THEATRICS OF EMOTION: SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-CULTIVATION IN ABHINAVAGUPTA’S AESTHETICS

Sthaneswar Timalsina
Department of Religious Studies, San Diego State University
timalsin@mail.sdsu.edu

Neither are there chariots, nor horses or the paths. Hence, [the self] creates the chariots, horses, and the paths.
Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.10

Theater

Like the reality created in a dream, the Upaniṣadic passage describes a self that constitutes reality as it pleases and, eventually, entraps itself within its creation. What we call reality is too small a playground. We soar high in the skies of our imagination and dreams, and we reshape the intersubjective on the ground of the subjective. To exist, in this light, is tantamount to believing who I am not and what it is not. In this game of self-deception, fantasy becomes phenomenologically real, and the projected self overpowers its creator. Hence, the subject sacrifices its creative freedom, enters his dream, and becomes the dream subject. There is no intentionality left; the subject is not deceiving any more but is deceived. At least so it seems if we read one stream of classical Indian philosophy. The paradox of self-deception is well addressed in classical Indian writing, and a common escape from the paradox is to assume two-tiered subjectivity: one being the witnessing self and the other the self-deceiving and self-deceived subject. As Mele (1987, 2001) points out, how can one deceive oneself without rendering one’s intentions ineffective? In this essay, I am exploring some arguments on self-deception and self-cultivation in Abhinava’s philosophy of theatrics. In so doing, I will attempt to bridge the philosophical traditions of India and the West. I am focusing on the philosophy of theatrics in addressing the issue of self-deception and self-cultivation because performance art requires at least a two-tiered breach of subjectivity and intersubjective introspection between the audience and the performer and the performer and the character that he is playing.

The issue of self-deception is thus central to the classical exegetes in describing this process. A common question is, during role-playing, to what extent are the actors aware of their own personality and how much are they merged with the character? Even when the actors are conscious of their distinctness from the character, they still undergo similar emotions and display similar psycho-physiological states. The question remains, to what extent is this auto-suggestion applicable to performance art? Is this self-deception even applicable to the audience as it experiences the surge of aesthetic bliss? Are the emotions of the audience and the actors the same as those of...
the characters? Or, to what extent are the emotions intersubjectively linked? In theatrics, viewers relate their experience to that of the protagonist: they are sad when the hero is sad, and when the hero is outraged so are they. But the question still remains, are the viewers relieved of emotions and thereby enlightened, or more confused and self-deceived? The emotions expressed by the viewers in watching a drama mirror those expressed when witnessing the real events. The real theatrics is outside the theater where the viewers compare theatrical emotions to everyday experiences. The distance between performance and reality is blurred in these experiences. These instances call into question the assertion that self-deception is logically impossible (see, e.g., Paluch 1967, Haight 1980).

From classical India, Lollaṭa (ninth century) maintained that theatrics is illusion. Real emotions, in his opinion, are manifest only in the characters, and the actors reproduce emotions by means of recollection. Both the audience and the performance artists are self-deceived to some degree, and what generates aesthetic pleasure is the very illusory nature of the reality that is depicted in a play. Lollaṭa’s analysis of rasa primarily rests on the performance artists, as he maintains that rasa experience comes into being (utpatti) in the performance artists. A similar position is maintained by Nāyaka, with a further discussion of the nature and substrate of illusion and a shift from the artists to the audience to locate the rapture of rasa. The key term for him is bhāvanā, which on the one hand describes the synthesis of different factors that constitute rasa and on the other stands for an active imagination that gives the sense of reality. Nāyaka’s approach is ‘intentionalist’ in the sense that the audience intends to self-deceive through an approach similar to that of ‘psychological partitioning’, as has been maintained by Rorty (1980), Pears (1984), or Davidson (1985). These positions specific to the hierarchy of subjects in terms of functional person and ‘witnessing consciousness’ (sākṣin) describe a structure particularly applicable in the philosophical paradigm of Śaṅkara. The self as a performer and the world as theatrics, in the aesthetic paradigm of Nāyaka and the philosophy of Śaṅkara, relate to their illusory nature.

Abhinava’s philosophy of theatrics develops against this backdrop. Rather than seeking the transcendental meaning of being-in-the-world, or finding the theatrics of life inherently a vanity fair or theater of the absurd, Abhinava exploits both the bliss and awareness of being as integral to role-playing. Accordingly, there is no misery intrinsic to the acting that portrays suffering, given that the subject is aware of role-playing. Now the core issue arises again as to how one can be self-deceived if one is aware of the mechanism and the process. Granted that acting as if in pain is not identical to being in pain, how can the subject be in pain if he is simply acting? Abhinava’s paradigm of jagadānanda or the state of integral bliss incorporates both corporeal and psychological states, and the spectator’s ability to relish, epitomized in theatrics, and it can be better described in terms of being in the world rather than separated from it. For Abhinava, neither watching a performance nor participating in role-playing demands self-deception. On the contrary, he argues for the presence of the transcendent gaze while being immersed in the play, whether as the audience or as an actor. In this paradigm, being in the world also implies having the ability to
relish the engagement of the senses. This integral state of rapture underlies the transcendence of self-consciousness while at the same time the self is engaged in the world, actively attending somatic processes and mental events. For Abhinava, relishing the rasa experience is an epiphany of wonder (camatkāra) that also applies to the bliss of being in the dynamic world (jagad) or living a good life. This foundational being that is equated with bliss is the awareness or meta-cognition of the blissful instances of somatic engagement, found by a yogin in all instances of cognition, and occasionally by a layperson when watching a drama.

For the philosophies of Nāyaka and Abhinava, the concept of ‘theater’ is crucial, as it is where roles are played and events are seen. Instead of ‘an enclosure for watching’ (preksāgrha), which is close to θετρον, with its link to θεωσα, meaning to see or to watch, the term more frequently occurring in Sanskrit is raṅgabhūmi, ‘the ground of engagement.’ Broadly, this is the ‘stage of colors’ and also a battlefield. Whether the phenomenal events are worth watching or engaging in makes a big philosophical difference. Does Kṛṣṇa engage in his roles as a charioteer, an ambassador, and a ascetic hermit, a warrior, a teacher, and an embodiment of time and death incarnate, or is he simply watching as the events unfold? Even in his own words, Kṛṣṇa says that “by presiding over my creative energy, I come into being by the powers of self-deception” (Śrīmadbhagavadgītā 4.6). The process of ‘becoming’ (saṃ + bhū), according to Śaṅkara, relates to ‘becoming as if embodied, and born with the inherent power of self-deception’.4 This makes self-deception not just a phenomenological problem but also a metaphysical one, and differing understandings rest in terminology itself, even in describing the theater. On the one hand we have both normal and pathological self-deception, where subjects intentionally delude themselves, while on the other we have a cognitive paradox, similar to the liar’s paradox, questioning whether a subject can experience himself as ‘self-deceiving’, and if he does, how can he not have the awareness of the real self and hence maybe is not deceived? Whether or not the self is capable of self-deception, a transcendental ground of consciousness is a logical consequence for the self to manifest and monitor the phenomenal self, where the role-playing self is more akin to the performance artist. It is in this latency that the dyadic relation of subject and object, or, in our own terms, an actor and its play, can come into being.

Performance and Self-deception

The issue of self-deception is too wide and most of the arguments are not relevant to this project. Philosophers East and West are equally eager to address, and apparently resolve, the paradox of self-deception. Just as in the Western literature—where one can trace the issue in the writings of Plato, Butler, Hegel, or Sartre, or in the psychoanalysis of Freud—in India the centrality of this issue can be seen, with the identification of one of the most fundamental categories in philosophy being avidyā. Not only is there communication between the artist and the audience in performance, there is also a great deal of self-deception. Before contextualizing Abhinava’s analysis of performance, I will borrow select arguments from contemporary analytical
discourse on self-deception.\textsuperscript{5} Since self-deception is tied to both epistemological and psychological issues, this conversation may lead to more disagreements than finding real agreements.

Central issues entangled with self-deception include the scope of intentionality, belief, and desire. Broadly, for the subject S to be self-deceived, S believes both that p and \textit{~}p. The arguments proposed to solve the paradox cannot ignore the fact of S having a belief and also the awareness of such a belief. The solutions given by the partial distinction or double agency of the subject also ignore the fact that if there are two separate agents, one deceiving and the other being deceived, these are not two logical agents; thus, the paradox itself is not addressed. Kent Bach’s analysis of self-deception in recent years exemplifies the centrality of desire in the process. His approach tries to explain why self-deception occurs, roughly analyzing the process as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item S believes that p,
  \item S desires that \textit{~}p, and due to this,
  \item S avoids the recurrent thought that p.\textsuperscript{6}
\end{itemize}

Accordingly, S can believe that p and at the same time think that \textit{~}p, broadly understanding beliefs as \textit{states} and thinking as an \textit{occurrence}.\textsuperscript{7}

Bach’s outline also points out that rationalization, evasion, and jamming are the prominent techniques for a subject to self-deceive. In other words, subjects wishfully rationalize what they think is not the case, they evade the recurrence of the thought p so that they can self-deceive about \textit{~}p, and they clutter their mind with supporting thoughts about \textit{~}p. Basically, they repress the fact of p in order to believe \textit{~}p. Abhinava’s own analysis of subjective transformation, which he addresses avoiding the terminology of self-deception in the cognitive sense, has some psychological nuances, and in this regard is comparable to Bach’s approach.

The issue of self-deception has been addressed in many ways. Some can flatly deny the phenomenon, pointing to the paradox ‘S believes that p and \textit{~}p’. One can adopt a Platonic, Freudian, or modified version of Davidson and divide the mind into distinct centers, with the subject split into two as deceiving and deceived. One can also compartmentalize one’s beliefs. Alternatively, one can avow, or convince oneself otherwise. Bach’s analysis can be compatible to this, and the role given to predisposition in this model makes it comparable with the Indian models. Finally, one can maintain the opposite of the first position (Bach’s) and only believe the deceived view.\textsuperscript{8}

Abhinava maintains that one cannot simulate psychological states such as grief or anger:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [Simulation] cannot correspond to mental states such as grief or anger. A performance artist does not simulate the grief of \textit{Rāma}, for there exists no grief there [in the mind of the actor]. On the contrary, if [the actor] experiences grief, it is not a simulation. There is nothing other [than grief itself] that is similar to grief.\textsuperscript{9}
\end{itemize}
By expanding this position, we can argue that one cannot simulate pain, as pain is a psychological state that as it occurs is transparent to the subject, and there exists no pain that is not cognized. The reflexivity of consciousness in Abhinava’s philosophy strengthens the argument that there is no unrecognized cognitive state. If applied to our discourse on self-deception, what this means is that if someone deceives oneself about being in pain, albeit not actually being in pain, there are only two possibilities: either he is a liar or he is in real pain. Abhinava, on the other hand, maintains that one can simulate the ‘consequent’ conditions (anubhāva) that involve somatic reflexes of being in specific psychological states. In other words, by seeing someone in tears, one can simulate tears, but cannot simulate pain and not be in real pain. This understanding of Abhinava contradicts the James-Lange (William James, Carl Lange) theory of emotions, and gives its phenomenological-cognitive account. On the other hand, some of the consequent conditions that Abhinava outlines are the psychological states, giving space for some emotions to be reproduced in the cocktail of emotions when the dominant emotion is something else.

Sādhārānikarana, or the emphatic universalization of emotions, is at the center of Abhinava’s aesthetics. He does use āveśa/samāveśa or similar terminology for describing transformed subjective states. It therefore becomes relevant how Abhinava maintains the psychological states that mirror another subject’s state, and who displays physical symptoms of grief or anger while not actually being in such states (at least not having those as the dominant emotions). Abhinava’s position becomes all the more crucial because even if the performance artists are simulating the characters they play, the audience has no reason to self-deceive, albeit the somatic responses are evidently there. In Abhinava’s metaphysics, the subject is eternally free and is described in terms of consciousness and bliss. In his monistic paradigm, this is the very self that assumes bondage and liberation. Now the question returns as to how Abhinava can justify that there is no self-deception if the fact is that bondage and liberation are mere fabrications of the self.

Splitting the personality into two, one deceiving and the other being deceived, may at first appear applicable, but the transcendent in the Pratyabhijñā paradigm is not a deceiver, and this self is not separate but only transcendent to the phenomenal self. Partial concealment of self-experience is another alternative, although this faces the same dilemma of the self being an entity that is a-temporal and non-spatial. Following the avowal view of self-deception (the view attributed to Robert Audi and Georges Rey), subjects are predisposed to affirm a proposition to oneself or others with sincerity. All these alternatives would be better placed with some or other forms of beliefs and predispositions.

Abhinava addresses this issue by adopting a reflexive or higher-order consciousness. The term he uses is anuvyavasāya, which simply means ‘after ascertainment’ or ‘after function.’ Rather than self-deception as the means of experiencing the other selves in performance, Abhinava’s philosophy of drama considers viewing or experiencing drama as a reflexive act of consciousness, and anuvyavasāya as a key term in this discourse. In the Nyāya school, which views consciousness as extrinsically manifest, a second-order cognition is maintained to monitor the first-order cognition,
and the term *anuvyavasāya* refers to the second order consciousness and is often translated as apperception. In Śaṅkara’s Advaita, there are two simultaneous acts of consciousness in which the first-order consciousness relates to the mind and the sensory faculties experiencing the objects while the second order, equated with the witness consciousness, monitors this engagement, and this higher-order consciousness is reflexive in nature since it does not require another consciousness for its confirmation. Following the school of Pratyabhijñā, consciousness is reflexive, but unlike the paradigm of Śaṅkara, cognitive modes or mental and sensory engagement retain some nuances of the pure consciousness, and in that sense are reflexive. His theory of *anuvyavasāya* needs to be read in this light, as what it implies is that reflexivity of consciousness incorporates embodiment, and somatic conditions or bodily gestures are not outside the domain of consciousness. Mindful embodied acts, integral to dramatic gestures, are involved within this reflexivity. On these grounds, Abhinava proclaims that the experience involved in performance art is *anuvyavasāya*, which can be understood as a ‘conscious bodily expression.’ Abhinava explains:

[The spectator,] immersed in the joy or grief erupted by viewing dramatic simulations such as gesticulation, [situates his heart] in the predisposition [that is] caused by the apprehension of Rāma et cetera as has been described [in a play] that [in turn is] caused by what has been suggested by the predisposition [corresponding to] the experience of the desired objects, such as a lascivious woman, music, or songs that cause the recurrence of the predisposition corresponding to the apprehension of objects such as Rāma or Rāvana. [This experience] is [1] devoid of the cognitive modes that can be identified in terms of correct knowledge, erroneous knowledge, doubt, or imagination, [2] is not circumscribed in any spatial or temporal modes, and [3] has emerged as a consequence of entering into another character by listening to the text.

Select concepts used here to describe the aesthetic transformation of heart are the immersion into specific psychological states, having conductive predispositions active and disruptive predispositions passive, and having a cognitive state that is distinct from the commonly identified cognitive states. The reflexive awareness that stands for the awareness of both psychological and somatic states, described in terms of *anuvyavasāya*, makes self-deception possible only in somatic states, since at the cognitive level consciousness is always reflexively given, and there is no such case that $Skp$ and $S-\overline{kp}$. This reflexivity is neither one of the commonly known cognitive modes nor any of the defective states of cognition, as Abhinava has outlined. This is not a second-order consciousness, as Naiyāyikas would have it, nor is it identical to the Pāṇaṇjalian application of the term to refer to the aspect of the mind that associates, integrates, differentiates, and assimilates pure sensations ($ālocana$) into percepts and concepts (Dasgupta 1924, p. 176). One needs to keep in mind, though, that not all theories of self-affirmation of consciousness are identical, and the case of *anuvyavasāya* as proposed by Abhinava, which incorporates physical reflexive states, is not compatible with various other schools that nonetheless accept reflexivity of consciousness.
Abhinava’s distinction between simulation and reflexive act helps situate the issue of self-deception in imitation. Plainly and simply, if the subject is somewhat deceived, or does not have an awareness of his role-playing, this is not performance art or theater. Abhinava’s project here is explicitly to define a phenomenological episode of dramatic experience wherein subjects not only experience the content but also become reflexively aware of what is phenomenologically given as an artistic corporeal expression. Abhinava therefore states:

During this [epiphany], since no experience in the form of having the external stimuli [such as that of the protagonist] is felt [by the artist], this simulation of speech [or mimetic representation] is a particular type of reflexive awareness (anuvyāvasāya) and is synonymous to performance art. One should not [confuse] it with [non-reflexive] simulation.15

Even with corporeal gestures, Abhinava maintains that only the gestures of a similar class can be performed, and an identical gesture cannot be copied. He proposes an impossible situation: how can you simulate being God, as it is not possible to mimic omniscience or omnipresence? Again, what lies behind this objection is to demonstrate that the subject S cannot have a psychological state that is a simulation of T and not an original psychological state of S. What transpires in performance art, then, is only S displaying the gestures that are generically similar to those of T. The underlying notion here is an action embedded within performance, rather than the copying of an action or simulation of the primary act.16

Just like cognitive states, somatic states are also reflexive. Abhinava, however, does not maintain that all physical states are similar to cognitive states and intrinsically reflexive. In his opinion, what defines performance art and dissociates it from mimicry is reflexivity.17 And this reflectivity is intermingled with the perceptual modes of listening to the music or viewing the gestures, and since this is essentially identical to the self mirroring its own orgasmic being, this higher-order consciousness is addressed as the ‘epiphany of wonder’ (camatkāra).18

Metaphors speak. When the phenomenal self is compared to a performance artist, it on the one hand stands by the premise of reflexivity, while on the other also maintains the originality of the acts, since, as has been stated, they are not just automatic reflexes but conscious acts. To be an actor in Lollāṭa’s or Nāyaka’s paradigm would mean the subject as illusion, but Abhinava’s paradigm frees the subject by bestowing autonomy. In his paradigm, the self ‘acts’ as if lost, or becomes someone else while not really losing sight of one’s true nature. For Abhinava, this concealment of the self occurs with assuming fourfold imitations.19 And this is possible only with the actor’s predispositions (saṃskāra), which are shaped by the narratives that weave the storyline.20

The passage is vague when Abhinava identifies performance with reflexive awareness. The following conversation, only a fragment of a broader conversation, gives a glimpse of what he means by the reflexivity of performance. Noteworthy in this passage is the distinction he makes between reflexive consciousness and the entity manifest in it, the latter being equated with performance:
Performance is an entity that manifests in reflexive consciousness as comprised of bliss and luminosity of the consciousness of the self, which is colored with distinctive mental states of the forms of pain or pleasure, and, for this reason, as variegated and alternatively experienced (pari + aya) as relishing, tasting, epiphany, savoring, enjoyment, and so on. This [reflexive consciousness] manifests when watching a performance played by a performer who is instrumental in communicating with the heart and effecting identity [between the hearts]. [This reflexive consciousness is caused] primarily by the predispositions that constitute subjects as empathic, and the instrumental predispositions that arise out of the commonsense [experiences] of the past such as perception or inference. [The performer in this process has] concealed the real nature of the self with an immersion into the assemblage of coloring [the essential nature of the self].

Noteworthy are the concepts of intersubjectivity and empathy. A dialogue between the spectator and the performer at the level of the heart is initiated in this performance, which breaches the boundary of hearts and allows multiple hearts to be one. This is where the other subjects relive the experience of one subject. While the instigators of such transformative experience are commonsense experiences, the result is unique, and all the terms used to describe it fail to exhaust the experience as such. The preceding statement explicitly details that psychological states are reflexively known when relishing aesthetic bliss, as there is not just one way of describing this epiphany, or even experiencing this rapture, and it is upon the subject’s predisposition, which entails their past commonsense experience, that the transformation of the heart occurs and subjects mingle in this empathic experience, which transcends phenomenal subjectivity. Moreover, although the predispositions arise from commonsense experience, aesthetic bliss is transcendental in the sense that it is known, and in this state the self is inversed, or reflexively manifesting itself.

As to the question of the phenomenality of dramatic construction, Abhinava proclaims that this is comprised only of cognition. In other words, performance is cognitively accessed and does not have any externality. What constitutes performance is its capacity to superimpose something that is not ontologically there. Its existence is simultaneous to it being experienced. In all accounts, the creator of these characters, the consciousness that gives performance art its phenomenality, is not the role that is played but rather the way it is felt, and if subjects fail to see something as performance, there is no performance. Not just for the artists but also for the audience, it is their reflexivity that allows them to maintain their distinctive roles. In situations when this reflexivity is breached and the spectators shift their identity, being as if possessed by the mental states of the characters, these subjects assume that the events they are watching are occurring in their real life. This, however, is not a topic for aesthetics but for pathology.

What makes performance art a performance is its reflexivity, or the acts being mindful. The agents are cognitively aware while performing something, knowing the sequence of gestures or tones. On this occasion, Abhinava’s phrase ‘awareness of [the mental state] that is soiled with concepts’ (rūṣitavikalpasaṃvedana) further confirms that the reflexive consciousness that he addresses does have the mental
event (vikalpa) as its object. His statement ‘this is known by its awareness itself’ (tadvedanavedya) confirms the same thesis that, unlike the apperception theory, where second-order consciousness grasps the first, this consciousness is intrinsically reflexive, and the reflexivity in performance is one’s own embodiment. What the artist reflexively knows are his own bodily or psychological states. The embodied nature of the reflexive state and mental events as intrinsic to being reflexive of them not only makes performance possible, it also provides a logical conclusion for Abhinava’s monistic philosophy to describe the phenomenal being.

The Autonomous Performer

The issue of moral responsibility is intertwined with free agency. Are the deceived subjects morally responsible for believing that p when the case is ¬p? This question becomes a bit more complicated when the deceiving and deceived subjects are identical. To make it even more complicated, if it is the transcendent self that is self-deceiving, and the phenomenal self deceived, should not the transcendent self bear moral responsibility? However, this will contradict the standard thesis that the transcendent self is eternally free and never defiled. If being in the world is equivalent to performance, as Abhinava posits, there is no real deception. Following the alternative disposition theory, even when subjects choose to be self-deceived, it is only that they believe that p and not think that p. In other words, a transcendent awareness is embedded with self-deception even when predisposition or its equivalent saṃskāra theory is applied.

In order to proclaim that aesthetic experience is not one of the consequent emotions/cognitions that follow some somatic or psychological reaction to stimuli, Abhinava negates all the possibilities:

[The cognition of the performers in theatrics] is not analogical, as [in the case of recognizing] a twin. It is not like being confused, like cognizing silver in the case of a shell that entails the memory of silver. Neither is this a superimposition, similar to the case of the ‘face is the moon’ [analogy], where veridicality is rejected and [what is cognized is] in the form of the superimposed (mithyā) cognition. Neither is this [metonymic] ascertainment [of certain properties] as in the case of ‘the person from Vāhika is [as dull as] an ox’. Neither is this metaphoric, as in the case of [cognizing] ‘the face is [similar to] the moon’. Neither is this a copy, as in the case of a painting or [copying] a book. Neither is this an imitation, like a playful exposition of a text between a teacher and a student. Neither is this an instantaneous construction, like a magical act. Neither is this like a magical hand-trick that skillfully simulates something. [The reason that the cognition in performance is not compatible with any of these is] because in all these alternatives, there is no relishing of rasa when the viewer is uncommonly disengaged.

Two crucial points are made in this conversation. The awareness that emerges when watching a performance is generated passively. This cognition, however, is not a form of erroneous cognition, or any other commonly known modes of simulation. While the list is long, the essence is that aesthetic relishing cannot be reduced to any
common cognitive mode. Since the various alternatives of erroneous modes and deception through magic tricks are explicitly outlined, the uncommon experience during the epiphany cannot be identical to self-deception either. The judgment of real or unreal for the events cognized is not applicable in this consciousness, and for this reason there cannot be a moral obligation for the viewers to act accordingly. In other words, a viewer is not morally responsible to stop the violence that occurs in a drama. Quite the contrary, Abhinava finds this experience morally uplifting, because it is in this aesthetic epiphany that the subject experiences his intrinsic nature and this experience empowers him, making him capable of moral decisions.

Recognition of the self is integral to the drama of self-deception. There is no self, in the phenomenal sense, without role-playing. Being and awareness, the essential characteristics of the absolute, do not retain subjectivity. Being qua awareness provides the foundation for the reality that is expressed in terms of speech and what is described by speech. Both language and the world are a mere simulation (anukāra) of this transcendent reality. Unlike the subjects in Baudrillard's paradigm, the agents of Abhinava retain their subjectivity, or, in other words, they have not lost their 'originality' even when being reproduced in a series of simulations. Rather than with the self-deceived selves in the above-described paradoxical situation, Abhinava aligns himself with the free agent playing his game with absolute awareness. It is where the concept of self-deception becomes theoretically problematic.

In contrast, the role Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka assigns for the self differs significantly, and the concept of self-deception is crucial to his phenomenology of theatrics:

The imitation of [characters such as] Rāma or Rāvana, which in essence is mere imagination and [thus] unreal, and for this reason has a characteristic of not being permanent, manifests as if real for some [indescribable] reason, although no cause [for its manifestation] exists. Performed by an artist who has not relinquished the basis of [his] personality [and for this reason is] comparable to the [transcendent] Brahman, [this artistic simulation] accommodates hundreds of thousands of imaginations in a single moment, and while being distinct from dream [or illusion] et cetera, [it] is the cause for a positive seizure of the heart. Despite [mimetic simulation] being unreal [tathā], it leads to [actualizing] the highest pursuit of humankind. Just like a drama, this world is a mere fabrication of non-substantial names and forms but nonetheless a means to achieve [liberation or] the highest pursuit of humankind.

The language above is explicit. Illusion and deception are central to this conversation. Nevertheless, Nāyaka argues that a drama is nonetheless a means for achieving the highest pursuit of humankind, that is, liberation. Whether or not dramatic experience is real, both Abhinava and Nāyaka thus maintain that the aesthetic experience in the course of watching a drama has a positive consequence. For Abhinava, there is an additional phenomenal purpose of the theatrics, as aesthetic bliss and the moral judgment that the subject develops are its highest pursuit. The distinction between self-realized and ignorant persons lies in their ability or lack thereof to acknowledge the phenomenality of the phenomenal self. If a subject is role-playing, for him to
recognize that he is role-playing is liberating enough. Unlike Baudrillard’s simulacra, these phenomenal selves are not devoid of the originals, as they walk and breathe with it, although they do not reflexively look back and recognize their true self when in the flux of samsāra. If there is such a thing as self-deception, what drama does is to prepare subjects to reflect back and look in the mirror and see their true nature. Drama or role-playing, which includes being in the world, in itself is thus a deconstructive process with the consequence of self-recognition embedded with it.

The Audience

In a performance, two layers of relationship are forged: between the audience and the actor and between the actor and the character. Abhinava analyzes the extent to which the subjectivity of an artist is transformed when simulating the acts of the character or to what extent his personal identity is shifted into the character. The way Abhinava elaborates on role-playing helps us contextualize his arguments on self-deception. This issue is more vividly addressed when he discusses the experience of the audience, as it is the audience who ultimately makes the connection with the character when it is mediated by the artist. The viewer, while transcending his subjective horizon and touching upon the subjectivity of the actor, is also capable of preserving his individuality as a viewer. While a connection is made between the character and the audience, it is required that the subjects watching a play are well aware of the distinction between the artists and the roles they play. Nevertheless, the viewer is also required to breach his own subjectivity and relate his experience to that of the character so that he can mirror the emotions that the character undergoes and be able to empathize.

At the same time, he also needs to be aware of himself as a viewer, or else the mirroring of emotions may overpower his emotional response, and, rather than relishing the performance, and in such situations, he may experience the negative emotions of the character. People do not watch a tragedy to cry or a horror film to be spooked. There is a higher-order consciousness that relishes the emotions, even the negative ones, when watching a drama, or experiences the epiphany of wonder in witnessing a tragedy or a gut-wrenching scene that evokes disgust. While on the stage, real-life emotions manifested by the actor elevate aesthetic sensibility even when evoking the corresponding emotions in the audience. Abhinava’s aesthetics shifts focus to the viewers, who, while suspending their disbelief, do not become lost in their immersion in the story as it unfolds, and are thus able to relish the drama. For Lollaṭa and Nāyaka, this provides an opportunity to expand upon the disinterested witness, who, while watching the drama as the plot unfolds, is not subjectively immersed. Abhinava’s enlightened subjects are not viewers who are emotionally detached as the drama unfolds: they are very much relishing world events as they unfold. His approach is thus twofold: (1) dramatic experience suspends everyday experience and thus allows the subjects to undergo aesthetic rapture, and (2) this rapture brings the subjects to the core of their being, brings them to the final repose,
and makes them able to see the way things are, empowering them to make a moral judgment. A clear sense of reality is maintained in this higher-order consciousness. In its absence, simulation would replace the sense of the true narrative and overpower the judgment of the audience. This would not only misdirect aesthetic judgment, but would also make the viewers morally responsible. Reading Abhinava at this juncture helps us contextualize role-playing and subjectivity on the one hand, while on the other it also grounds some key issues related to ritual and morality.

First, the following lines help us understand how Abhinava explains the suspension of everyday experience and the cultivation of aesthetic perception:

However, in the context of performance art, since [1] there is an absence of the predisposition of intentionality, such as ‘I will have accomplished something absolutely real today’, [and] since [2] there exists the predisposition of intentionality, such as ‘I will hear or see [something] extraordinary that is superior to the distinctive savoring of the rapture accessible to all the viewers’, [the spectator] has forgotten the commonsense experience due to relishing the delightful songs and music, and for this reason, he has his heart similar to a stainless mirror.29

This statement is also applicable in analyzing self-deception, with the prominence of two terms: intentionality and forgetting. The audience is psychologically willing and ready to escape everyday experience in the quest for something sublime. This intentionality facilitates forgetting, as the subjects forget their commonsense experience, with their cognitive modalities occupied with the rapture engendered by the drama. What allows the viewers to suspend their commonsense experience and also to suspend their disbelief, following Abhinava, is the uncommon rapture, the epiphany of wonder, the aesthetic relishing, which, by its nature, is more enjoyable than everyday reality. This quest for rapture is for something more sublime than the quest for the ‘pleasure principle’, as Freud would have it. Rather than the rasa experience being guided by the id, a higher order judgment and telos are involved in this aesthetic judgment. This makes Abhinava’s aesthetic judgment value-oriented, and also helps make a distinction between raw emotions and an uncontrolled display of basic instincts. This distinguishes the systematic display of emotions in theatrics from the carnival of non-reflexive overpowering immersion in emotions. That a rasa experience is a value-oriented judgment is explicit in Abhinava’s claim that the enjoyer seeks an uncommon experience that transcends the rapture engendered by everyday experience. This, of course, is beyond Freud’s pleasure principle, but in the sense that it is more sublime, and, if making use of Freudian terms, it is closer to the Super Ego.

This association of the epiphany of rapture in aesthetic experience to Abhinava’s rasa experience relates it with a higher teleology, making aesthetic experience the guiding principle for morality.

For Abhinava, the self is intrinsically blissful, and the lack of self-awareness constitutes suffering. Along these lines, theatrics allows the subjects to return to their primordial nature, the inner blissful state, and in the tranquil state of self-recognition subjects are able to make a moral judgment. He argues:
The spectator, with his self-awareness immersed in the acts of the protagonist and his mind filled with the epiphany of wonder, universalizes this experience in each person through the vantage point of self in the span of just five or six days. The viewer perceives only generalized instances of consciousness, delivered through his empathic gaze in the form of an imperative found in the syntactic structure of liṅ this is what happens for one doing this, with reflexive consciousness not particularized in terms of space and time. In this epiphany, the subject is content with the experience of rasa which results as a consequence of the predisposition of the marvelous songs and music that accompany the relishing of the rasa that resembles the bliss of the amorous play with a lover that stimulates specific modes of consciousness. For this reason, he relishes the epiphany without experiencing even a fraction of the loss of bliss even when pierced with hundreds of arrows deep into the heart. For the reason that his mental state is always content with the desire to achieve virtue and abandon vice, the spectator conducts virtuous acts and abandons the vicious ones.

Abhinava’s arguments for a performance art that leads the viewer to moral acts, needless to say, come within the pretext of theatrics as a means for self-recognition and theatrics as a means for moral action. Abhinava acknowledges the connection between dramatic universalization, which allows the viewer to empathize with the character, and the universal nature of moral imperative. Just like the ritual commands, moral imperatives are not guided to one specific subject but have a universal appeal. Abhinava relates rasa-catharsis to a pristine state of heart, which he views as the source of moral acts. Moral imperatives, accordingly, come from one’s own heart and the role drama plays is in allowing the subjects to encounter their inner self-nature.

Following Abhinava’s statement cited directly above, the audience has their self-awareness immersed in the acts of the protagonist, and in the surge of the epiphany of wonder all real-world cognitive functions are momentarily suspended. The audience universalizes experience by transcending the gaze from the vantage point of oneself, and this allows them to reprogram their embodied memory through the very compressed time in which the drama occurs. Accordingly, habit memory is both the means for transcending commonsense experience, as aesthetic saṃskāras are the constituents of a connoisseur and aesthetic relishing allows the subjects to reprogram their basic tendencies required for making a value judgment. Following Abhinava, the moral imperative experienced in theatrics is in the form of command, comprehended in the form of syntactic injunction. The complexity of aesthetic judgment in Abhinava’s paradigm is epitomized when he incorporates carnal experience with rapture, while still maintaining the possibility of moral judgment as syntactically accessed. Relating the aesthetic to the somatic, he compares this epiphany with carnal orgasm, an example often used to vivify the collapse of subjective and objective horizons. While being fully embodied, this rapture makes other somatic experiences negligible, even if they are the basic sensations of being pierced by arrows in the heart. In this experience of being within the self, the subject regains his awareness, escapes from false egos and their appropriations and judgments, and becomes capable of making a moral judgment.
Notes

Many thanks go to Dr. Arindam Chakrabarti for bringing to my attention the selected passages from the Abhinavabhāratī, meticulously discussing these sections with me, and eventually encouraging me to write this article. I also thank Mrs. Mary Hicks for her editorial support.

The following abbreviation appears in the Notes:
AB in NŚ Abhinavabhāratī, in Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni. See Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni in References below.

1 – For a detailed analysis of Nāyaka’s position, see Pollock 2010, pp. 143–184.

2 – Nāyaka’s application of bhāvanā also rests on the Mīmāṃsā understanding of the term, which can be broadly analyzed as ‘modal’ and semantic ‘sacrifice’ in the imperative sentences that prescribe ritual sacrifice. In general, bhāvanā stands for the function of the agent that is supportive of materializing the event.

3 – Śaṅkara’s Advaita is simple in this regard for maintaining the concepts of sāksin or the witnessing self and jīva or the phenomenal self. The Pratyabhijñā system identifies a series of subjective states where beings can evolve and devolve according to the degree of expression of the intrinsic powers of will, cognition, and action. The highest in this series is Paramāśiva, the transcendent, all-encompassing witnessing self; and the subject at the bottom of this hierarchy is sakala or the one with the attributes of limiting factors (kalā).

4 – . . . sambhavāmi dehavān iva bhavāmi jāta ivātmamāyayā. . . . (Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on Śrīmadbhagavadgītā 4.6).

5 – The discourse on self-deception is too big and the literature too extensive to address here all the issues related to this topic. Prominent among the contemporary writings are the bibliographic account of Foss (1980), Champlin (1977), and Haight (1980). For a brief overview of the topic, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-deception/.


7 – I am adopting Hellman’s (1983) arguments in this synopsis.

8 – I am adopting Leeuwen’s (2007) arguments in this synopsis.

9 – na cittavṛttīnāṃ śokakrodhādirūpānāṃ | na hi nāto rāmasadrśaṃ svātmanah śokam karo ti | sarvathaiva tasya tatrābhāvāt | bhāve vā’nanukāratvāt | na cānyad vastv asti yac chokena saddrśaṃ syāt | (AB in NŚ 36:1–3).

10 – Based on this description, only the consequent bhāvas (anubhāvas) can be ‘performed.’ There are distinct anubhāvas for each rasa experience. A smile or suggestive glance, for instance, is the consequent of śṛṅgāra. In the case of tragedy, a consequent role can be played by despondency, suspicion, envy,
anxiety, anger, et cetera. It is noteworthy that both the psychological and corporeal conditions fall under the consequents. For a detailed list of consequent bhāvas in the secondary literature, see Nardi 2006, pp. 144–146.

11 – I am thankful to Arindam Chakrabarti for making this suggestion. In his reading, anuvyavasāya refers to ‘ideaṁ asyānukaṇaraṇam iti camatkārātmaṁ jñānam’ or the awareness that can be described only in terms of epiphany while still retaining the consciousness that the act of T imitates the acts of S.


13 – Jayarathna explains anuvyavasāya in the following passage: mana eva hi kalpanāntaraṃ cakṣurādi-vyavasitam apy artham anuvyavasaṇa niścaya-daśaṁ adhiśaya-vaat tad ekānekarūpaṃ davyam avalam-bamāna eṭaḥ kriyādi- kalpanāḥ kuryāt (Viveka on Tantrāloka 9.278–279). In this understanding, vyavasita is something cognized by the sense organ (percepts), and anuvyavasāya as an ascertainment, a reflexive consciousness that confirms what has been given by the sense organ. This consciousness is subsequent to perception, and is a mental activity. This consciousness is quite similar to what Vijñānabhikṣu has pointed out in the following passage: kiṅ ca mā bhavaṭv anavasthā vṛttigocarānanta vṛttikalpanāgauravam tv aparipāram eva, asmābhīr lāgha nova sākvalvṛttigocarākavisābhujāṇakalpaṇāḥ iti (Vārttika in Yogasūtra 4.21). Accordingly, a singular consciousness that manifests all the mental modifications, including percepts and concepts, is what manifests cognitive events or vṛttis that are not reflexively cognized.

14 – For a minor difference, Vācaspati, while expounding upon the Yogasūtra, holds that the self is reflected onto the mental mode that in itself is not reflexive, and thus the mental mode becomes reflexive. Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, contends that the self is reflected on the mental mode and this reflection is reflected back on the self. For further discussion, see Sinha 1958, vol. 1, pp. 214–221.

15 – idāniṁ upāya-vasamvedanālābhāt tadidam anukīrtam anuvyavasāyaviśeṣo nātyāparaparyayaḥ | nānukāra iti bhramitavyam | (AB in NS 35:23–24).

16 – anvābhavams tu karoti | kiṅ tu sajātiyān eva | na tu tātsadṛṣaṇ | sādhāraṇarūpasya kah kena sādṛṣyārthaḥ | tailokavartinaḥ sadṛṣṭavaṇu na viśeṣātmanā vaugapadyenopapadyate | kadācit kramena niyata evanukṛtāḥ syāt | sāmāyāt-makatve ko ’nukārārthaḥ | (AB in NS 36:3–6).

17 – tenānuvyavasaṇāvata viśeṣāvikāram nātyaṁ | (AB in NS 36:9).
18 – . . . anuvyavasāya pratyakṣakalpanātye hṛdayagītādyunusyūtatayā camatkāra-thānātvād hṛdayāṇupravesāyogayatvam | (AB in NS: 36:12–13). I have followed Darius Cooper in interpreting the term camatkāra in terms of the “epiphany of wonder.” He quotes the Abhinavabharati to explain camatkāra: “camatkāra is an uninterrupted (acchina) state of immersion (āveśa) in an enjoyment characterized by the presence of a sensation of inner fullness (tṛpti). It might be said indeed that camatkāra is the action proper to a tasting (cam) or enjoying subject, i.e., to a person immersed in the inner movement (tṛpti) of a magical (adbhuta) enjoyment” (Cooper 2000, pp. 24–25).

19 – The fourfold abhinayas in Bharata and Abhinava’s theatriecs are: āṅgika or the gestures of corporeal limbs, vācika or speech, āhārya or physical decorations and costumes, and sāttvika or the corporeal reflexes or physical response to psychological states such as tears, shaking, et cetera.

20 – prastāvanādinā nātajānasamśkārasācivyaṃ. . . . (AB in NS: 36:14).

21 – The term nātya, derived from the root nāṭ + śyaṇ (in the accusative) refers to all the skillful expressions of the body. Following Amarakośa I.7.10, the term nātya refers to all dancing, singing, and playing of musical instruments. In Bharata’s understanding, the term nātya collectively expresses all three artistic expressions in terms of nātya or dramatic expression, nṛttta or artistic expression of a theme, and nṛtya or skillful mimetic expression. When Abhinava identifies nātya with reflexive consciousness, he is not addressing the ontology of drama but rather the phenomenological analysis of a performance art. I have avoided the terminology of ‘representation’, as the term presupposes something (S) being represented (by means of T), as this understanding does not align with that of Abhinava.


23 – tac ca jñānākāramātram āropitaṃ svarūpam sāmyāyātmaṃ tattkālanirmi-tarūpam cānyad vā kiṃcid astu | (AB in NS: 36:19–20).

24 – . . . tasmād anuvyavasāyaṃ kirtanaṃ rūṣitavikalpasaṃvedanāṃ nātyam | tadvedanavedyatvāt | na tv anukaranarūpam | . . . (AB in NS: 36:23–24).

25 – na sāḍrṣyena yamakatvaḥ | na bhṛstantvena rūpyasāntiṣṭūpakāsukkāṭiprīpyatvāt | nāropeṇa samyag-jñānabādhānuntamithyājñānaraṇaḥ mukhayacandra itivat | na tatdhyavasāyenā gaurāhikavat | not-prekṣamāṇatvena candramukhayatvāt | na tatpratikrtītvena citrapustavat | na tat anukaraṇa gurusīṣ gotvavāhya-sāyavāya…

Sthaneshwar Timalsina 119
26 – Even one of the foundational texts, the Śīva Sūtra (3.9), describes the self in terms of a performer: nartaka ātmā.

27 – For both Bhartṛhari and Baudrillard, everyday experience is a simulation of reality. For Bhartṛhari, our reality is an anukāra of the Brahman (Vākyapadiya I.5).

28 – yathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṁ tata evānavaṣṭhitakarūpaṁ kṣaṇena kalpanāsa-tasahasrasaḥ samvā行业发展kim kṣaṇam api suṣṭhatarāḥ hṛdayaṅgahanidānam atyaktasvālambanabrahmakalpanatoṣparicātām rāmarāvadicitātām asatyaṁ kuto ‘py abhūtābhināvittāy bhāti | tathā bāsāmānam api ca pumarthopāyatām eti | tathā tādṛg eva viśvaṁ idam asatyanāmaṇaṇāpaprapaṇcātmakaṁ atha ca śravaṇamanaṇaṇāvaśena paramapumarthamārṇāki | (AB in NS 35:16–21).

29 – nātye tu pāramārthikāṁ kiṁcid adya me kṛtyaṁ bhavisyatīti evambhūtābhisandhisamskrābhāvaṁ sarvaparāṣatsādhāraṇapramodāparyantarvitasamādā- rājyaṇyalokottara daśānāśraṇopapavō bhavisyāṁty abhisandhisamskrād ucitatātityacarvanāvīṃsāsāṁsārikabhbhavatāya vimalamukurakalpībhuṭañjahrdayah.... (AB in NS 35:9–12).

I have understood ‘abhinsandhi’ here as intentionality, and it can also be translated here as ‘concept’. I am using this in the sense of ‘desire’ rather than the way intentionality is used in contemporary phenomenology.

30 – pāncaṣair divasaṁh saracamādakāratidhyacaritamadhyapraṣṭasvātmaraṇapaṁmaṁ svātmadvāreṇa viśvam tathā paśyan pratyekeṁ sāmājiko deśaṅkālaśeṣeṇā-parāmaṁśa evamkāriṇām idam iti līṅkāmavakvidhi-samarītaṁ sāmviṣyātiya eva sāmvidviṣeṣaraṁjākaśaṁvālabhāpārāparatmarasāśvaḥsacacaramayagī- tātṛityasamskrārāsāmubhavavāśena hṛdayābhyanantarikātaṁ tata evotapunīkaṁ aṁ api māṁmaṁ apy abhaṁmaṁ bhajāṁs tattacchabhāṣubhaṅpréśajāhāsasatasyāvārīttvād eva śubham ācārtya asubhaṁ samuṣjaṁ | (AB in NS 35:17–23).

References


120 Philosophy East & West


Yogasūtra: *With the Vārttika of Vījñānabhikṣu.* See *Yogavārttika of Vījñānabhikṣu* 1981.