Bhartṛhari and the Daoists on Paradoxical Statements

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Background

“This statement is false,” “I am a liar,” “This is unnamable,” are some paradoxical statements over which philosophers East and West have brainstormed for millennia. Whether we are reading LaoZi or Zeno of Elea, we are reminded of the limits of logical structure and linguistic expression. Studies on paradox have not just evolved but have branched off, with philosophers focusing on different types of paradoxes. In our times, Russell, Quine, Wittgenstein, Tarski, Kripke, or Strawson are a few individuals that have advanced arguments on resolving paradoxes. Statements such as ‘I am a liar’ are false if true and true if false, creating a paradox. Studies on this and other paradoxes have escaped the boundary of logic and language, as even contemporary physics is no exception to dealing with paradoxes. The scope of this paper is limited to analyzing a particular type of paradox, mostly the type that can be considered a set of contradictions, and the type that plays significant role in propositional logic. The approach is semantic and the objective is to analyze the arguments in resolving the paradox applied by the classical philosophers, Bhartṛhari in particular.
Bhartṛhari, a fifth century philosopher from India, introduces a set of problems involving linguistic expression. Some of these resonate with contemporary Western and classical Chinese discourses on proposition and truth, involving to some extent the issue of definability. Specifically, what measurements shall be taken to address a statement such as “I am a liar,” or does identifying something as unnameable amount to giving it a name? In this reading, I will examine some of the contemporary arguments upon the same subject just so that the classical positions, particularly that of Bhartṛhari, can be contextualized.

One of the key issues that lingers in the discourse on paradoxical statements involves negation. Whether expressed in negative terms, e.g., alive vs. not alive, or in oppositional terms, e.g., alive vs. dead, a fact cannot contain both possibilities. Is the question, ‘When did you stop smoking?’ applicable for someone who never smoked, or can negation be a possible answer to this question? In the case of the liar’s paradox and many other contradictions, a general tendency among classical Indian and Chinese philosophers appears to be that of interpreting them and rather than leaving them as paradoxical, a real virodha in Sanskrit terms, they leave it as paradoxical merely in its appearance (virodhābhāsa), a statement whose paradoxicality can be resolved after a proper analysis. This analysis that resolves the paradoxical situation cannot be a mere presentation of the facts, for instance, explaining that morning star and evening star are not stars but a planet. This, in fact, requires an identification, the morning star is Venus, and so also is the evening star. The additional information, the negation of Venus being a star, is an additional fact, which is not required for explaining the paradox. A verse often cited in classical texts collects some contradictions and paradoxes:

\[
ešavandhyāsutoyātiśaśaśṛigadhanurdharah
kūrmakṣiracayesnātaḥkhapuspakṛtaśekharah
\]
Here comes the son of a barren woman carrying a bow made of the horn of a rabbit and wearing on his forehead the sky-flower, having bathed in the milk of tortoise.

The problem is, while one may get around some apparently contradictory statements through exposition, statements such as 'this is the son of a barren woman' is straightforward, similar to the statement, 'this statement is false,' and so begs no exposition. In such cases, classical Indian philosophers identified a case of \textit{alika}, (or \textit{tuccha} according to the Advaitins), and broadly defined them as the entities that are outside of the scope of cognition (\textit{jñānāviśaya}). To what extent is the paradoxical statement subject to interpretation is not just a contemporary problem. In our times we have Russell, Quine, Tarski, Kripke, or Strawson, just to name a few, that address the particular type of paradoxes described above. What I would like to explore in the following pages is how this type of paradox is identified and understood by Bhartṛhari. While doing so, I will focus on the domains that have not been properly addressed in the contemporary discourse on the same topic. I will also explore the possibility of bridging these issues with the classical Chinese philosophers in order to expand the scope of this inquiry.

However, the scope of paradoxical statements is not always identical in Eastern and Western modes of thinking. The Vedic ritual debates, the \textit{brahmodya}, could have given birth to paradoxical thinking in classical India. Paradoxes comprise a significant part of literature in India and China, tagging along with metaphors and other poetic tropes. What I find significant in both the classical Indian and Chinese modes of thinking, despite my reservations to the stereotype of the Chinese mind hypothesis, is that paradoxes are used as tools by these traditions, as if a particular class of language is utilized to describe reality when the everyday language fails to accomplish the task. In addition, these cultures find
paradoxicality as an occasion to explore solutions, as the classical exegetes feast on these examples to find their philosophy. The deeper layer of language, paśyantī in Bhartṛhari’s terms, is in itself paradoxical: it accomplishes contradictory tasks. In both Daoist and Bhartṛhari’s worlds, paradox is subsumed in light of the recognition of higher reality. Paradoxical statements are treated on some occasions as mystical, and this matter alone would require a separate treatment. Rather than considering the process of thinking in correlation or association to be uniquely Asian, I would like to conclude with a note in this paper that Indian and Chinese cultures uniquely apply metaphoric language and are exemplary for ‘thinking along or thinking through paradoxes.’

Bhartṛhari on Paradoxical Statements

Herzbergers (1981) brought to mainstream discourse some of the paradoxical statements in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya (VP). To clarify this discussion, I would offer the three key verses:

When something (yad) is described as “unsignifiable,” if that is ascertained as something that is described in terms of unsignifiable, [it] then becomes signified.

If, on the other hand, [even the term ‘unsignifiable’] is itself unsignifiable, then the entity {tad = inherence} will not be ascertained, and the very state of what is intended to [to be conveyed] will not be determined. When something is described as unsignifiable, whether in terms of association (tathā), dissociation (anyathā), or in the absolute sense (sarvathā), even in those contexts, those words do not reject that very situation.
While this small passage has generated significant amount of conversation in contemporary discourse, I fail to see most of the assumptions that have been proposed, particularly the "paradox" that Bhartrhari supposedly treats as a real paradox. Bhartrhari does say that we use language to say that something is indeterminable. This, however, is not to reject the determinability of the very situation that is identified as indeterminable. The passage is clear, Bhartrhari is explaining the paradoxical situation and resolving the paradox, and if by resolving the situation, it turns out to be non-paradoxical, this is not a problem for Bhartrhari. What is evident though is that Bhartrhari is aware of a paradoxical situation of self-referentiality. The approach Bhartrhari has applied can be expanded further; his insight can be applied to other cases such as "I am a liar" or "This statement is not true."

Paradoxical Statements in the Daoist Context

The situations where the paradoxical statements appear in the Daoist literature somewhat resemble the situation that Bhartrhari has identified. It often relates to the limitation of language, in the ways language cannot go beyond conceptuality, and the Dao stands outside the realm of concept and language. Since the Dao is ineffable, any description including this very statement, poses paradoxicality. As Lao Tzu says, the Dao is "infinite, boundless and unnameable." He understood the Dao to be nameless, and reminds us that "as soon as there are names, know that it is time to stop." We can import the conversation above, and make the same argument that the unnamability thesis does not apply to this condition of the Dao being unnamable. Both Lao Tzu and Bhartrhari are situating their secular discourse in light of the absolute, the Brahman in the case of Bhartrhari and the Dao in the case of Lao Tzu. Even the discourse on the namability or signifiability of inherence or any such entity in Bhartrhari's discourse does not
transcend the metaphysical background of the Brahman being above language and still being expressed through language. For Bhartṛhari, all cognitions are penetrated by word, and thus there is no language-free consciousness. He also goes on to argue that all words essentially convey the very absolute, while particularities are mentally construed. Following T'angChün-I, Lao Tzu’s statements concerning the Dao do not refer to the ultimate reality, but to the principle of space that is compared with the ‘air route in the sky’ (Ch’ien 1984, 376). The real challenge for Bhartṛhari, unlike what the contemporary scholars have identified in discussing paradox, is that of determining the scope of language in describing the absolute. Since the absolute Brahman is the singular reality, the failure of language to describe it would make language unable to describe the truth. On the other hand, language cannot escape the parameters of conceptuality and thus cannot name the unnamable. This provides a platform where the Daoists can interact with the Indian thinkers such as Bhartṛhari.

Following are some of the most common paradoxical statements found in the Daoist literature. The first are a set from Hui Shi’s writings:

1. The south has no limit and has a limit. (H6 in Fung 2006, 41).
2. I go to the state of Yue today and arrived there yesterday. (H7 in Fung 2006, 41).
3. I know the center of the world; it is north of Yan and south of Yue. (H9 in ibid.)
4. Love all things equally; the universe is one. (H10 in ibid.)

Additional statements made by sophists are also of comparative interest:

1. A white dog is black (S8 in Fung 2006, 41).
2. Fire is not hot. (S10 in Fung 2006, 42).
3. Eyes do not see. (S12, ibid.).
4. The shadow of a flying bird never moves. (S16, ibid.).
5. The rapid motion of a flying arrow consists of moments in which the arrow is neither in motion nor at rest (S17, ibid.).

6. If a rod one foot in length is cut every day by one half of its length, it will still have something left even after ten thousand generations. (S21, ibid.).

Yet another example from Gongsun Long

There are no things [in the world] that are without zhi, but this zhi is not zhi. (G4 in Fung 2006, 43).

These examples are just a few among the many listed by Fung, but these may suffice for our examination of the paradoxical statements in order to explore the hermeneutic strategy employed by both the Indian and Daoist masters.

Resolving the Paradox: The Semantic Approach of Bhartrhari

Starting with Ganguli’s (1963) initial report, Bierdeau (1964), Herzbergers (1981), Davis (1978), Houben (1995), and Parsons (2001) have analyzed the paradoxical statements in Bhartrhari’s VP through various approaches. The primary focus of these studies has been to address paradoxical statements of self-referentiality. What dominates these studies is the tendency that often fails to see the texts in themselves or the tendency to ignore the exegetical approach of Bhartrhari while assigning multiple paradoxes to his name. My own reading aligns to some degree with that of Houben, who explains the paradox of inexpressibility in light of the way Bhartrhari deals with the Liar paradox. In my understanding, the interpretive technique that paradoxes are a set of linguistic problems which can be resolved by means of explaining the intent of the speaker or by limiting referentiality of language, is central to Bhartrhari’s methods and his hermeneutics resembles that of Daoist scholasticism.

Bhartrhari is not interested in creating paradoxes: his focus is on resolving them by relying on his
hermeneutics. In contrast of the arguments of Herzbergers and Matilal, Houben argues that although Bhartrhari raises the issue of ‘unnameability paradox,’ it is not the intent of Bhartrhari to leave it unresolved. This is to argue that there are no unresolved paradoxes and therefore there are no paradoxes. When analyzing the unnameability paradox, Houben rejects Helarāja’s conclusion that the entity considered unnamable is addressed as ‘something’ and therefore it is namable as ‘something.’ His argument is, if the speaker intends to express that something is unsignifiable and if this unsignifiability cannot be expressed and it becomes signified, then the problem moves to the second level, the unsignifiability of ‘something being unsignifiable.’ Houben points out of infinite regress that occurs when following this line of argument.

If we follow Bhartrhari, language reveals the intent of the speaker rather than resolving the problem by adopting a correspondence theory of language. For him, the role of language is to express the pratyayas inherent to the speaking subject. If the speaker has the concept that there is something that cannot be expressed, this concept is expressed exactly through those words. On the other hand, if the unsignifiability is understood as a strong case, that there indeed are some instances of mental events that are not interpenetrated with language, it would contradict with one of the central theses of Bhartrhari that there exists no pratyaya that is devoid of word.

Bhartrhari’s treatment of doubt supports the argument that he is not relying on correspondence theory and the role of language for him is to merely express mental images (pratyayas). He argues, one cannot be in doubt of whether he is doubting. This example only serves if we accept that mental states are directly given. However, if we follow that mental states are revealed through correspondence, one could be doubting whether he is in doubt or not. This is the same case with ascertainment (niścaya), discussed in the next
verse (SS 24). Bhartrhari introduces the Liar paradox in this context (SS 25). Following Bhartrhari, the intent of this statement is merely to express the objective of the speaker, who is not using this sentence to refer to itself but rather to refer to something else. He gives the example: this thesis has no probans (SS 27). In this example, the statement is not referring to itself, but what is meant by ‘thesis’ is something else. Based on this treatment of paradoxes, it becomes clear that Bhartrhari does not treat them on the basis of ‘true’ or ‘false’ statements, but rather, he resolves the paradox. When resolved, a paradox is no longer a paradox.

Bhartrhari’s treatment of similar situations needs to be explored in light of the aforementioned strategy, where paradoxes are not abandoned alone, but are considered a challenge for the exegetes. In order for us to investigate Bhartrhari’s strategy to deal with this situation, we can explore a few examples from VP and VPvr:

1. One is many (VP 1.2).
2. The powers identical [to itself] are aggregated in the Brahman of the nature of word without contradicting [its] oneness.
3. Speech is one and has many forms.
4. [The absolute] is beyond distinctions and oneness.
5. Brahman is both cause and effect, distinct and non-distinct.
6. Appearances such as form and action are merely the functioning of the power of ignorance and they are indescribable in essential cognition either as that or as other.
7. The self of the world is transcendent to oneness and plurality, being and non-being, sequence and non-sequence, truth and untruth.
8. That [absolute] is near and far away.
9. Brahman is pure but attains manifoldness due to ignorance.
10. The power of action [inherent to] time \{tasya\} that is being distinguished in the form of portions that are endowed with sequence impose distinction there [in time] that is pertinent to the portion of vikāra.\textsuperscript{18}

11. The one exists in multiple forms of enjoyer, enjoyment, and the object of enjoyment.\textsuperscript{19}

12. Although one, [it] is described in various ways. (VP 1.5).

13. Although speech is distinguished in space and while having distinction in form, it is nevertheless not outside the designation by one designator.\textsuperscript{20}

14. Since sound is born of sequence, this is neither the first nor the last. While devoid of sequence, [it] manifests as if having distinction [and] in sequence (VP 1.48).

15. The sudden and sequential [aspects] of sound \{tasya\} do not exist in contradiction with oneness and eternity.\textsuperscript{21}

16. Letters do not exist in a word, and there are no [distinct] limbs in letters. There is no absolute distinction of the words from a sentence (VP 1.73).

17. Although cognition is non-distinct and formless, it manifests in distinct forms assuming [the forms of] the entities of cognition.\textsuperscript{22}

18. The distinctions of speech manifest as if distinct while without exceeding oneness.\textsuperscript{23}

Most frequently occurring paradoxes are in the presentation of paśyantī, the inner speech identical to consciousness:

1. paśyantī is [the speech] where the sequence has been retrieved and is endowed with the power of sequence while remaining indistinct.\textsuperscript{24}

2. [paśyantī] is both moving and not moving.\textsuperscript{25}

3. [paśyantī] is both covered [with defilements] and pure.\textsuperscript{26}
4. [paśyanti] is endowed with the forms of the entities of cognition, is with forms dissolved, and is formless.27
5. [paśyanti] is revealing all the conditioned entities, revealing the intermixed entities, and withdrawn from revealing all the entities.28

There are a number of passages cited in VPvr that demonstrate the same paradoxical case:
1. Or, there was just non-being in the beginning (BĀU 6.1.1.1.).
2. Neither was there being nor was non-being (RV 10.129.1).
3. A blind man pierced the gems, a man without fingers wove that, a man without a neck wore that, and a man without tongue praised that (TaiĀ 1.11.5).
4. The single self divides into being and non-being.29
5. Consciousness is potent with many seeds, both expressed and inexpressed.30
6. That functions and that does not function (ĪśU 5).
7. Even a portion of Brahman does not exceed its universal form and is free from vikalpas31
8. The very name manifested as the form, and the form dwelt in the essence of name. They distinguished the one that [in fact] is undistinguished in one. Others say that there is [an inherent] distinction as is before.32

Paradox and Interpretation: Engaging Bhartṛhari and the Daoists

This brief conversation is sufficient to demonstrate that (1) thinking about paradoxes is common to the philosophers East and West, and also that (2) Asiatic thinking can be specified for ‘thinking through paradoxes,’ or for using paradoxical statements as a tool for language to carry out a specific semantic function that the ordinary language fails to conduct. This conversation points to the assumption that classical Indian and Chinese philosophers do not understand
‘paradox’ in the absolute sense, as they come up with overarchings theories that gives coherent meaning to apparently paradoxical statements. In this paradigm, apparent paradoxicality, just like metaphor, does not escape the rational space while stretching beyond the literal meaning. As Fung argues, paradoxical statements do not exceed rationality as long as they serve the purpose of presenting the thesis or aspects of what is being described (Fung 2006, 4). The problem, for instance in Zeno’s paradox, is not that of lacking interpretation. One can situate ontological paradoxes on this ground and expand them for addressing the Mādhyamika paradoxes that revolve around the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā). For Bhārtṛhari and the Daoists, paradoxicality is a situation that needs hermeneutic endeavor. The problems we face by means of paradox, in this light, are of semantic nature. The examples such as ‘I am a liar,’ or ‘This statement is false’ are exemplary, particularly to explain the position of Bhārtṛhari.

If something is paradoxical, it cannot be resolved by interpretation, and if it can, than it is only appearing as paradoxical. At least, in the case of the antinomians, following Quine’s classification, the truth-value cannot be ascertained. After analyzing numerous apparently paradoxical statements, Fung argues that none of these can be labeled as antinomian, or as the liar’s paradox (Fung 2006, 8). From the list above, Fung points out that none of the H6, H7, or H9 can be considered antinomian. Rather than relying on absolute truth, Daoist masters, just like Buddhist philosophers, describe relative truth. This relativity has prompted some to argue that Chinese philosophy is not in a truth-seeking mission. What is missing in this position is the understanding that to describe truth in relative terms is nonetheless to describe the truth.

How the exegesis resolves paradoxes is vivid in the case of S16: “The shadow of a flying bird never moves.” This is apparently paradoxical, as the shadow of the bird
moves along as the bird flies. However, shadow is not an entity having motion of its own, and as Fung points out, "unlike Zeno’s flying arrow, the so-called “moving” shadow can neither possess inertia nor have forces acting directly upon it. Dynamically the shadow cannot engage in action" (Fung 2006, 14). A shadow is dependent upon another phenomenon and so the action of flying cannot be lying on the shadow, although it is imposed on it.

While explaining the Mohist canons, Harbsmeier argues that some of the statements are only apparently paradoxical, while others are rooted on conceptual confusion (1998, 342). In essence, most of it can be grouped into veridical and falsifiable statements, and not in the category of antinomians. While reading On the Uniformity of All Things, we can find that Mohists are not fond of paradoxes, and the objective of apparently paradoxical statements are to transcend the relative predicament. This aspect of transcending relativity is vivid in Zhuanzi, and this is what draws the position of Bhartrhari relatively closer. And this position brings into crisis Tanaka’s view that the Daoist paradoxes cannot be ultimately resolved and we are left with their paradoxes (Tanaka 2004, 192). When reading paradoxes, what is missing in this stance is the commentarial tradition.

Tanaka’s understanding underlies the assumption that Western philosophers consider language as representational, while language, following the classical Chinese philosophers, “prescribes acceptable behaviors in society” (Tanaka 2004, 192). In his presentation, Tanaka places the Indian philosophy of language in alignment with the Western counterpart. The problem is that, while Nyāya or some other schools are explicit in adopting this representational model of language, injunction and prohibition are primary roles of language for the Mīmāmsakas, and Bhartrhari is indebted to this school in his central categories of language.
Shendao’s distinction between discourse dao and performance dao, wherein the first provides ashi-fei or ‘this’ and ‘not this’ discrimination and the second, also identified as the great dao, while achieving everything, does not provide the distinction of ‘this’ and ‘not this,’ parallels Bhartṛhari’s depiction of paśyantī. Paśyantī has two forms. Its parāpaśyantī form is transcendent to world events and is always pure, being never enmeshed with the phenomena. The lower aspect of paśyantī that manifests in sequence and partakes verbal exchange is both impure and the cause of ontological and epistemological categories. Just like the śabda Brahman of Bhartṛhari that, in its pure form of paśyantī, permeates everything, and abides shining alone, the actual performance dao is depicted in terms as: “Dao is that which leaves nothing out” (Tanaka 2004, 196).

Rather than maintaining paradoxes, this stratification of dao, in my opinion, helps resolve paradoxes. This at least is the case with Bhartṛhari’s paśyantī.

Like the commentators on Zhuanzi, Bhartṛhari’s genius is not in introducing paradoxes. Vedic literature is replete with apparent contradiction, echoing the saying that “gods love the indirect.” Whether in the Nāsadiya statement, “there was neither being nor non-being then,” or in the statement, “there indeed existed non-being in the beginning,” paradoxes are everywhere. The challenge Bhartṛhari undertakes is to make a coherent sense out of these apparently paradoxical statements. In his opinion, Brahman is above the tension of paradoxicality. The phenomenal realm, the playground of the powers inherent to Brahman, is where the paradoxes lie. Since the powers inherent to Brahman are mutually exclusive, it is due to their inherent tension that the realm of phenomenal experience gives rise to the paradox.

Just like the stratification of dao allows the Daoist masters to retain its manifest and dynamic aspect while maintaining its transcendent nature, we find a similar solution in the distinction of īṭa and satya. Reality, in
this depiction, has two aspects, one phenomenal, that is always in dynamism and is depicted in terms of ṛta, while the absolute, the transcendent, is depicted in terms of satya. This is vivid in vyavahāra - paramārtha distinction in Mahāyāna literature.

It is therefore safe to argue that, for Bhartṛhari as well as for the Daoist philosophers, the world the way it appears is paradoxical, and not their teachings. If interpreted adopting Bhartṛhari’s hermeneutics, the act of seeing the motion in a shadow of a flying bird, an example from the Daoist literature, it is only a superimposition, an adhyāsa, of the properties of a bird in relation to its shadow. This is due to ignorance that the properties of the source are imposed in the target, making superimposition possible. For Bhartṛhari, this superimposition is at the heart of phenomenality. And the ‘instructions’ (śāstra) are not prescribed to reaffirm this illusion, but rather to awaken its readers from this vicious chain of paradox. I believe this also is the case with the Daoist texts.

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Abbreviations

BĀU Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
ĪŚU Īśāvāsyopaniṣadā
RV Rgveda
TāiĀ Taittirīyāraṇyaka
VP Vākyapadiya
VPvr Vākyapadiya-Vṛtti
References


NOTES

1. I have presented this verse just the way I heard from my teachers. The closest reference to this verse that I could find follows:

\[\text{mrgatṛṣṇāṃbhasisnātaḥkhapuspakṛtaśekharah} / \]
\[\text{eṣavandhyāsutoyātiśaśaśrīngadhanurdharah} | \]
\[\text{Āgamaḍambara 10.} \]

2. See Jhalakikar 1996, 81, for further discussion.


4. Recognizing the typically different nature of discourse in China, Granet, Needham, and a number of other scholars have identified thinking in ancient China as “correlative thinking” or “associative thinking” that is juxtaposed with the Western “analytical thinking.” Graham provides a counter argument that correlative thinking is not necessarily a logical, arguing that “the analytical upper layer which is thicker and denser in the West is grounded on the correlative stratum of thinking which is more fully exposed in China” (Graham 1986, 23). For a systematic treatment of these viewpoints, see Fung 2006.

5. Fung argues that “thinking in correlation or association is not other thinking than the analytic kind; it is just the rational thinking in correlation or association” (Fung 2006, 4). I argue that these observations are too narrow, as these are just variants of metonymic thinking and contemporary research on cognitive linguistics has revealed that this process is ubiquitous.

6. \[\text{avācyamitiyadvācyam} \text{ tad avācyatayāyadā} / \]
\[\text{vācyamityavasiyetavācyamevatadābhavet} // \]
\[\text{athāpyavācyamityevamna} \text{ tad vācyampratiyate} / \]
\[\text{vivakṣitasyāvāsthaśaivaśnādhyavasiye} // \]
\[\text{tathānyathāsarvathācayasyāvācyatvamucyate} / \]
\[\text{tatprāpinivaśvasthātaiḥśabdaiḥpratiṣidhyate} // \]
\[\text{Sambandhasamuddeśa 20-22.} \]
Terence Parsons (2001, 532) correctly raises the issue of questioning his own reading of what Bhartrhari has actually said, moving beyond reading this passage either as referring to the noun, signification, as has Herzberger meant, or as the act of signifying something, as has Parsons himself understood. In my reading, I am closely reading the passage in light of Helaraja's Prakāśa commentary and Raghunātha's Ambākarto commentary.

10. ekatvasyāvirodhenasaśabdatattvebrahmanisamuccitā-virodhīnāya-ātmabhūtāhāsaktayaḥ | VPvr 1.2.
11. This is based on the citation on VPvr: süksmām. . ekām. . . nānārupamātmanisannivistām | Cited in VPvr 1.1.
12. bhedasamsargasamatikrameṇaśasamāviṣṭam. . . (VPvr 1.1).
13. kāryakāraṇātmaskasyaviḥkātviḥkātasyaikāshabhaṃnaḥ. . . (VPvr 1.1).
14. mūrttikriyāvivartauavidyāśaktipravṛttimātram tau vidyātmantattvābhīhāmaṇākhyeyau | VPvr 1.1.
15. vyatītobhedasamsargaḥbhāvābhāvaṃkramākramaḥ | satyānte tecaviśvātmāpravekātprakaṣate | VPvr 1.1.
16. antaryāmisabhubhānāmārāddūrecadrṣyate | VPvr 1.1.
17. tathēdamamṛtam brahma nirvikāramavidyāḥ | kaluṣataṃvāṇamibhandharaṃpamvivartate | Cited in VPvr 1.1.
18. tasyakramavadhīmātrāryāḥkārtṛśaktirvibhayāmānā-vikāramātrāgataṃbhadharaṃpamtrādyāropatī. . . | VPvr 1.1.
19. ekasyasarvabījasyayasyaceyanamanekadāḥ | bhokṭrbhokṭavyārūṇēnbhogarūṇaṃcaśthitiḥ | VP 1.4.
20. yathāvāgdesabhedabhināsātīyapisvarūpabhedekābhe-dheyinibandhanatvamavyatikrānta | VPvr 1.5.
21. tasyatukramayaugapadyenityatvaikatvābhīyaṃviro-dhānnavidyete | VPvr 1.48.
22. abhinnampiṃjñānamarūpamsarvajñeyopaghāhitvādbhe-dharūpatayāpratyaṭvabhāsate. . . | VPvr 1.86.
23. ekatvamanatikrāntāvānnetrāvānṇibandhāḥ | prthakpratyaṭvabhāsantevāgvībhāgavādayāḥ | cited in VPvr 1.118.
25. *śācalācalā* | ibid.
27. *sanniviṣṭajñeyākārāpratilīnākārānīkārāca* | ibid.
29. *... saṭṭvāsattvābhyāmekaātmāvibhajyate* | Cited in VPvr 1.8.
30. *vivṛṭāvivṛttambahudhānakāmca itanyam* | Cited in VPvr 1.8.
31. *pradeśo īpi brahmaṇaḥsārvarūpyamanatikrāntaścāvikalpaśca* | Cited in VPvr 1.9.
32. *nāmaivedamarūpatvenavavṛterūpamedamāṃbhāveva tasthe* 
   *eke tad ekamavibhaktāṃvibhejuḥprāgivānyebhedarūpam va- 
   danti* | Cited in VPvr 1.12.
33. While a significant number of scholars do not see *śūnyatā* as a metaphysical or ontological position, I am making *śūnyatā* a metaphysical issue only in relation to those classical philosophers to whom it thus represents.
34. *parokṣapriyāiva hi devāḥ* | . . . Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad IV 2.2.