsya* in DNC (176.4) and *mūrtivibhāgabhāvanā* in VPvṛ (Biardeau 1964, p. 24.7), describe the same unfolding of forms. The self in Mallavādin's depiction is 'not having its essence differentiated' (*apravibhakta-svatattva*) that resonates of the word principle described in VPvṛ in the same passage as 'free from distinctions' (*apravibhāga*). Both use the same phrase, 'free from distinctions while attaining distinctions' (*vibhaktāvibhakta*) to describe the absolute, whether it is understood in terms of either word or *puruṣa*.[58] Even the terminology in these presentations appears comparable, as the supreme reality is 'apravibhāga' for the author of the VPvṛ whereas it is 'nirvibhāga' for Mallavādin.

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[52] *yathā viśuddham ākāśam. . . meghasaṃplavān* ‖ Cited in DNC, 241: 4–11. These are from the verses found cited in VPvṛ. See Biardeau (1964, 26: 19–28: 2). The order of the verses is changed in Mallavādin's citation. For discussion on these verses, see Unebe (2000).

[53] *tathā cāha tatra bhavān bhartṛhariḥ.* Commentary on *Mṛgendratantra*, p. 65.

[54] *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, II: 38. This is identified in Iyer (1992, p. 22).

[55] Pind (2003, pp. 257–270).

[56] Compare: . . . *vṛttam avṛtañ ca bahudhānakaṃ cetanācetanādiprabhedarūpam* | *anvāha ca — tadejati.* . . DNC 192–2; and . . . *vivṛttāvivṛttam bahudhānakaṃ caitanyam ityāhuḥ* | *tadejati.* . . VPvṛ on verse 8. See Biardeau (1964, 38: 20–21).

[57] Jambūvijaya was first to identify the passage of DNC in VPvṛ in his footnote 3, DNC, p. 239.

[58] VPvṛ. See Biardeau (1964, p. 24: 10), DNC, 177.

The focus on the oneness of consciousness (*caitanya*) in DNC parallels the oneness of Brahman as the word principle discussed in VPvṛ.[59]

Although using different terminology, both DNC and VPvṛ present that consciousness, singular in its nature, attains the forms of the objects of cognition:

VPvṛ: *na hi jñeyagato vṛkṣādyākārāvagraho jñānasyaikatvena viruddhyate |*
in VP, verse 2. Biardeau 1964, 28: 18-19.

DNC: *jñānam ekatve 'py anekabodhyākāraṃ bhavati |*   DNC 197:2-3.

Mallavādin stresses in various contexts that the concept of the singularity of consciousness, identified with the term *jñāna*, is not challenged even when found in different cognitive forms. Mallavādin declares that consciousness is singular even when found in various states such as waking and dreaming. He also identifies that consciousness remains unchanged in its essential nature even when found in erroneous cognition, non-cognition, and so forth. Arguably, these concepts are found in seminal form in the text, VPvṛ. The following passages can be compared to demonstrate that this concept of the singularity of awareness (*jñāna*) is similar to both texts under consideration:

eko 'yam śaktibhedena bhāvātmā pravibhajyate |
buddhivṛttyanukāreṇa bahudhā jñānavādibhiḥ ||

A passage cited in VPvṛ, verse 26.
DNC: . . . *arthasya ca tathātathātattvāj jñānam eva hy arthaḥ |* DNC, 183:2-3.

On the basis of the difference in the meaning of *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* in classical Indian philosophy, one can argue that the philosophical framework of Bhartṛhari and the *puruṣa* doctrine presented by Mallavādin are different. This argument, however, is inconclusive, as Bhartṛhari appears to have made no distinction between the terminology of *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*, and has used these terms interchangeably.[60] The presentation of the *pariṇāma* of one entity into many found in these two texts is comparable:

VPvṛ: . . . *sarvaprabodharūpaḥ sarvaprabhedarūpaś caikasya citikriyātattvasyāyaṃ pariṇāma. . .*

in VP, verse 128. Biardeau 1964, 162: 20-21
DNC: . . . *yo 'sau puruṣas tad eva tat, tenātmatvena pariṇamitatvāt |*

DNC, 185:3.
The example of *pariṇāma* given in DNC in this sequence is that of earth, water, etc. transforming into rice.[61] This example is also found in VPvṛ, with the additional

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[59] Compare: . . . *rūpādipravibhaktam apravikhaktasvatattvam* DNC, 177: 1–2 with *vibhaktāvibhaktasyaikasya brahmaṇaḥ. . .* VPvṛ. See Biardeau (1964, p. 24: 10).

[60] This issue has been discussed in Iyer (1992, pp. 129–134l). Bhartṛhari most likely did not make a distinction between the terms *vivarta* and *pariṇāma*. For example, the first verse in VP utilizes the term *vi*+*vṛt*, in order to describe the process of the singular word principle to be manifold whereas he utilizes the term *pariṇāma* in verse 120. For discussion on *vivarta*, see Hacker (1953) and Houben (1995, pp. 301–310). For the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, see also Nakamura (2004, pp. 393–668).

[61] DNC, 185: 3–186: 1.

example of the earth transforming into a tree.[62] These are distinctively different from the traditional examples of transformation such as gold constituting various forms of jewelry, clay in the form of pots, or thread in the form of cloth. The example of earth transforming to rice and plants is indeed unique to these two texts. The key issue here is that of consciousness transforming into matter, and the early examples of gold or clay do not explain this concept. On the other hand, in the example of earth and plant, there is a visible transformation of matter to a living form. The main objection to this position concerns the origin of the elements that bind the self, such as passion or delusion. Both these texts cite the position that the self itself is free from the defiling factors such as passion.[63]

Bhartṛhari is generally credited for the application of the term *vivarta* to describe the process through which the singular entity—be it of the character of speech or of pure consciousness—attains plurality. In describing Puruṣa monism, Mallavādin uses *viparivarta* (DNC 187: 2), a term that can be read both along the lines of *vivarta* or *parivarta = pariṇāma.* Congruent with the above description of causation, the notion of difference in the sense of cause and effect while having no substantial difference, can be the interpretation of *vivarta.*

Even based on select examples addressed above, one can argue that Mallavādin's exegetical methods are deeply grounded on linguistic analysis, in particular, etymological interpretation. He explicitly identifies that distinction exists only in the naming, whether it is linguistic monism or the monism of consciousness or that of metaphysical time. It makes sense to argue therefore that Mallavādin relies on Bhartṛhari's linguistic philosophy and expands upon the same texts also to address Puruṣa monism. This fact also supports the argument made by Pind that, due to the closeness of the time frame of Mallavādin and Bhartṛhari, the text VPvṛ may have been of the authorship of Bhartṛhari himself. Whether or not one accepts this conclusion regarding authorship, as far as reading the doctrine of Puruṣa goes, it could very well be true. It is reasonable that the VPvṛ relies on a philosophical text, or perhaps even Bhartṛhari himself is relying on some metaphysical texts for advancing linguistic monism. We cannot decisively prove who the author of such a text could have been, or what was the extent of the philosophy established there.

It is reasonable, however, to argue that Mallavādin had other sources in addition to VPvṛ when synthesizing the doctrine of *puruṣa*. The first supporting argument is that Mallavādin identifies the doctrine under consideration as Puruṣavāda, whereas there is no citation in VPvṛ that identifies the concept by this name. More importantly, several components of the doctrine of Puruṣa addressed in DNC are absent in VPvṛ. For instance, the concept of the states (*avasthā*) of *puruṣa* with three states having internal variations, is not found in VPvṛ. The application of the term *puruṣa* in DNC is in a cosmic and metaphysical sense and is used in the singular, whereas this term as applied in VPvṛ is in the sense of a linguistic person.

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[62] VPvṛ in verse 128. See Biardeau (1964, 164: 2–7).

[63] Compare:

 VPvṛ: *sarvo hi vikāra ātmamātreti keṣāñcid darśanam* | in the verse 128. See Biardeau (1964, 162: 17).
 DNC: *caitanyād ātmā pṛthivyādisuṣuptāvasthāyā viparyayeṇa vṛtto rāgādyupayukta upayogasvātantryeṇa baddhvātmanātmānam asvatantrīkaroti* | DNC, 186: 2–3.

While there is no textual citation to confirm that Mallavādin was aware of the *Brahmasūtra*, various concepts found in the *puruṣa* section of DNC are comparatively closer to this text than to the subsequent commentarial traditions. There are instances where the highest principle is identified in BS as *ātman* (BS 1.1.6; 2.3.15). BS is consistent in the position that Brahman itself is the cause of the world.[64] Creation, following BS, is carried out by the absolute with Brahman's powers, since it is considered to be omnipotent (*sarvaśakti*) (BS 2.1.30). This causation of the world from Brahman appears closer to the concept subsequently identified as *pariṇāma*, or the transformation of one entity to another (BS 1.4.26). This fact leads to the affirmation that there is an actual existence of an effect in the cause (*satkārya*) (BS 2.1.7). BS is explicit in identifying cause and effect, utilizing the term 'not other' (*ananya*) (BS 2.1.14). In agreement with Mallavādin's presentation that conceptual distinctions are made due to linguistic constructions, with the same substance found in different shapes identified with different names, BS confirms that any distinction is due to 'comprehension by word' (*vācārambhaṇa*) (BS 2.1.14).

These similarities, however, are not sufficient to identify the doctrine of *puruṣa* found in DNC with the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa found in BS, because other prominent elements found in these two presentations are not identical. First of all, contrary to Mallavādin's identification of the doctrine as Puruṣavāda, BS does not mention *puruṣa*.[65] Furthermore, the description of causation found in the *puruṣa* section of DNC is closer to the Sāṅkhya notion of causality, with *tanmātrās* mediating the manifestation of gross elements. While addressing the emergence of sky and so forth from consciousness, BS does not discuss the subtle elements identified as *tanmātrās* (BS 2.3.1–12). There is no reference to something that mediates the supreme Brahman and the world, such as Īśvara, in the depiction of the doctrine of *puruṣa* found in DNC, and the application of the term *parameśvara* is used to identify the very *puruṣa*. The concept of a governing principle (*antaryāmin*) can be found in BS 1.2.18. The *puruṣa* addressed in DNC is identified with consciousness that is addressed with various synonymous terms. The Brahman in BS, while identified as consciousness (BS1.1.5; 1.1.9; 1.1.10; 3.2.16), is also identified as 'being' (*sat*) (BS 2.3.9), and 'bliss' (*ānanda*) (BS 3.2.11, 13),[66] while these additional aspects are not mentioned in the depiction of *puruṣa* in DNC.

The quest for the source of the philosophy criticized by Mallavādin leads again to the VPvṛ. While commenting upon VP 1.120 [128], VPvṛ presents some philosophical positions that are mostly lacking in the subsequent scholastic development of Advaita:

> *sarvo hi vikāra ātmamātreti keṣāñcid darśanam | sa tu pratipuruṣam antaḥ sanniviṣṭo bāhya iva pratyavabhāsate | rūḍhatvāc ca vyavahāramātram idam antar bahir iti | na hy etad ekatve 'mūrtattve vā saṃbhavati | apareṣāṃ sarvaprabodharūpaḥ sarvaprabhedarūpaś caikasya citikriyātattvasyāyaṃ pariṇāma ityādi svamātrāvādināṃ darśanam | caitanyaṃ bhūtayonis*

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[64] For discussion on the philosophy of BS, see Nakamura (1983, pp. 469–532).

[65] Nakamura has identified this disparity between the philosophy of BS and the comments of absolutism found in Buddhist and Jain sources as the doctrine of Puruṣa. See, Nakamura (1983, p. 491).

[66] For discussion, see Nakamura (1983, pp. 484–486).

> *tilakṣodarasavat pravibhajyata ity eke | anye tv āhuḥ | tad yathā mahato 'gner*
> *visphuliṅgāḥ sūkṣmād vāyor abhraghanāś candrakāntād vibhāginyas toy-*
> *adhārāḥ pṛtivyā vā sālādayo nyagrodhadhānādibhyo vā sāvarohaprasavā*
> *nyagrodhā ity evamādi paramātrāvādināṃ darśanam | svaparamātrāvādināṃ*
> *darśanaṃ vidyābhāṣyebhyaḥ pratipattavyam |*

Some have the view that all the transformation is the 'part' (*mātrā*) of the self. The self {*sa*} appears as if external, while being situated within each person. Also because it is conventional, this [division of] inner and external [self] is merely a usage. This [convention] is not possible if there is [just] one or [if it is] formless. According to the others who follow the view of *svamātrā*, this [world] is the transformation of the single essence of the nature of the act of awareness that is of the form of all cognitions and of the form of all differences. Some say that consciousness is the origin of all entities (*bhūta*) that become distinguished like [the difference between] the oil and pulp of sesame. Others say: just as are the sparks from a big fire, thick cloud from the invisible air, the distinguishing streams of water from the 'moon-light-gems' (*candrakānta*), [trees] such as *sāla* from earth, [or] fig tree with roots from the seeds of fig, so also [is creation]; this is the view of those adopting the view of *paramātrā*. The view of those following *svamātrā* and *paramātrā* should be understood from the *Vidyābhāṣya*.

This description comes very close to the one given in Mallavādin's discussion on *puruṣa*. This citation suffices to argue that the seminal form of the concepts of non-dualism, dualism, and the concept of identity-in-difference were known to the author of VPvṛ. Also significant is the view of those adopting *paramātrā* that plants are the transformation of earth etc. This is the concept shared by those adopting the doctrine of *puruṣa* following the depiction given by Mallavādin. It is possible that the term *Vidyābhāṣya* in the above citation referred to some text now lost.[67] If this thesis is true, this could very well be one of the primary texts for the doctrine of Puruṣa.

Conclusion

This discussion brings to light the doctrine of *puruṣa* synthesized by Mallavādin that depicts one of the earliest strands of monistic thought emerging from the Upaniṣadic tradition. As discussed in this essay, this model of Advaita differs from the mainstream philosophy established by Śaṅkara. The identification of this doctrine as Puruṣavāda by Mallavādin and as Advaitavāda by the commentator Siṃhasūri also indicates a shift in naming this doctrine within that timeframe. From its earliest fragmentary sources to the texts of Mallavādin and Samantabhadra, this doctrine has been criticized by its opponents, suggesting its very popularity. Based on parallel citations and discussion of similar thought that can be found in VPvṛ, it is also

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[67] This possibility has been raised by Biardeau (1964).

reasonable to argue that this doctrine provides a framework for other philosophical works, such as that of Bhartṛhari in classical times.

The doctrine of *puruṣa* addressed by Mallavādin presents the world comprised of insentient matter as just another condition of consciousness itself. In this monistic worldview, there is no radical distinction between consciousness and matter. This position, however, does not arise from negation of the material world but rather through confirming the phenomenal as one of the conditions of consciousness of the singular nature. This model of Advaita tallies with the studies of Walter Slaje, who, in his lengthy analysis of the example of water and salt found in the Upaniṣads, comes to the conclusion that:

> Salt was conceived as being indeed *substantially the same as water,* albeit in a particular *crystallized state of water,* similar to, e.g., ice or hailstones as frozen states of water. Therefore, a mere *change of states* ('manifestation') of *one and the same identical substrate* is alluded to: given particular preconditions such as the influence of heat, the original liquid manifestation of water changes into crystalline form, i.e., takes the shape of salt. . . If the original 'substrate' thus remains an unchanging one, the primordial 'substance' *ātman* must be seen as a material, self-transforming cause (*upādānanimitta-kāraṇa*) in the emanation process of the world. Taking the particular terminology (*mahadbhūta, bhūta* [pl.]) in use there also into appropriate consideration, a strand of thought may reveal itself from which—in a process of bifurcation—the monism (*pariṇāma/ bhedābheda*) of the *Brahmasūtra* as well as the dualism of the Sāṅkhya system may each have originally developed.[68]

Congruent to the philosophy presented by Mallavādin that in many respects resembles the one presented by Bhavya and Śāntarakṣita, Slaje concludes his analysis of the Upaniṣadic passage by saying that "Through additional sequences the elemental entities (*bhūtas*), being themselves direct transformational products of the Principal Entity, would—in their bodily combination as an individual— eventually transform into—or 'produce'—consciousness."[69] This concurs with the analysis of the elemental entities identified as *bhūta.* Arguably, this model of Advaita was transformed with the philosophy of Gauḍapāda with his focus on *māyā* for describing plurality and the cause-and-effect relation, and Śaṅkara with his focus on terminology of *māyā* while also incorporating *avidyā* to describe the same process. Change, process, manifold manifestation, in the paradigm of Puruṣa, are intrinsic to the absolute entity. On the other hand, Śaṅkara maintains that it is due to illusion or due to ignorance that the changeless Brahman appears as if changing. While both models confirm absolute monism, their approaches to the commonsense world differ significantly.

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[68] Walter Slaje (2001, pp. 25–57). Citations in the text from page 42, lines 31–38.

[69] See Slaje (2002, 206: 35–38).

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