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Trichur S. Rukmani

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11

Linguistic and Cosmic Powers
The Concept of Śakti in the Philosophies of Bhartṛhari and Abhinavagupta

Sthaneshwar Timalsina*

Śakti: The Power of Language

In general, the term *śakti* means force: the power of words to signify their referents, or the cosmic power or powers pertinent to gods in general, or to *Brahman*.[1] The concept of linguistic power is central to Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. At its apogee in the Trika tradition, the cosmic nature of *śakti* refers to the procreative cosmic force identified by the term *vimarśa* (reflection) that is inseparable from *prakāśa*, or awareness. In Trika philosophy, these two aspects are identified with the primordial couple, Śiva and Śakti, and are addressed as inseparable. This divine Śakti embodies all that exists, gives rise to sequence, and thus is instrumental for causing events to occur. Tāntric Kaula tradition elaborates upon the personal and embodied nature of this energy. Although these linguistic, cosmic, and embodied aspects of *śakti* appear distinct and similar in terms, a close examination of the philosophies of Bhartṛhari and Abhinavagupta allows us to establish a nuanced relation of these concepts.

Contrary to theological schools, Indian philosophical systems consistently use the term *śakti* to refer to linguistic power. The central debate between Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya concerning the expressive power of language can be synthesized as the positions regarding the universal, the particular, or their combination as what is expressed by language. Although Bhartṛhari's concept of *śakti* is still related to the signifying

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* Department of Religious Studies, San Diego State University

1. For treatment on *śakti*, see Larson 1974, Cefalu 1973, and Padoux 1990. For the concept of *pratibhā*, see Kaviraj 1924, Joshi 1977, Rukmani 1987, Dragonetti and Tola 1990, Kuanpoonpol 1991.

power of language, it is much wider, and Bhartṛhari is aware of these positions while promulgating his own theory of language. It does not take time to notice that linguistic expression in Bhartṛhari's philosophy does not merely describe the phenomenal reality: his *śabda* is identical to *Brahman*, and is also the means to reveal the highest truth. This self-revealing aspect of language is what particularly links Bhartṛhari with subsequent Trika philosophers.[2] The Vedic Mīmāṃsā philosophers, Bhartṛhari, and the Trika philosophers all present their response to the metaphysical question, how can the supreme reality that is not grasped by other means of knowledge be expressed through language and cognized through linguistic apprehension?

Two concepts found in the expressive power of language are crucial to the current discussion. The Nyāya position appears secularized while emerging from a theological foundation, as the early concept of expressive power is distinctively the "Will of God" (*īśvarecchā*), while this becomes merely the will of the user of a word to signify a specific object.[3] This will in the Trika paradigm is both the dormant will among the individuals, and the Will of Śiva that is manifest in the form of the world. Next, the scope of linguistic expression, both as universal and particular, demonstrates the expressive power of language to embody the totality in its subsequent theological twist, while still referring to the particulars.[4]

Bhartṛhari analyses the two different positions that words describe the particular or the universal in two separate chapters of the *Vākyapadīya* (VP). In the *Jāti-Samuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari asserts that when a speaker uses a word, it is his intention that determines whether it is a universal or a particular that is meant. He identifies the "superimposition of conception" (*adhyāropa-kalpanā*) as what occurs in the process of knowing particulars

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2. Besides conceptual connections, there are also historical links between Bhartṛhari and the Trika philosophers. Bhartṛhari has remained popular among the Kāśmīri scholars. Both Helārāja and Puṇyarāja, the commentators on Bhartṛhari's texts, hail from Kashmir. Trika philosophers such as Somānanda prominently engage the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, even when they are rejecting his view. The most compelling reason, however, is that Helārāja is one of the teachers of Abhinava. Abhinava is noticeably respectful to Bhartṛhari, as he often cites from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.

3. It is Vātsyāyana to first bring "desire" (*icchā*) to the discussion of the designating power of words, and for him, the primacy of universal or particular relies on the desire of the speaker. See the commentary of Vātsyāyana on *NS* 2.2.63.

4. For universal as the significance of language, see the *Bhāṣya* of Śabara on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.30–35. For Kumārila's defense of universal as the signified, see the *Ākṛtivāda* section in the *Ślokavārttika*.

after comprehending the universal directly signified by word. This discussion favours "universal" as the meaning, defining the universal property as something common to all members of a class that distinguishes the particular members of that class from other classes.[5] In the next chapter, Dravya-Samuddeśa, Bhartṛhari identifies "substance" as the essential nature (*ātman*), an entity (*vastu*), and the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) or reality (*tattva*). In this discussion, the generic form (*ākāra*) is referred to as something that helps one to know the intrinsic nature of the entity. The *dravya* discussed in this section is not the particular that is born or is perishable, but rather, it is the essential nature, the true nature of the substance that is free from origin or destruction.[6] What is noteworthy in Bhartṛhari's discussion is the way he understands "universal," where *sattā* is the highest universal, which is identical to *pratibhā*, and is understood as what is essentially referred to by words. The description that the very *ātman* is the referent of a word or that the very essential being is the meaning, transcends the dichotomy of the phenomenal and the real; his neutral terminology embraces both meanings. This also helps to establish a link between linguistic power expressed in terms of "fitness" (*yogyatā*)[7] and metaphysical power. Although various aspects of linguistic power are absent in the cosmic depiction of Śakti, nuances shared by Bhartṛhari and the Trika philosophers such as Abhinava allow us to establish a link between these two systems.

Śakti as the Causal Factor

The concept of *śakti* in Bhartṛhari's philosophy is wider than the mere signifying power of language in the common sense. Identified in plurality (*VP* 1.2), these *śaktis* located in *Brahman* are of a mutually exclusive character.[8] While remaining the power of the word principle," their existence does not contradict the singularity of *Brahman*, as these are described as the very self-nature of the *Brahman*. Since the word principle is the essence of all these powers, having multiple *śaktis* does not connote

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5. This discussion comes from the Jāti-Samuddeśa of VP. See Coward and Raja 1990: 154.

6. This topic is elaborated in the exposition of the *sūtra* "siddhe śabdārthasambandhe" on MB 1.1.1. "*evam hi dṛṣyate loke ... ākṛtyupamardanena dravyameva śiṣyate*." — Ibid.

7. *indriyāṇām stavisayasaṃbandhi yogyatā yathā | anādirarthaiḥ śabdānām saṃbandho yogyatā tathā ||* — VP 3.3.29.

8. *ekatvaṣṭivirodhena śabdatattve brahmaṇi samuccita virodhinya ātmabhūtāḥ śaktayaḥ?* | — VP 1.2. Iyer 1966, p. 16, lines 1-2.

9. *brahmedaṃ śabdanirmāṇaṃ śabdaśaktinibandhanam* | — Cited in VPvṛ on VP 1.1. Iyer 1966, p. 14, line 3.

duality.[10] Of the various powers of *śabda*, Bhartṛhari identifies two among them, direction (*dik*) and time (*kāla*), with terminology similar to that applied to consciousness (*caitanya*).[11] This similarity is particularly crucial in comparing Bhartṛhari's philosophy with the Trika system.

Crucial to a comparison of the linguistic power discussed in *VP* with the concept of Śakti in Trika philosophy, consciousness in Trika system is identified as the "light" (*prakāśa*) that is never devoid of self-reflection (*vimarśa*). Relying on the concept that awareness is always self-aware, Trika philosophers propound that these two aspects of consciousness are inseparable. The early terminology of neuter gender *caitanya* shifts to feminine *citi* to describe consciousness, and this is linked with this relationship of cosmic power with the power of linguistic expression.[12]

The issue of the number of energies is central to both the Trika categorization of divine energies and Bhartṛhari's philosophy of expressive power. While Bhartṛhari lists four pertinent powers of language, he also cites a position that holds six different powers (*VP* 3.7.35). This identification is noteworthy, because the energies that give rise to plurality are described as beyond distinctness and identity,[13] and the entity that is the substrate for these energies is described as free from all mental constructions.[14] Just like *kāla* and *deśa* are two central categories within which all Śaivite categories are found, these two powers are pertinent to Bhartṛhari's discourse on language. Allowing us to identify a further link, the *śaktis* in Bhartṛhari's philosophy allow the word principle to manifest successively through the power of sequence (*krama-śakti*) in the forms of word and sentence.[15] Following this presentation, word-meaning can be cognized only in sequence (*kramagrāhya*), and it does not transcend the conditions of subject and object in the sequence of manifestation.[16] Through

10. *sarvaśaktyātmabhūtatvam ekasyaiveti nirṇayaḥ* | — VP 3.1.22.
11. *caitanyavat sthitā loke dikkālaparikalpanā* | —VP 3.6.18.
12. For instance, see the terminology of Utpala in *IP* 1.5.13 that addresses *parā vāc* and *citi* in the same breath.
13. ...*bhedasaṁsargasamatikrameṇa samāviṣṭaṁ sarvābhiḥ śaktibhir vidyāvidyāpravibhāga-rūpam aprarūbhāgam* . . . — VPvṛ on VP 1.1. Iyer 1966, p. 1, line 3 – p. 2, line 1. *tad evaṁ apṛthaktvaṁ pṛthakpratyavabhāsānām api mithaḥ sarvaśaktīnām* | —VPvṛ on VP 1.2. Iyer 1966, p. 17, line 2.
14. ...*sarvavikalpātīta ekasminn arthe sarvaśaktiyogād draṣṭṝṇāṁ darśanavikalpaḥ* . . . —VPvṛ in VP 1.9. Iyer 1966, p. 35, lines 4-5.
15. VP 1.86. See also: *sa tu evaṁ pratiṣṭhaḥ* ... *kramaśaktiḥ pratigṛhṇāti* | —VPvṛ in VP 1.51. Iyer 1966, p. 110, line 5 – p. 111, line 2.
16. VP 1.52 and the *Vṛtti* (*VPvṛ*) thereon.

the association of interacting powers, this word principle becomes many, just as the earth element transforms into the form of plants.[17] The aspects of "sequence" addressed while addressing linguistic power is contextual for reading the Tantric Krama system, as it adopts the same premise while addressing the sequence of Kālis. This philosophy of sequence not only describes the soteriological order, but it also grounds the ontological and epistemic orders.

Bhartṛhari identifies entities as the constellation of *śaktis*.[18] Since the *śaktis*, to which he refers, are the powers of the word principle, the objects of cognition, following this line, are merely the fusion of various powers inherent to the word principle. The commentary on *VP* 3.7.2 further confirms this position by stating that, "pot, etc. are merely the constellation of powers."[19] Just like specific energies in a *maṇḍala* embody further energies within, Bhartṛhari asserts that there are further *śaktis* within *śaktis*. In other words, a *śakti* can simultaneously be the power of one entity and also endowed with further powers.[20] Bhartṛhari's discourse on power paves the path for refining Trika notion of Śakti, as can be seen in Abhinava's definition of *śakti*, that it is the essential form of the entities assumed by the subject (*Tantrāloka*, hereafter *TĀ*, 1.69). The *śaktis* in Bhartṛhari's cosmology are neither one nor many (*VP* 3.7.39).[21] Paralleling the depiction above, Abhinava, with the example that there is no distinction between fire and its powers of burning and cooking, confirms that there is no real difference among the powers inherent to Śiva (*TĀ* 1.70). On the same ground, he also confirms that there is no distinction between power itself and that which is endowed with power (*TĀ* 1.71-72). Relating further to Bhartṛhari's discussion on *śakti*, Abhinava maintains that the absolute appears in plurality due to its power of autonomy (*svātantrya*, *TĀ* 1.73).

Śaktis in Plurality

The role of *śakti* in the mechanism of linguistic apprehension in the

17. *sa ca saṁsṛṣṭopṛtaśakti vivarttaṁ pṛthividikālānyagrodhadhānādiad bhedam upagṛhṇāti* | —VPvṛ 1.119. Iyer 1966, p. 180, lines 1-2.
18. *śaktimātrāsaṁnihasya viśvasyānekadharmaṇaḥ | sarvadā sarvathā bhāvat kvacit kiñcid virakṣate ||* — VP 3.7.2.
19. *ata eva tāḥ śaktayas tatra mātrā bhāgā iti śaktisamāhāramātraṁ ghaṭādayaḥ* | — commentary on ibid.
20. *paraspaprasāktimānto bhāvāḥ*, commentary on VP 3.7.11. Bhartṛhari gives the example of taste to describe that something is in itself power can embody further powers (see, VP 3.7.11). The position that energies can hold further energies within is identified by Bhartṛhari as that of the *saṁsargavādin* (see VP 3.7.9).
21. For the issue concerning singularity or plurality of powers, see VP 3.6.24-27.

philosophy of Bhartṛhari is as crucial as it is in the cosmic manifestation and self-realization in the philosophy of Abhinava. According to Bhartṛhari, the multiple powers inherent in śabda that relate word to meaning also allow the single principle to manifest as many. Śakti, in this paradigm, plays the role of both the signifying linguistic power and the cosmic forces that give rise to duality. The metaphysical aspect of these powers is explicit in descriptions wherein the entities in their latent form become fully manifest in their external form by their intrinsic powers (Iyer 1992: 109). Bhartṛhari describes the powers such as time (kāla), direction or space (dig), means (sādhana), or action (kriyā) in such a way that these simultaneously identify the linguistic process and the cosmic manifestation. Bhartṛhari asserts that while these powers are inherent to the word principle, these are also endowed with further powers, such as the powers of "obstruction" (pratibandha) and "permission" (abhyanujñā) inherent to time (VP 3.9.4, 30). Along the same lines, relation (saṃbandha) is considered to be the power even of powers.[22]

Bhartṛhari identifies direction or space as a separate power for the reason that it is distinct from substances and foundational for their transformation. Since the cognition of an entity presupposes both space and time, these are therefore considered as powers. Space is also considered as the power for qualifying objects that are located within it while never being revealed on its own.[23] In this discussion, Bhartṛhari points out that powers inherent to entities are known through their effect (VP 3.6.6), and also that it is through these powers that division is conceived of even the entity that is devoid of it (VP 3.6.13). Bhartṛhari relies on the argument that consciousness is confirmed by itself when he argues that the confirmation of śaktis, such as time and direction, in the same way, does not rely on any other means of knowledge (VP 3.6.18). Some of these arguments are borrowed in the subsequent development of the Trika concept of Śakti and also its treatment of consciousness.

When addressing another power, namely sādhana, Bhartṛhari explains that concrete entities are merely the materialization of powers (VP 3.7.2) and the plurality of powers relies on different cognitive functions (VP 3.7.6). Crucial to this discussion is the identification that entities are powers in essence is the philosophy of the Saṃsargavādins (VP 3.7.9). This is to suggest that a similar concept must have existed prior to Bhartṛhari himself

22. śaktīnām api sā śaktir guṇānām apy asau guṇaḥ | — VP 3.3.5.
23. Significant to this discussion are the passages in VP 3.6.3, 6, 13, 14, 20, 24, and 27.

and he is merely synthesizing one strand of the philosophy of power. While addressing the issue of whether the energies are distinct from their substrate entity, Bhartṛhari argues that neither the view that power and the entity that is endowed with it are identical, nor the view that these are distinct, is real in the absolute sense. In his opinion, it is the very essence (tattva) that manifests as identical or distinct from each other (VP 3.7.39-40). Also noteworthy is Bhartṛhari's presentation of three views in this discussion of the nature of śakti. According to the first view, power is produced in an entity before action through other causes. Following the second view, this śakti is inborn in an entity. The third view says that action occurs prior to the rise of powers, holding that the cause of action is not the same as that of the power (VP 3.7.32). Parallel to these positions, the power inherent to Śiva is defined in different ways by the dualistic Siddhānta and monistic Trika Śaiva traditions. Congruent with Bhartṛhari's opinion that śakti is ultimately singular, Abhinava asserts that the powers identified in various forms are essentially one, as they cannot be distinguished in their essential Khecarī form.[24] Similar to the doctrine of Saṃsargavādins, Tāntrics maintain that "there exist two categories, power and that what is endowed with power."[25] The concept that a singular power appears as many (VP 3.7.37, 146) tallies with the Śākta understanding of power.

As understood by Bhartṛhari, action (kriyā) is the power that brings about transformation,[26] and is explained as the successive process that is presented as to be accomplished, whether finished or unfinished (VP 3.8.1). Bhartṛhari defines action as a collection of activities produced in a sequence that is mentally conceived of as one (VP 3.8.4). Each part of the action appears to occur in sequence due to the śaktis inherent in its parts (VP 3.8.14). Following this depiction, action in reality is one and without sequence but is presented in parts (VP 3.8.18). Being (sattā), in Bhartṛhari's understanding, is autonomous in its power to assume forms, whether as an entity or process (VP 3.8.35). Here, an entity is considered to be the accomplished form of action. Bhartṛhari presents the view of other philosophers, according to whom action is the eternal creative force (VP 3.8.36). Many of these arguments are seminal to the development of the

24. Parātriśikā. Singh 1988, p. 13, lines 22-23.
25. śaktiś ca śaktimatiś caiva padārthadvayam ucyate | śaktayo 'sya jagat kṛtsnaṃ śaktimatas tu maheśvaraḥ || Sarvavīrabhaṭṭāraka. — Cited in Mahārthamañjarī 80:19-20.
26. This view is presented by Yāska as bhāvapradhānamākhyātaṃ sattvapradhānāni nāmāni (Nirukta 1.1). Durgācārya has elaborated upon this in his commentary.

Śākta philosophy of Krama that explains cosmic and epistemic processes in terms of the sequence of Kālī, the power inherent to time.

Bhartṛhari's characterization that action in reality is one and without sequence is comparable to Utpala's segmentation of action into the phenomenal and eternal, the second belonging to the Lord (IP 2.1.2), which parallels the description of time in this context as nothing but sequence (IP 2.1.3), Utpala defines time in this context as nothing but sequence (IP 2.1.3), which parallels the description of time and action found in VP. Similar to Bhartṛhari's depiction that action is mentally conceived of as one, Utpala proposes that the mind produces mental constructs such as action (IP 2.2.3). As found in VP 3.8.30 — that a single time attains sequence due to its powers — Utpala asserts that action, while remaining one, involves succession (IP 2.4.5). The autonomy of sattā in assuming manifoldness parallels the autonomy of Śiva that gives rise to external entities. Just as Śiva in the Trika system transcends sequence, Bhartṛhari posits that there is no sequence in reality, as sequence is not possible of something that does not exist and something that exists does not render a sequence (VP 3.8.36).

Bhartṛhari identifies "relation" (sambandha) as the factor that unites all other powers. Since it binds all other powers while itself being power, it is defined as the śakti of all śaktis and the attribute of all attributes.[27] This power is identified as inherence (samavāya) and is addressed as the power that motivates other powers. Similar to the description of paśyantī found in the Vṛtti upon VP (VPvṛ), relation (sambandha) is identified as beyond identity and difference.[28] Bhartṛhari's characterization of the attributes of śakti also parallels the position of those adopting Brahman as the singular reality that gives rise to sequence (krama, VP 3.3.83). Arguably, this is the position of the Advaitins prior to Bhartṛhari and it is likely that they were the Saṃsargavādins. Helārāja's commentary upon VP 3.3.83 that identifies this power of Brahman to be the power of autonomy (svātantrya) further allows us to bridge the grammarian's concept of śakti with that of the Trika philosophers.

Based on these select examples, it can be concluded that Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is a source text for the discussion on śakti and its nuanced treatment in subsequent literature. It is also explicit that several categories in Bhartṛhari's cosmology parallel Tāntric cosmology. The

27. *śaktīnām api sā śaktir guṇānām apy asau guṇaḥ* | — VP 3.3.5.
28. *tāṃ śaktiṃ samavāyākhyāṃ śaktīnām upakāriṇīm | bhedābhedavyatikrāntām anyathaiva vyavasthitām* || — VP 3.3.10. Helārāja elucidates *śaktīnām upakāriṇī* as

argument here is not to reduce the Tāntric Śākta paradigm to the linguistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari, as the theological elements of Śakti, such as devotion to Śakti or her iconic visualization, are unique to Tāntric traditions. Based on the above discussion of linguistic and cosmic powers, we can further explore the concepts of *vāc*, *pratibhā*, or *kāla*, crucial to Trika perspective.

Vāc: Linguistic and Cosmic

Bhartṛhari asserts that *vāc* or speech manifests in the three levels of *vaikharī*, *madhyamā*, and *paśyantī* (VP 134 [142]). Trika philosophers beginning with Somānanda criticize him for accepting *paśyantī* as the highest speech.[29] The Trika system introduces *parā* or transcendent speech, surpassing the three other levels of speech. This categorization becomes standard even among subsequent grammarians. If the division of speech into four categories is considered unique to Trika Śaivas, then even in this case, the credit goes to Bhartṛhari for providing the framework. The addition of *parā*, however, needs to be read in light of the deity Parā, central to the Trika system.[30] What is not explained is, is this *parā* speech distinct from the Goddess Parā? Or, is there a separate deity, such as Kālī, always in the Trika Maṇḍala placing the Goddess Parā as subordinate?

While the very concept of the stratification of speech is relevant to our discussion on *śakti*, two internal modes, "seeing" (*paśyantī*) and the "middle" (*madhyamā*), are quintessential. The VPvṛ describes the "middle" as abiding inside, "as if assuming sequence" (*pariġṛhītakrameva*). This position is congruent with sequentiality and the transcendence of consciousness that is found in the Trika depiction. Resembling the depiction of Kālasaṃkarṣiṇī in Tāntric liturgy and the essential nature of consciousness in Trika philosophy, the "seeing" aspect of speech is described as "where the sequence is absorbed" (*pratisaṃhṛtakramā*), and "endowed with the power of sequence" (*saṃāviṣṭakramaśakti*) while being "pure while remaining covered" (*āvṛtā ca viśuddhā ca*), and non-dual in nature. Just like Trikas depict consciousness as subsuming paradoxicality, *paśyantī* is depicted as being "motionless while moving" (*calācalā*), "pure while remaining covered"

29. Somānanda endeavours to refute the *paśyantī* of the grammarians. See *Śivadṛṣṭi* (SD), Chapter 2, and Chapter 3, verses 85-87.
30. In the Trika system, three goddesses constitute the essential cognitive and cosmic triad. In this paradigm, Parā relates to will (*icchā*), Parāparā is linked with cognition (*jñāna*), and Aparā is associated with action (*kriyā*). These deities are viewed as

"associated with the forms of the objects of cognition while being formless and having forms hidden."[31] The *VPṛ* also introduces the transcendent (*parā*) form of *paśyantī* that is beyond all conventions in the world (*lokavyavahārātīta*). This introduction of the transcendent form of *paśyantī* can be identified as the foundation for the depiction of *parā* speech found in later traditions.

Further research uncovers reasons that allow comparison of the divinity Parā identified by Trika philosophers with the fourth state of speech, *parā*. First of all, Utpala identifies *paśyantī* as the Goddess Parāparā,[32] with this identity further confirmed by Abhinava.[33] When making this identification, he also addresses Parā by saying that *paśyantī* is of the character of Parāparā which is the essential energy of Parā, giving an example of counter-image.[34] In *IP* 1.5.13, *parā* is described as *parā* speech. While elaborating upon this linguistic *parā* (*IP* 1.5.14), Utpala cites a verse from the *Parātriṃśikā* that describes the Goddess Parā and not the *parā* speech. Evidently, Utpala is comfortable with this identification. The identification of speech with awareness, as found in *IP* 1.5.13, is commonplace in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Abhinava identifies Aparā with the "middle" speech.[35] This identity is not only crucial to Trika cosmology, since establishing the parallels between speech and the deities opens up a soteriological domain of Trika that is grounded on the divination of speech.

Pratibhā: Meeting Point of the Powers of Śabda and the Powers of Śiva

The concept of *pratibhā* is very broad, and it is not necessary to repeat

31. "*vuidharyā ...*" that is listed as 1.142 in Biardeau's and Raghunatha Śarmā's editions.

32. Pandey 1963: 634. See *IP* 1.5.13-14. See also *ŚD* 2.1-2 and Utpala's commentary thereon.

33. *Parātriṃśikā*. Singh 1988, p. 22, lines 7-11.

34. *paśyantī ca parāparābhaṭṭārikāsattatvā parašikter eva sātmasakter darpanavikalpa* —PTV. Singh 1988, p. 49, lines 8-9; ... *paśyantyātṛtiviṣṭaparāparābhaṭṭārikādiprasarā ...* — PTV. Singh 1988, p. 38, lines 17-18; *parāparādipaśyantyādiprasara ...* — PTV. Singh 1988, p. 30, line 12; ... *paśyantyādikāli paraparābhaṭṭārikāisphāraṇāpāḥ. ...* — PTV. Singh 1988, p. 35, lines 24-25; see also Singh 1988, p. 38, lines 17-18. Abhinava also relates the deity *parā* with *paśyantī* identifying the second as the expression of the first: *parābhaṭṭārikayāś ca paśyantyādītadamuyaḥ nirṇttam prāg eva |* — PTV. Singh 1988, p. 19, line 15 . . . *paśyantyāpi parābhaṭṭārikayaḥ prathamaprasartvat |* — PTV. Singh 1988, p. 28, line 20.

35. ... *madhyamāktim aparātmakaśiktinātikā*... — PTV. Singh 1988, p. 17, lines 13-14.

many of the arguments of the early scholars.[36] This term is used in mystical, metaphysical, religious, aesthetic, and psychological contexts with different meanings (Pandey 1963: 693), and so it is not possible to address all these aspects in this brief paper. The scope of this essay is to establish a link between linguistic *pratibhā* with cosmic Pratibhā. According to Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* is the meaning of language itself; it is the intuitive power of the yogins; it is the spontaneous surge of specific qualities such as the particular voice of the cuckoos in the spring; and it is poetic ability. In these applications, the cosmic aspect of *pratibhā* that grounds the Trika philosophy of Abhinava is not explicitly identified.

The yogic intuition that can be found in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga system of Patañjali appears in the treatment of *pratibhā*, both in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari and the Trika system. Just like the concept of the autonomy of *śakti*, the intuitive power that surges in *yogīs*, sometimes even automatically, appears to be an earlier concept expanded upon by both Bhartṛhari and the Trika masters. *VPṛ* identifies this *pratibhā* as the power through which *yogins* become aware of another's intention.[37] Not only that, even the power of goblins and demons to "enter into another being's body" (*parāveśa*) and to be invisible are identified as the same *pratibhā*.[38] The intuitive knowledge or *pratibhā* of the seers, in the same way, is revealed through their knowledge of the Vedas (*VP* 1.30). This description makes explicit that the *pratibhā* of Bhartṛhari is not only the meaning of a sentence, as it covers varied concepts.

The application of *pratibhā* as the meaning of sentence, where the "meaning" itself is referring to non-dual awareness, binds Bhartṛhari's linguistics with soteriology. This dual application of the term, on one hand the meaning in the phenomenal sense, and on the other hand, the essential meaning, the very being (*sattā*) that governs all that exists, is paving the way for further expansion, as is evident in the subsequent Trika application. Making the linguistic application in describing reality contextual, the *pratibhā* of Bhartṛhari is directly revealed by word, or by its impression in its absence.[39] The inner awareness, the inspiration that

36. The most noteworthy of the treatments of *pratibhā* is in Gonda 1963: 318-48. For a detailed treatment of *pratibhā*, see Pandey 1963: 678-732.

37. *yogyanimitta kācit | tad yathā yogīnām atyabhicāreṣu parābhiprayajñānātiṣu |* —*Vṛtti* on *VP* 2.152.

38. *tathā kācitadṛṣṭaninittā | tadyathā rakṣālpiśācādīnāṃ parāveśāntardhanātiṣu |* —*Vṛtti* on *VP* 2.152.

39. *vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthanāṃ pratibhanyena jāyate |* — *VP* 2.145.

one has by hearing sentences, is free from object and is understood as the very *pratibhā*. The rise of this awareness is identified as non-sequential, since the surge of sudden awareness does not depend upon understanding meaning in any specific mode of time.

As mentioned above, the *pratibhā* of Bhartṛhari is not merely the meaning of a sentence, because in his cosmology, the power embodied within *śabda* constitutes the world and this is identified as of the essence of *pratibhā*.[40] The rise of cognition in this paradigm is through the process wherein the powers of objects retract to the sense organs, the powers sense organs retract to cognitions, and the powers of cognition remain at the core of speech through the retraction of sequence.[41] This power of word described by Bhartṛhari is not simply the signifying power of language. Bhartṛhari asserts that, besides their power to refer to something, words have powers to carry out magical effects such as removing poison (VP 1.130 (138). The inclusion of the power of *mantra* within the discussion of the signifying power of language facilitates an alignment of Bhartṛhari's *śakti* with the expanded concept of *pratibhā* that includes intuitive and divine powers. His understanding of *pratibhā* as interconnection (*saṁsargā*), action (*kriyā*), or purpose (*prayojana*) that is the meaning of a sentence, but the intuition (*pratibhā*) that arises immediately upon hearing the sentence. It is this collective and indivisible entity (*akhaṇḍa*), the meaning understood in a flash that is identified by *pratibhā*. This is considered to be distinct from the meaning derived from words.[42] This *pratibhā* cannot be grasped as "this" or "that"; it is established as self-evident to each and every subject, and it is not determined even by the subject.[43] This *pratibhā* is supposed to arise spontaneously, like the intoxicating power that arises in specific time in some substances.[44] For Bhartṛhari, this *pratibhā* is common to all sentient beings. It is through the

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40. *śabdeṣv evāśritā śaktir viśvasyāsya nibandhanī | yannetraḥ pratibhātmeyaṁ bhedarūpaṁ pratīyate ||* — VP 1.110 (118) in the Iyer edition (1966).

41. *yathāpareṣām   indriyeṣu   viṣayamātrāśaktayaḥ   pratilayaṁ   gacchanti tathendriyamātrāśaktayo buddhiṣu buddhi-mātrāśaktayaḥ pratisamhṛāakrame'ṅgātmani |* — VP 1.110 (118).

42. *vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānāṁ pratibhānyaivopajāyate | vākyārtha iti tam āhuḥ...* — VP 2.143.

43. *idaṁ tad iti sāṁṣeṣāṁ anākhyeyā kathañcana | pratyātmavṛttisiddhā sā kartāpi na nirūpyate ||* — VP 2.144.

44. *yathā dravyaviśeṣāṇāṁ pariṇākair ayathṇajaḥ | madāśaktaiyo dṛṣṭiḥ pratibhās tadvatāṁ tathā ||* — VP 2.148.

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same *pratibhā* that even birds such as cuckoos have a distinct voice during the spring (VP 2.149).

Abhinavagupta identifies *pratibhā* as awareness (*cit*).[45] This, however, is not simply awareness in a generic sense. This is the consort of Bhairava and the Supreme Deity Parā. What is explicit is that Abhinava has incorporated the concept of time found in Bhartṛhari's writing into the deified *pratibhā*, as this deity is synonymous with the "power of autonomy" (*svātantryaśakti*) in Abhinava's depiction, whereas VPṛ describes time in terms of *svātantrya*.[46] To further buttress this argument, it is evident that *pratibhā* is foundational to the concept of powers in Abhinavagupta's Trika doctrine. Among the powers of autonomy (*svātantryaśakti*), the desire to manifest in succession (*kramāsisṛkṣā*), and to have succession (*kramātmatā*), the first, or the power of autonomy, appears identical to this *pratibhā*, which is also identified with Parā, the central deity of the Trika doctrine.[47] Although not deified and not visualized in iconic form, *pratibhā* is also at the centre of the powers of language, as propounded by Bhartṛhari.

The linguistic aspect of *pratibhā* is incorporated within the wider application of this term in Abhinava's philosophy, where he describes it in terms of *parā-pratibhā* that not only holds *paśyantī* within, but also the endless varieties of objects (Pandey 1963: 679). The application of *pratibhā* as awareness that embodies all that exists adds a layer to the *paśyantī* that plays the same role in Bhartṛhari's metaphysics. The linguistic character of *pratibhā* in Bhartṛhari's writings can be fruitfully compared to the application of this term found in the Pratyabhijñā system of Utpala and Abhinava. In his commentary on Utpala's statement,

that what is identified as *pratibhā* is coloured in the sequence of distinct objects, the self, that is the supreme Lord, is beyond sequence and of the character of unbound consciousness.

—ĪP 1.7.1

Abhinava identifies two different etymologies of the term *pratibhā*: (1) *pratibhāti*, or "appears," in the sense of the appearance of entities to awareness, and (2) *prati bhāti*, or "appears with regard to the self," which

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45. *...citpratibhāti...* — TĀ 1.2. Jayaratha interprets this phrase as *cidrūpā cāsau pratibhā prajña*, further identifying *cit* and *prajña* with *pratibhā*.

46. *kālākhyeṇa hi svātantryeṇa sarvaḥ paratantrā śaktayaḥ samāviṣṭaḥ kālaśaktyrttim anuprāviśanti |* — VPṛ, p. 18, lines 3-4.

47. *svātantryaśaktiḥ kramasaṁsisṛkṣā | kramātmatā cetivibhor vibhūtiḥ || tad evadevītrayam antaristhm | anuttaraṁ me pratīhaḥatsvarūpam ||* — TĀ 1.5.

refers to consciousness that is given to the self, or to itself.[48] The first meaning refers to the knowing of objects whereas the second meaning refers to the self-aware nature of consciousness. While the first meaning confirms the appearance of an object, the second meaning reinforces the concept that it does not manifest independent of the conscious subject. In this sense, both subject and object are within the domain of *pratibhā*.

With the identification of *pratibhā* as awareness, the argument that *pratibhā* cannot be denied in any mode of cognition since it envelops all concepts, is an extension of the premise that consciousness is self-aware. Abhinava can none the less be credited for establishing the meaning of *pratibhā* as awareness. His interpretation of the suffix *śiti* that follows the root √*bhās* in the term *pratibhā* as relation is interpreted in terms of autonomy (*svātantrya*), the term identified with Parā and also with Pratibhā.[49] This *pratibhā* has the appearance of sequence (*kramātvabhāsa*) when linked with external objects.[50] In the context of explaining *pratibhā*, Abhinava identifies autonomy (*svātantrya*) as the power of time (*kālaśakti*), a further nexus between himself and Bhartṛhari.[51] He describes this *pratibhā* in its essential form as beyond sequence (*akramā*), due to its real nature of awareness itself.[52] This description of *pratibhā* embodying both the cognitive modes while remaining pure in its essential nature, occurring in sequence and still remaining transcendent to the sequence, tallies with the description of *paśyantī* found in *VPvṛ*. The identity of *pratibhā* as *paśyantī* is made in the *VPvṛ*.[53]

The Kāla-Śakti of Bhartṛhari and the Goddess Kālī

There is no unanimity among classical Indian philosophers regarding the concept of time. The Vaiśeṣikas viewed time as a substance (*dravya*) while the Advaita Vedāntins depicted time as identical to ignorance (*avidyā*), and time was shown as the power of the word principle in Bhartṛhari's literature. To apply *kāla* in its widest sense to the concept of Kālī found in

48. *pratibhāti ghaṭa iti yady api viṣayopaśliṣṭam iva pratibhānaṃ bhāti tathāpi na tadviṣayasya svakārī tv api tu saṃvedanam eva tat tathā cakāsti nāṃ prati bhātīti pramātṛlagnatvāt |*
— *Vimarśinī* on IP 1.7.1.

49. *Vimarśinī* on IP 1.7.1. Iyer 1986, p. 350, lines 3-4.
50. Ibid. p. 351, line 1.
51. Ibid. p. 352, lines 1-3.
52. *paramārthataś ca antarmukhatvena prakāśamātraparamārthatayā bhedābhāvād akramā |*
— *Vimarśinī* on IP 1.7.1. Iyer 1986, p. 352, lines 5-6.
53. *vāgrūkatānāṃ prakṛtiṃ paśyantyaktyutāṃ pratibhām...* — *VPvṛ* on VP 1.14.Iyer 1966, p. 48, line 1.

Krama philosophy, thus, can be misleading and inaccurate. However, just as Trika philosophers adopted the framework of Bhartṛhari and added new categories like the levels of speech identified above, so also did they expand upon the concept of deified time. There is also a historical link, Helarāja being the main figure that bridges the soteriology of Kālī found in Krama system with the linguistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari. To initiate the discussion, *Pañcaśatikā*, a liturgical text on Krama, asserts that Kālī is transcendent to *Śabda-Brahman*.[54]

Bhartṛhari identifies three different philosophies concerning time (VP 3.9.62). The first view considers it as *śakti* where *śakti* stands for instrumental cause. This view differs from the Vaiśeṣika understanding that instrumental cause is not an independent category and comes closer to the Mīmāṃsakas. However, Mīmāṃsakas do not acknowledge time as belonging to the category of independent cause. Thus, this view of considering time as power in the sense of instrumental cause and as an independent category depicts a distinct school of thought. The second view considers time as the *ātman* or the individual self. The third view, most likely the view held by Bhartṛhari himself,[55] considers time as the divinity, the power of *Brahman* having the character of awareness.[56] In other words, the linguistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari considered time as divine. Helarāja's terminology to describe this, such as "the gulp that devours the entire world" (*sakalajagadgrāsaghusmarā*), and that the awareness (*saṃvit*) that in itself is devoid of sequence (*akramā*), are similar to Abhinava's language to describe the Goddess Kālī. In Abhinava's words, awareness (*saṃvid*) reveals as both inside and outside and while revealing itself, it appears as if revealing the other, the external entity.[57] Abhinava identifies this very

54. *śabdabrahmaṇpadātīta ṣaṭtriṃśāntanuvartitagā |* — Cited by Jayaratha in TĀ, *Viveka* 4.163.

55. *aniye tu vigvrāhavatīṃ mahāprabhāvetāṃ devatāṃ kālakteṣa pratipadyante | atrapi cādrupisa brahmaṇḥ śaktir devatāira sakalajagadgrāsaghusmaratya etal āmaguṇyaṃ etceti | idaṃ evātra siddhāntariṇāṃ darśanam | ata evaitāt kāladarśanaṃ avidyāyāṃ saṃsāraḥetrubhinīnāṃ prathamam | bhedacetkhisamayo'ti saṃsāro'bhedas cādeśikālabhyātiṃ tatra kālalbhedo jagatsṛṣṭer ādyaḥ | akramā hi paśyantīrūpā saṃvit pārvaertiṃ upārīda | kālātmanā parigṛhītakrameu cakāsti |* — Helarāja on VP 3.9.62.

56. Although Bhartṛhari is not explicit in assigning this position to himself, classical Indian scholars generally presented their opinion at the end, after presenting other viewpoints. At least, this is what Helarāja thinks.

57. *ata eṣā sthitiḥ sañcid antarbahiyollnagatmanā | sraganti nirbhāsya tatra yad bhāsayantra bhāsate ||* — TĀ 4.147.

awareness, pure and eager to manifest external entities, as Sṛṣṭikālī (TĀ 4.148). Helarāja's terminology is also comparable to the one found in the *Kramastotra*.[58] In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, time in itself is devoid of sequence wherein the sequence of entities is grasped.[59] Abhinava's depiction that Mahākāla is where the duality in terms of subject and object is dissolved (TĀ 4.168) parallels the concept of the word principle that is beyond the dyad. Abhinava's depiction of Kālī as transcending sequence while also manifesting in sequence (TĀ 4.179) tallies with Bhartṛhari's depiction of time as beyond sequence and transcending differences (VP 3.9.30-31). Abhinava establishes awareness as the entity beyond description in terms of sequence and non-sequence.[60] Furthermore, time as depicted by Bhartṛhari is not itself in sequence, as time is shown as obtaining sequence through its power of obstruction (*pratibandha*) and permission (*abhyanujñā*).[61] He also confirms that the world, which in reality is the very *Brahman*, is devoid of sequence, but appears as if in sequence due to time (VP 3.9.46). This position can be compared with Abhinava's, for whom time is the pulsation (*kalanā*) present both in sequence and beyond sequence.[62]

Among the powers of *śabda* that are identical to *Brahman*, time is the most prominent one for Bhartṛhari.[63] What is significant for this discussion is that this power is identified in the *VP*vṛ as the power of autonomy (*svātantrya*).[64] Following the *Vṛtti*, it is due to the support of this power of autonomy that the cognition of the appearance of sequence is possible.[65] The small measurements (*mātrā*) of this time that are found in sequence, following this depiction, give rise to transformations such as origination,

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58. *saṃvārthasaṅkarṣaṇasaṃyamanasya | yannusya yantur jagato yamāya || vapur mahāpralaśrāilāsaṅgāt | saṅkarṣaṇpittiṃ praṇamāmi kālaṃ ||* — *Kramastotra*, cited by Jayaratha in his commentary *Viveka* on TĀ 4.151. See also *...Kramastotra*, cited by Jayaratha on TĀ, *Viveka* 4.154.

59. *tanaṃprakāśavat te etc traya'dhvano vyavasthitiḥ | akramāś teṣu bhavedhāḥ kramaḥ samupalbhyate ||* — VP 3.9.52.

60. *kramākramakālātītaṃ saṃcvitattvaṃ suvirmalam |* — TĀ 4.180.

61. *pratibandhabhyanujñābhyāṃ vṛttir yā tasya tatsvati | tayā vibhajyamāno 'sau bhajate kramarūpatāṃ ||* — VP 3.9.30.

62. *kramākramakalanūru kālḥ |* — *Tantrasāra* (TS), Ch. 6, Chakravarty 1986, 50:3.

63. He addresses this power in the very beginning of his text (VP 1.3).

64. *kālākhyena hi svātantryeṣi sarvaḥ paratantrā śaktayaḥ samatuṣṭāḥ katusāktreṣṭim anuyitanti |* — VP*vṛ*, Iyer 1966, p. 18, lines 3-4.

65. *...saktyavacchedena kramavitteśvābhāsopagamo lakṣate |* — VP*vṛ* Iyer 1966, p. 18, line 4 — p. 19, line 1.

growth, and destruction. In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, the power of time (*kāla-śakti*) is the dynamic creative force and its functioning is identified as the power of autonomy. The word principle is the material cause of the rise of the world and time is presented here as the auxiliary cause. Since creation, sustenance, and dissolution are dependent upon time, it is considered a foundational requisite for change. Time, therefore, is addressed as the architect of the world which functions by limiting some entities and activating others (VP 3.9.3-4). The three aspects of time are described as its powers that are differentiated into further categories (VP 3.9.37-38). When time is perceived in its own form without being relative to existence or non-existence and is reflected in a sudden awareness, this is defined as the present time (VP 3.9.89-90). It is noteworthy that Utpala identifies awareness not only in terms of Parā speech, he also calls it "autonomy" (*svātantrya*, IP 1.5.13). The autonomy of awareness, identical to the self or to Śiva, is one of the central elements of the Trika doctrine that makes it distinct from the Advaita of Śaṅkara.[66] This autonomy is one of the key concepts that links Bhartṛhari's concept of time with the Goddess Kālī.

This power of *śabda* identified as time is endowed with two powers of obstruction (*pratibandha*), and permission (*abhyanujñā*) (VP 3.9.4, 30). The origin and continuity of entities is due to the permission aspect of time, whereas the inability of entities to continue or to accomplish their purpose is due to the aspect of obstruction. Depiction of three modes of time as consisting of three distinct powers, and the presentation of present time as the play of permission and the other two modes of time as that of obstruction also confirms the autonomy of *śakti* in this paradigm. Abhinava's depiction that time is a limiting factor (TĀ 4.166) tallies with Bhartṛhari's depiction of time endowed with the power of obstruction.

Abhinava assigns meaning to the term Kālī according to its derivation from four different verbal roots. With the root √*kala kṣepe*, he interprets Kālī as the force that establishes difference or that reveals external reality. From the next root, √*kala gatau*, he identifies Kālī as the power to recognize entities that are perceived as "outside" as the very self. With the same root, he derives another meaning of Kālī as acknowledging the essential

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66. See *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* 1 (Singh 1963); *ātmā prakāśacapur eṣa śivaḥ svatantraḥ svātantryamarmadhhasena nijaṃ svarūpam...* — TS 1.5. As Abhinava argues: *so ca prakāśo na paratantrā prakāśyatmatva iti parātantryam |* — TS, Ch. 1, Chakravarty 1986, 5:10-11. Abhinava explains the first aphorism form the Śivasūtra, *caitanyam ātmā*, as: *caitanyam iti bhāvenātmani śabdāḥ svātantryamātrikam |* — TĀ 1.28. See also TĀ 1.31, 1.73.

nature of the self, as in the case of a counter-image, which, although not distinct from the image, is cognized as different. From the root √kala saṅkhyāne, he derives the meaning of Kāli as referring to the actual manifestation outside. From the root √kala nāde, he interprets Kāli as the awareness of the self (TĀ 4.173-175). Kāli, then, constitutes a range of subtle, yet distinct and overlapping, meanings.

The kāla of Bhartṛhari reveals and conceals entities with its two powers. The terms he uses to describe it, unmīlana and nimīlana (VP 3.9.56), are noteworthy for this comparison. Bhartṛhari also describes this in terms of "seeing" (darśana) and "not seeing" (adarśana) (VP 3.9.61). The functions of unmīlana and nimīlana inherent to Śiva, following Kṣemarāja's interpretation, are the powers that give rise to the world and reabsorb it.[67] These two terms also describe two different modes of absorption in his soteriology.[68]

Similar to Bhartṛhari's identification of kāla as the action in which the form enters into cognition and which in turn coalesces into awareness without any other action occurring,[69] Abhinava identifies Kāli as being of the character of awareness.[70] The description of the sequence of Kālīs, where the objects of cognition (prameya) dissolve into cognition and that in turn into the subject (pramātṛ) and that to the awareness free from limitations is comparable to this understanding of time. While the ontological and epistemological nuances of the concept of time in these two systems are closely comparable, the Krama system of Kāli, while exploiting early philosophies on time, expands upon the concept and amplifies its meaning.

Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Spanning all the arguments is the point that the secular notion of power, predominantly found in the discussion on the scope of language, overlaps the theological śakti, the divine power. The initial point of discussion, the concept of śakti as the divine will that has been dropped in the later Nyāya

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67. *Nirṇaya* commentary on *Spandakārikā* 1.1. Singh 1980, p. 8, line 30.
68. *nimīlanonmīlanasamāhitadvaye 'pi...* — Singh 1980, p. 26, line 15; *nimīlanasamādhi. . vaiśādṛṇyam unmīlanasamādhi. ..* — Singh 1980, p. 108, lines 28-30; *nimīlanonmīlanasamādhisthaya...* — Singh 1980, p. 127, line 6.
69. *jñāne rūpasya saṅkrāntir jñānenāntasaṅkṛtiḥ | atiḥ kriyāntarābhāve sā kriyā kāla ucyate ||* — VP 3.9.78.
70. *parāmarśasvabhāvatvāt etasyā... |* — TĀ 4.181.

writings and identified as merely the will of the user, demonstrates the cosmic aspect of language. Simply put, if language is of the divine origin, it has the potential to reveal the divine, and if it is merely a human enterprise, it cannot be instrumental to revealing the divine. Along the same lines, both the particular and universal as defined by Bhartṛhari embrace cosmological nuances, with the highest universal being (sattā), as identical to Brahman and the particular defined in terms of "essential being" and the "self."

More important than the specific śaktis identified by Bhartṛhari is the nature and function of śakti as defined in VP to the comparison of śakti as depicted in the Trika system. For both Bhartṛhari and Abhinava, śaktis are found in plurality; they are inherent to the absolute within their own system; they depict the autonomy of consciousness; and are the power that embraces sequence while transcending it. As Bhartṛhari rejects the existence of concept in the absence of language, Abhinava finds prakāśa and vimarśa to be inseparable. Both hold a monistic world view, accepting that the highest principle manifests in plurality due to its own inherent powers.

For both Bhartṛhari and Abhinava, śaktis can embody further śaktis. Tāntric maṇḍalas rely on this assumption. Bhartṛhari states that these śaktis are born together (sahaja), a concept crucial to subsequent Tāntric traditions. Two central categories found in Bhartṛhari's discussion of the philosophy of language that are crucial to the development of Trika system are the concepts of pratibhā and parā. For both, Bhartṛhari and Abhinava, pratibhā stands for the intuitive power that transcends sequence. Many nuances of the concept of parā as the highest speech, found in terms of parā-paśyantī in Bhartṛhari's system, parallel the description of the divine Parā in Abhinava's system. In the cases of both pratibhā and parā, what is missing from Bhartṛhari's writings is the deified pratibhā or parā, their iconic form, and accompanying rituals that are found in Abhinava's Tantrism.

Among the number of powers identified by Bhartṛhari, the depiction of the powers of time is very close to the description of Kāli in the Krama system. The exposition of time as the autonomous power (svātantrya) found in Bhartṛhari's depiction further confirms this identification. The two powers intrinsic to time, the power to reveal and to conceal entities, unmīlana and nimīlana in Bhartṛhari's terminology, can be compared with the two functions of unmeṣa and nimeṣa, the two modes of Śiva of emanating and retrieving the world. Although many of the other powers of Bhartṛhari are not crucial to the Trika system, the description of the powers

such as *sādhana* or *dik* resonates with the description of *śakti* in the Tāntric Krama system. Finally, the description of *kriyā-śakti*, the power of action, suggests this power in the Trika system.

Abbreviations

IP   *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Kārikā* of Utpala

MB   *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali

MS   *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* of Jaimini

NS   *Nyāya-Sūtra* of Vātsyāyana

PTV   *Parātriśikāvivaraṇa* of Abhinavagupta. See Singh 1988.

ŚD   *Śivadṛṣṭi* of Somānanda

TA   *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta

TS   *Tantrasāra* of Abhinavagupta

VP   *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari

VPvṛ *Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti*. See Iyer 1966.

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12

Freedom in the Bhagavad-Gītā
An Analysis of Buddhi and Sattva Categories

*P. Pratap Kumar**

Introduction

THE *Bhagavad-Gītā*, of the many Hindu sacred texts, occupies a singularly significant place among both Hindus as well as among the Western intellectual community. The West came to know of the text first through the translation of it by Charles Wilkins in 1775 into English and thereafter scores of translations became available in many European languages. Exactly 100 years later, in 1885, Edwin Arnold rendered the text into poetic version and titled it "the Song Celestial." Incidentally, it was this translation of the *Gītā* that Gandhi (Koppendrayer 2002) is said to have read and became influenced by its philosophical simplicity and beauty and used it as a daily guide. In the late nineteenth century the text became an important tool in the struggle for freedom, deployed by many reformers and political commentators and activists, the most significant among them being Bal Gangadhar Tilak (Brown 1958) and Aurobindo Ghosh (1970). While Tilak produced a commentary (*Gītārahasya*) of political activism playing on its philosophy of *karma*, Aurobindo produced a commentary on it with an emphasis on transcendentalism.[1] Many Western intellectuals, such as Tolstoy and Robert Oppenheimer, were deeply affected by the text. Oppenheimer is said to have become so deeply affected by its philosophy of *karma* as detached action, that he is claimed to have defended his scientific activities in producing the atomic bomb through what he believed as *Gītā*'s philosophy to perform one's duty without regard to its effects (Hijiya 2000).

* University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

1. For a substantial comment on the influence that *Gītā* had on various Indian intellectuals, see Kosambi 1961.