The Brahman and the Word Principle (*Śabda*)

Influence of the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*

Sthaneshwar Timalsina

Abstract The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana have drawn significant attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Maṇḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana's literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari's writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari's writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, this analysis will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara, often addressed as 'pure non-dualism' (*Kevalādvaita*) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as 'non-dualism of the word-principle' (*Śabdādvaita*).

Keywords Bhartṛhari · Maṇḍana · *Brahmasiddhi* · *Vākyapadīya* · Śaṅkara · Advaita · *śabda* · Brahma · *avidyā*

The Advaita literature available today has a lacuna of texts covering a significant period of time. After the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, the earliest texts available are those of Gauḍapāda and Ādiśeṣa. The writings of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara dominate the subsequent Advaita literature. In the later period, the non-dualistic thinking that follows the Upaniṣadic tradition becomes identified as the school of Śaṅkara.

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Most philosophers writing on Advaita between the periods of Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda are known to us only through citations. This being the case, the Advaita philosophy that developed within this period and its influence on the scholastic thinking of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana can be known only through secondary literature, the texts on other traditions that occasionally address Advaita philosophy. The *Vākyapadīya* (VP) of Bhartṛhari (450 CE) and the *Vṛtti* (VPvṛ) thereon, traditionally attributed to Bhartṛhari himself, are notably exceptional. These texts, although primarily propounding the philosophy of language, also address contemporaneous issues that have become prominent in subsequent Advaita thinking. This study examines the influence of Bhartṛhari's writings on the *Brahmasiddhi* (BS) of Maṇḍana.

The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana have drawn significant attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Maṇḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana's literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari's writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari's writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, this analysis will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara, often addressed as 'pure non-dualism' (*Kevalādvaita*) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as 'non-dualism of the word-principle' (*Śabdādvaita*).

The Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara evolved in multiple models subsequent to his lifetime. His prominent disciple Sureśvara adopted the model of Ābhāsa, explaining the nature of the individual self as a false appearance (*ābhāsa*) of Brahman. Padmapāda, on the other hand, interpreted the relationship of the individual self and Brahman in terms of image and counter-image, propounding the doctrine of Pratibimba. The commentator Vācaspati adopted another model, namely, the doctrine of limitation (Avacchedavāda), comparing the relationship of Brahman and the individual self as that of unbound space and that confined in various objects. Vācaspati is comparatively closer to Maṇḍana, as he also commented upon *Brahmasiddhi*. It is also possible that the theological orientation of the monasticism of Śaṅkara and his disciples and the tradition of householders, articulated by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, maintains some differences, particularly concerning the role of ritual and meditation in self-realization.

The ritualistic tendency of Hindu practice first received criticism through the non-Brahmanic traditions established by the Buddha and Mahavīra. This trend also emerged within Hindu scholastic thinking itself, with monastic traditions either rejecting the role of ritual in liberation or by subordinating its contribution to the process of self-realization. Householder thinkers within the Brahmanic tradition often adopted the ritualistic philosophy of Mīmāṃsā, and both Maṇḍana and

Vācaspati demonstrate their affiliation with this school. Of particular relevance to this paper, Maṇḍana's third chapter on BS addresses *niyoga*, an issue closer to the philosophy of ritual. His adoption of *prasaṅkhyāna* further supports this ritualistic affiliation, as repetitive thought, according to Śaṅkara, is a type of ritual that is not an immediate cause for the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. Philosophically, this *niyoga* chapter is less related to the issues that are addressed in Bhartṛhari's writings. The remaining three chapters on BS demonstrate the intricate relationship of these two philosophers, Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana.

Comparing the Texts

Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana identify the first chapter of their texts, respectively VP and BS, as *Brahmakāṇḍa*. Although the Brahman of Bhartṛhari is identical to the word principle (*śabda*) whereas Brahman is non-qualified for Maṇḍana, the monistic nature of their highest principle and its manifestation in manifold forms can be found expressed by both in similar terminology. Furthermore, compared to Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana is more closely aligned with the philosophy of linguistic non-dualism, as he is also the author of a text, *Sphoṭasiddhi*, following the philosophy of Bhartṛhari.[1] Maṇḍana's inclination towards Bhartṛhari's terminology becomes further explicit in his description of the word principle, *akṣara*, found in the very first verse of BS. A close analysis of the first verse of BS and the auto-commentary of Maṇḍana thereon further reveals the intimacy between these two texts. Maṇḍana states:

> *ānandam ekam amṛtam ajaṃ vijñānam akṣaram* |
> *asarvaṃ sarvam abhayaṃ namasyāmaḥ prajāpatim* || BS 1.1.

The first parallel to be found in this verse is the application of the term *akṣara* which can mean both 'indestructible' and 'letter.'[2] This term is also found in Bhartṛhari's VP 1.1. However, with an application of the term *akṣara*, Maṇḍana describes the non-transforming nature of Brahman, the same concept that is addressed in VP with use of the term *vivartta*. What is significant, though, is the absence of the term '*vivartta*' from BS 1.1. The model of causality in the non-dualistic school of Śaṅkara is subsequently identified as 'the doctrine of *Vivartta*' (Vivarttavāda).[3] The phrase 'birthless and deathless' (*amṛtamajam*) found in BS 1.1 is synonymous with the expression, 'free from end and beginning' (*anādinidhanam*), found in VP 1.1. Aligning with the tradition of the grammarians, Maṇḍana's interpretation of eternal (*nitya*) follows that of Patañjali.[4]

Bhartṛhari describes the word principle as one (*eka*) that manifests in distinctive forms (*pṛthag*) by taking support of powers (*śakti*) (VP 1.2). In BS 1.1, Maṇḍana's

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[1] Kuppuswami Sastri is first to point out Maṇḍana's favor towards Bhartṛhari. See, Sastri 1984, xxvi.

[2] *akṣaram iti śabdātmatām āha, viśeṣeṇa sāmānyasya lakṣaṇād apariṇāmitvaṃ vā, pariṇāme pūrvadharmanivṛtteḥ kṣaraṇasya bhāvāt tadvyudāsena* | BS. See Sastri 1984, 16:23–24.

[3] For discussion on the development of the concept of Vivartta, see Hacker 1953.

[4] BS. See Sastri 1984, 19:16–21.

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articulation of the paradoxical nature of Prajāpati describes the same concept in different terminology, 'all [and simultaneously] not all' (*asarvaṃ sarvam*).

The second verse of VP and BS both confirm that the highest principle is realized through the knowledge transmitted in the lineage (*āmnāya*), referring to the Vedic testimony. While Bhartṛhari describes it in terms of *yad āmnātam* (VP.1.2), Maṇḍana utilizes the terminology of '*āmnāyataḥ prasiddhim*' (BS 1.2).

Besides utilizing terminology similar to Bhartṛhari, Maṇḍana also uses the term *prapañcavilaya* in the verse BS 1.2. A doctrine associated with this term is attributed to Bhartṛprapañca, which is found only in citation and in the criticism of Śaṅkara and Sureśvara. It is reasonable to argue that Maṇḍana was comfortable with this doctrine to some extent, as he utilizes the term that is identified with one particular doctrine. Bhartṛhari's application of the terminology *bhedasaṃsargas-amatikrameṇa* (VPvṛ 1.1) resonates of the same concept, however, with different terminology.[5]

For both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana, the highest principle is of the nature of 'universal' (*sāmānya*). Bhartṛhari describes this highest principle in terms of 'the highest universal' (*mahāsā-mānya*). Both identify this as a state where all differences are dissolved:

> *sarvabhedānuguṇyaṃ tu sāmānyam apare viduḥ* |[6] VP.2.44.

> *saṃhṛtākhilabhedo 'taḥ sāmānyātmā sa varṇitaḥ* | BS 1.3.

The second line of BS 1.3 utilizes the example of gold and ornaments, elaborating on the concept of the particular and universal found in the first line. This example, common among grammarians such as Patañjali, is also found in Bhartṛhari's writing. Compare:

> *hemeva pārihāryādibhedasaṃhārasūcitam* ‖ BS 1.3.

> *suvarṇādi yathā yuktaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ* |
> *rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddham evaiti vācyatām* ‖ VP 3.2.4.

This example describes the oneness of Brahman as not contradictory with difference perceived in the world. This example, like the example of waves and the ocean or the Upaniṣadic example of clay and clay-pots, differs from examples such as shell and the silver perceived therein due to illusion, or of a mirage, or of rope perceived to be a snake. The conceptualization of gold that confirms oneness in the generic sense does not contradict with the perception of ornaments.

Tarkakāṇḍa

The influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana is not limited only to the first chapter of BS. Two other chapters, *tarkakāṇḍa* (Ch. 2), and *siddhikāṇḍa* (Ch. 4), likewise demonstrate textual similarities.

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[5] Compare also: '*bhedodgrāhavivarttaena labdhākāraparigrahā āmnātā*' (Cited in VPvṛ 1.118 [126]).

[6] The concept of universal is addressed by Bhartṛhari elsewhere as well: ... *pratibhedaṃ samāpyate* | *jātivat samudāye 'pi*... (VP II.43).

Maṇḍana explains that perception, arising through sense-object contact, allows us to have an affirmative cognition of the entities of perception. Unlike perception, which arises through affirmation, Maṇḍana explains that the knowledge derived through negation is linguistic in nature. The position that the cognition derived through negation is linguistic in nature applies in Maṇḍana's philosophy to describe the nature of the knowledge derived through the Vedic testimony. In BS 2.1, Maṇḍana addresses that the Vedic testimony provides knowledge through negation. This concept is found in the VPvṛ.[7] Maṇḍana's position that cognition (*jñāna*) rests upon the objects of cognition (*jñeya*), with the statement that perception is affirmative, parallels a citation found in VPvṛ, that there is no knowledge devoid of its object.[8] The position of Maṇḍana that the knowledge acquired through language, or through the Vedic testimony, does not depend upon perception tallies with Bhartṛhari's position that the Vedic seers (*Ṛṣis*) have extra-sensory perception (VP 1.38), and that there exists knowledge that is not acquired through inference (VP 1.35-43).

While describing the affirmative nature of perception, Maṇḍana proclaims that difference is not the essential nature of an entity. This rejection of difference to be an entity in itself tallies with Bhartṛhari who adheres to the position that the existence of an entity is not the negation of the other entity. He argues that, if absence were an entity, entities could be negatively confirmed. This being the case, he posits that difference is indeterminable.[9] This indeterminacy of difference, as posited by Bhartṛhari, is noteworthy also in understanding the nature of *avidyā* in Advaita, because, following the Advaita tradition, difference is considered to be the product of indeterminable *avidyā*.

The discussion above shows that addressing the issue of an entity (*vastu*) leads both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana to the issue of difference (*bheda*). While describing an entity, Maṇḍana states that an entity does not depend upon another for its existence, unlike the birth of a son presupposes the existence of its father. This example is found in Bhartṛhari's writing to demonstrate difference:

> *pauruṣeyīm apekṣām ca na hi vastv anuvarttate |*
> *pitrādiviṣaye 'pekṣā jananādiprabhāvitā* ‖ BS 2.6.

> *putrasya janmani yathā pitroḥ kartṛtvam ucyate |*
> *ayam asyām iyam tvasmād iti bhedo vivakṣayā* ‖ VP 3.7.19.

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[7] Compare: *āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣam na niṣeddhṛ vipaścitaḥ |*
naikatva āgamas tena pratyakṣeṇa viruddhyate ‖ BS 2.1 and
na ca pratiṣedhābhyanujñayor asya pravṛttitattvaṃ vikalpate (VPvṛ in verse 9. Iyer 1966, 37:5).

[8] ... *jñānaṃ jñeyavyapāśrayam* ‖ VP 1.86. And, *jñeyena na vinā jñānaṃ vyavahāre 'vatiṣṭhate* | VPvṛ in verse 86. Iyer 1966, 153:2.

[9] Compare: *na bhedo vastuno rūpaṃ tadabhāvaprasaṅgataḥ |*
arūpeṇa ca bhinnavtaṃ vastuno nāvakalpate ‖ BS 2.5
and
na śābaleyasyāstitvam bāhuleyasya bādhakam |
na śābaleyo nāstīti bāhuleyaḥ prakalpate ‖
abhāvo yadi vastu syāt tatreyam syād vicāraṇā |
tataś ca tadabhāve 'pi syād vicāryam idam punaḥ ‖
avastu syād atītam yad vyavahārasya gocaraḥ |
tatra vastugato bhedo na nirvacanam arhati ‖ VP III 3.75-77.

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Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana reject the essential being of difference. Maṇḍana at one point describes that the difference such as that of short and long is imposed due to difference in action and is not inherent to the entity itself. This can be compared with Bhartṛhari's position:

ekakriyāviśeṣeṇa vyapekṣā hrasvadīrghayoḥ | BS 2.7ab.

viśeṣadarśanam yatra kriyā tatra vyavasthitā | VP III.7.66.

The issue of causal efficacy (*arthakryā*) becomes crucial for both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana in establishing relation between entity and difference. For Maṇḍana, the difference established on the grounds of causal efficacy does not confirm difference in the entity itself. This is comparable with Bhartṛhari's position:

arthakriyākṛte bhede rūpabhedo na labhyate ‖ BS 2.7.

sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe 'py arthakriyākāriṇi pratyaye śaktyapoddhārakalpanayā bhedasaṃsargamātrām na vijahāti   VPvṛ in Biardeau 1964, p. 187.

yad ekam prakriyābhedair bahudhā pravibhajyate | VP.I.22.

Maṇḍana argues that a single entity manifests in many forms following the example of fire, which, while remaining one, carries out multiple functions of burning or cooking that rely on various inherent powers. This issue is strikingly similar in Bhartṛhari's writing, where he argues that a single entity is found carrying out different functions relying on different powers. Compare:

dāhapākavibhāgena kṛśānur na hi bhedavān |
ekasyaivaiṣa mahimā bhedasampādanāsahaḥ ‖
vahner iva yadā bhāvabhedakalpas tadā mudhā |
yathaiva bhinnaśaktīnām abhinnam rūpam āśrayaḥ ‖ BS 2.8-9.

And

anekaśaktir ekasya yugapac chrīyate kvacit |
agniḥ prakāśadāhābhyām ekatrāpi niyujyate ‖ VP II.474.
anekaśakter ekasya pravibhāgo 'nugamyate | VP.II.441.

For both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana, it is the inherent power of the entity to manifest as many or to carry out various functions. While Bhartṛhari utilizes the term *śakti*, Maṇḍana, in addition to the use of *śakti*, also applies the term *mahiman*, which is found in early Vedic literature.[10] In addition to the example of fire to

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[10] For application of the term *mahiman*, see Böthtlingk 1991, pp. 667–668. *Nāsadīya* 3 uses *mahin* in the similar meaning. The same text uses the term *mahiman* for explaining the glory of the primordial entity to attain manifoldness. (*Nāsadīya* 5). Bhartṛhari frequently uses *śakti*, with the first instance in the second verse of VP: *ekam eva yad āmnātam bhinnaṃ śaktivyapāśrayād* | *apṛthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveneva vartate* ‖ VP.1.2. There are instances also from the VPvṛ of the application of śakti for describing the cosmic process of the primordial element manifesting in manifold forms. For instance, *eko 'yam śaktibhedena bhāvātmā pravibhajyate* | cited in VPvṛ I.24-26.
tasyaikam api caitanyam bahudhā pravibhajyate |
aṅgarāṅkitam utpāte vārirāśer ivodakam ‖ cited in VPvṛ I.1.

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describe a single entity carrying out manifold functions, Bhartṛhari uses the example of a single light assuming the shape of the entities being revealed.[11]

Rejection of difference is one of the central arguments in Maṇḍana's philosophy. Various instances of this position demonstrate stylistic similarities with Bhartṛhari's writing. Maṇḍana argues that cognition of an entity in one particular form and not in any other form is confirmed through difference. Bhartṛhari points to difference in the attributes of an entity for determining difference in entities.[12] The notable divergence is that, in Bhartṛhari's description, difference is dependent upon cognition, whereas in Maṇḍana's writing, cognition is dependent upon difference:

> *nāsminn ayam nāyam ayam iti bhedād vinā na dhīḥ* | BS 2.11ab.

> *yo 'pi svābhāviko bhedaḥ so 'pi buddhinibandhanaḥ* | VP III.14.570ab.

> *buddhyavasthāvibhāgena bhedakāryaṃ pratīyate* | VP III 14.573.[13]

In order to confirm that difference is not directly cognized, Maṇḍana rejects the argument that the cognitions revealing difference and identity are separate. The language and argument applied by Maṇḍana in this context parallel those of Bhartṛhari:

> *bhedābhedāvabhāse dve vijñāne cet parīkṣatām* |
> *na tāvad dvayam aikātmyaprakhyānānavakalpanāt* || BS 2.12.

> *so 'yam ekatvanānātve vyavahāraḥ samāśritaḥ* |
> *bhedābhedavimarśena vyatikīrṇena varttate* || VP.III.14.369.

> *bhedābhedvyatīteṣu bhedābhedavidhāyinīm* | VP III. 11.12.

The issue of difference is crucial to both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana. Instead of attributing the cognition of an entity to difference, both identify inherence (*sāmā-nya*) as a category that gives rise to cognition by distinguishing one entity from the other through inherence. This inherence is considered by both as the intrinsic power of the entity, with the only difference being the choice of words used. Bhartṛhari identifies this as *śakti* whereas Maṇḍana identifies it as its *sāmarthya*:

> *samavāyakṛtaṃ tac cen na bhedasyāparicyuteḥ* |
> *bhedāntardhānasāmarthyaṃ tasya bhede 'pi cen matam* || BS 2.13.

> *tām śaktim samavāyākhyām śaktīnām upakāriṇīm* |
> *bhedābhedāvatikrāntām anyathaiva vyavasthitām* || VP III.3.10.

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[11] ... *eka eva sarvārthaḥ prakāśaḥ pravibhajyate* |
dṛśyabhedānukāreṇa. . . || VP II.7.

[12] *aṅgadī kuṇḍalī ceti darśayan bhedahetubhiḥ* |
caitram īdṛśam ity āha buddhyavasthāparigrahāt || VP III.14.569.

[13] For further discussion on *bheda* in VP, see: *bhedābhedau pṛthagbhāvaḥ sthitis ceti virodhinaḥ|*
yugapan na vivakṣante sarve dharmā valāhake || VP III.7.144.
san asan vārtharūpeṣu bhedo buddhyā prakalpyate | VP. III.7.3.
naikatvam asty anānātvam vinaikatvena netarat | VP. III.6.26.

The monistic views of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana support the idea that there exists a single entity that causes manifoldness. This issue is described by Maṇḍana in language that resonates of lines found in VP and VPvṛ:

hantaikasyaiva tat kiṃ na yad evam avabhāsate |
dṛṣṭaḥ samsargadharmo 'yam yady ekam api vai tathā || BS 2.14.

sa tadānīm eko 'pi vibhaktoddeśāvacchada iva pratyavabhāsate | ...
samsargidharma evāyam itthambhūtaḥ | tathā hy atyantamabhinnātmā
bhinna-rūpāvayavī nānādeśasthitādhāro vaicitryeṇopalabhyate | VPvṛ I.48
(Iyer 1966, 106:7–107:3).

bhinnā iti paropādhir abhinnā iti vā punaḥ |
bhāvātmasu prapañco 'yam samsṛṣṭveṣveva jāyate || VP. III.1.20.

Another striking similarity between Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana is the description of a picture and colors in the picture. Both describe that a single flash of cognition grasps the picture with multiple colors. The oneness of 'form' described by both, found in the cognition of various colors in a picture, is identical in description:

nānāvabhāsate citraṃ rūpam ekam yathā matiḥ |
na ca sambandhisambandhaḥ samsargo vyavadhānataḥ || BS 2.15.

citrasyaikasya rūpasya yathā bhedanidarśanaiḥ |
nīlādibhiḥ samākhyānam sākāṅkṣair anugamyate || VP II.8.

bhinnārthapratyavabhāsamātrāyām ekasyām upalabdhau arthākāraka-
pratyavabhāsamātrāḥ ... VPvṛ.1.2 (Iyer 1966, 16:2–3).

Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana argue that the distinction made in convention, such as 'this is a white cow,' relies upon the imposition of the distinguishing factors such as qualities and universals. The way the argument is presented by Maṇḍana is comparable to Bhartṛhari's presentation:

vyavahāre paropādhau sarvā dhīr vyāvahārikī |
ayathārthā yadā bhāvabhedakalpas tadā mudhā || BS 2.16.

bhinnā iti paropādhir abhinnā iti vā punaḥ |
bhāvātmasu prapañco 'yaṃ samsṛṣṭeṣv eva jāyate || VP III.1.20.

bhāgair anarthakair yuktā vṛṣābhodakayāvakā |
anvayavyatirakau tu vyavahāranibandhanam || VP II.12.

Maṇḍana rejects the argument that there is an external cause for any erroneous cognition, giving an example of *timira*, an eye disease that causes for instance, the perception of two moons. This example is commonly found in the Yogācāra literature. Although Bhartṛhari utilizes the example of mirage instead of the sighting of two moons, the issue is the same:

ayathārthadhiyo bījam avasyaṃ bāhyam eva na |
dṛṣṭas timirakāmādir āntaro 'pi hy upaplavaḥ || BS 2.17.

yady api pratyayādhīnam arthatattvāvadhāraṇam |
na sarvaḥ pratyayas tasmin prasiddha iva jāyate ||
darśanam salile tulyam mṛgatṛṣṇādidarśanaiḥ |
tulyatve darśanādīnām na jalam mṛgatṛṣṇikā || VP II.286-287.

The argument that difference is imposed by the mind on the entities which are just there, existing and not inherently distinguishing from each other, is addressed by Bhartṛhari in various places. One explicit line follows:

san asan vārtharūpeṣu bhedo buddhyā prakalpyate | VP III.7.3.

Bhartṛhari propounds that non-existent entities can be confirmed through language and gives an example of rabbit horn:

atyantāsac ca prasiddham loke śaśaviṣāṇādi...

VPvṛ 1.113[121] (Iyer 1966, 186:3–4).

While presenting the argument that 'the universal' demonstrates the oneness of entities and 'the particular' articulates their distinctions, Maṇḍana shows that the concepts of distinctness (*bheda*) and universal exist on the same substrate (*sāmā-nādhikaraṇya*) and argues that there is oneness. This argument, although not the final position of Maṇḍana, is found addressed in Bhartṛhari's writing in similar language:

ekatvam avirodhena bhedasāmānyayor yadi |
na dvyātmatā bhaved ekataranirbhaktabhāgavat || BS 2.18.

viśeṣa eva sāmānyam viśeṣād bhidyate yataḥ |
abhedo hi viśeṣāṇām āśrito vinivartakaḥ || VP III 14.143.

In the same sequence of the argument rejecting difference, Maṇḍana presents the position that the nature of an entity is neither universal nor particular, and proposes that this is both particular and universal. Bhartṛhari also articulates the same concept:

sāmānyam na hi vastvātmā na bhedaś citra eva saḥ |
tasyānanvayato bhedavādaḥ śabdāntarād ayam || BS 2.21.

bhedābhedavibhāgas tu sāmānye na nirūpyate || VP III.14.144.

sāmānyabhūto dravyātmā paricchinnaparigrahaḥ |
kriyābhir yujyate bhedair bhāgaśaś cāvatiṣṭhate || VP.III.14.186.

Bhartṛhari points out that a single entity is cognized when oneness is grasped by abandoning difference. In parallel language, Maṇḍana likewise articulates the rejection of difference at the cognitive level when that what is cognized is considered to be generic:

yadi vākhilabhāvānām abhedāt tad atattvataḥ |
abhedavādāśrayaṇam syād anyavidhayā girā || BS 2.22.

yadā bhedān parityajya buddhyaika iva gṛhyate |
vyaktyātmaiva tadā tatra buddhir ekā pravartate || VP III.1.96.

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The rejection of difference remains one of the key arguments in Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana. Both Vimuktātman and Śrīharṣa primarily follow the argument articulated by Maṇḍana in rejecting difference that its cognition does not depend upon one or the other entity but on the cognition of both. Difference, in this understanding, depends on cognition. This cognition, furthermore, relies on the cognition of another entity when one entity is identified as different. This description found in Maṇḍana's writing parallels the same argument found in VP:

> āpekṣitatvād bhedo hi bhedagrahapuraḥsaraḥ ǀ
> naikajñānaṃ samīkṣyaikaṃ na bhedaṃ tattvahānataḥ ǁ BS 2.26.

> anvākhyānāya yo bhedaḥ pratipattinibandhanam ǀ
> sākāṅkṣāvayavaṃ bhede tenānyad upavarṇyate ǁ VP II.443.

> sattām indriyasambandhāt saiva sattā viśiṣyate ǀ
> bhedena vyavahāro hi vastvantaranibandhanaḥ ǁ VP. III.10.112.

> sākāṅkṣāvaayavam bhede parānākāṅkṣaśabdakam ǀ VP. II.4.

Maṇḍana posits that immediate cognition reveals only the pure object. He finds it faulty to state that the difference that has not been cognized in the cognition of an object is also the object of same cognition. This argument of Maṇḍana is found addressed by Bhartṛhari in strikingly similar language:

> ālochyate vastumātraṃ jñānepātajanmanā ǀ
> achetyamāno bhedo 'pi cakāstīty atisāhasam ǁ BS 2.27.

> astitvam vastumātrasya buddhyā tu parigṛhyate ǀ
> yaḥ samāsādanād bhedaḥ sa tatra na vivakṣitaḥ ǁ VP. III.10.113.

In the above description of Maṇḍana, the entity that is immediately cognized is pure object (vastumātra). In Bhartṛhari's depiction, it is the 'thing in itself' (tattva) that attains the forms of mental construction:

> vikalparūpam bhajate tattvamevāvikalpitam ǀ VP. III.2.8.

Rejection of the immediate perception of difference is a key argument found in Maṇḍana's BS in the process of the refutation of difference. Although found in a different context, Bhartṛhari presents similar arguments, some of which are pertinent to this discussion. Most noteworthy is the example wherein Bhartṛhari explains the cognition of one entity:

> yadā bhedān parityajya buddhyaika iva gṛhyate ǀ
> vyaktātmaiva tadā tatra buddhir ekā pravartate ǁ VP III.1.96.

For both Bhartṛharti and Maṇḍana, the object of the first flash of cognition is generic in nature. This argument of universal (sāmānya) as the object of cognition and not a particular (viśeṣa) leads Maṇḍana to maintain that cognition of the entity in itself (vastumātra) is not to cognize an entity in particular (viśeṣa). Following this argument, this cognition of pure object cannot be false, as even in erroneous

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cognition, particularity is imposed upon the pure object that is immediately grasped. This is found in parallel description in Bhartṛhari's writing:

> pratiṣṭhitaṃ ca vijñānam arthamātrāvalambanam |
> bhedeṣu tv apratiṣṭhatvam astīndriyadhiyām api || BS 2.28.

> astitvam vastumātrasya buddhyā tu parigṛhyate |
> yaḥ samāsādanād bhedaḥ sa tatra na vivakṣitaḥ || VP.III.9.113.

Remarkable here is the choice of terms, as Bhartṛhari uses *vastumātra* whereas Maṇḍana uses *arthamātra*. However, the application of *vastumātra* is found in Maṇḍana's auto-commentary thereon.[14]

In the same sequence, Maṇḍana explains that entities are not of the character of difference on their own. This issue is also articulated by Bhartṛhari:

> anyonyābhāvarūpatvaṃ sarveṣāṃ na prakalpate |
> tatropādhau pratīyantāṃ tathā bhinnā na rūpataḥ || BS 2.29.

> bhinnā iti paropādhir abhinnā iti vā punaḥ |
> bhāvātmasu prapañco 'yam samsṛṣṭeṣveva jāyate || VP.III.1.20.

> tasyātmā bahudhā bhinno bhedair dharmāntarāśrayaiḥ |
> na hi bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā vastu kiñcana vidyate || VP III.9.6.

In this description, Bhartṛhari explicitly states that an entity in itself is neither distinct (*bhinna*) nor identical (*abhinna*). The lengthy description of Maṇḍana essentially elaborates the same concept.

In the same sequence, Maṇḍana demonstrates in BS 2.30 that the concepts of difference and identity are interdependent, showing that the distinction established between the reflection of a face and the face itself depends upon the concept of identity which, in turn, relies upon the concept of difference. This example of a face in the mirror becomes a key example in scholastic Advaita, with a specific doctrine of *pratibimba* relying fundamentally on this example. Bhartṛhari also utilizes this example on several occasions.[15] Maṇḍana further elaborates upon the concept that difference is imposed upon a single entity just as difference seen in a reflection is due to the difference in the surface reflecting the entity. He is closely reading VP even in this description:

> pratyekam anuviddhatvād abhedena mṛṣā tataḥ |
> bhedo yathā taraṅgāṇām bhedād bhedaḥ kalāvataḥ || BS 2.31

> prakāśakānāṃ bhedāṃś ca prakāśyo 'rtho 'nuvartate |
> tailodakādibhede tat pratyakṣaṃ pratibimbake || VP I.99

> samkhyābhedo 'py ādarśabhede jalataraṅgabhede ca dṛśyate sūryādipra-
> tibimbānām   VPvṛ I.99. (Iyer 1966, 165:4–5).

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[14] ...na ca vastumātrāvabhāsasya | BS. See Sastri 1984, 71:12–13.

[15] *pratibimba* VP I.50, II.294, *pratibimbaka* VP I.102, III.9.40, *pratibimbsakadharma* VP III.14.326, *pratibimbavat* VP I 20.

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In BS 2.8, which runs parallel to the concept addressed in BS 2.31, Maṇḍana repeats the concept that manifoldness is the glory (*mahiman*) of a single entity. Although this concept is central to monistic arguments, the stylistic similarity between Bhartṛhari's presentation and Maṇḍana's argument are so close as to invite comparison:

ekasyaivāstu mahimā yan nāneva prakāśate |
lāghavān na tu bhinnānām yac cakāsaty abhinnavat ‖ BS 2.32.

ekam eva yad āmnātam bhinnam śaktivyapāśrayāt |
apṛthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveneva vartate ‖ VP I.2.

sarvaśaktyātmabhūtatvam ekasyaiveti nirṇaye |
bhāvānām ātmabhedasya kalpanā syād anarthikā ‖ VP.III.22.

BS, Chapters 3–4

Compared to the first and second chapters of BS, there are very few instances in Maṇḍana's third chapter that resonate of Bhartṛhari's literature. Explicitly, the issue of *niyoga* addressed in this section is not at the center of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. There are nevertheless some examples found in this section suggestive of Bhartṛhari's writings. This nexus becomes more likely in light of the similarities found in the early sections of BS.

Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana accept 'existence' (*sattā*) as a presupposition for any verbal or conventional exchange.[16] Maṇḍana explains that the verb $\sqrt{as}$, meaning 'to be' or 'to exist', is given in any description (BS 3.29-33), which can be compared with Bhartṛhari's statement that entities cannot be imagined without their existence, either in terms of existence (*asti*) or in terms of non-existence (*nāsti*).[17] In simple Sanskrit construction, a single subject such as a 'pot' (*ghaṭaḥ*) can be understood as a sentence, with an understood verb 'exists' (*asti*). This linguistic property allows Bhartṛhari to address the issue of *sattā* in the given manner. The issue concerning *sattā* expands in VPvṛ where the text attributes *sattā* to be the origin (*yoni*) even of *avidyā*.[18] In the case where there is no real entity, the concept of *buddhisattā*, or the existence of an entity only in mind, is considered to be given. The rejection of entities such as the non-existent rabbit's horn depend upon linguistic or mental constructs. This concept is utilized by Maṇḍana in his description where he identifies Brahman to be the fundamental *sattā* upon which the imposition of all existing or non-existing entities resides. For comparison:

na ca mānāvagamyatvam astītiviṣayo mataḥ |
mānād eva yato buddhir abhūd asti bhaviṣyati ‖ BS 3.30

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[16] BS (Sastri 1984, 3:30–31) discusses *sattā*. *Sattā* is addressed three times in the *Kālasamuddeśa* (111–113) chapter of VP.

[17] VP III 8.499

[18] *sattālakṣaṇam mahāntam ātmānm avidyāyonim* VPvṛ in verse 137. See Iyer 1966, 226:4–5.

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astitvaṃ vastumātrasya buddhyā tu parigṛhyate |
yaḥ samāsādanād bhedaḥ sa tatra na vivakṣitaḥ ‖ VP III.9.113

While describing how verbal testimony can be utilized for self-realization, Maṇḍana presents his position that the non-dual entity is free from the distinctions such as cognition and its object. This description is very close to the one found in VPvṛ. In particular, the phrase '*vibhāgodgrāha*' is identical:

pralīnagrahaṇagrāhyavibhāgodgrāham advayam ‖ BS 3.101cd

sarvavibhāgodgrāhapratisaṃhāreṇa. . .
pūrvavibhāgodgrāhabhāvanāmātrām avyatikrāman
<div align="right">VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 98.</div>

Along the same lines, BS 3.132-134 elaborates upon the nature of memory and cognition in the context of explaining error. The description found here is comparable to VP III.14.572-573. Particularly the phrase found in BS, *bhedod-grāha*, resonates of the same phrase found in VPvṛ:

bhedagrahāpavādena rahito bhāvarūpataḥ | BS 3.148

bhedodgrāhavivarttena labdhākāraparigrahā |
<div align="right">Cited in VPvṛ, verse 116. See Iyer 1966, 194:1</div>

In the context of describing the nature of verbal testimony that gives rise to the knowledge of Brahman, Maṇḍana states that Brahman is revealed in all instances of cognition, following the argument that the concept of particulars also gives rise to knowledge of the universal.

sarvapratyayavedye vā brahmarūpe vyavasthite |
prapañcasya pravilayaḥ śabdena pratipādyate ‖ BS 4.3.

This position resonates with terminology found in VPvṛ:

tad etad ekaṃ sarvaprabodharūpam ... VPvṛ in verse 8. Iyer 1966, 33:5.
... sarvarūpe brahmaṇi. . . VPvṛ in verse 9. See Iyer 1966, 36:3.

na hi jñeyagato vṛkṣādyākārāvagraho jñānasyaikatvena viruddhyate |
nāsyākārāt tadākārasyātmabhedo 'sti teṣām ekajñānatattvānatikramāt |
<div align="right">VPvṛ in verse 2. See Iyer 1966, 16:3–17:1.</div>

Maṇḍana argues that Brahman, free from verbal or mental constructs (*prapañca*), is not known in its true form through any means other than the testimony of the Vedas.

pravilīnaprapañcena tadrūpeṇa na gocaraḥ |
mānāntarasyeti matam āmnāyaikanibandhanam ‖ BS 4.4.

This statement is very close to Bhartṛhari's position that *dharma* is known through the scriptures:

jñāne svābhāvike nārthaḥ śāstraiḥ kaścana vidyate |
dharmo jñānasya hetuś cet tasyāmnāyo nibandhanam ‖ VP I.134.

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In addition, some lines in the prose section of BS in the above sequence can be compared with VPvṛ:

brahmaṇo vyatirekeṇa pratyetavyasyābhāvāt BS, 157:14–15.

nāsyākārāt tadākārasyātmabhedo 'sti teṣām ekajñānatattvānatikrāmāt |

VPvṛ in verse 2. Iyer 1966, 17:1–2.

A phrase in this sequence, *pratyastamitanikhilabheda* (BS, 157:20) is suggestive of *pratyastamitasarvavikāra. . .* VPvṛ in verse 14. Iyer 1966, 48:2–3.

Reading BS in Light of VPvṛ

The above description traces, in a textual sequence, Bhartṛhari's imprint upon Maṇḍana's writings. In this analysis, the focus has been the verses. Maṇḍana also wrote a lengthy commentary upon his BS. There are numerous similarities in this commentary with VP and VPvṛ. Select examples are identified in this discussion and listed below.

It is not completely new that there are parallels in Maṇḍana's writings and VPvṛ. Allen Thrasher points out that the issue of the indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) nature of *avidyā* and the issue of awareness free from mental constructs (*nirvikalpa jñāna*) as established by Maṇḍana parallel similar concepts addressed in VPvṛ.[19] Before delving into philosophical concerns that underpin apparent similarities, select examples are presented here to demonstrate the textual influence of the VP and the VPvṛ on Maṇḍana's auto-commentary on BS.

1. The description of Brahman as free from beginning and end is common to all models of Advaita. However, the language Maṇḍana uses to describe this is very close to that of Bhartṛhari:

   anādinidhanatve hi   BS 8:16.

   anādinidhanaṃ brahma   VP I.1.

2. The issue of *avidyā* as neither existing (*sat*) nor non-existing (*asat*) as propounded by Maṇḍana becomes one of the key concepts in Advaita. This concept parallels Bhartṛhari's description of *prakṛti* that is identified as both existing (*satī*) and non-existing (*avidyamānā*):

   nātyantam asatī nāpi satī; evam eveyam avidyā māyā. BS 9:11–12.

   satī vā 'vidyamānā vā prakṛtiḥ pariṇāminī   VP III.7.47.

3. The central concept of VP, that the world is the modification of the word principle, is found in BS. Maṇḍana's application of the term *akṣara* is not limited to its etymological meaning of indestructible, but also identifies the word principle:

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[19] Thrasher 1993, 4, 17–18, 42, 68. He has identified lines from VPvṛ on pages 21–22 that demonstrate the direct influence on BS in the context of *anirvacanīya*; on page 84, lines 90–92, to show the influence of VPvṛ on Mandana's formulation of *nirvikalpaka jñāna*.

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*prakṛtirūpānvitā vikārāḥ; vāgrūpānvitaṃ ca jagad ato vāco vipariṇāmo
vivartto vā 'vasīyate* | BS 18:1–3

śabdasya pariṇāmo 'yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ |
chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyavarttata || VP I.120

tadrūpopagrāhyaṃ jagat tadvivartta iti pratīmaḥ BS 18:17

bhedānukāreṇāsatyavibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartaḥ

<div align="right">VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, 5.</div>

4. Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana propound that entities are brought into being
   through language, with an argument that in the absence of language to refer to
   something, even the entity that exists cannot be distinguished from something
   that does not exist. Furthermore, it is language that gives the notion of existence
   at the level of linguistic construction:

*api ca santyarthā vyavahārikā yeṣāṃ śabdavivartād anyat na tattvam . . .
asantaś cālātacakraśaśaviṣāṇādayaḥ* | BS 18:17–20.

sadapi vāgvyavahāreṇānupagṛhītam artharūpam asatā tulyam |
*atyantasac ca prasiddhaṃ loke śaśaviṣāṇādi prāptāvirbhāvatirobhāvaṃ ca
gandharvanagarādi*

<div align="right">VPvṛ. See Biardeau 1964, pp. 180–181.</div>

5. Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana maintain that it is through language that someone
   is motivated to act or restrained from action:

pravṛttinivṛttyānuguṇyena śabdatattvam eva tathā tathā 'vabhāsate
<div align="right">BS 18:25–19.1.</div>

tat tu ... śabdatattvam ity abhidhīyate | *sthitipravṛttinivṛttivibhāgā hi
śabdena kriyante* | VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, pp. 3–4.

6. Maṇḍana posits that relation (*saṃsarga*) does not exist independent of its relata.
   The citation in BS echoes comparable language found in Bhartṛhari's text:

saṃsargo na saṃsargivyatirekeṇa kaścit BS 19:1–2.

*na ca guṇasāmānyaṃ śvetasamavāyi śvaityam ekatvād bhedahetuḥ
sambhavatīti saṃsargidharmāntarāśrayo 'vāntarasyaikasyāpi bhedaḥ
parikalpyate* VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 113.

7. In Advaita texts, the term *jñāna* is sometimes used to refer to the absolute that is
   described as the essential nature of awareness in itself, free from mental con-
   structs, and at other times, it is used to refer to cognition that arises through
   sense-object contact. Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana use this term to describe
   cognition and not as an absolute:

na jñeyaśūnyaṃ jñānam BS 19:2.
jñānaṃ jñeyaparatantram. VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 97.

<div align="right">🙋 Springer</div>

na vikalpapratyayo vāgrūpoparāgarahitaḥ. . .   BS 19:3.
jñānam api sarvaṃ vāgrūpamātrānugatam VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 185.

na hi jñeyagato vṛkṣādyākārāvagraho jñānasyaikatvena viruddhyate |
                                                   VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 12.

8. Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana point to the vocalic notes of *ṣaḍja* in the process
    of clarifying that although there is some cognition prior to the application of
    language, this cognition is not as vivid as it is after the application of language:

    yady api ṣaḍjādiṣu gavādiṣu ca prāk śabdāt jñānam asti, tathāpi na tādṛk
    yādṛk śabdaniveśād uttarasmin kāle | BS 19:5–6

    ṣaḍjarṣabhagāndhāradhaivataniṣādapañcamamadhyamānāṃ cānavasthita
    prasiddhasaṃvijñānapadānāṃ viśeṣo 'vadhāraṇanibandhanapadapratya-
    yam antareṇa nāvadhāryate | VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 175.

9. Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana maintain that naming something is essential for
    distinctly identifying an entity. The phrase they use in this description is identical:

    gopālāvipālādayo vivekajñānasiddhaye saṃjñāṃ niveśayanti BS 19:7–8

    gopālāvipālādayo   hi   nibandhanapadāni   prakalpya   gavādiṣu
    viśeṣaviṣayaṃ vyavahāram ārabhante | VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 175.

10. Maṇḍana explains that when language is applied, something is vividly cognized.
    He argues that in the absence of verbal application, cognition is not as trans-
    parent. The way Maṇḍana applies this example is comparable to its application
    in the VPvṛ:

    śabdasaṃsparśe 'rthe bodhotkarṣadarśanāt tatpratisaṃhāre ca sañcetitānām
    apy asañcetitakalpatvāt pathi gacchatas tṛṇādīnām apakarṣaṇāt vāgrūpā-
    dhīnam eva citaś cititvam BS 19:8–10.

    tadyathā tvaritaṃ gacchatas tṛṇaloṣṭādisaṃsparśāt satyapi jñāne kācid
    eva sā jñānāvasthā yasyām abhimukhībhūtaśabdabhāvanābījāyām
    āvirbhūtāsvarthopagrāhiṇām ākhyeyarūpāṇām anākhyeyarūpāṇāṃ ca
    śabdānāṃ pratyarthaniyatāsu śaktiṣu śabdānuviddhena śaktyanupātinā
    jñānenākriyamāṇa upagṛhyamāṇo vastvātmā jñānānugato vyak-
    tarūpapratyavabhāso jñāyata ity abhidhīyate
                                                   VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 184.

11. Bhartṛhari maintains that there is no cognition devoid of language. Maṇḍana posits
    that even in the absence of a conversation that can be heard, there nonetheless
    exists the subtle power of speech (*vākśakti*). These positions are identical:

    vākśaktir eva vā citiḥ tatpratisaṃhāre 'pi sūkṣmā vākśaktir ity eke
                                                                            BS 19:10–11.

    jñānam api sarvaṃ vāgrūpamātrānugatam | yāpy asañcetitāvasthā tasyām
    api sūkṣmo vāgdharmānugamo 'bhyāvarttate VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 185.

12. Maṇḍana develops his thesis that the awareness of the entities of cognition depends upon speech. This position appears to have been drawn from the *Vṛtti* on VP:

sarvathā vāgrūpādhīno jñeyabodha	BS 19:11.
vidyādayaś ca vāgrūpāyāṃ buddhau nibaddhā	VPvṛ 188.
sarvaṃ jñeyaṃ vāgrūpānvitaṃ gamyate.	BS 19:12.
sarvaṃ vāgrūpatānusāreṇa prakalpyate	VPvṛ 188.

13. *Avidyā* plays a vital role in the Advaita of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara. The VPvṛ cites some passages that may represent an Advaita that pre-dates Bhartṛhari. Maṇḍana's position regarding *avidyā* is comparable to that earlier articulation found in VPvṛ:

avidyākrīḍitam eva prapañcaḥ	BS 20:8.
mūrtikriyāvivartāv avidyāśaktipravṛttimārtam	
	Cited in VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 5.

14. Maṇḍana posits that the power of word is not found in entities out of the domain of functions. This can be compared with the position of Bhartṛhari:

na pravṛttisambandharahiteṣv artheṣu śabdānāṃ śaktir gamyate	BS 28:9
viṣayatvam anāpannaiḥ śabdair nārthaḥ prakāśyate	VP I.56

15. Both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana maintain that the application of language is not possible in the absence of an awareness of its meaning. The language Maṇḍana describes this issue is comparable to the position found in the *Vṛtti*:

anavagatasāmarthyāḥ śabdā bhūte 'rthe kathaṃ tad avagamayeyuḥ BS 28:9

prayuktesv api śabdeśuv apratītasvarūpeṣu śabdaviśeṣapratipattyarthaṃ kiṃ bhavān āhety āhuḥ VPvṛ. Biardeau 1964, p. 105

16. The supreme reality, in the philosophy of both Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana, is free from difference. The language Maṇḍana uses in describing this is stunningly similar to the VP and the *Vṛtti* thereon:

pratyastamitasakalaviśeṣaṃ tattvam.	BS 26:15.
pratyastamitabhedāyā yad vāco rūpam uttamam	VP I.18.
vigalitavibhāgodgrāhaṃ sarvavikalpātītam	BS 33:16.
sarvavikalpātīta ekasmin narthe sarvaśaktiyogād draṣṭēṇāṃ darśanavi-	
kalpāḥ	VPvṛ. Bierdeau 1964, p. 27.

17. Maṇḍana draws from VP or VPvṛ various terms and phrases indiscriminately. A few more citations demonstrate their comparability:

1. *kramavator hi vyāpārayoḥ*	BS 45:12.
kramavatā hi vyāpāreṇa	VPvṛ I.48.
2. *tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīyo*	BS 48:7.
tattvānyatvābhyām anākhyeyau.	Cited in VPvṛ I.1.

3. *ekasya hi vastunaḥ sāmarthyaviśeṣān nānāvabhāso 'bhyupeyatām*
                                                                                    BS 61:13–14.

ekasya hi brahmaṇas ... aniruktāvirodhiśaktyupagrāhyasya ...
paraspara-vilakṣaṇā bhoktṛbhoktavyabhogagranthayo vivartante
                                                                                    VPvṛ I.4.

Conclusion

This study of select examples from BS suggests that Maṇḍana very closely read VP and VPvṛ while composing his text. Maṇḍana's position is crucial to the subsequent development of Advaita. Besides the *Tattvasamīkṣā* commentary on BS, Vācaspati Miśra also wrote a commentary, *Bhāmatī*, on the *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya*. The position of Vācaspati is shaped by the philosophy of Maṇḍana and since Bhartṛhari has been shown to influence Maṇḍana, the commentarial tradition of Advaita Vedānta draws significantly upon the philosophy of language. Maṇḍana's discussion on difference (*bheda*) and the role of *avidyā* has an unmistakable imprint upon the philosophy of Vimuktātman and śrīharṣa. This discussion has already pointed out that both of these issues are shaped in Maṇḍana's writing by the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. This being the case, the philosophy of language has played a great role in the development of the non-dualist tradition of śaṅkara. It is not the intent of this paper, however, to demonstrate that the Advaita tradition is shaped simply by the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. The citations found in VPvṛ, for instance, are sufficient to demonstrate that there existed an early commentarial tradition following a monistic viewpoint that has also influenced the linguistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Based on the texts available now, it is reasonable to maintain that the philosophy of Maṇḍana is shaped in a great deal by the philosophy of Bhartṛhari.

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