

SEEING AND APPEARANCE

STHANESHWAR TIMALSINA



Although Advaita Vedānta, one of the most prominent Indian philosophical traditions, considers Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi (seeing as identical with creation) as one of its main doctrines, there has been no study on this doctrine so far. The present study fulfills this need, exploring the development of this thought through analysis of its classical exegetical tradition. It also examines the intricate relationship among various monistic philosophical traditions in India concerning the nature of consciousness. Central to this doctrine is the idea that consciousness is non-dual seeing itself and that the very Brahman is conceived as transmigrating, assuming bondage or liberation, although this seeing in reality is free from transformation.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABS	<i>Advaitabrahmasiddhi</i>
AiU	<i>Aitareyopaniṣad</i>
AIOC	Proceedings and Transactions of the All India Oriental Conference.
AP	<i>Anubhūtiprakāśa</i>
ĀP	<i>Ātmapurāṇa</i>
ARR	<i>Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa</i>
AS	<i>Advaitasiddhi</i>
ĀTV	<i>Ātmatattvaviveka</i>
BĀU	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad</i>
BĀUBh	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad</i> - Śaṅkara's commentary
BĀUBhVā	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika</i>
BG	<i>Bhagavadgītā</i>
BoS	<i>Bodhaikyāsiddhi</i>
BS	<i>Brahmasiddhi</i>
BSū	<i>Brahmasūtra</i>
BSūBh	Śaṅkara's <i>Bhāṣya</i> on <i>Brahmasūtra</i>
CU	<i>Chāndogyopaniṣad</i>
CUBh	<i>Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>
DS	<i>Dṛṣṭisrṣṭi</i>
DSE	<i>Dṛṣṭisrṣṭi</i> under <i>ekajīva</i>
EJ	<i>Ekajīva</i>
GC	<i>Gurucandrikā</i>
GK	<i>Gauḍapādīyakārikā</i>

GKBh	<i>Gaudapādīyakārikābhāṣya</i>
GTĀ	<i>Gūḍhārthatattvāloka</i>
IS	<i>Iṣṭasiddhi</i>
KaUBh	<i>Kāīhakopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>
KU(P)Bh	<i>Kenopaniṣad-padabhāṣya</i>
KU(V)Bh	<i>Kenopaniṣad-vākyabhāṣya</i>
KU	<i>Kauṣṭhiki Upaniṣad</i>
KhKh	<i>Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍakhāḍya</i>
LAS	<i>Laīkāvatārasūtra</i>
LC	<i>Laghucandrikā</i>
LYV	<i>Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha</i>
MSA	<i>Mahāyānasūtrāīkāra</i>
MUŚ	<i>Mokṣopāyaśāstra</i>
NA	<i>Nyāyāmṛta</i>
NP	<i>Nayanaprasādinī</i> (commentary on TP)
NRD	<i>Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī</i>
NS	<i>Naiṣkarmyasiddhi</i>
NSC	<i>Naiṣkarmyasiddhicandrikā</i>
NyC	<i>Nyāyacandrikā</i>
NyS	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i>
PD	<i>Paīcadāśī</i>
PP	<i>Paīcapādīkā</i>
PPV	<i>Paīcapādīkāvivaraṇa</i>
PS	<i>Pāīnīya-sūtra</i> (<i>Aṣṭādhyāyī</i>)
PU	<i>Praśnopaniṣad</i>
PUBh	<i>Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>
RC	<i>Rāmacarita</i>
SB	<i>Siddhāntabindu</i>
SBhVā	<i>Sambandhabhāṣyavārtika</i>

ŚD	<i>Śivadṛṣṭi</i>
SLS	<i>Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha</i>
SLSK	<i>Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha-Kṛṣṇāīkāra-īkā</i>
SN	<i>Svānubhūtināīka</i>
ŚP	<i>Śāstraprakāśikā</i> , commentary on BĀUBhVā
SS	<i>Saīkṣepaśārīraka</i>
ŚŚ	<i>Śataslokī</i>
SYPP	<i>Svātmayogapradīpa</i> with <i>Prabodhinī</i>
TaiU	<i>Taittirīyopaniṣad</i>
TC	<i>Tattvacintāmaṇi</i>
TP	<i>Tattvapradīpikā</i>
TŚ	<i>Tattvasuddhi</i>
TU	<i>Taittirīyopaniṣad</i>
US	<i>Upadeśasāhasrī</i>
VāP	<i>Vākyapadīya</i>
VSM	<i>Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī</i>
VP	<i>Viṣṇupurāīa</i>
VPS	<i>Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha</i>
YS	<i>Yogasūtra</i>
YV	<i>Yogavāsiṣṭha</i>

INTRODUCTION

The term Vedānta etymologically refers to the *Upaniṣads*, the final sections of the Vedic literature. With the rise of Indian philosophical discourse, this term has been applied to the philosophical schools emerging from the exegetical traditions surrounding the *Upaniṣads*. The schools of Vedānta are essentially either dualistic or non-dualistic, analyzing reality as 'one' or 'many.' Advaita, a specific philosophical approach within the study of Vedānta, postulates that all is Brahman in reality, of the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss. Following this doctrine, plurality is merely an appearance, and what really exists is the self, identical with Brahman alone. Historical analysis demonstrates early Advaita to be monistic in positing the unity of all phenomena and asserting the Brahman as the highest principle that can be recognized only through the Vedic testimony. In subsequent philosophical discourse, Advaita emerges as the doctrine that rejects duality on logical grounds.

Śaṅkara, an eminent philosopher of the eighth century, was aware of various exegetes who agreed upon Advaita as the ultimate doctrine, while differing on phenomenal issues. The school of Śaṅkara rejects any real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the highest principle, introducing *vivarta* (false appearance) as the theory of causality. Advaita, however, can be established in multiple ways. While accepting non-duality of the self and the Brahman at the core, classical Advaita exegetes differed in their interpretations. Issues include accepting or rejecting the agency of the self, interpreting phenomenal reality in different ways, explaining the causality of the world in terms of ignorance (*avidyā*) or illusion (*māyā*), or considering the singularity or plurality of the individual self (*jīva*). For all these reasons, Advaita emerged as a philosophy with multiple streams. The scope of this text is not to explore the inner differences among Vedānta philosophies, but rather to closely examine one specific model of Advaita Vedānta, the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, which postulates that creation is 'seeing only'.

It is not possible to understand one specific model, *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, without addressing the body of its literature in light of other concurrent doctrines. In the process of identifying *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* in the classical writings, this study has looked through the lenses proposed by the classical exegetes themselves. The objective of these volumes, then, is to make a case that Indian philosophies can be studied as a vibrant tradition with contrasting models existing even within a single school of thought, as recognized by the classical writers.

Due in part to an Orientalist influence, the popular imagination about Hinduism has been Vedāntic, specifically non-dualistic. The contemporary scholarship has only infrequently addressed internal differences within distinct schools of Indian

philosophies, resulting in a lack of awareness about the subtle philosophical differences. The popularity of the non-dualistic model of Vedānta in India and the West and the treatment by scholars of Advaita and Vedānta as synonymous has obscured their internal differences. Although the movement of Bhakti Vedānta has given one contrasting picture to the popular imagination, the various schools of thought that have emerged from the exegetical tradition are little known. This reductive tendency has over-simplified Indian philosophies, ignoring the inherent diversity within each school. Reading contradictions within a single school of thought demonstrates how philosophical systems confront and survive in a changing historical scenario. This approach opens the possibility of comparing or reconstructing different streams of thought in a dynamic philosophical paradigm. This investigation of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, the model of Advaita with the least available literature, operates upon this very assumption.

Contemporary scholarship has not paid much attention to the study of the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*. This tendency has given rise to the following positions:

- 1) Prakāśānanda founded this doctrine;
- 2) *Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* is closest to the philosophy of Maṇḍana;
- 3) This doctrine advocates the world as momentary perception;
- 4) This doctrine aligns with the Yogācāra doctrine;
- 5) *Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* is identical to George Berkeley's 'esse est percipi'.

Although there is partial truth to most of these assumptions, the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* cannot be confined within any one of these positions. This study, then, intends to demonstrate the complexity of the concept and its interrelationship with other streams of Advaita philosophy.

An understanding of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* remains impossible without tracing the history of Advaita in light of this specific thought, as the Advaita exegetes have not systematically examined this specific stream of philosophy. Although the term itself appears relatively late, nuances of this thought emerge much earlier in the commentarial literature and independent treatises. Furthermore, there is no agreement on the meaning of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, even among the philosophers who propound this concept. As a consequence, these complexities make an understanding of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* extremely difficult, requiring an examination of its history, meaning, and philosophy in a new light. The two volumes of this study focus within these parameters: the first volume examines the history and meaning of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, while the second examines the philosophical argumentation that establish this doctrine.

Divided into ten chapters, the first volume of this study collectively builds an understanding of the history and meaning of the nature of 'seeing and appearance' in the Advaita context. Grounded upon historical analysis of numerous primary sources, it sheds new light on these aspects, opening with a brief introduction to the different philosophical positions contained within Advaita. This study also attempts to find coherence in the fragmentary and mostly unsystematic evidence supporting *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* scattered throughout the wide range of Advaita literature.

The first section of this study briefly treats the different and contrasting models of Advaita. This contextualizes the investigation of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, bringing core issues to the front. Historical analysis in Section II reveals that the central philosophy of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* dates considerably earlier than is commonly accepted. Advaita exegetes exploit the *Upaniṣadic* passages in order to establish this concept. However, these treatments are mostly unsystematic, and *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* as a doctrine is addressed only in later-classical Advaita. This doctrine can be established by both accepting the singularity or plurality of the individual selves (*jīva*). However, the present study focuses upon the model that defends *ekajīva*, the doctrine in which there exists only a single individual self. The core passages analyzed here are those that establish a singularity of the self on the logical ground of the singularity of self-experience. Historical analysis reveals that the Advaita established on the ground of two degrees of reality is congruent with the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*. This investigation ranges from the writings of Śaṅkara to Madhusūdana, exploring those scriptures that are most commonly cited in relation to DS. Historical evidence, which is scattered throughout the textual corpus of the Sanskrit tradition, has been collected and presented here in chronological order as far as possible. This arrangement of the fragments in historical order has remained challenging, as the authorship of several texts is unknown.

Section III of this study investigates the meanings of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*. The term itself does not seem particularly complicated at first glance. But when serious exploration is undertaken, it becomes a very difficult task indeed to try and establish a particular meaning for this term. Analysis in the third chapter demonstrates how *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* possesses different meanings and how these different understandings serve contrasting philosophical assumptions, depending upon the context within which it is deployed.

An analysis of the meaning of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* reveals that 'seeing' is a complex notion interpreted in many different ways. This study points out that the earlier understanding of the term *dr̥ṣṭi* is 'awareness in itself', and is widely found in classical Advaita literature. Comparing the meaning of *dr̥ṣṭi* found in the Advaita literature with the philosophy of language propounded by Bhartṛhari and the Trika Śaiva philosophy allows the identification of 'consciousness as perceived' in these non-dual thoughts as the constant nature of 'seeing,' seeing either itself or perceiving duality. The popular meaning, that *dr̥ṣṭi* is false appearance, is more congruent with the application of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* in Mokṣopāya. This variance in meaning grounded upon one single phrase results in distinct understandings of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* that 'creation is pure and changeless consciousness alone' or that 'creation is momentary, false appearance only'. To affirm that there is consciousness alone, free from duality, is to also confirm that there is no origination. While different philosophers prefer one or another interpretation, this study simply presents how 'seeing' is understood in the writings of classical Advaita philosophers.

The tenth chapter integrates the results of the historical and hermeneutic analysis found in the second through ninth chapters. This conclusion further demonstrates the fluid nature of classical Indian philosophy, where terms are loosely interpreted, and the concepts often overlap and interpenetrate. This complexity, we argue, keeps philosophical thinking alive, as this study demonstrates that all the models that have

emerged within Advaita represent efforts to resolve one or another problem often pointed out by their opponents. Furthermore, this study also shows how specific concepts become dormant and resurface as the philosophical discussion evolves.

Synthesizing the philosophy of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* becomes a real challenge because there is no separate and comprehensive treatment upon this topic by classical philosophers. The second volume of this study explores the logical coherence of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*. Since contrasting models emerge even within DS, it is not possible to logically defend all different models in one study. Therefore, the second volume aims to investigate the arguments that defend the singularity of the individual self (*eka-jīva*), following the premise that the plurality of self-experience cannot be proved.

The second volume defends one specific understanding of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭimātra*, according to which what essentially exists or what is essentially perceived is 'seeing only'. Advaitins argue that 'consciousness' is 'given' and so is confirmed by itself in the moment it is cognized, and nothing other than consciousness can be logically confirmed. The close examination in this study demonstrates that the concept of the self-aware nature of consciousness is complex; even the very term 'self-aware' is interpreted differently by different philosophers and varies widely among different schools of idealistic thought. The establishment of consciousness as aware of itself leads to the conclusion that nothing exists that is not known and there exists only what is cognized. As the philosophers under consideration argue, it is due to ignorance that one accepts 'awareness' as external objects rather than as awareness itself. However, when logically examined, this 'ignorance' cannot be determined excluding the conscious subject, leading to the conclusion that what exists is consciousness alone. This self-confirmation of awareness is pivotal to the arguments that lead to *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* and *ekajīva*, as Advaitins argue that this self-given awareness in itself is the self and there is no other self except for this awareness-in-itself. This establishment of 'seeing only' follows the classical Advaita argument that negates the existence of difference. Difference, along these lines, is perceived merely due to illusion. -This study categorizes the examples that demonstrate the illusory nature of the world, as these illustrations embody the philosophical differences resulting in contrasting models of Advaita. Since self-awareness is what is immediately experienced and what is presupposed in all other cognitions, and since the plurality of this awareness cannot be logically established, all that fundamentally exists is only the self that is immediately experienced. Liberation and bondage, Advaitins argue, are imposed due to ignorance, and so the self imagines itself as suffering, though the very self, awareness in itself, is eternally free from bondage. This singular awareness identified with the self is the conclusive meaning of 'seeing' which, either 'sees' its own true nature free from difference, or 'appears' in manifoldness when the true nature of awareness is not cognized.

This study traces the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* found in fragments in the Advaita literature from the time of Śaṅkara. Although there are limitations to historical analysis when the exact time frame of the philosophers remains uncertain, in this case, reading the development or shift of concepts in chronological order uncovers previously unknown nuances of the thought being studied, highlighting the

constructive nature of philosophical debate in classical India. With the demonstration that a single understanding of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* is not possible, this study identifies the need for examining philosophical terms in light of historical flux. This investigation into the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* demonstrates that inner contradictions can co-exist within a single philosophy, bound together by the underlying premise.

Chapter 1

Drṣṭisrṣṭi in Light of Different Advaita Doctrines

Framing Advaita into Multiple Models

Ample references from the *Upaniṣads* support the premise that all that exists is essentially one. Advaita exegetes grounded their arguments upon these passages to establish non-dualism of the self, identical with Brahman. Although the commentarial literature prior to Śaṅkara has been lost forever, at least ten vibrant schools emerged from the *Upaniṣadic* exegesis, the Advaita of Śaṅkara being one among them.¹ The approach to unify all the instructions found in the Vedānta² literature into a single stream of thought has remained problematic, the writings of Śaṅkara being no exception. Understanding the problems inherent to textual interpretation is pivotal to the quest not only to differentiate among the Vedānta traditions, but also to categorize the school of Advaita in distinct models.

Before entering into the internal differences found within the non-dual school of Vedānta, it is relevant to address factors that accompany this diversity. Current scholarship has credited different Advaita philosophers for their specific treatments upon the issues that have remained controversial throughout the history of Advaita. The objective of this study is to demonstrate that the Advaita premise can be equally defended by different functioning models. With this hypothesis in mind, an examination of the writings that support one or another of these different arguments should not overlook the specific models the positions propose. When these distinctions are clear, in addition to reading different nuances of Advaita philosophy as specific to an individual philosopher, this difference can be recognized as inherent to the model the specific philosopher has in mind. Although the scope of this study is not to categorically analyze all the differences inherent within Advaita but rather to study one specific stream of thought, it is nonetheless relevant to address the central issues that give rise to this diversity.

¹ Besides the exegeses that predate Śaṅkara, there are at least ten different schools of Vedānta: the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara, Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja, Svābhāvika-Dvaitādvaita of Nimbārka, Madhva's Dvaitavāda, the Śuddhādvaita of Vallabha, Bhāskara's Autpādika Bheda-bheda doctrine, Śuddhādvaita of Viṣṇusvāmin, Viśiṣṭādvaita of Śrīkaṅṭha, Śrīpati's Viśeṣādvaita, and Acintyabhedābheda of Baladeva.

² The three texts collectively addressed as *prasthānatrayī*, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, constitute the core of Vedānta literature and the challenge of the Masters was to compose their commentary establishing the congruence of their thought with all the instructions found in the aforementioned texts.

The Vedic concept of *puruṣa*³ developed into multiple understandings in early Advaita.⁴ The establishment of the plurality of *puruṣa* by the Sāṅkhya philosophers, the early treatment of Advaita as the doctrine of *Puruṣa*, and the established conceptual difference between Advaita and Sāṅkhya allows one to assume that the *Puruṣa* doctrine of Advaita essentially defends the singularity of the individual self. This early notion of cosmic *puruṣa* grounds the existence of a single Self.

Advaita philosophy accepts diverse positions that concern the individual self (*jīva*). According to one model, there is a solitary individual self, whereas another model proposes its plurality. This difference in Advaita understanding concerns only phenomenal experience, as all Advaita instructions essentially confirm the non-duality of the self and Brahman. The model that advocates a singularity of the empirical self, *ekajīvanavāda* (EJ), is identified as a primary teaching of Advaita by Madhusūdana, who also equates EJ with DS.

The second fundamental question that generates diversity within Advaita is the interpretation of world phenomena while accepting the existence of the Brahman alone. Although Advaitins concur in rejecting the existence of anything other than Brahman, there is no agreement upon what constitutes the world. Diverse positions, such as ignorance causing the world, ignorance with the instrumentality of Brahman causing the world, the world as an illusion (*māyā*) with a difference between illusion and ignorance, and the Lord (*īśvara*) causing the world by aid of his divine *māyā*, emerged within Advaita exegesis. This results in conflicting theories, with the Brahman, or ignorance, or the Lord, or the empirical self as the cause of the world. Often the causality of the world is ascribed to more than one of these categories.⁵

Philosophers of early Advaita for the most part analyzed reality in two tiers. The first category is *paramārtha*, the absolute reality, and the other is appearance, expressed in different terms such as *ābhāsa*, *avabhāsa*, or *prāpti*, with no distinction between *vyavahāra* and *avabhāsa*.⁶ This categorization applies at least to the texts such as Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa, the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda, and the stanzas found

³ Mallavādin comments upon Advaitic thinking under the topic *Puruṣavāda* in *Dvādaśāraṇayacakra*. The same is the case with Samantabhadra. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, another early Jaina text with strong criticism of Advaita, also deals with this topic while addressing *Puruṣavāda*. See *Puruṣaparikṣā* in Nakamura 1983, 148, 222, 223-226, 230-240; and *-vādin* ibid., 231, 239.

⁴ RV X.97.4-5; RV X.90; AV X.2; AV X.7. For the use of *puruṣa* for the self alongside with *ātman*, *jīva*, *ḥṣetraja*, see Larson 1969, 167-168.

⁵ Only *Pārva-Mīmāṃsā* is understood by *Mīmāṃsā* from the later classical period, as *Vedānta* became prevalent term to denote *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā*.

⁶ Advaitins commonly interpret reality analyzing it in three degrees: ultimate (*pāramārthika*), conventional (*vyāvahārika*), and appearance (*prātibhāsika*). When the Conventional and Appearance are conflated, this gives rise of the doctrine of two realities. These two can ultimately be reduced to a single reality, since from the Advaita perspective only the Brahman is real, and whatever is not the Brahman is ultimately false, non-existent.

in *Viṣṇupurāṇa* that support Advaita. This dichotomy between absolute and phenomenal truth continues in the subsequent writings, specifically in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śaṅkara, and in the writings of Sureśvara. DS, in whichever way it is interpreted, adopts the two-tiered method of interpreting the truth, distinguishing it from other scholastic Advaita models. The Advaita epistemology developed under the school of Vivaraṇa, founded by Prakāśātman, originating with Padmapāda's commentary *Pañcapādikā*, as well as the *Bhāmānī* school of Vācaspati Mīśra, advocates three degrees of reality.

In its essence, the central disagreement between the various non-dualistic schools concerns the question, 'what is the nature of the empirical world?' Are the entities of perception, the things of this world as they are commonly perceived, a mere illusion (*māyā*) or the product of the divine power (*māyā*), or resulting from a divinely derived power which takes the form of worldly ignorance (*avidyā*), or are there in fact no entities as such at all? While these positions might at first glance appear to reflect nothing more than matters of semantics, they ultimately lead to vastly different understandings of both human experience and the supreme reality.

How philosophy⁷ under the umbrella of Śaṅkara emerged with contrasting doctrines and how Advaita incorporates different models within one school are questions with no single answer. Reading Advaita literature reveals that variations within Advaitic thought can be found as early as the writings of Gauḍapāda. Questions including the origin of the world are left open-ended, while the issue of interpreting dream and reality is approached differently by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. However, these differences do not challenge the unitary identity of the Advaita philosophy.

Other distinctions emerge in the dialogue with different philosophies. As Gauḍapāda is historically in dialogue with Buddhist doctrines and Maṇḍana with

⁷ 'Philosophical discourse' is not possible without the category of 'philosophy'. In addition to usage of this term, other Western categories such as idealism, subjectivity, illusionism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and so forth, are not less problematic. Even application of the very term 'Indology' has not remained free from challenge. Franco 1997, 156, 165, 306. Speaking about Indian philosophy in English terminology invites obfuscation, strictly following the footprints of scholars *par excellence* in this field. Matilal has demonstrated that translating *avidyā* as 'ignorance' or 'nescience' is problematic. Matilal 1985, 319-332, 356-57. Daye has pointed out that 'inference' for *anumāna* and 'perception' for *pratyakṣa* are misleading. Matilal 1984, 231-252. Clearly, *śruti* is not exactly 'verbal testimony', as it frequently refers to Vedic testimony. The use of 'Vedic scriptures' to refer to *śruti* in the meaning of the Vedas, e.g., Matilal in Ganeri 2002, 278; Potter 1991, 57 is not less annoying, because it does not explain the traditional transmission of the Vedas coming through 'hearing'. Ingalls has noticed problems with the words for existence: *sanā* and *bhāva*. Ingalls 1951, 53-54. Halbfass has paid much attention on the issues inherent with existence while analyzing these terms. Halbfass 1992, 21-45. I have not come across *satya* translated as 'truly existing', as Hacker proposed. Halbfass 1995, 139. However, the rejection of all English equivalents leads to the impossibility of cross-cultural and trans-cultural discourse. Several non-Indian terms are utilized herein, not with a belief that these actually translate the specific Indian notions, but, acknowledging Quine's thought that no radical translation is possible, this usage simply aims for linguistic discourse.

Mīmāṃsā, the points of agreement and conflict in their works consequently give rise to different Advaita models. The two exegetical traditions of Bhāmānī and Vivaraṇa, for example, develop different explanations for the role of Brahman and *māyā*, vary on procedural issues like accepting the mind or hearing as an immediate cause for self-realization, and differ on whether or not to accept injunction in hearing the Vedic testimony.⁸ The fundamental distinction lies in how the role of action (*karma*) is accepted in the process of self-realization.

This study establishes that Advaita is accepted with multiple models as early as Śaṅkara. Core issues such as the number of *jīva* or the degrees of reality are treated differently by different philosophers. Those emerging immediately after Śaṅkara came to various conclusions concerning the treatment of ignorance (*avidyā*), its support, object, and function. The commentaries of Vācaspati Mīśra and Padmapāda with Prakāśātman's sub-commentary thereon, have established two distinct streams (*prasthāna*) of Advaita within the school of Śaṅkara. The issue of how Advaita incorporates this diversity within a single school can be explained with illustration of Sarvajñātman. He posits that contrasting positions, such as the world as the transformation of consciousness, or as false appearance (*vivarta*), or as the experience of only Brahman in all modes of consciousness, are merely the views valid in different levels of spiritual awakening.⁹

The positions that Brahman itself is the support and object of ignorance, that the *jīva* is the support of ignorance while Brahman is its object, that there is a single *jīva*, or that there are numerous *jīvas*, cannot be reconciled within a single model of Advaita. However, this is not to say that there has been no attempt to synthesize these different positions.¹⁰ Addressing internal variety within different models is a subsequent development in the history of Advaita. Citsukha, for instance, separately treats the models of both single and multiple *jīvas* in his *Tattvaprādīpikā* (TP). This tendency culminates with the *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* (SLS) of Appayya Dīkṣita, where Dīkṣita identifies the different positions on all issues co-existing within Advaita.

This brief overview demonstrates that Advaita embodies contrasting positions and continues as a single tradition under the umbrella of Śaṅkara. And, to dismiss those inner differences denies the vibrant complexity of this doctrine. This study focuses upon the historical development of the doctrine of DS. It is nonetheless essential to compare DS in light of other Advaita doctrines. This comparison of DS can be initiated in relation to the *Ajātivāda* of Gauḍapāda, as these two models share several aspects in common.

⁸ For systematic analysis of the differences between Vivaraṇa and Bhāmānī, see the preface of Srirama Shastri in Chandrasekharan, 1958.

⁹ See *Saṅkṣepasāūtraka* 2.56-68; 77-93 for the three views the Advaita can be realized.

¹⁰ Some Advaita philosophers including Anandagiri and Vidyāraṇya have attempted to unify different models of Advaita, ignoring subtle differences.

Ajāti and Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi

The philosophy of Gauḍapāda has perplexed scholars, although he is one of the most-studied figures among Advaita philosophers.¹¹ As the 'illusionism' (*māyāvāda*) of Gauḍapāda shares multiple nuances with DS, comparisons can be hastily made with the intention to identify these two models of Advaita as one. Although the scope here is not to examine the philosophy of Gauḍapāda in depth, it is nonetheless relevant to explore some nuances that agree or contradict the doctrine of DS.

In order to establish a history of the DS doctrine, a close examination of relevant sources is required, including texts that have been utilized by the proponents of DS.¹² This inquiry begins with the Advaita literature that discusses two strata of reality: *paramārtha* and *pratibhāsa*, exploring their meaning in relation to other terms that express either something that is absolutely real, or has the appearance of that reality in other forms. This distinction can be found with other terms, such as *satya* and *asatya*, as Hacker points out (Halbfass 1995, 138-140). However, this stratification does not address the conflict within later-classical Advaita where writers primarily rely upon three degrees of reality, adding *vyavahāra* or 'convention' as a separate degree of reality.¹³ The focus of this study is a particular set of arguments that leads to the

¹¹ Gauḍapāda is one of the most closely examined and highly contested figures among the Advaita philosophers. For bibliographic reference for works on Gauḍapāda, see Bouy 2000, 353-386; Potter 1995, 229-233. For systematic treatment on the philosophy of Gauḍapāda, see Nakamura 2004, 211-382; King 1995. With regard to the controversy over the fourth chapter of GK, see Bouy 2000.

¹² Both Madhusūdana and Appayya claim that EJ and DS are the same concept. The whole DS literature fits with the EJ concept; however, this is not the only stream that accepts EJ. Both the *Pratibimba* and *Ābhāsa* schools have an EJ model, even though there is no unanimity concerning this issue in *Vivaraṇa*.

¹³ In order to deal with the Advaita understanding of reality, it is necessary to point out that Hacker has projected his own categories in his study of classical Advaita. The second series that Hacker proposes, found in Halbfass 1995, 138-144, consisting of *sat-asat-sadasat-anirvacanīya-pāñcamaprakāra*, is misleading, because the arguments of Vimuktātman, upon which this category is based, simply follow the *Ābhāsa* model which Hacker calls the 'first series', *sat-asat*. Instead of categorizing the Advaita philosophy on the basis of degrees of reality, this study proposes different models inherent to Advaita thought, as understood by the classical Indian exegetes.

Scholastic Advaita is more systematic about establishing different doctrines within the same school. Two models of Advaita became well-established in the later scholastic period: *Bhāmaiti* and *Vivaraṇa*. See Roodurmun 2002. However, the models proposed date back to Gauḍapāda, as discussed in Bouy 2000; King 1995; and Maṇḍana, found in Sastri 1984; Thrasher 1993.

The Advaita tradition appears to be a system of multiple thoughts: see Comans 2000; Nakamura 1983, 369-514. The division of the Advaita doctrine into two models, one following three realities and the other, following two truths, is explicit in Madhusūdana's ARR: *atha sarvaikye 'pi trividhasatvena sarvavyavahāropapattiḥ* ARR p. 19, l.12; *trividhasatvopagamāt sarvavyavahāropapattiḥ* ARR p. 19, l. 14; *iti bhramamātraviṣayarvabhādhūsvādi-vyavahārikatvanirvacanena sattātraividhyopapattiḥ* ARR p. 24, l. 13; *trividhasatvavādimite . . .* ARR p. 27, l. 39; *trividhasatvena sarvavyavahāropapattiḥ* ARR 20, l. 5. Madhusūdana assigns the doctrine following two truths to the early Vedāntin: *kevalaṃ*

premise of 'consciousness only'. The acceptance of real and false as two categories, therefore, is not fundamental, but rather applied in this Advaita model for didactic purposes. The aspect of Advaita that advocates the existence of constant 'awareness only' (*cinmātra*) while categorizing the phenomenal as merely 'imagined' (*kalpita*) aligns with the Advaita criticized by the Buddhists in early literature.¹⁴ One of the assumptions of this study is that the early Advaitins categorize reality in two degrees and the later development of DS relies upon their writings for its establishment.

Some aspects of thought and terminology within the philosophy of Gauḍapāda can be compared with the DS doctrine:

- 1) He utilizes the instruction that adopts two truths, real and false or illusory.¹⁵ Scholars have pointed out the close relationship of this concept to the Buddhist Mahāyāna tradition.¹⁶
- 2) There is no creation. In Gauḍapāda's terminology, it is non-origination (*ajāti*).¹⁷ This concept of *ajāti* appears to be of Mahāyānic origin as well.¹⁸

With regard to the first point, what is clear from GK is that Gauḍapāda does not interpret two truths as relative and absolute, but rather as phenomenal and real. The phenomenal, for Gauḍapāda, is not real while being relative, but rather illusory, and therefore false. In other words, that which is illusory has never really occurred. However, the 'two truths' in Mahāyāna teaching are not identical with this usage. According to the Mahāyāna stance, 'ultimate' and 'relative' are two perspectives in which both are real.

Neither is the concept of non-origination in Gauḍapāda congruent with the Mahāyāna doctrine of non-origination. Some scholars have attempted to establish these two distinct but apparently confusing concepts to be identical. However, San-

pāramārthikatvaṃ vyavahārikatvaṃ iti ca brahmaprapañcayor dharmadvayaṃ vṛddhair vedāntibhiḥ śavamūṣṭi-nyāyena bodhitam ARR p. 19, 143 – p. 20, l. 1. Madhusūdana compares the conflict in the doctrine teaching three realities with the doctrine of two truths as a 'family quarrel' (*svagotra-kalaha*): *pāramārthikavavyavahārikavalakṣaṇadvividhasatvasvikāre trividhasatvābhūyupagamabhaṅgaprasaṅga iti cet, so 'yaṃ svagotrakalāho na tu vyavahārikavavivādaḥ* ARR p. 21, l. 14-15. Ānandānubhava, while addressing the world as the play of illusion, compares it with a shell that appears to be silver or with a dream. This brings him closer to the model of two truths. See NRD p. 226, l. 7.

¹⁴ Nakamura 1983, 249. This discussion brings the philosophies of DS and *Ābhāsa* very close to each other. "Early Vedānta, as seen by the Buddhists" and identified by Nakamura 1983, 131- 263, resembles DS to a greater extent than the later models following *Avaccheda* or *Pratibimba*, as suggested by Śaṅkara's school.

¹⁵ Rather than *pratibhāsa* and *paramārtha*, Gauḍapāda applies *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*. See GK 4.73-74; 2.1.4; 4.33; 4.57, 58.

¹⁶ Nakamura 2004, 256; King 1995, 120-126.

¹⁷ GK 3.1-4; 3.7; 3.43; 3.48.

¹⁸ Nakamura 2004, 341-344; King 1995, 126-131.

gamlal Pandey distinguishes between two usages of the concept of *ajāti*, saying that in Vedānta, *ajāti* is "at once the negation of creation and assertion of the absolute reality. In Buddhism, however, it simply denotes the negation of creation".¹⁹ In agreement with this position, King distinguishes between the concept of *Ajāti* in Madhyamaka tradition and Advaita Vedānta:

- 1) "There is no birth" (Madhyamaka), and
- 2) "There is an Unborn" (Advaita Vedānta).²⁰

GK is cited by Madhusūdana as supporting the EJ doctrine.²¹ The author of LC considers the commentary upon GK as one of the sources for the DS concept.²² Although these instances suggest a connection of Gauḍapāda with the development of DS, the authors on DS neither explicitly attribute this concept to Gauḍapāda nor do they cite instances from GK in order to establish this concept.

Several other elements of DS-*vāda* are not explicitly present in Gauḍapāda's writings, and this absence is the reason why he cannot be placed at the center of this thought. Gauḍapāda does not mention any term like *cinnmātra* or *dr̥ṣṇmātra* in his discussion; instead, he focuses mainly on 'illusion only' (*māyāmātra*). Nothing in his writing suggests that he embraces the notion of a single *jīva*, or that he is even aware of this; Gauḍapāda categorizes consciousness relying upon *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (MU) that accepts the hierarchy of the Absolute, *īśvara*, and *jīvas*, with the different worlds imagined by *jīvas* being Gauḍapāda's contribution. There is no reference to method, such as *Asparśayoga*, in the texts discussing DS. The reason for comparing DS with Gauḍapāda's teaching is the shared metaphor of dream. However, while most of the idealistic philosophies draw upon this metaphor, they cannot be compared with Gauḍapāda's instructions in their totality. Even when Gauḍapāda compares waking with dreaming, the deep sleep consciousness is separate, and the transcendent state is different from both. The texts discussing DS deal with the same states of consciousness. However, *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (KU) demonstrates that creation is manifested out of the cognition and life force (*prāṇa*) of the subject in deep sleep, and this creation dissolves into *prāṇa* when the subject goes back to deep sleep.

The contribution of Gauḍapāda to Advaita is his doctrine of *Ajāti*, the doctrine that nothing is originated. The doctrine of DS can be identified as a theory of causality. And, agreeing with the central notion of Gauḍapāda, the philosophers propounding DS claim that creation is *dr̥ṣṇī* only, in whichever way the term *dr̥ṣṇī* is interpreted. If the term *dr̥ṣṇī* is interpreted as false appearance, this doctrine rejects creation, and if this term is explained as pure consciousness, then DS confirms creation in terms of consciousness alone. Both understandings reject creation as such, and in this way, DS

¹⁹ Pandey 1974, 323. Quoted in King 1995, 128.

²⁰ King 1995, 138.

²¹ GK 1.16 quoted in AS p.540, line 17.

²² LC in AS 537, line 19.

tallies with *Ajāti*. While maintaining that all the entities that are perceived are nothing but ignorance (*avidyā*) or illusion (*māyā*), the doctrine of *Ajāti* advocates that the very notion of 'creation' is ignorance, as creation does not exist in reality.

Ajāti explicitly negates creation, whereas DS negates creation in positive terms, with creation either as non-dual 'seeing-in-itself', or as 'momentary instances of awareness perceived due to ignorance'. In the concept of DS, what makes the world perceptible is ignorance, not illusion, although the texts are not always consistent in making this distinction. However, for Gauḍapāda, it is illusion or magic that gives rise of the external world (noteworthy, not the 'idea' of the world, but rather, the external world itself).²³ Gauḍapāda analyzes dreaming consciousness in order to establish *ajāti*, showing that false entities appear. However, the usage of 'dream' in the discussion of DS is to demonstrate that all that appears is consciousness only.

Concerning the causality of ignorance, Gauḍapāda's doctrine of illusionism has direct impact on the DS concept. However, these models cannot be viewed as identical. For Gauḍapāda, the world is equated with dream, which is *vaitathya* or non-factual, whereas the primary interpretation of DS advocates that what exists is but 'awareness only'. Contradictory statements, such as 'what exists is consciousness only', or 'what is perceived is illusion only', cannot be the same. According to Gauḍapāda, whatever exists is *māyāmātra* or illusion only, whereas adopting one model of DS, the world is nothing but pure consciousness. Gauḍapāda's approach of establishing non-origination relies upon the comparison of the world with dream. The establishment of DS, on the other hand, primarily relies on the analysis of perception with an establishment that difference cannot be confirmed, and so what is immediately cognized is 'consciousness only'.

The doctrine of *Ajāti* relies upon the argument that the entities that are experienced are illusory in nature, comparing the phenomena to dream, magical appearance, or the illusion of snake in a rope. While Gauḍapāda strongly propounds the illusory nature of external entities, the plurality of individual selves is not addressed in the same way. The issue of 'other minds' does not receive extensive treatment. Nevertheless, the position that all that is experienced is illusory can be broadly interpreted as embracing subjective experience. This leads to the final conclusion that all subjective and objective experiences are superimposed on a single self. While adopting such an interpretation, the proponents of DS explain the illusory nature of all the modes of experience. Although this position is commonly found in scholastic Advaita, DS can be defended following the position that all that appears or all that is within the realm of experience is in fact awareness itself.

Classical Advaitins differ in their interpretations of world appearance, all of which relate to the concept of 'ignorance'. Gauḍapāda's understanding of *māyā* is not of *māyā* as the divine power, but as the illusion of the individual self, constituting entities that are not really there. The issues of contradiction arising in the commentaries after Śaṅkara include the nature of *māyā*, the function and location of ignorance, and

²³ In particular, see the application of *māyā* found in GK 3.19-30 and 4.61, 62.

the degrees of reality. The subsequent developments of identifying ignorance and *māyā* as one or accepting their difference, distinguishing ignorance into two distinct categories, or accepting manifold ignorance, all of these address the role and the nature of ignorance which the Advaitins agree to be indeterminable (*anirvacanīyā*). The philosophy of Gauḍapāda, the *Ābhāsa* model, and the doctrine of DS concur in accepting *māyā* and ignorance as identical. Arguably, the focus on *māyā* emerges from ontological questions: to the question 'what exists there?', the reply is 'it is illusion', whereas the shift in focus to ignorance as the cause of world appearance demonstrates an epistemological twist, changing the inquiry to the nature of experience.

The model of DS considered to be the highest Advaita instruction defends the existence of immediately experienced awareness only, with *dṛṣṭi* as pure awareness. The challenge for those defending DS, then, is how to interpret commonsense experience. Advaitins generally tend to explain this as *avidyā*. To reconcile Advaita with this understanding, *māyā* can be identified as ignorance. Gauḍapāda appears to say that what is cognized is 'illusion', with ignorance identical with *māyā*. Furthermore, Gauḍapāda focuses upon world phenomena, while proponents of DS address the nature of experience.

Four models of Advaita

The above treatment demonstrates that Advaita is a tradition with inherent diversity. This diversity, we propose, results from different arguments the Advaita philosophers advocated while establishing the same thesis. This fluidity within a single school can be examined through the lenses of the different philosophers. This study, however, adopts different Advaita models to analyze this diversity. This approach of reading variations as inherent to specific streams follows the method embraced by later classical writers such as Appayya or Madhusūdana, and suggests the relevance of separately examining all the different models of Advaita. Within one essay, this is not possible. The scope of this study, then, is to examine only the doctrine of DS.

DS emerged as one of the conclusions of arguments developed in the process of establishing non-duality. This being the case, it is not possible to examine DS without touching upon other issues, nor is it possible to treat all issues that consequently result in DS. For instance, the role of ignorance (*avidyā*) in Advaita is treated differently in various Advaita models; the status of *Jīva* and *Īśvara* is not commonly shared; the issue surrounding 'the degrees of reality' is separately analyzed. Nonetheless, there can be a comprehensive method: to briefly introduce the contested issues within different models of Advaita. The following summary relies particularly upon the later classical doxographies of Madhusūdana (SB 258-263), and Sadānanda (ABS 247-271), and the comprehensive preface of Sriram Sastri.²⁴

²⁴ PP Madras ed., 116-135.

Ābhāsavāda:

Constituent elements of the *Ābhāsavāda* doctrine are:

- A. The self conditioned by (*upahita*), and identical with, ignorance is *Īśvara*.²⁵
- B. The self conditioned by, and identical with, cognition (*buddhi*) is *Jīva*.²⁶ Due to the pluralities of cognition, a solitary consciousness appears as if different in each subject.
- C. Bondage is the *ābhāsa* of pure consciousness. Withdrawal of that is liberation.²⁷
- D. Realization is through the *jahat*-type of implication (*lakṣaṇā*).²⁸ In the example of a prince who experiences himself as a hunter, the moment he stops thinking himself a hunter, he is the prince. The self is the very Brahman, and so there is nothing else to be confirmed. Realization is to abandon what is false.²⁹

Pratibimbavāda.³⁰

According to Prakāśātman:

- A. *Īśvara* is the image consciousness (*bimbacaitanya*) conditioned (*upahita*) by ignorance³¹.

²⁵ This is Madhusūdana's position: "*ajñānopahita ātmā ajñānatādātmyāpannasvacidābhāsāvivekāḍ antaryāmi sāṅgī jagāikāraṇam Īśvara iti ca kathyate*", in SB, p. 42, Abhyankar ed. Markandeya Sastri presents this position as that in which *Avidyā* rests upon the Brahman and produces the projection of *Īśvara*; this very *Avidyā* resting upon the self generates the cognition of the mundane world. Sastri 1973, 5. Sastri's position regarding the empirical self does not tally with Madhusūdana's.

²⁶ This is Madhusūdana's position: *buddhyupahitāś ca tattādātmyāpannasvacidābhāsāvivekāḍ jīvaḥ karū bhoktā pramāteṭi ca kathyate* | SB, p. 43, Abhyankar ed. Sadānanda states: *ata eva jīvo 'ntahkaraṇāvaccinnatvāt tatsambaddham eva* | ABS 249. M. Sastri posits that "The division of *Avidyā* with reference to Brahman, *māyā* with reference to *Īśvara* and *Ajñāna* with reference to *Jīva* as far as the respective cognitive functions at these stages of evolution are concerned, is accepted but there are not two or more *Avidyās* as such." Sastri 1973, 5.

²⁷ This again is Madhusūdana's position. M. Sastri states that "The primordial *Avidyā* is not a projection or *Ābhāsa* of the Supreme. Consequently it is not *Anirvacanīya*, but only *avicāritasiddha*." Sastri 1973, 4.

²⁸ *asmīṅś ca pakṣe tatvamādīpade jahallakṣaṇaiva* | SB, p. 43, Abhyankar ed.; . . . *vārtikamate. . . jahallakṣaṇāvīkāra* | ABS, p. 248.

²⁹ M. Sastri agrees with the position that Sureśvara accepts *jahallakṣaṇā*. However, he adds that 'primary sense' itself is adequate in the strict sense. Sastri 1973.

³⁰ The points, if not mentioned otherwise, follow Madhusūdana's gloss. Sadānanda merges *Ābhāsa* with the *Pratibimba* doctrine. He treats some differences as difference within a single model. ABS: 248:5, 13, 19-20.

³¹ *ajñānopahitaḥ bimbacaitanyam Īśvaraḥ. . . iti vivaraṇakāraḥ* | SB, p. 46, Abhyankar ed.

- B. *Jīva* is consciousness reflected upon (*pratibimbīta*) the ignorance which is conditioned by inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and impressions (*vāsanā*).³²

According to Sarvajñātman:

- A. Consciousness reflected upon ignorance is *Īśvara*.³³
 B. Consciousness reflected upon cognition is *Jīva*.³⁴
 C. Image consciousness conditioned by ignorance is pure.³⁵

The points of agreement:

- D. Due to a plurality of cognition, there is a plurality of *jīvas*.³⁶
 E. There is *jahadajahad*-type of implication in sentences given as methods for self-realization.³⁷
 F. The locus and the content of ignorance is the same.³⁸
 G. The primal ignorance is one only.³⁹
 H. The mind is not a sense organ.⁴⁰
 I. Ignorance (*Avidyā*) is located in pure consciousness.

³² *antaḥkaraṇatatsaṃskārāvachinnājñānapratibimbītaṃ caitanyaṃ jīva itī vivaraṇakārāḥ* | SB, p. 46, Abhyankar ed. Roodurmun presents the position, "Jīva is the reflected image of Brahman in *Avidyā*". This mostly tallies with Prakāśātman's position; nonetheless, the modifying phrase 'conditioned by inner sense and impressions' is missing. Roodurmun 2002, 43. Sadānanda's position tallies with Madhusūdana's. ABS: 247.9-10.

³³ *ajñānapratibimbītaṃ caitanyam īśvaraḥ . . . itī saṅkṣepasārīrakakārāḥ* | SB, p. 46, Abhyankar edition.

³⁴ *buddhipratibimbītaṃ caitanyaṃ jīvaḥ . . . itī saṅkṣepasārīrakakārāḥ* | SB, p. 46, Abhyankar edition.

³⁵ *ajñānānupahītaṃ tu bimbacaitanyaṃ śuddham itī saṅkṣepasārīrakakārāḥ* | SB, p. 46, Abhyankar ed.

³⁶ *anayoś ca pakṣayor buddhibhedāj jīvanānātvaṃ* | SB, p. 47, Abhyankar ed. Sadānanda posits: *atra cāntaḥkaraṇānānvāy jīvanānātvaṃ* | ABS: 247.15.

³⁷ *pratibimbasya ca pāramārthikatvāj jahadajahallakṣaṇaiva tatvamādīpadeṣu* | SB, p. 47, Abhyankar ed.

³⁸ See SŚ 1.319. The subsequent four points (F-I) are discussed by Roodurmun 2002, 43, as well.

³⁹ For detailed analysis of the plurality of ignorance according to the *Bhāmatī*, and singularity according to the PPV, see Sriram Sastri on PP, Madras edition, 130-132.

⁴⁰ Whether 'mind' (*manas*) is a sense organ or not is not simply a metaphysical question; this invites problems with regard to final realization. The instrument for direct realization of the Brahman, following the *Bhāmatī* position, is mind, whereas, following the *Vivaraṇa*, this is *śabda*. Sriram Sastri on PP Madras edition, 118.

Avacchedavāda:

- A. Madhusūdana posits that *Īśvara* is the consciousness that has been objectified by ignorance.⁴¹ Roodurmun elaborates on this position with *Jīva* as consciousness limited by ignorance and *Īśvara* as consciousness that transcends the limiting adjunct (Roodurmun 2002, 37).
 B. Consciousness that is the locus of ignorance is *jīva*. Since there is plurality in ignorance, there is plurality in *jīva*.⁴²
 C. There is difference in the world of each *jīva*, because this very *jīva*, being conditioned by ignorance, is the material cause of the world.⁴³
 D. *Īśvara* is imposed to be the cause of the world, because he is the support of ignorance, the world, and *jīvas*.⁴⁴
 E. The mind is a sense-organ.⁴⁵
 F. There are no entities out of the domain of knowledge.⁴⁶

Drṣṭisrṣṭivāda:

Model 1:

- A. *Īśvara* is image consciousness conditioned by ignorance.⁴⁷
 B. *Jīva* is consciousness reflected upon ignorance.⁴⁸

Model 2:

- A. Pure consciousness not conditioned by ignorance is *Īśvara*.⁴⁹
 B. Consciousness conditioned by ignorance is *Jīva*.⁵⁰

⁴¹ *Ajñānaviṣayibhūtaṃ caitanyam īśvaraḥ . . . itī vācaspatimīśrāḥ* | SB, p. 47, Abhyankar ed.

⁴² *Ajñānāśrayibhūtaṃ ca jīva itī vācaspatimīśrāḥ | asmimś ca pakṣe ajñānānānvāy jīva-nānātvaṃ* | SB, p. 47, Abhyankar ed. This tallies with Maṅḍana's position, "nanu kasyā-vidyeta, jīvanām itī brūmah" BS:10.3.

⁴³ *pratījīvaṃ ca prapañcabhedaḥ | jīvasyaivājñānopahitatayā jagadupādānavāt* | SB, p. 47, Abhyankar ed. *pratījīvaṃ viyadādīprapañcabhedaś ca* | ABS p. 251.

⁴⁴ *īśvarasya ca saprapañcajīvāvidyādhiṣṭhānavena kāraṇatvopacārād itī | ayam eva cāvacheda-vādaḥ* | SB, p. 47, Abhyankar ed.

⁴⁵ The points listed above within the *Avaccheda* model follow Madhusūdana. This particular point follows Roodurmun 2002, 37. *Vācaspati* has two reasons in accepting 'mind' as a sense-organ, 1) internal feelings, such as pain and pleasure, are immediately known; immediate knowledge is possible only through perception, and so these must be perceived by mind as a sense-organ; 2) mind would not be able to cognize its own state if it were not a sense-organ. For discussion, see Indich 1980, 48.

⁴⁶ This is one of the major components of DS. Sadānanda, on the contrary, identifies it as the *Avaccheda* doctrine. ABS 251:17.

⁴⁷ *Ajñānopahītaṃ bimbacaitanyam īśvaraḥ* | SB, p. 48, Abhyankar ed.

⁴⁸ *ajñānapratibimbītaṃ caitanyaṃ jīva* | SB, p. 48, Abhyankar ed.

⁴⁹ *ajñānānupahītaṃ śuddham caitanyam īśvaraḥ . . .* SB, p. 49, Abhyankar ed.

Commonalities in models 1 and 2:

- C. The very *Jīva* is material and instrumental cause of the world.⁵¹
- D. The object of perception is appearance only.⁵²
- E. The error of plurality of *jīvas* is due to the plurality of bodies.⁵³
- F. Bondage and liberation are imagined only.⁵⁴

The model of DS that Madhusūdana presents is comparatively closer to the *Pratibimba* model with regard to the first two points that deal with *Īśvara* and *Jīva*. Concerning the causality of *Jīva*, this doctrine tallies with that of *Avaccheda*. The explicit plurality of *jīva* is a common criterion for both the *Pratibimba* and *Avaccheda* models, although subsequent texts closer to the *Pratibimba* model often touch upon the concept of the singularity of the individual self. Most nuances within the DS model can be found in the doctrine of *Ābhāsa*, bridging these two streams of Advaita.

The singularity of self-experience is not limited only to the doctrine of *Ābhāsa*; this concept is addressed by several masters, even those writing in the *Vivarana* school.⁵⁵ Within these parameters, however, there is no possibility for the DS concept to be embraced by the scholastic philosophy that followed the doctrine of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, as there are several contradictory elements within the doctrine of *avaccheda*, as propounded by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. The most apparent points are: the *avaccheda* doctrine accepts a plurality of individual selves, while also accepting the individual self as a locus of ignorance with Brahman as object of that ignorance; it accepts three degrees of reality. Neither of these positions tally with the doctrine that identifies creation with seeing.

The entire discussion rests upon one single issue: how to understand consciousness. All Advaitins posit that consciousness is self-aware. The advocates of the DS doctrine exploit this, concluding that only consciousness can be confirmed. This position with regard to consciousness is strongly defended by Śrīharṣa. The very act of con-

⁵⁰ *ajñānopahitaṅ ca jīva itī vā mukhya vedāntasiddhānta ekajīvavādākhyaḥ | imam eva ca dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivādām ācakṣate |* SB, p. 49, Abhyankar ed.

⁵¹ *asmīnś ca pakṣe jīva eva svājñānavasāḥ jagadupādānaṅ nimittaṅ ca |* SB, p. 49, Abhyankar edition.

⁵² *dr̥ṣyaṅ ca sarvaṅ prāṅtikam |* SB, p. 49-50, Abhyankar ed.

⁵³ *dehahedāc ca jīvabhedabhrāntīḥ |* SB, p. 50, Abhyankar ed.

⁵⁴ *ekasyaiva ca svakalpitaguruśāstrādīpabṛṅhītaśravaṇamananādīdarūḥīyād āmasākṣātkāre mokṣaḥ |* SB, p. 50, Abhyankar ed.

⁵⁵ The *Vivarana* school is named after the 'Vivarana' sub-commentary of Prakāśātan on the *Pañcapādīkā* of Padmapāda, which was itself a commentary on Śaṅkara's *BS-bhāṣya* on the first five Sūtras of BS. There are several elements of contention between adherents to the *Vivarana* and *Bhāmata*, the schools named after the sub-commentaries of Padmapāda and Vācaspati Miśra. Due to the dominance of these two schools, Sureśvara's *Ābhāsa* doctrine was overshadowed, and merged with the *Vivarana* school. This process can be traced as early as the *Pañcapādīkā*; however, Vidyāraṇya's works in later scholastic period completed the process of identification.

firming something establishes the existence of awareness, and at this point, existence and consciousness are reciprocal. DS advocates explore the immediate function of consciousness in its self-revealing aspect. This, however, is not to argue that only the non-dual nature of awareness-in-itself is what is expressed by the terms denoting consciousness, including the term *dr̥ṣṭi*. The multiple understandings of DS exemplify the inexhaustible nature of words to reveal new meaning.

Sr̥ṣṭidr̥ṣṭi and *Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*

Later scholastic Advaita developed into two schema that accommodated its divergent strands of thought. The commentaries on the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana rely upon the distinctions made at this juncture, paving the way for subsequent writers engaged in this dialogue. This categorization was quite widely accepted after Madhusūdana. At a rudimentary level, the first model, *sṛṣṭidr̥ṣṭi* (SD), accepts that entities exist independent of perception and the awareness of entities rests upon their phenomenality, whereas the second model, *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, is interpreted by those who project Advaita within these streams as a doctrine that advocates the existence of entities dependent upon perceptual awareness. Although this specific definition does not cover all usages of DS throughout the Advaita literature, and the third section of this study focuses upon its nuances, this understanding nonetheless demonstrates the latest interpretation of DS in the history of Advaita philosophy.

These two models can be understood as structural frames to fit within them the various arguments otherwise scattered throughout different exegeses. Although the early distinction does not explicitly identify the issues that can be schematized within these two models, later commentators and doxographers highlighted the aspects that frame SD and DS. Dharmadatta Śarmā, an early 20th century commentator, exploits the Advaita literature to synthesize arguments within these two streams. His synopsis in the sub-commentary *Gūḍhārthattvāloka* upon Madhusūdana's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* is most concise and highly systematic. According to Dharmadatta, these models are two contrasting poles within Advaita philosophy, with central elements identified below:

Central Tenets of *Sr̥ṣṭidr̥ṣṭi*:

1. The SD model accepts the world as a transformation of ignorance composed of three qualities,⁵⁶ considering the desire of God as its instrumental cause and the principle of the unseen factor (*adr̥ṣṭa*) as its associate instrumental cause.⁵⁷
2. SD is defined as *sṛṣṭau satyāṅ dr̥ṣṭir jñānam* (knowledge, or seeing, when there is an [independent] existence of creation).⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *triguṇasyājñānasya samānasattākatayā pariṇāmatvam |* GTĀ, App. 47.

⁵⁷ *parameśvarekṣaṇādyaḍṣṭādisahakṣṭījñānaṅ kāraṇāmanā pariṇamate |* GTĀ, App. 47.

⁵⁸ *sṛṣṭau satyāṅ dr̥ṣṭir jñānaṅ sṛṣṭidr̥ṣṭir ity ākhyāyate |* GTĀ, App. 47.

3. Even with the absence of knowledge, entities, which are the product of ignorance, have their phenomenal existence.⁵⁹
4. Since entities last for several moments, they can be recognized and seen by many subjects.⁶⁰
5. There is a third category of truth, the truth of appearance (*prāṭītika*) which is present, for example, in entities seen in a dream or erroneous perception, like seeing a snake in a rope.⁶¹ The other two are real (*paramārtha*) and phenomenal (*vyāvahārika*) truths.
6. If intrinsically formless, mere awareness is accepted, there would not be any differentiation in all objects. In this case, there will not be a causal efficiency and all actions could start from any object.⁶²
7. Entities are imposed on the non-dual Brahman, of the form of awareness that permeates all entities.⁶³
8. SD is more concerned with distinguishing itself from various streams of Buddhist philosophy. The entities, according to *Yogācāra* Buddhism, are considered as illusory and are compared with dream entities or false perception. Following SD, the entities of empirical reality are not parallel to dream entities, and so are not labeled as fictitious (*tuccha*).⁶⁴
9. SD accepts the function of direct perception even in the case of erroneous perception. The argument is that the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) by which perception has arisen is the contact between senses and their objects. Even though there is no cognition of the real object through sense-object contact in an erroneous perception, there is nevertheless a cognition of an object. This perceived object may be generic in form, or it may be an object falsely perceived, as in the case of a

⁵⁹ *jñānābhāvakāle 'pi vyāvahārikālakālabādhyatayāsty eva vyāvahārikam satvam sarveṣāṃ anādyavidyāmātradoṣaprayuktānām kāryānām* | GTĀ, App. 47.

⁶⁰ *ekasyaivānekakālasthāyitayā pratyabhijñāyamānatvam anekadraṣṭṛdrśyatvam ca* | GTĀ, App. 47.

⁶¹ *īrtīyam apy asti satvam prāṭītikam prāṭīmātrañvitānāmavidyāpariṇāmabhūtānām svāpnaindrajālikavastuśūktirajātānām* | GTĀ, App. 47.

⁶² *jñānamātrābhūyapagame tasya svato nirākāratayā vastubhūtabhedakadharmasūnyatayā sarvajñānataḥ sarvaṇpravṛtīdyūpattir ity abhūyapeyo viśayaḥ* | GTĀ, App. 47.

⁶³ *asty ādhyāsikam tādātmyam sarveṣāṃ vastūnām paramārthasadrūpe vyūpake jñānātmay ekasmin advītiye brahmaṇy adhiṣṭhāne 'jñānenādhyāsāt* | GTĀ, App. 48.

⁶⁴ *sūnyatāvādīmādhyamikamate bhramasya sadadhīṣṭhānakasyānabhūyapagamena satvena prāṭīyamānasya daṇḍaghaṭādiṣu sarveṣv abhāvāt sarveṣāṃ gaganakusumādītulyatayā tucchatvam | vedānānaye ca bādhit purvaṃ sarveṣāṃ sad ghaṭaḥ san paṭa ityādisadadhīṣṭhānabhramātmakaprayayā satvena prāṭīyamānavād atucchatvam iti viśeṣaḥ* | GTĀ, App. 49. Madhusūdana defines *vyāvahārikatva* as *alīkatva*, explaining it as *tuccha*. ARR p. 23, l. 3.

shell perceived as silver. In reality, the shell is not silver. The error is that the object directly perceived is seen as something else.⁶⁵

10. Following this model, the perception of an object is the identity of consciousness in the form of an object.⁶⁶

Central Tenets of *Dṛṣṭisrṣṭi*:

1. It is the doctrine appropriate only for those having an advanced, fully purified mind.⁶⁷
2. Since the entities of dream or erroneous perception appear as long as they are not sublated, they are different from *tuccha*. Even the empirical world bears the same degree of truth.⁶⁸
3. *Dṛṣṭi* is appearance (*prāṭī*).⁶⁹
4. As there is no existence of silver seen in a shell prior to that quality coming into awareness, and as the origination of the cognition of silver emerges when conscious seeing occurs, in the same way entities continue to exist as long as there is no knowledge of the truth of non-dual Brahman. As long as there is modification (*vṛtti*) of knowledge, there is no evidence to prove that things exist when they are not known.⁷⁰
5. The definition of DS is 'to be pervaded by self-knowledge' or 'to be pervaded by an absence of ignorance of oneself'.⁷¹
6. As an object is originated in the moment it is known, recognition of that object as well is originated in the moment of recognition.⁷²
7. Destruction and so forth of entities is conventional knowledge.⁷³

⁶⁵ *manmate bhramasthale rajatādeḥ pratyakṣatve 'pi tasya cākṣuṣatvānāṅgīkārāt | ... cākṣuṣadamākāravṛttitādātmyasya rajatākāravṛttāvadvādyāsāt* | GTĀ, App. 50.

⁶⁶ *viśayapratyakṣatvam api viśayāvachinnacaitanyasya svākāravṛttypahitapramāṭṛcāitanyābhinnatvam* | GTĀ, App. 51.

⁶⁷ *aparāś cotamādhiḥkāraṇam prati darśito dṛṣṭisrṣṭivādaḥ sa cānatīśuddhāntoḥkaraṇair durbodhaḥ* | GTĀ, App. 52.

⁶⁸ *prāṭīke śūktirajātādaḥ svāpnaprapaṅce ca bādhit purvaṃ sattayā prāṭīyamānavena tucchavilakṣaṇe vīyādādiḥpapañcānām api tathātvam evocitam* | GTĀ, App. 52.

⁶⁹ *... ita utpattyanantaram na dṛṣṭiḥ prāṭīḥ* | GTĀ, App. 52.

⁷⁰ *vyāvahārikavena sampratīpanvānāṃ prapañcānām api svasvakāraṇād utpattau satyām uttara-kālāna dṛṣṭir api tv advītyabrahmajñānāt svākāravṛttau satyām utpattir ajñānatādaśāyām sītāu mānābhāvāt* | GTĀ, App. 52.

⁷¹ *evaṃ ca svajñānavyūpyatvam svīyajñānābhāvavyūpyatvam vā dṛṣṭisrṣṭir iti paryavasannam* | GTĀ, App. 52.

⁷² *svajñānakāle ghaṭavat pratyabhijñānakāla atīyasya jananāt* | GTĀ, App. 52.

8. The problem with accepting this theory pertains to whether or not it differs from Buddhist theories. Dharmadatta replies that this problem is raised due to not knowing the intention of the texts propounding DS. The fundamental difference between this doctrine and the *Yogācāra* concept is that entities, according to Vedānta, are the transformation of ignorance; ignorance, in turn, has Brahman as its foundation. What exists is being itself which is identical with awareness in its true form. It is ignorance to see this reality in the form of the world. And therefore, *vivarta* is to perceive Brahman as the world. This illusion does not fit with the Mādhyamaka illustration of a sky-flower, which is a non-substantial perception.⁷⁴ In essence, accepting either Brahman or emptiness as the basis of illusion distinguishes these two philosophies.
9. Dharmadatta, like Madhusūdana, accepts six entities, including *jīva*, as beginningless and out of the domain of DS.⁷⁵ These six categories are: *jīva*, *īśvara*, pure consciousness, the difference between *jīva* and *īśa*, ignorance, and the relationship of ignorance with consciousness.
10. The domain of DS lies only within the object of sensory perception. Therefore, in the context of an impression or that which is unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*), there is no DS.⁷⁶
11. Except for the knowledge of Brahman, all other knowledge is erroneous.⁷⁷
12. The passages mentioning the creation of space, and so on, are equal to the sentences describing the entities of dream.⁷⁸
13. The *Upaniṣadic* passage given as a source for DS is 'all the worlds, all the *prāṇas* . . . are manifested out of this very self'.⁷⁹ This text, as previously addressed, explains the creation of *prāṇa* and so on, emerging from the self awakened from deep sleep. Dharmadatta accepts that, while mentioning *antyaḍṛṣṭi*, Sarvajñātman

⁷³ *nāśāder api prāṇīkaravivrodhitvāt* | GTĀ, App. 53.

⁷⁴ *sadaḍhiṣṭhitavidyāpariṇāmasya sadvīvartasyāvidyākṛtasadvīvartamātrasya vā tasyābhyupagameṇa na niradhiṣṭhānabhramāṅgikāra itī bauddhamatād bahuvīśeṣasya sabbhāvāt* | GTĀ, App. 53.

⁷⁵ *jīvādīnām śaṅṅam anāditvam eva na tatra ḍṛṣṭisṣṭyabhyupagamāḥ* | GTĀ, App. 54.

⁷⁶ *indriyagocara eva hi ḍṛṣṭisṣṭīḥ | katham anyathā saṅskārādṛṣṭādau na ḍṛṣṭisṣṭīḥ* | GTĀ, App. 54.

⁷⁷ *brahmanānātīrīkatasya sarvajñānasya bhramāsvayeseṣātvāt . . . ḍṛṣṭisṣṭīpakṣe sarvasya vyāvahārikajñānasyāpi svāpnavibhramatulyarvāṅgikāreṇokasyāpiṣṭatvāt* | GTĀ, App. 54.

⁷⁸ *aīha vīyādādīnām api prātibhāsitakve tato vīyādīyutpādabodhakaśruter aprāmāṅyam ātyantīkam syād itī cen na | svāpnavībhodhakaavākyaulyatvasyaiva tasyābhyupagamāt* | GTĀ, App. 55.

⁷⁹ *ḍṛṣṭisṣṭau ca 'evam evāsmād ātmanāḥ sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokā' ityādi śrutiḥ sūptotīhāsyā jīvāt prāṇādisṣṭīṇi prapīḍāyanī pramāṅgam* | GTĀ, App. 55. Dharmadatta borrowed this line from the DS-chapter on AS.

had DS in mind.⁸⁰ He cites "*avidyāyonayo* . . ." as further evidence, claiming that it is found in various texts dealing with DS.⁸¹

In summary, Dharmadatta's understanding of DS contains most of the elements of Madhusūdana's exposition. Nonetheless, his understanding of *ḍṛṣṭi* is much more similar to what Vyāsaśrī had in mind—a momentary vision collapsing in each instance—and so his DS explains the fictional nature of existence. Even though the gloss of Dharmadatta is very short, it reveals to some degree how the Advaitic analysis of origination evolved into two contradictory schools which nevertheless come to the same conclusion. This merging of apparently divergent philosophical trajectories—one centered on perceiving (DS) and the other on the perceived (SD)—highlights our thesis that the hermeneutic method the Advaita philosophers adopted concludes with two distinct models as a consequence of the philosophical debate that concerns the issue of what is immediately cognized. Dharmadatta cites the *Kauṣītaki* chapter discussed above and the very familiar verse which confirms that entities are of the origin of ignorance (*avidyāyonayo bhāvāḥ*). With his identification of *ḍṛṣṭi* as awareness, he clearly connects DS with *Ābhāsa*.

Dṛṣṭisṣṭi: A model with models within

As the reader can see, based on this preliminary survey of the ground which this term and this study set out to cover, it is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of DS as one single idea, since it incorporates a host of divergent and diverse models, and in fact does not include other approaches with which it seems to share a closer sense of kinship. The obvious solution would be to discard some of the approaches bearing this name that are only tangentially related. But this would be profoundly destructive to the historically-driven part of our study. As useful as such an approach would be in terms of narrowing DS's semantic field, it is utterly inappropriate in terms of the tradition we are studying to exclude anything of importance which was considered DS prior to a more modern era. As important a philosopher as Madhusūdana has considered DS to be applicable to a plurality of models. Thus, in order to accurately represent the role DS has played in the history of Indian thought, we must also take into account such schools or risk impinging on the validity of our study.

After locating DS within the context of multiple Advaita thoughts, it becomes necessary to trace the philosophical concept of DS. The term *ḍṛṣṭisṣṭi* presents an understanding of entities as identical to their experience.⁸² compelling Madhusūdana to define it as 'the existence of only what is within the domain of knowledge' or as 'an ab-

⁸⁰ *ḍṛṣṭisṣṭīpakṣayottamāi ca saṅkṣepaśārīrake tattvāvedakamānadṛṣṭir adhamā tattvaṣṭatir madhyamā, tattvapracyutivibhramakṣatikarī tatrāntyaḍṛṣṭir materyādīnokā* | GTĀ, App. 55.

⁸¹ *evam ākareṣv anyatrāpi | avidyāyonayo bhāvāḥ sarve 'mī budbudā iva | kṣaṇam udbhūya gacchantī jñānaikajaladhau layam || ityādy uktam itī* | GTĀ, App. 55. This line is also borrowed from AS.

⁸² *prattīmātra evaitat bhūti viśvaṃ carūcaram* VSM 18. Prakāśānanda interprets *prattī* as pure consciousness.

sence of what is not within the domain of knowledge.⁸³ This definition of Madhusūdana's, while not explaining the internal meaning of the terms *dr̥ṣṭi* and *sr̥ṣṭi*, nevertheless, elaborates upon the philosophical concept that is under consideration.

The term *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* is generally analyzed as a *karmadhāraya*-type compound. Commonly, *dr̥ṣṭi* is understood as seeing and *sr̥ṣṭi*, as creation. Although acceptance of 'creation as identical to seeing' undergirds the term DS, this is not the only way to understand the term. Both adding a middle term to the compound, *dr̥ṣṭisamakālāsr̥ṣṭiḥ*, which means 'creation as contemporaneous to seeing', and subsequent analysis, provide a different structure. Some later writers have identified two distinct doctrines of DS, following these methods of two interpretations.⁸⁴

A study on DS faces multiple problems, including the very meaning of the term *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*. The term itself does not occur often in Advaita literature, even though the concept associated with it is identified as one of the major concepts in Vedānta.⁸⁵ By investigating both the concept and the term itself, this study excavates the history and development of the philosophy associated with it. A second difficulty facing this study is that DS was never crystallized into a single philosophical concept. Rather, its meanings were developed, expanded, critiqued, and refined by a number of Advaita exegetes between the 8th and 16th centuries CE. Therefore, this study seeks to retrieve the multiple meanings of this dynamic, contested term through a systematic historical, linguistic, and philosophical analysis of the writings of representative authors dealing with this specific thought. That the term has been interpreted differently for contesting concepts will be established with this investigation.

Madhusūdana positions DS as the highest of doctrines within Advaita Vedānta. In his short chapter on DS, he defends four possible meanings of the term.⁸⁶ If these meanings are carefully examined, it becomes clear that the DS models favored by Madhusūdana and Prakāśānanda are not identical.

In excavating the concept and meaning of DS, this study examines these misconceptions. A major setback, however, is that no single text contains all the arguments of DS, and historical inquiry rests on available fragments from different philosophers. Further complications result from the multiple and sometimes conflicting arguments and interpretations of DS.

The literature after Madhusūdana analyzes Advaita as the two doctrines of DS and *Sr̥ṣṭidr̥ṣṭi* (SD), synthesizing the previously existing arguments. These models can be distinguished by acceptance of either two or three degrees of reality, that is, 1) real and illusory, or 2) real, conventional, and illusory. Though these models with their

⁸³ *pratipannopādhyāyājñātaikasatvasya vā, draṣṭranarāvedyatve sati jñātaikasatvasya vā vivakṣitarvāḥ* | AS 533-534 in Sastri 1982 edition.

⁸⁴ This seems to have been fashioned after Appayya's interpretation, and will be discussed in the section discussing Appayya, Section 2, Chapter 5, pp. 123-127.

⁸⁵ Madhusūdana Sarasvaṭi, in the *Siddhāntabindu*, SB 234, for instance.

⁸⁶ To be discussed in the chapter on Madhusūdana, Section 2, Chapter 5, pages 127-135.

distinctive terms emerge relatively later, they basically exploit the early philosophical structure found in the scholastic Advaita literature.

The issues of what really exists and that of the nature of knowledge coincide with the study of *Dr̥ṣṭi*, in which what actually exists is only awareness-in-itself. The model 'Consciousness only' widely varies in the Advaita, Trika Śaiva, and Yogācāra streams of thought. The DS model fundamentally differs from the Yogācāra doctrine in the sense that awareness, which is frequently addressed with various terms common to both the Advaita and Yogācāra texts, essentially is not the momentary consciousness that differs in each instance of awareness. Neither is this the *Dr̥ṣṭi* that is acceptable to the Trika-Śaivas, because the *dr̥ṣṭi* applied in Advaitic teachings does not advocate agency, neither does it accept inherent power that characterizes consciousness. The third section of this text clarifies that the *dr̥ṣṭi* applied in the Advaita doctrine bears hardly any resemblance to the Yogācāra concept of *vijñapti*. This position is based on historical analysis.

The reality concerning the subject of perception under illusion emerges as another related issue. Classical Advaita posits that what exists is mere Brahman. However, explaining the nature of the world phenomena has generated multiple understandings. Contrasting perspectives can be gleaned from the writings of Maṇḍana, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda. Maṇḍana accepts the individual subject as the support of ignorance, with Brahman being perceived as the form of the world and the object of illusion. Sureśvara accepts that what is the subject of ignorance is Brahman itself, which, due to ignorance, experiences subjecthood, and thereby visualizes its own consciousness as the world in objective form. The Vivarana school differentiates this illusion in two strata: with pure consciousness coming to *Īśvara*-hood due to *māyā*, and with subject and object as two forms of consciousness itself. In this bifurcated model, consciousness allows the world phenomena to exist, and the subject who is free from ignorance is identified as *Īśvara*.

The philosophy of Maṇḍana Mīra is often identified with the DS concept.⁸⁷ Maṇḍana posits that pure awareness is immediately experienced in all modes of perception. He further advocates that the world is the collective projection of the ignorance of individual selves. However, Maṇḍana advocates the plurality of the selves (*jīva*) and accepts *jīvas* as the support of ignorance and Brahman its object. The model of DS that advocates the beginninglessness of six categories — the individual self, God, pure consciousness, the distinction between the God and individual self, ignorance, and the relationship of ignorance with pure consciousness — is comparatively closer to the Advaita advocated by Maṇḍana. The acceptance of the plurality of individual selves, the distinction between appearance (*pratibhāsa*) and conventional

⁸⁷ "Maṇḍana Mīra may be regarded as the originator of the Vedāntic doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*, which was, in later times, so forcefully attributed to Prakāśānanda". Dasgupta 1975, 2: 84. Maṇḍana is tentatively dated as 700 CE, and regarded by some scholars as a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara. What seems to be more likely is that Maṇḍana was a junior contemporary of Śaṅkara; there are some instances in which Śaṅkara's influence on Maṇḍana can be traced. For discussion, see Thrasher, 1993, Appendix A.

reality (*vyavahāra*), and the role of ignorance are some of the characteristics that distinguish Maṇḍana's philosophy from the model of DS that can be identified with EJ.

The DS doctrine found in the Advaita school of Śaṅkara has often been compared with the philosophy of *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (YV). This study only addresses the specific nuances relating to DS that can be found while reading YV and the *Mokṣopāya* (MUS). Most essential is the role of ignorance in projecting world phenomena. MUS and YV frequently conflate ignorance with *māyā*. Following these texts, to imagine is not to misrepresent. Imagining, along these lines, is the inherent nature of consciousness and cannot be separated from it. Furthermore, what is imagined is consciousness alone and any distinction is found due to ignorance. According to this doctrine, ignorance solely means, 'to know things other than what they are.' Since there is no instance of not-knowing, there is either knowing in the true form of awareness itself, or knowing it otherwise.

Following the arguments concerning the subject of experience, 'seeing as creation' can be analyzed in two distinct models: one accepting singularity of the subject, and the other accepting a plurality of subjects. The model with many subjects collectively sharing a perception of the same entities due to their *karma* aligns closely with the philosophy propounded in MUS and YV. This model shares many aspects with the thought of Maṇḍana. It is not unlikely that both Maṇḍana and the author of the MUS were under the influence of Bhartṛprapañca,⁸⁸ but since no original text of Bhartṛprapañca exists, it is difficult to confirm this categorically. In the second model, Brahman alone exists, and this Brahman itself imagines both subjecthood and worldly phenomena. This second model posits a mere subject identical to the Brahman who imagines the world, and resembles the doctrine of Sureśvara. Since a cornerstone of Sāṅkhya thought is the doctrine of the plurality of *jīvas*, it is very probable that Advaita Vedānta formulated the doctrine of the singularity of *Jīva*, or *Puruṣa*. If this is the case, the DS doctrine will indeed be the primary doctrine of the Advaita school.

According to one interpretation of DS, there lies simultaneity of creation and seeing. According to this doctrine, multiple subjects of perception originate entities corresponding to their respective perception, which are shaped by *karma*. It is not necessary that they perceive the same object, since the imposition of sameness is due to the shared *karma* of different subjects. The present study shows that the doctrine of simultaneity (*samakāla*) is refuted by Vimuktātman. That Prakāśānanda challenges this *samakāla* concept indirectly suggests the possibility that Maṇḍana's position is itself being refuted. Here, the 'simultaneity of perception and its object' is significant, when multiple minds perceiving the same object is accepted. On the contrary, Madhusūdana aligns DS with the EJ concept, tying DS to a concept that accepts a singularity of the subject. The current study focuses mainly on the EJ doctrine, as the standard concept of DS is accepted in scholastic Advaita Vedānta. Since issues in both are similar, they are, time and again, discussed together.

⁸⁸ The philosophy of Bhartṛprapañca is significant to the development of Vedānta and therefore warrants separate treatment. For this study, the most relevant issues will be addressed in both the second and third sections. He seems to have believed in the *satkāryavāda* doctrine of causality. For detail, see Rüping, 1977, 69-71; Hiriyanna 1972, 6-16.

In order to establish the historical development of DS, it becomes necessary to analyze the instances recorded by writers who have explored this thought. In this process, it is not sufficient to explore the term DS alone, since in most cases, the term as such is hardly applied. It is equally important to understand the meaning of the terms that comprise the compound. The second term, *ṛṣṭi*, may seem straightforward. *Ṛṣṭi* can simultaneously be proven to be the action of construction, and the result of that process, i.e., that which is constructed. Understanding the meaning of *dṛṣṭi*, on the other hand, is very complex. The term *dṛṣṭi* first appears in the *Upaniṣads*, and exegetes interpreting those passages have added and altered layers of meaning. In subsequent commentaries, this question ranged far from scriptural issues to variants proposed by individual authors. Conceptual difference can be established as early as the writings of Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, with the latter quite important to our understanding of the meaning of *dṛṣṭi*.

However, if, in all instances, DS means 'construction as mere seeing', this doctrine needs another doctrine to define seeing. Can seeing define seeing? If seeing itself suffices to define seeing, this 'seeing' will fall under creation. And, if *dṛṣṭi* is 'construction', this will be false, since what is created is considered as the projection of ignorance, and therefore false. But if seeing itself is reality, then neither is this a construction, nor will there be bondage in any mode of time.

The subsequent understanding of *dṛṣṭi* aligns this term with *vṛtti* (mental modification).⁸⁹ This Advaita understanding of 'mental modification' can be compared with the Yogic concept of *ākāra* (image). Dharmarāja, the Advaita philosopher following the Vivaraṇa stream, argues that the mind, through the sense organs, flows out and transforms itself into the form of the objects of perception. The images this produces are what are called *vṛttis*. In Madhusūdana's understanding, the term *dṛṣṭi* refers to the consciousness conditioned by *vṛtti*.

The arguments leading to DS rest upon the epistemological issues of the nature and means of knowledge. Proponents of DS posit that that which is not experienced cannot be confirmed, because existence or non-existence is determined by experience alone. Even though all models of Advaita commonly accept that the self is of the nature of consciousness and is alone the ultimate reality, DS doctrine grounds upon the thesis that the self, immediately experienced in subjective cognition, is real, and the existence of other selves is never immediately cognized. Some contemporary scholars correlate the Advaita position on consciousness with a phenomenological stance.⁹⁰ Some compare Advaita, especially the models of DS or *Ekajīva*, with western solipsism. This study, however, focuses on analysis of DS on its own historical and philosophical ground. The existence of a single cognizing 'self' recognized as EJ is not a philosophical problem in Advaita; however, this thesis is not acceptable to all those

⁸⁹ *Vṛtti* is one of the terms common to the school of Yoga, which led Hacker to think that Śaṅkara built his Advaita within the structure of the Yoga school of thought. Halbfass 1995, 101-134. In using *ākāra* repeatedly in such instances where Śaṅkara may have used *vṛtti*, Sureśvara echoes Dharmakīrti.

⁹⁰ Specifically, J.N. Mohanty and Bina Gupta have exploited phenomenological terminology and have identified Advaita as phenomenology.

who advocate Advaita doctrine. Proponents of *Ekañva* argue that nothing other than the very self is immediately cognized. However, a plurality of *Jīvas* is given as an alternative model of DS. If this alternative is regarded as the DS doctrine, this coincides with Maṇḍana's thought.

This study explores the Advaita arguments that align with the model of DS that is identical with EJ. A careful study of Advaita texts shows that DS is the conclusive argument in a chain of logical debate emerging from the non-dualistic ground. Although there is no direct reference to DS-*vāda* in the *Upaniṣads*, it is simply inaccurate to declare that there is therefore no such concept. Rather, what is evident and will be shown is that, in spite of the lack of the term as such, there was a trend to accept a single self in all that exists. And if this very self is free to construct the world, the basic tenets of DS already appear in this monistic thought. Moreover, if one can accept the existence of DS only after the term itself appears in texts, then DS is not even available in Prakāśānanda's VSM, the text generally credited by contemporary and classical writers as the first text clearly following the DS concept. This would be a baseless conclusion.

Next, it becomes necessary to establish the structure of the DS argument as it was developed in the Advaita literature. The subject matter of this study is seeing in itself, the subjective experience as such, with the inevitable perplexing consequences of the dichotomy of subject-object relationship. Equally true is that the self, pure consciousness in its nature, is neither subject nor object. But to arrive at this understanding, it is essential to examine how an object of knowledge cannot be logically proved. For this, basic arguments are borrowed from Vimuktātman and Śrīharṣa. The subsequent task will be to examine how seeing establishes itself.

If arguments regarding what is perceived are strictly followed, then the confirmation of the existence of entities presupposes knowledge of those entities, because they cannot be proven on their own. Self-awareness, on the other hand, is not dependent upon external entities for its establishment. When consciousness confirms an object, this still is a modification of consciousness itself that is found as an external object. This being the case, nothing other than consciousness in itself is confirmed. A hierarchy of consciousness in the form of a plurality of selves, the distinction between *Jīva* and *Īśvara*, and the very conception of pure consciousness and the *Jīva* bound in the world, all are fundamentally false. Following this doctrine, consciousness does not gradually evolve in the form of the world. The world appears to be other than consciousness itself as long as the perceiving self suffers from ignorance; once he frees himself from ignorance, he recognizes the world as nothing but consciousness alone.

Chapter 2: Origins

yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati na hi draṣṭur draṣṭer viparilopo vidyate 'vināśivāt | na tu tad dvīṛyam asti tato 'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyet |
BĀU 4.3.23

Now, [the self] does not perceive [anything] in deep sleep {*tar*}. Although [the self] does not perceive [anything] there {*tar*}, [it is] seeing. The seeing [inherent] in the perceiver has no cessation, since [it is] imperishable. However, there is no object {*tar*} second [to the self] that could perceive something distinct and separate from itself.¹

Analysis of the states of consciousness is the predominant method utilized in the *Upaniṣads* while explaining the nature of the self.² Later classical Advaita philosophy, in which *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* (DS) developed as a distinct stream of thought, exploits these passages. Vedānta, beginning with the scholastic period (8-16th centuries), follows the structure of consciousness in four states: waking, dreaming, deep sleep, and the transcendent.³ However, this is not the only framework with which the early *Upaniṣads* analyze consciousness. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (BĀU), with no explicit reference to the fourth state (*turīya*), describes deep sleep as the blissful non-distinct nature of the self (BĀU 4.3.9-33). *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* (CU) opens the possibility of explaining the fourth state, with reference to the 'supreme light' (*paraṃ jyotis*) beyond the third or

¹ This passage has been interpreted in multiple ways, from Bhartṛprapañca to Sureśvara. The translation of *tar* as *tatra* (the locative form of *tar*) and the interpretation of this as 'in deep sleep' is in accordance with Śaṅkara:

vipratīṣiddham etac caitanyam ātmavabhāvo na jānāti ceti | na vipratīṣiddham ubhayam apy etad upapādīyate eva | kaṭham — yad vai suṣupte tan na paśyati paśyan vai tat tatra paśyan eva na paśyati | yat tatra suṣupte na paśyati jānīṣe tan na tathā gṛhṇīyāḥ | kasmāt paśyan vai bhavati tatra | Śaṅkara on BĀU 4.3.23.

The exposition of *tar* as *tatra* and *yat tatra suṣupte* explicitly shows that Śaṅkara does not explain the term *tar* in this passage in the accusative, but rather in the locative. However, while explicating the passage *na tu tad dvīṛyam asti*, Śaṅkara considers the term *tar* in the accusative as *kim tar | dvīṛyam viśayabhūtam*, referring specifically to an object of knowledge. The discussion below will reveal multiple understandings of the passage under consideration. While translating this passage, I have utilized Hume 1921, 137; Mādhavananda 1950, 672-673; Radhakrishnan 1953, 263-264; and Olivelle 1998, 115.

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deep sleep state.⁴ This passage identifies 'deep sleep' (*susupti*) as the state in which awareness is lost.⁵ However, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the models these two *Upaniṣads* have applied regarding the ontic nature of consciousness. CU interprets '[he] sleeps' (*svapiti*) as 'becomes returned to himself', as suggested by *svam+api+ī+ktā*.⁶ BĀU posits that 'dreams provide a greater degree of insight into the nature of the self when compared to the waking experience.'⁷ With its references to creation in the dream state with the self as creator, BĀU (4.3.9-10, 13) is significant in the development of the monistic thought subsequently identified as DS. Later exegetes exploit this passage in order to establish that the very empirical self constructs all entities of perception. This particular interpretation that places the subject as an architect of phenomenality supports the concept of DS.

The implication of the structure of consciousness as proposed in the aforementioned passages is significant in the classical writings: *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* (MU) and *Gauḍapādakārikā* (GK) rely upon the analysis of the states of consciousness.⁸ In the same way, BSū addresses this issue in detail.⁹ Whether or not an empirical self is endowed with creativity, and whether or not deep sleep is the true nature of consciousness, both premises grounded upon *Upaniṣadic* passages are the pivotal points of this study.

Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad

The questions directly concerned with an autonomy of the empirical subject in creating phenomenality throughout the *Upaniṣadic* texts are not in a very systematic order, and often occur with similar, but not identical, subjective perspectives. Thus, the whole text cannot be used as a reference for understanding this most radical form of idealist thought under discussion. Similarly, though *Purāṇas* do not play a vital role

⁴ CU 8.7-12. PU, *Praśna* 4 elaborates the concept with regard to the transcendent state, with terms such as *pare deve manasi* found in PU 4.2, *para āmani* in PU 4.7, and *param evākṣaram pratipadyate* in PU 4.10. The YS asserts *nidrā* as a modification of consciousness that must cease in order to attain the Yoga, defining it as the state of mind resting upon the concept of absence: *abhāvapratyayāmbanā vṛtīr nidrā*. YS 1.10.

⁵ CU 8.7-12. For further discussion, see King 1995, 61-63.

⁶ *yatraītat puruṣaḥ svapiti nāma satā somya tadā sampanno bhavati | svam apīto bhavati | tasmād enaṁ svapitīty ācakṣate | svam hy apīto bhavati |* CU 6.8.1.

"When one says here: 'The man is sleeping,' son, then, he is united with the existent; into himself (*sva*) he has entered (*apīta*). Therefore, people say with reference to him: 'He is sleeping' (*svapiti*), for then he has entered into himself." Olivelle 1998, 251.

⁷ King 1995, 62 within the quote.

⁸ GK melds the arguments of both the BĀU and CU in its interpretation. King 1995, 63. See Bouy 2000 for tracing *Upaniṣadic* references that parallel MU and those read by Gauḍapāda in process of composing his *Kārikās*.

⁹ BSū 1.3.42-43; 1.4.16-18; 3.2.1-10.

in philosophical discussion, there are some exceptionally determining textual references in *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (VP) that require an analysis in order to understand the DS doctrine. The instances from the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (KU) and VP are presented as textual evidence by the subsequent philosophers on DS, and so DS needs to be analyzed, not merely from the chapters on DS alone, but also including analysis of the references that the authors on DS have exploited. The perspectives of both these texts are different: KU discusses deep sleep, while VP has some scattered verses often cited by the authors writing on DS. All of these verses concern the nature of awareness, constant in all instances.

Subsequent philosophers establishing DS cite as evidence the KU passage that occurs at the conclusion of the dialogue between Ajātaśatru and Bālākin. Found in a slightly different variation in BĀU, the passage explains that the world dissolves into *prāṇa* in the state of deep sleep and emerges from *prāṇa* when the subject comes to the waking state (KU 4.20 and BĀU 2.1.17-20). Vidyāranya and Madhusūdana accept this as the fundamental source when initiating an examination of issues concerning DS.¹⁰ Even though this is not the only textual support for DS writers when deriving this concept, the authors, Amarānanda, Prakāśānanda,¹¹ Madhusūdana, and Ananta Paṇḍita¹² are quite aware of this. Another citation that connects DS with this passage from the *Upaniṣads* is a passage from *Candrikā* (NSC), a commentary of Jñānottama on *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (NS) of Sureśvara. This study discusses that Ātmāsukha, a commentator on *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha* (LYV), identifies Jñānottama as a follower of DS,¹³ citing the line where Jñānottama quotes the passage from KU. These instances establish that the tradition following DS connects itself with this very *Upaniṣadic* passage.

A common understanding of the writers already identified with DS is that this notion is founded upon KU. In the third chapter of KU, Indra instructs Prataradana on the topic of *prāṇa*: in deep sleep, everything dissolves into *prāṇa* and, while awake, everything manifests from *prāṇa* (KU 3.2-5). After addressing *prāṇa*, KU speaks of pure knowledge with the changed terminology; the term used here is *prajñā*. This *prajñā* enables one to function or think, manifesting through all the senses (KU 3.6).

When *prajñā* ceases, as when it separates from the body, the senses of an individual are not capable of functioning (KU.3.7). However, *prajñā* is not identified as the absolute category in this discussion. That position belongs to the subject bearing *prajñā*. KU does not explicitly stress *prajñā* as the partless Absolute, rather, as something that can have parts (KU 3.8). Whether there is a support of this *prajñā* as the highest reality, or this very *prajñā* is itself the highest truth, remains an issue not properly considered in Advaita prior to Śaṅkara. Whether the Absolute is the wit-

¹⁰ Madhusūdana mentions KU 4.20 and BĀU 2.1.17-20 in the DS chapter of AS p. 536, l. 8; Vidyāranya cites KU 4.20 in AP chapter 9.

¹¹ Prakāśānanda on VSM 116, 3-4.

¹² SN 104, 2-4. Anantaṇḍita is a junior contemporary of Madhusūdana.

¹³ *Vāsiṣṭhacandrikā* on *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha* 114.

nessing consciousness, or mere knowledge cognizing itself, becomes the pivotal issue that distinguishes post-Śaṅkara Advaita doctrines. Knowledge as the Absolute can be traced to the early *Upaniṣads*. *Prajñānam brahma* (AiU 3.3) (Brahman is the pure awareness), a sentence stressing awareness as the nature of Brahman, is acknowledged as one of the major passages establishing non-duality. The interpretative method used becomes all the more vital in deciding which form of idealism the doctrine of 'Prajñā only' can defend.

The exact *Upaniṣadic* passage cited in nearly all references establishing DS pertains to the dissolution of all phenomena into the self in deep sleep, with the projection of the world out of the self starting from *prāṇa*, when entering the waking state:

*athāsmiṃ prāṇa evaikadhā bhavanti | tad enaṃ vāk sarvair nāmabhiḥ sahāpyeti |
caḥsuḥ sarvai rūpaiḥ sahāpyeti | śrotraṃ sarvaiḥ śabdaiḥ sahāpyeti | manaḥ sar-
vair dhyānaiḥ sahāpyeti sa yadā pratibudhyate yathāgner jvalataḥ sarvā diśo
visphuliṅgā vipraṭiṣṭherann evam evaitasmād ātmanaḥ prāṇā yathāyatanaṃ
vipraṭiṣṭhante prāṇebho devā devebhyo lokāḥ |*

KU 4.20

Then these become unified in this very *prāṇa*. Then speech merges into it, with all the names; sight merges with all forms; hearing merges with all sounds; [and] mind merges with all thoughts. When he awakens, as from a blazing fire, sparks fly off in all directions, so from this self all *prāṇas* go forth to their particular fields; from the *prāṇas* emerge the *devas*, and from the *devas*, the worlds.¹⁴

Delving into the KU 3.3, 4.20, it becomes clear that the term *ātman* referring to the self immediately experienced as the subject is applied while explaining the source from which the world emerges. A compound, *prajñātman*, correlates pure knowledge to *prāṇa*. This *prāṇa*, equated with the selves discussed in this context, sustains the self and is the bodily self (*śarīram ātmānam*). In addition, the subsequent discussion primarily considers the individual subject—not knowledge only—as the source of creation. *Prājñā*, the subject in deep sleep, standardized as a doctrine in *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (MU), seems to be a further development of this very *prajñātman*. Deep sleep, then, having individual subjective experience, or pure knowledge as an essence in this state, has become one of the issues causing an internal schism in subsequent scholastic Advaita. As this passage explicitly leads to the subjective notion of creation, it has remained a pivotal source for the DS concept.

The development of DS from the above KU passage becomes apparent when subsequent texts concerning this passage are analyzed. *Ātmapurāṇa* (ĀP)¹⁵ focuses on this passage to demonstrate that creation emerges from the life-force (*prāṇa*).

¹⁴ This is the central passage cited by later scholastic Advaitins in support of DS. While translating this passage, I have utilized Müller 1962, 307; Hume 1921, 334.III; Radhakrishnan 1953, 791; and Olivelle, 1998, 361.

¹⁵ Śaṅkarānanda, 13th century CE, is the author of this text. One Rāmākṛṣṇa from Punjab of a relatively later period (19th c?) has written a commentary on it, called *Satprasavavyākhyā*.

Rāmākṛṣṇa, a commentator on ĀP, identifies the concept discussed here as the DS doctrine,¹⁶ using terms such as DS-*pakṣa*,¹⁷ DS-*mata*,¹⁸ or DS¹⁹ as synonymous.

While elaborating the concept found in the KU, ĀP posits that all the senses contract in the individual self together with their objects²⁰ while in deep sleep and that these, while in the waking state, do not originate from somewhere else, but rather from the very individual self.²¹ The problem not dealt with by other authors on DS is: why is it, then, called 'generation' (*sr̥ṣṭi*), if there is no difference in cause and effect? ĀP resolves this with the explanation that generation is effected even in identical entities, for instance, the sparks of burning fire.²² KU is one of the earliest references to this example, further confirming that, while developing the concept of DS, the subsequent exegetes did not deem it necessary to alter the traditional example. ĀP demonstrates an inherence (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of Brahman and the world, using the illustration of thread and cloth. As the material cause, thread exists both in the absence of cloth and together with it. Cloth, as effect, does not exist in all the states of the existence of thread. Shifting from the example to the context of creation, ĀP elaborates on causality, based on KU: *prāṇa* exists even in deep sleep, but the senses and their objects do not exist in that state. *Prāṇa*, therefore, is both the cause of the senses and their objects (ĀP 2.1.316-317). ĀP explains that generation is simply a notion of the perceiver:

*yato ghaṭe 'pi naivāsti jāto 'ham iti dhīḥ kvacit |
kintu tadbraṣṭur evaiṣā tasmād vyartham idaṃ vacaḥ ||
cetanā api naivātra jānanty utpattimātrataḥ |
vayaṃ jātās tato vyarthā jaḍājuḍavibhāgadhiḥ ||*

ĀP 2.1.327-328

[While being made or when made], a pot has no notion that 'I am born'. The notion of generation {*eṣā*} is merely that of its perceiver. This debate [concerning generation] is therefore meaningless. Even sentient beings do not know in the moment of generation {*atra*}, merely by [the reason of] generation, that 'we are generated'. This notion of a division between sentient and insentient is therefore meaningless.

¹⁶ ... *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivādaṃ sphuṭayan* ... *Satprasavavyākhyā* in ĀP 2.1.314; 'dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivādin' Ibid, 2.1.326; *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivādī uttarayat* ... Ibid, 2.1.327; *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivādinā upādhinām* ... Ibid, 2.1.329; *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivādinō mate* ... Ibid, 2.1.366; *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāde pramāṇam* ... Ibid, 2.1.429.

¹⁷ *Satprasavavyākhyā* in ĀP 2.1.330; 2.1.336.

¹⁸ *Satprasavavyākhyā* in ĀP 2.1.331; 2.1.365 (twice).

¹⁹ *Satprasava*. in ĀP 2.1.337; 2.1.352; 2.1.359 (twice); 2.1.363 (twice); 2.1.365; 2.1.431.

²⁰ *ayaṃ hi karaṇagrāmaḥ prāṇopādhai mayiṣvare | pratyekam ātmaṣṣayaiḥ saha sūptau pralīyate ||* ĀP 2.1.307.

²¹ *prabodhakāle naivāite jāyante 'nyata eva hi | mattaḥ prāṇātmanas tasmāt prāṇātmaṃ pratardana ||* ĀP 2.1.309.

²² ... *ime mamarūpāni jāyante matta eva hi | abhede 'pi janir dr̥ṣṭā yathāgner jvalataḥ kaṇāḥ ||* ĀP 2.1.311. This example of sparks and fire is found in KU 4.20.

The problem then arises: Why is this called generation? ĀP replies:

*prādurbhāvo janēs cārthaḥ sa syād darśanam eva hi |
prādurbabhūva saviteryādaḥ darśanam īritam ||*

ĀP 2.1.330

The meaning of the verbal root *jan* is to arise, and that is merely seeing. In examples such as the sun 'has arisen' (*prādurbabhūva*), merely 'coming into perception' (*darśana*) is expressed.

*api loke janimṛi prasiddhe ye hi dehinām |
te 'pi vijñānamātreṇa prasiddhe nānyakāraṇāt ||*

ĀP 2.1.352

In the phenomenal world, generation and cessation, which are common to all who possess a body, are established merely by knowledge, not due to any other reason.

Thus, ĀP identifies creation as 'merely coming into knowledge'. Śaṅkarānanda, in composing ĀP, clearly derives the existence of 'knowledge only' from KU:

*viśayāḥ sarva evaite svajñānād na pṛthak kvacit |
rajjusarpasya vijñānād yathā nānyo 'sty asau phaṇi ||*

ĀP 2.1.485

All these [phenomenal] objects are nowhere separate from one's own cognition, as of this [illusory] snake here (*asau*) [before us] is not different from the cognition of a snake in a rope.

These examples suffice to establish that, while explicating KU, ĀP is congruent with the DS concept.

The textual references discussed above support a premise of this study that KU is traditionally the earliest reference to the idea of DS. The specific model defended by these arguments is the 'existence of what is known,' which does not stress 'pure awareness' in all instances.

Viṣṇupurāṇa

The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (VP) is another text frequently cited to establish DS. Amarananda greatly relies upon VP while composing his text, *Svāmayogapradīpaprabodhinī* (SYPP).²³ Amarananda also wrote a commentary on VP, *Viṣṇuvallabhā*, not

²³ Chithambaran in SYPP 185-187. Over 40 instances of Amarananda citing *Viṣṇupurāṇa* can be traced in SYPP. Besides these direct citations, numerous verses in SYPP and the commentary thereon synthesize the passages from VP.

because he was a radical Vaiṣṇavite,²⁴ but because the text is the best reference to support his arguments.²⁵ In a brief treatment of DS doctrine, Appayya Dīkṣita cites one verse from VP; SLS 356. Madhusūdana, while propounding the doctrine of a single self in all bodies, refers to VP in order to establish this concept; see ARR 6; and the verse that he cites explicitly supports this thesis.²⁶ Acceptance of VP as the source of the DS concept is also found in an independent section on DS in the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* (ABS) of Sadānanda.²⁷ These citations suffice to link DS with the Advaita concept as presented in VP. The charge of Anubhūtiśvarūpa, that 'EJ is the doctrine of *Sālagrāma* (stone)-worshippers',²⁸ tallies with our findings that VP, a major treatise on Vaiṣṇava theology, is considered to be one of the main sources by the philosophers writing on DS.

The picture of the Advaita doctrine that emerges from the fragments scattered throughout VP indicates that many features found here resemble DS. According to VP, the world emanates from, dissolves in, and is sustained in Viṣṇu, and therefore, he himself is the world.²⁹ In this text, Viṣṇu is clearly identical with pure awareness. In other words, VP argues that all entities having the appearance of difference are nonetheless manifestations of awareness.³⁰ Subsequent VP passages discussed in this section support the central argument which establishes DS and refutes any difference between what is seen and seeing-in-itself, i.e., the object of knowledge and knowledge itself. Stated differently, everything originates from, and is sustained by that which is substrated, and this foundation is the self itself. Awareness, in its original form, is free from stain, but due to illusion, it assumes the form of objects.³¹ To perceive in the state of awareness-in-itself, free from all modifications, is realization, and bondage, along these lines, is to conceptualize in the form of the world. This fundamental

²⁴ The benedictory verses address Lord Viṣvanātha, SYPP 1.1; 6.20; 6.21. Perhaps the author first wrote a commentary on VP. In his later age he may have moved to Vārāṇasī and may have become a devotee of Viṣvanātha.

²⁵ Madhva, an eminent Vaiṣṇava philosopher and proponent of Vedānta dualism, does not cite VP. The non-dualistic nature of the text must have prevented him from relying on it. Historically, VP is much earlier than Madhva, and even Rāmānuja. It may be posited that early Vaiṣṇavism had a monistic tendency.

²⁶ *yadā samastadeheṣu punān eko vyavasthitaḥ | tadā hi ko bhavān ko 'ham ity evaṃ viphalam vacaḥ ||* VP 2.13.91.

²⁷ He quotes VP 1.4.40, 2.12.43, 2.13.91, 2.16.22 all in sequential order; clear evidence that Sadānanda is using VP as a testimony to prove DS. ABS 256-264.

²⁸ Anubhūtiśvarūpa on GK 3.3.

²⁹ *viṣṇoḥ sakāśād udbhūtam jagat tarraiva ca sthītam | sthītiśaṅyamakartā 'sau jagato 'sya jagac ca saḥ ||* VP 1.1.31.

³⁰ *jñānasvarūpo bhagavān yato 'sāv aśeṣamūrtir na tu vastubhūtaḥ | tato hi sailābhidharādī-bhedāḥ jānīti vijñānavijṛmbhitāni ||* VP 2.12.39.

³¹ *jñānasvarūpam atyantanimalaṃ paramārthataḥ | tam evārthasvarūpeṇa bhṛāntidarśanataḥ sthītam ||* VP 1.2.6.

principle is of the form of mere *sat*, essentially singular but visible in various forms.³² In this mere 'existence' (*sat*), there is no construction of name or genre; it is of the nature of pure awareness that is beyond the empirical self. This passage confirms that the Advaita notion of pure consciousness transcends the dichotomy of subject and object, and the realm in which subject and object are cognized is considered to be illusory.³³ This all-pervasive self, of the nature of transcendent awareness (*parajñāna-maya*), is eternally free from name or form.³⁴

These instances point to the influence of Advaita thought on the author of VP, with his advocacy of 'existence only' identical to 'consciousness only' (*sanmātra-cinmātra*). According to VP, Brahman is the awareness that is free from difference, of the nature of mere existence, beyond the senses and perceived only by the self.³⁵ This becomes even more explicit when 'the knowledge beyond differences' is stressed in VP and is verified by the statement that 'what is regarded as the higher Brahman, and what is regarded as this world is mere awareness: there is nothing other than awareness'.³⁶ In another VP passage, "There is no movement [in it]; it is beyond names; it is [known] following comparison; it is an object of self-awareness only; it is existence only, free from delimiting factors'.³⁷ Elsewhere in VP, Viṣṇu is considered as essentially 'being-in-itself' and 'awareness-in-itself'.³⁸ Therefore, there is no entity other than awareness, anywhere, at any time. This Brahman assumes difference and yet is without difference. There exists no difference in reality; it is only conceptual construction.³⁹ Whatever is seen to possess form is of the nature of awareness, comprised of awareness alone. Those who are not yogins perceive the world as distinct from awareness due to erroneous knowledge.⁴⁰

³² *sanmātrarūpiṇe 'cintyamahimne paramātmane | vyāpīne nāikarūpaikasvarūpāya namo namaḥ || VP 5.18.48.*

³³ *na santi yatra sarveṣe nāmajātyādikalpanāḥ | satāmātrātmake jñeye jñānātmāny ātmanaḥ pare || VP 6.4.37.*

³⁴ *parajñānamayo sadbhīr nāmajātyādibhīr vibhūḥ | na yogavān na yukto 'bhūn naiva pāṛthiva yokṣate || VP 2.14.30.*

³⁵ *pratyaśtamitabhedam yat satāmātram agocaram | vacasām āmasaṅvedyaṃ taj jñānam brahmasaṅ-jñātam || VP 6.7.53.*

³⁶ *jñānam eva paraṃ brahma jñānam bandhāya cesyate | jñānāmakam idaṃ viśvaṃ na jñānād vidyate param || VP 2.6.50.*

³⁷ *nirvyāpāram anākhyaṃ vyāptimātram anūpanam | āmasaṅbodhaviśayaṃ satāmātram alakṣaṇam || VP 1.22.50.*

³⁸ *sadbhāva evaṃ bhavato mayokto jñānam yathā satyam asatyam anyat | etat tu yat saṅvyava-hārabhūtam, tatrapī cōkṣaṃ bhuvanāśritam te || VP 2.12.45.*

³⁹ *etat brahma tridhā bhedaṃ abhedam api sa prabhūḥ | sarvabhedeṣv abhedo 'sau bhūdyate bhinnabud-dhibhīḥ || VP 3.3.29.*

⁴⁰ *yad esad dṛśyate mūrtaṃ etaj jñānāmanas tava | bhrāntijñānena paśyanti jagadrūpam ayogīnaḥ || VP 1.4.39.*

These textual passages suggest a model of non-dualism in which awareness sees either itself or perceives the objects outside. A yogin is aware of the very essential nature of awareness, whereas an *ayogin* (not-yogin) does not see awareness itself, but rather perceives objects. This notion is strikingly similar to the DS concept that advocates two forms of *dṛṣṭis*, in which the first is essential awareness, and the other is awareness modified in the form of ideas confined by objects. According to a passage found in VP that supports the aforementioned argument, though the entire world is merely of the nature of knowledge, those who perceive it as of the nature of objects are ignorant.⁴¹ Yet another passage posits that those with a pure mind who have mastered knowledge (*jñānavid*) perceive the whole world as awareness itself.⁴²

The issue, whether there is a single self that pervades all the bodies or there are separate selves in each body, can be traced in VP. In one passage, the text declares that, whether in one's own body or in other bodies, there is only one awareness existing as the true reality, and those perceiving duality perceive that which is not real.⁴³ Difference in the self is imposed like difference in the form of a note of music,⁴⁴ as the wind in itself has no such difference, so is the self.⁴⁵ VP posits that there is only one self, all-pervasive, indestructible, free from birth and change, pure, and above *prakṛti*.⁴⁶ According to VP, difference is perceived due to external factors, such as actions that cause transmigration. When the notion of difference in subjective experience is removed, the self is no longer veiled.⁴⁷

When the term 'self' is used as interchangeable with 'oneness', it is not clear whether VP is addressing the individual or the universal self. In some instances, the text advocates singularity of the empirical self. Bharata, one liberated sage, while addressing the issue of the plurality of the self, is presented in VP as stating that, if there were any self other than his own which is experienced as the self, then one could even state that the self outside is other than mine and I am another; however, when there is

⁴¹ *jñānasvarūpam akhilaṃ jagad etad abuddhayaḥ | arthasvarūpaṃ paśyanto bhrāmyante mohasamplave || VP 1.4.40.*

⁴² *ye tu jñānavidaḥ suddhacetasas te 'khilaṃ jagat | jñānāmakam prapaśyanti tvadrūpaṃ param-eśvara || VP 1.4.41.*

⁴³ *tasyātmaparadeheṣu sato 'py ekamayaṃ hi yat | vijñānam paramārtho 'sau dvaitino 'tathya-darśinaḥ || VP 2.14.31.*

⁴⁴ This is one of seven sound levels used in Indian musicology.

⁴⁵ *veṅurandhraprabhedena bhedaḥ ṣaḍjādisaṃjñāḥ | abhedavyāpīno vāyos taihāsya para-māmanaḥ || VP 2.14.32.*

⁴⁶ *eko vyāpī samaḥ suddho nirguṇaḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ | janmavṛddhikyādirahīta ātmā sarvagato 'vyayaḥ || VP 2.14.29.*

⁴⁷ *ekasvarūpabhedas ca bhāya-karmāvṛtipraja | devādibhede 'padhvaste nāsty evāvaraṇe hi saḥ || VP 2.14.33.*

a single self, statements such as 'Who are you?', and 'I am this' are fruitless.⁴⁸ Just as a single sky (*nabhaḥ*) appears different due to the colors imposed upon it by vision, those having deluded sight perceive the self as separate.⁴⁹ This very awareness (*vijñāna*) attains varied forms, with the difference in mind caused by actions.⁵⁰ This is explicitly identified as of non-dual nature and is considered as the state of self-realization.⁵¹

The concept of 'consciousness only' (*cinmātra*) appears frequently in VP, with the whole world of the form of awareness considered to be the inherent nature of an object (*arthasvarūpa*) by an unwise person merged into the ocean of illusion.⁵² *Viṣṇupurāṇa* postulates that awareness manifests in dichotomy: either seeing the essential nature of reality (*paramārthadr̥ṣṭi*) or 'perceiving something else due to error' (*bhrānta-dr̥ṣṭi*).⁵³ When the self imagines, the world appears and the creation is of the form of ignorance.⁵⁴ VP compares the illusion of the world to bubbles on water.⁵⁵ This metaphor resonates with Madhusūdana's writings explaining DS, where he quotes from the *Yogavāsīṣṭha* (YV).⁵⁶ The yogic slumber (*yoganidrā*) belonging to Viṣṇu causes this great magic by which the self is deluded.

VP identifies Viṣṇu's 'power' as ignorance (*avidyā*),⁵⁷ accepting both knowledge and ignorance as 'awareness only'. This being the case, the entire world consists of awareness, with nothing beyond it.⁵⁸ When *karma* is destroyed and knowledge is free from defects, then only the pure form of the self remains, with no difference

⁴⁸ *yadā samastadeheṣu pūmān eko vyavasthitaḥ | tadā hi ko bhavān so 'ham ity etad viphalam vacaḥ ||* VP 2.13.91.

⁴⁹ *sitanīlādibhedena yathaikaṃ dr̥ṣyate nabhaḥ | bhrāntadr̥ṣṭibhir ātmāpi tathaikaḥ san pṛthak pṛthak ||* VP 2.16.22.

⁵⁰ *vijñānam ekaṃ nijakarmabhedavibhinnacittair bahudhābhyupeyam ||* VP 2.12.43 cd.

⁵¹ ... *tad advaitam aśeṣataḥ* VP 2.16.18b, ... *tenādvaitaparo 'bhavat* VP 2.16.19.

⁵² *jñāna-svarūpaṃ akhīlaṃ jagad etad abuddhayaḥ | artha-svarūpaṃ paśyanto bhrāmyante m ohasaṃplave ||* VP 1.4.40.

⁵³ *paramārthadr̥ṣṭi* in VP 2.16.24, and *bhrāntadr̥ṣṭi* in 2.16.22.

⁵⁴ *abuddhipūrvakaḥ sargaḥ prādurbhūtas tamo-mayaḥ ||* VP 1.5.4 cd. The term *tamas* is generally used to refer to *avidyā*, translated here as ignorance. Here, *abuddhi* is ignorance, because *buddhi* is accepted as a synonym for *Jñāna*; that follows Vātsyāyana's definition: *buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarīhātaram Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.15.

⁵⁵ *tat krameṇa vivṛdhaṃ saḥ jalabudbudavat samam |* VP 1.2.55a-b.

⁵⁶ The DS chapter in AS accepts Vāsiṣṭha as one of its sources.

⁵⁷ *avidyākarmasaṅgīṅāyā tṛṭiyā śaktir iṣyate |* VP 6.7.61c-d.

⁵⁸ *jñānam eva paraṃ brahma jñānaṃ bandhāya ceṣyate | jñānāmakaṃ idaṃ viśvaṃ na jñānād vidyate paraṃ || vidyāvīdyetī maitreya jñānam evopadhāraya |* VP 2.6.50-51.

inentities.⁵⁹ These instances from VP support the specific understanding of DS according to which there exists 'awareness only' which is free from difference.

The frequent use of *jñāna* and sometimes *vijñāna* in VP (VP 6.7.29) led Hacker to conclude that Vijñānavāda Buddhism influenced the VP (Hacker, 1960, 341-354). Hacker was aware that the use of *jñāna* and *vijñāna* in VP are identical in meaning. As VP repeatedly uses *jñāna* with the meaning of constant awareness, the conclusion could be that *vijñāna* and *jñāna* have the same meaning—*vijñāna* here denotes constant awareness, not momentary consciousness that differs in each cognitive mode. This study finds that the application of the terms such as *vijñāna* or *vijñapti* in the Advaita literature differs from the Yogācāra understanding of the same term. Śāṅkara's use of *vijñānamaya* to refer to the self that is immediately experienced tallies with the application of *vijñāna* in VP. Another finding by Hacker, namely, the recognition of a relationship between early Advaitins with Vaiṣṇavas (Halbfass, 1995, 33-39), nevertheless, tallies with this study's exploration of later Advaitins such as Amaraṇanda and Madhusūdana. More relevant to this study is the fact that the philosophers explaining DS necessarily utilize stanzas from VP. The section on Amaraṇanda will further strengthen the connection of VP to the Advaitins affiliated with the concept of DS, particularly those interpreting *dr̥ṣṭi* as pure awareness.

Draviḍācārya: A lost figure

Draviḍācārya has nearly vanished from the history of Advaita.⁶⁰ When Toṭakācārya⁶¹ and Ānandagiri⁶² mention Draviḍācārya, they ascribe a short narrative to him: a prince, having been raised by hunters and imagining himself a hunter, loses his true, princely identity. He regains identity with his princehood immediately after instruction by a master. Toṭaka refers to this story when he refutes the stance that meditation is essential for self-realization.⁶³ This position favors sudden realization as opposed to sequential realization. Śāṅkara cites this story when he defends the model of Advaita that fits with EJ.

⁵⁹ *yadā tu suddhaṃ nijarūpi sarvaṃ karmaṣaye jñānam apāstadoṣam | tadā hi saṅkalpataroḥ phalāni bhavanti no vastuṣu vastubhedāḥ ||* VP 2.12.40.

⁶⁰ In connecting Draviḍācārya to the Advaita lineage, there is a ritual of Vyāsa-worship during the full moon of *Āṣāḍha*, in which one of the offerings goes to five masters starting from Draviḍācārya, in a sequence followed by Gauḍapāda, Govinda Bhagavatpāda, Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda, Śāṅkṣepapādācārya (referring to Sarvajñātman), and Vivaraṇācārya (referring to Prakāśātman).

⁶¹ *Śrutisārasamuḍdharaṇam* 106.

⁶² Ānandagiri's commentary upon BĀUBh 2.1.20 identifies the person as Draviḍācārya whom Śāṅkara refers as the one who knows the tradition. This identification is followed in Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī's edition of the *Vārtika* of Sureśvara. BĀUBhVā 2.1.506.

⁶³ This position may have been advocated by Brahmādatta, who predates Śāṅkara. Brahmādatta may have adopted the *Bhedābheda* doctrine.

Attributed to Dravidācārya, this story seems to be an intermediate version between the *Mahābhārata*'s narrative of Karṇa and the story of Gādhi in YV. Several writers on DS refer to the example of Karṇa, the prince who imagines himself a hunter. Karṇa, the character in *Mahābhārata*, is a son of Kuntī, and so a prince, while Rādhā, who cares for him, is of the hunters' caste. Dravidācārya's contribution is the implementation of this story as an illustration that sheds light on subjective illusion, with self-realization and liberation from suffering being the major amendments. YV's Gādhi amplifies this story with graphic elaboration.⁶⁴ In another similar example, Rāma forgets his lordship, assumes himself a mortal, and suffers.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Granoff compares the story of a hunter prince to the character Gādhi, placing the story of Gādhi in the context of the Vaiṣṇava stories in YV. See Granoff 1989, 189-198. Hanneder points out limitations of the arguments that Granoff has given, rejecting the position that YV is fundamentally a Vaiṣṇava text. Hanneder 2005, 120-122.

⁶⁵ Śaṅkara gives this example in US 18.100.

Chapter 3: The position of Śaṅkara

Texts dedicated to the doctrine of DS or to philosophers solely relying upon DS are rare and difficult to find. This being the case, the present study examines traces of scattered concepts that fit with what the subsequent philosophers and doxographers, both proponents and opponents of Advaita, have assigned as pertinent concepts of DS. Therefore, studying Śaṅkara in light of DS is not to claim that Śaṅkara followed the DS model but only that some of the nuances Śaṅkara has addressed fit with the Advaita philosophy subsequently identified as DS. The Advaita tradition identifies the commentary upon GK as one of the sources for DS and also accepts this commentary as written by Śaṅkarācārya. Scholars are skeptical about the originality of this commentary as being composed by the same person.¹ Once again, it is not the scope of this study to claim what texts were the original writings of Śaṅkara. Instead, the scope of research herein utilizes texts commonly accepted as composed by Śaṅkara.

A close examination of the commentaries of Śaṅkara reveals that his writings were not consistent with one specific model of Advaita, whether addressing the notion of *Aviḍyā*, EJ, or degrees of reality. Select terminology can be found in one text that may not appear elsewhere. This has led modern scholars to assume that multiple Śaṅkaras existed, and even the tradition of the Śaṅkara lineage fits with this assumption. However, what has been overlooked is that Śaṅkara did not claim to propound a unique philosophy. He as a commentator must have endeavored to adhere to the main text, as long as this does not contradict with his central doctrine of Advaita. Utilizing

¹ Nakamura argues that the commentary upon GK is not composed by the same author who wrote BSūBh. Nakamura, 2004, 262-265. Although the purpose of this writer is not to establish that these two texts were composed by the same author, nonetheless, I would like to show how two of his arguments are baseless:

1) Nakamura comes to the conclusion that GK is not by the first Śaṅkarācārya, arguing that this text applies the term *advaya*, while *advaita* is the common term in the literature written by Śaṅkara. However, he overlooked US. See the application of *advaya* in US 8.2; 8.4; 9.3; 10.3; 10.4, 6, 7, 9, 11-13; 11.7; 13.21; 13.24; 14.15; 14.17; 14.45; 17.80; 18.26.

2) Nakamura's conclusion takes for granted that the application of *vijñāna*, *vijñapti*, or *vi-jñaptimātra* is not found in other writings attributed to Śaṅkara. With regard to this specific issue, scholars persistently overlook GK 4.45, where *vijñāna* is explained in terms of *aja* and *acala*, alongside *advaya*. The *vijñāna* acceptable to the *Vijñānavādin* is not some constant, nondual awareness, but rather the instances of cognition that arise simultaneously with the rise of the concept of the subject of cognition. Furthermore, the use of *vijñāna* as identical with Brahman is found as early as the *Upaniṣad* itself, see BĀU 3.9.28. In any case, Śaṅkara explains the self as *nityavijñānarūpa* in US 13.5, explicitly differentiating it from the application of the term *vijñāna* found in the Yogācāra texts. The use of *vijñaptimātra* in the Advaita Vedānta literature is further explored in this study; see Section 2, Chapter 4, the subsection *Saīstōkti*, and Section 3, Chapter 7, on Sureśvara.

this understanding, different answers for the same argument can be found in the commentaries upon different passages with a difference in terminology, but this fact alone cannot establish that multiple authors wrote it. The *Upadeśasāhasrī* (US) is least contested as belonging to the first Śaṅkara, and the position found in US can be attributed solely to Śaṅkara, as this is his independent treatise.

Following the model of Advaita that can be synthesized from US, 'seeing' is constant non-dual awareness, the essential nature of the self eternally free from modifications, self-evident and never sublated.² This very awareness is assumed as born due to ignorance, and this origination refers to the modifications of consciousness.³ According to the instruction of Śaṅkara as found in US, the difference appearing in consciousness in the triadic form of cognition, cognizing subject, and the object of cognition is merely mental.⁴ Although DS as understood in the later scholastic writings derives from the understanding of *dr̥ṣṭi* in the sense of illusory instances of cognition, this first understanding of *dr̥ṣṭi* as pure awareness allows for the possibility of understanding Advaita as the confirmation of the self as immediately cognized reality. In this non-dual state, there is no illusion to be dispelled.

The concept of a single *jīva* can be derived from the instances in US where Śaṅkara advocates that all beings, from Brahmā to plants, are 'my body'.⁵ He reconfirms this when he states that 'all beings are always illuminated by my awareness and so all beings are my body'.⁶ Further supporting this argument, Śaṅkara declares that 'I observe the modifications of the minds of all beings'.⁷ Although these passages can be interpreted as referring to the absolute self, there is nonetheless a possibility of interpreting from the perspective of a single *jīva*. This particular concept of a single *jīva* is congruent with the third type of EJ doctrine advocated by Appayya that accepts a single *jīva* in all bodies, free from any particularity.⁸

Another factor crucial to DS is the non-substantiality of ignorance. If ignorance were substantial, its product, the world, would also have some degree of substantiality. The concept of a single degree of reality is not congruent with a substantiality of ignorance. Śaṅkara's statement that 'this world is non-existent, because all is caused by ignorance',⁹ tallies with the arguments that reject ignorance bearing any degree of reality. Elsewhere in US, Śaṅkara explains that the state of deep sleep is the seed of

² See US 2.3 cd; US 12.9-10.

³ US 12.15; 13.6; 13.8.

⁴ US 13.21-23.

⁵ *brahmādītyāḥ sthāvarāntā ye prāṇīno mama pūḥ smṛtāḥ* | US 9.4.

⁶ *maccāitanyīvabhāṣyavāt sarvapṛāṇīdhiyāṅ sadā | pūr mama pṛāṇīnaḥ sarve sarvajñāsyā vipāṛmanaḥ* || US 9.6.

⁷ *sarveṣāṅ manaso vṛttam avīṣeṣeṇa paśyataḥ | tasya me nirvikārasya viṣeṣaḥ syāt kathaṅcana* || US 11.3.

⁸ For specifics, see the section on Appayya in chapter 5.

⁹ *avidyāprabhavaṅ sarvaṃ asaī tasmād idam jagat* | US 17.20.

the states of waking and dreaming.¹⁰ This statement can be compared with the *Upaniṣad*ic passage that considers waking and dreaming as streaming out of the deep sleep state, giving rise to the notion of the externality of the world.

The objective of analyzing these instances here is not to conclude that DS is found in Śaṅkara's writings, but rather to demonstrate how traces of this concept are visible in his writings. In order to strengthen the argument that Śaṅkara's writings allow for interpreting Advaita in terms of DS, further evidence is required.

In Śaṅkara's commentarial writings, two passages clearly support the premise of two doctrines within the single Advaita philosophy: the BĀU-*bhāṣya* (BĀUBh) and *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya* (BSūBh). Although these infrequent citations may not depict the main thesis of Śaṅkara, nevertheless, his comments therein support the possibility of interpreting passages in multiple ways.

Historically, the term *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭa* first occurs in Śaṅkara's *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya* (PUBh), in the sense that 'entities [are] created by *dr̥ṣṭi*'.¹¹ Linking Śaṅkara with the concept of DS, Madhusūdana, in his chapter on DS, twice mentions that the doctrine of DS is established in the 'mine' (*ākara*) (AS 534.6 and 537.5), but in both cases he does not specify which text he meant by the 'mine of DS thought'. The *Gurucandrikā* (GC) commentary upon AS identifies this 'mine' as the commentary of Śaṅkara.¹² In light of this, if we analyze the phrase 'rather, to the contrary, DS is frequently propounded in the *ākaras*' (*pratyutākaṛeṣu bahuśo dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭir upapāditāiva*), this demonstrates that Madhusūdana aligns DS with Śaṅkara. The *prima facie* position, that contradiction exists between the *bhāṣya* on *Sūtra* and *Vivaraṇa*, led Madhusūdana to write the above line.¹³ So even in reply, where this line occurs, it was considered appropriate to mention Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*. However, with regard to the reference to *Vivaraṇa*, Madhusūdana does not explicitly identify the passage to which he refers.

The issue here is, can the commentary of Śaṅkara be a strong source for establishing DS? If so, then can it be assumed that both the *Vivaraṇa* and *Bhāmāṭī* schools deviated from Śaṅkara's original thought while commenting upon his BSūBh? Another alternative is, Śaṅkara had different models in mind and he applies these in different contexts. In support of this second alternative, this study traces instances from

¹⁰ *suṣuptākhyaṅtamo 'jñānaṅbījaṅ svapṇaprabodhayoḥ* | US 17.25.

¹¹ Śaṅkara on PU 6.4. Whether PU-*bhāṣya* was of Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkara, the commentator on BS is another issue. A close examination of style may decide whether or not PU-*bhāṣya* was authored by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. For an overview, see Stephan 2002, 20.

¹² *ākareṣu samanvayasūtra-bhāṣyādiṣu* GC, Vol. II, 318-319; *jñānanivartayātanyathānupapatti* chapter; *Samanvaya-sūtra* refers to BSū 1.1.4 (*tat tu samanvayāt*). This *Sūtra* alone makes one *adhikaraṇa* (chapter), known as *samanvayādhikaraṇa*. . . . *ata eva sr̥ṣṭau frutitāparyam abhyupetya vādātvaṃ teṣāṃ ākare uktaṃ advaitabrahmaṅ eva tattāparyāc ca*, GC Vol. II, 345.

¹³ . . . *sūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇādigraṅthana vīrodha* . . . AS 534.4.

Śaṅkara's commentaries that parallel with the components identified as those pertaining to DS.

Direct evidence at odds with DS can be found in BSūBh, where Śaṅkara shows the differences between the entities in a dream and those of the waking state, defending three degrees of reality (BSūBh, 3.2.1-6). Nonetheless, it can be argued that Śaṅkara is bound as a commentator to not deviate from the original text, when the original text, in this case, BS, explicitly distinguishes between dreaming and waking states. In deciding whether or not Śaṅkara accepted a model of Advaita thought that can be aligned with DS, further compelling evidence is required.

In this light, two passages of Śaṅkara require thorough investigation:

- 1) Commentary on BĀU 2.1.20, which is the concluding sentence of the dialogue between Ajātaśatru and Bālākin;¹⁴ and
- 2) Some instances in the *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* chapter of BSūBh on BS 2.1.14-20.

The information that can be gleaned from BSūBh (2.1.14-20)¹⁵ is relatively small but still decisive. Here Śaṅkara states that Bādarāyaṇa had two doctrines in mind while composing BSū, and interprets the statement 'However, as in the world, [creation is] merely a play'¹⁶ with the conventional meaning, and the statement 'there is non-difference [in cause and effect] according to the passages on origination¹⁷ and so forth'¹⁸ in the absolute meaning.¹⁹ This evidence suffices to establish Śaṅkara's position that identifies two different models of Advaita, whether or not Bādarāyaṇa composed these Sūtras with the same purpose as is identified.

In the *ārambhaṇa* chapter on BS, Śaṅkara speaks of 'two truths' (*ubhaya-satyatā*), a clear distinction from three degrees of reality.²⁰ Following the strata of two realities: Śaṅkara states that singularity is the absolute reality, whereas plurality results from false knowledge.²¹ The general terms given for these two realities are 'correct knowl-

¹⁴ Although Śaṅkara did not write a commentary upon KU, the story and the context in which this passage occurs in KU is also found in BĀU 2.1.20.

¹⁵ This section is entitled the *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* chapter.

¹⁶ *lokavat tu līlākaivalyam* BSū 2.1.33.

¹⁷ Here, the *ārambhaṇa* passage refers to CU 4 - 6.1.4.

¹⁸ *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ* BSū 2.1.14.

¹⁹ *sūtrakāro 'pi paramārthābhīprāyeṇa tadananyatvam ity āha, vyavahārābhīprāyeṇa tu syāl lokavad iti mahāsamudrasthānīyatām brahmaṇaḥ kathayati* BSūBh 2.1.14.

²⁰ For discussion of Hacker's analysis of degrees of reality in classical Advaita, see Halbfass 1995, 137-152.

²¹ *ekatvam evaikaṃ paramārthikaṃ darśayati, mithyājñānavijṛmbhitāṃ ca nānātvam, ubhayaśatyatāyāṃ hi...* BSūBh 2.1.14.

edge' (*samyagjñāna*) and 'false knowledge' (*mithyājñāna*).²² He negates the existence of the categories of illusory (*prātibhāsika*) and phenomenal appearance (*vyāvahārika*) by asserting that, in a dream, what is perceived is identified as perception (*pratyakṣa*), not as its appearance (*pratyakṣābhāsa*). Śaṅkara compares the activities in the phenomenal world that arise prior to self-realization to those in a dream.²³ This textual evidence suffices to establish that (a) Śaṅkara interpreted passages differently according to varying circumstances, and that (b) the nuances of the model of Advaita under consideration, DS, can be traced in specific passages of his commentaries.

This is not all that brings Śaṅkara to the forefront of this analysis. The next issues he raises are identical with issues relevant to DSE: how can the texts, which in themselves are not real, give rise to true knowledge? Examples given in this context question the causal efficiency of false things: a man bitten by a rope-snake does not die, and the actions of drinking or drowning are not possible in the water of a mirage.²⁴ Śaṅkara replies with an illustration that the conviction of poison can kill a person who believes he is poisoned even in the case when he is not.²⁵ He elaborates on the relationship between dream and waking states: what is seen in dream has effect in the waking state and if these were independent states, there should be no effect.²⁶ According to Śaṅkara, the illusory nature of a mirage mirrors the relationship of the world and Brahman. To explain this, he uses the term '*dr̥ṣṭānaśṭasvabhāva*' (of the nature of seen and collapsed),²⁷ an expression which hews closely to one of the understandings of *dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭi*. In addition to the two *Upaniṣadic* illustrations of spider/web, and fire/sparks, Śaṅkara adds his own example of bubbles and water,²⁸ frequently cited in passages discussing DS.

Śaṅkara elaborates upon the BĀU passage that resembles KU, accepting that two further *Brāhmaṇas* explain this very passage:²⁹

²² ... *samyagjñānapanodyasya kasyacin mithyājñānasya saṃsārakaraṇatvenānābhīpāgamāt* | BSūBh 2.1.14.

²³ BSūBh 2.1.14.

²⁴ *katham tv asatyena vedāntavākyena satyasya brahmātmavasya pratīpattir upapadyeta? na hi rajju-sarpeṇa daṣṭo mriyate, nāpi mṛgatṛṣṇikāmbhasā pānāvagāhanādīprajojanaṃ kriyate iti* BSūBh 2.1.14.

²⁵ *saṅkāvīṣādinimitamāraṇādīkāryopalabdheḥ* Ibid.

²⁶ BSūBh 2.1.14. In this sequence he adds one example, that morphemes which are real are understood by curves and lines: *tathā akārādi-satyākṣara-pratīpattir dr̥ṣṭiā rekhāntākṣara-pratīpateḥ* Ibid.

²⁷ *yathā ca mṛgatṛṣṇikodakādīnām ūsarādibhyo 'nanyatvam, dr̥ṣṭānaśṭasvarūpatvāt svarūpeṇa tv anupākhyatvāt, evam asya bhogyabhoktrādīprapañcajātasya brahmavyatirekeṇā-bhāva iti dr̥ṣṭavyam* Ibid.

²⁸ *yasmād ūtmanaḥ sthāvarajaṅgamaṃ jagad idam agnīvīṣṭhūlīṅgavad vñuccaraty anīṣaṃ yasmīn eva ca prātyate jalabudbudavad yadātmakaṃ ca vartate...* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

²⁹ *etasyaiva vākyaṣya vyākhyānāya utaraṃ brāhmaṇadvayaṃ bhaviṣyati* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

sa yathorṇanābhis tantunoccareḍ yathāgneḥ ksudrā visphulīṅgā vyuccarantī
evan evāsmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni
vyuccaranti. . .³⁰

As a spider emanates [of himself] by way of [his] thread, as sparks emanate from fire, all the *prāṇas*, all the *lokas*, all the *devas*, and all beings emanate from the self in this same way.

Śaṅkara's comments on this passage decisively reveal that the philosophy he had in mind while writing his commentary fits with that generally identified as DSE in the later classical Advaita texts. His commentary for the passage above is:

. . . *asmād ātmano vijñānamayasya prāk pratibodhāt yat svarūpaṃ tasmād ity arthaḥ | sarve prāṇā vāgādayaḥ, sarve lokā bhūrādayaḥ sarvāṇi karmaphalāni, sarve devāḥ prāṇalokādhiṣṭhātāro 'gnyādayaḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni brahmādistambaparyantāni prāṇijātāni, sarva eta ātmāna ity asmin pāṭha upādhisamparkaṇanitaprabudhyamānaviśeṣātmāna ity artho vyuccaranti |*

BĀUBh 2.1.20

The meaning [of] 'from this self' [is] 'from the essential nature [of the self] comprised of knowledge (*vijñānamaya*) upon returning to the waking state,' [from which] emanate all *prāṇas* such as speech, all worlds such as *bhū*, all results of actions, all gods such as Agni who are the rulers of the worlds [corresponding to] *prāṇas*, all those having life (*prāṇin*), from Brahman to grass (*stamba*). Following the reading '*sarva eta ātmāna*' (all these selves), the meaning is 'all the distinct selves coming into the waking state [are] caused by contact with limiting factors'.

The commentary explains that the *Vijñānamaya* is the conscious self in the waking state, and all manifestation, including the *Vijñānamaya* nature, dissolve in deep sleep, and emerge upon returning to the waking state. Notably, this passage has two recensions: the *Kāṇva* and the *Mādhyandina*. The *Mādhyandina* recension allows the interpretation that all individual selves are manifestations of the self which is only one in deep sleep.³¹ In both cases, manifestation is not from the Brahman which is beyond the three states, rather, from that which in deep sleep is One, and is the true nature of the self (or selves) comprised of objective consciousness.

While developing his thesis further in this commentary on BĀU 2.1.20, Śaṅkara raises an issue: Does this passage refer to the self that awakens from sleep when shaken by someone's hand, or to the higher Self? The first position makes no distinction between the selves of empirical experience and the highest esoteric experience. The self, accepted in this passage as the source and enjoyer of the world, is the one

³⁰ BĀU 2.1.20. The *Mādhyandina* recension adds '*sarva eta ātmāno*' after . . . *sarvāṇi bhūtāni* . . . See Olivelle 1998, 499, note 1.20.3.

³¹ Śaṅkara's inclination towards a *Kāṇva* recension and Sureśvara's choice of a *Mādhyandina* recension may have caused some divergence in their philosophy. This difference does not need to be explicit in the text itself; the preferred particular scriptures may suggest this divergence. Bhartṛprapañca composed his commentary on the *Mādhyandina* recension; and Sureśvara's relation with Bhartṛprapañca differs in this regard.

who awakens when shaken by another. There is no other self to control the body and senses, but rather, this is the immediately experienced self which is eternally free from sensation or feeling such as hunger or pain. The illustration from BĀU, in which the king promises to instruct the Brāhman and uses the example of waking a sleeping person to demonstrate how the self moves to deep sleep from the waking state by way of dream, suffices to establish that the self under consideration is the individual self immediately experienced. The metaphors of creation such as sparks of fire and a spider's web strictly follow the passage that refers to the empirical self cited in the ablative case [*asmāt*], explaining the origin of manifestation. Strikingly, these examples propound subjective monism rather than illusionism. Śaṅkara's additional example of bubbles can be interpreted in both ways. The two distinct models of DS are grounded on this subtle difference of how to interpret these metaphors.

While analyzing passages that describe the changing modes of consciousness, of prime concern in deciphering DS are the issues concerning what dissolves in deep sleep and what the *jīva* is while awake. As noted above, the passage from KU grounds all subsequent discussions of DS. Explicit DS references link this notion with the passages dealing with states of consciousness. This parallels Prakāśātman's (1200 CE) view of *dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭi* (PPV 174-175). The first view that Prakāśātman has presented considers that the product of ignorance dissolves in deep sleep, allowing only ignorance to remain in seminal form that recreates the world when one wakes up from deep sleep. According to another opinion, there are two components of I-sense (*ahaṅkāra*): the aspect of action and of knowledge, and the aspect of knowledge that dissolves in deep sleep. The third view in this sequence, the one identified with DS, advocates dissolution of I-sense (*ahaṅkāra*) in deep sleep. Since in deep sleep there is no I-sense experienced, the dissolution of *ahaṅkāra* corresponds to the view of the person in deep sleep. Both minds experienced as personal and impersonal do not exist in deep sleep. That the sleeping person does not cognize I-sense is sufficient to claim that there is no subjective experience from the perspective of the one in deep sleep, while except for the state of superimposition (*adhyāsa*), impersonal self-experience does not exist (PPV 174-175).

This issue of what dissolves in deep sleep appears with a direct reference to DS in Vidyāraṇya's *Anubhūtiprakāśa* (AP) as the best example:

*pratyagbrahmatvabodhārthaṃ dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭim avocata |
suptāv āsīd yad ajñānam ahaṅkāralayo 'tra hi ||
so 'haṅkāraḥ karmabhogakāle syāt punar udgataḥ |
tenāvaccinna ātmāpi karṇā bhokāpi pūrvavat || AP 9.51-52*

[Ajātaśatru] mentioned DS in order to [give] knowledge of the Absolute as the immediate self. For *Ahaṅkāra* dissolves into that very ignorance which was in [the state of] deep sleep. That *ahaṅkāra* rises again during the time of the enjoyment of *karma*. The self, limited by that [*ahaṅkāra*], is the agent, and as well enjoyer, as it was in the previous state [*pūrvā*].

This reference further supports a central point of this study that the dissolution of I-sense in deep sleep remains pivotal to DS in scholastic Advaita.

In the above-mentioned passage, Śaṅkara accepts the individual self as the source of the world. He explains that there is no higher category of the self described in the *Upaniṣads* as the cause of the world, because the self addressed in this passage is 'comprised of knowledge' (*viññānamaya*).³² This clear position of Śaṅkara suffices to link him with DS-*vāda*. Here, Śaṅkara further analyzes several issues that concern the essential nature of existence. Nonetheless, another problem remains: Does this passage confirm origination as 'seeing only' or not? This excerpt from KU alone may not suffice to confirm a link with DS; however, it does support the position that the 'creation' being addressed is personal, emerging from the self that awakens from deep sleep. If the concept addressed here is that the individual self imagines the external reality including the dream world, then this concept definitely aligns closely with DS.

According to Śaṅkara, the *viññānamaya* mentioned in this passage (BĀU 2.1.16-17)³³ is the empirical subject immediately experienced in the waking state.³⁴ Śaṅkara adds that knowability in the form of the self is shown as 'I' in all the *Upaniṣads*, not as external entities.³⁵ His premise that the final goal of Advaita is to realize the self is an extension of the *Upaniṣadic* passage that 'one should not desire to know [the senses such as] speech; rather, one should know the subject of [the sensory function such as] speaking' (*na vācaṃ vijijñāsīta vaktāraṃ vidyāt*).³⁶ It cannot be argued that there is another subject, a meta-subject other than the empirical self who is not suffering in the world, since this is not experienced.³⁷ Questioned whether an individual can create a world difficult even to imagine, Śaṅkara's reply cited as evidence in BĀUBh is 'in the same way from this very self' (*evam evāsmād ātmanah*).

³² *na tāvat asaṃsārti paraḥ pāṇipeṣapratibodhitāt śabdādibhujāḥ avasthānaraviśiṣṭāt utpattiśruteḥ, na praśāsītā aśanāyādivarjitaḥ paro vidyate, kasmāt? yasmāt brahma jñāpayisyāmi iti pratijñāya sūptam puruṣam pāṇipeṣam bodhayivā, tam śabdādibhokṣtvaviśiṣṭam darśa-yitvā, tasyaiva svapnadāvarena susuptyākhyam avasthāntaram unnīya, tasmād eva ātmanah susuptyavasthāviśiṣṭāt agnivisphulīngorṇanūbhīdīṣṭāntābhīyam utpattiṃ darśayati śrutiḥ - evam evāsmād ityādina, na cānyo jagadutpattikāraṇam antarāle śruvo 'sti, vijñānamayaśyaiva hi prakaraṇam* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

³³ Śaṅkara compares this BĀU passage with KU passage by stating *samānaprakarane ca śrutyantare kauṣṭhikīnāmādītyādīpuruṣān*. . . BĀUBh 2.1.20. KU, however, does not use the term '*viññānamaya*' while discussing this notion, rather uses '*prajñātmān*'. Śaṅkara's identification of these two passages support the argument that these terms are synonymous.

³⁴ *prabuddhasyaiva vijñānamayaśya vedīavyatāṃ darśayati* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

³⁵ *sarvavedānteṣu ca pratyagātmavedyateṣu pradarśyate aham iti, na bahirvedyat ā śabdādivat pradarśyate asau brahmeti* Ibid.

³⁶ *vāgādīkaraṇair vyāvṛtīyaśa kartur eva vedīavyatāṃ darśayati* Ibid. Olivelle translates the passage *na vācam*. . . KU 3.8 as 'it is not the speech that a man should seek to apprehend; rather, he should get to know the one who speaks it'. Olivelle 1998, 353.

³⁷ *yo jāgarūte śabdādībhuk vijñānamayaḥ sa eva susuptākhyam avasthāntaram gato 'saṃsārti paraḥ praśāsītā anyāḥ syāt iti cen na, adṛṣṭavāt* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

On this ground, it may be concluded that Śaṅkara, with full awareness, is commenting upon texts that apply different didactic methods. In this case, he interprets the passage as meaning that the world emanates from an individual suffering in the world (BĀUBh 2.1.20), aligning with the DS stance.

Śaṅkara introduces another position according to which there is another self who creates the world and is not suffering in it.³⁸ However, this is not the position of Śaṅkara; otherwise he would not refute it.³⁹ To solve the problem of how the self is both transcendent and suffering in the world, Śaṅkara first puts forth the view of *bhedābheda*, the doctrine of identity in difference, propounded by Bhartṛprapañca.⁴⁰ Śaṅkara refutes this concept by demonstrating that the single self cannot be segmented into parts, with one suffering in the world, and another transcendent. An objection is made that scriptures mention parts of the self with the example of fire and sparks. BG explicitly mentions that the empirical subject is part of the supreme Self.⁴¹ Śaṅkara replies that a spark is not *part* of a fire, but fire itself.⁴² Utilizing this example, he concludes that the *Upaniṣads* initially propound identity, then explain creation, and eventually establish non-difference. Śaṅkara clearly accepts this premise, stating that the sentences propounding origination do not really establish this; rather, they confirm the identity of the self and the Brahman.

The inner structure of argumentation in this sequence relates to linguistic procedure: if the collective meaning of words is accepted as the meaning of a sentence, the words propounding origination cannot be simply dismissed, since a sentence cannot give an entirely different meaning than that suggested by individual words. This shift from the ontological status of the self to a linguistic analysis leads Śaṅkara to conclude that the meaning of a sentence cannot contradict either its premise (*upakrama*) or its conclusion (*upasamhāra*).⁴³ And according to Śaṅkara, the opening and ending of this discussion only confirm identity, not origination.⁴⁴ Thus, in his opinion, the

³⁸ *yaḥ sarvajñāḥ. . . evam avirodhaḥ syāt* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

³⁹ *na punar asaṃsārti brahma saṃsāryātmakatvena cintayed agnim iva śūatvenākāśam iva mūrtimattvena | brahmātmavapratīpādakam api śāstram arthavādo bhaviṣyati | sarvatarka-śāstralokanyāyais caivam avirodhaḥ syāt | na, mantrabrāhmaṇavādebhyaś tasyaiva praveśa-śravaṇāt | . . . paramātmavyatīrekeṇa saṃsāriṇo 'bhāvād ekam evādvīṭyam, brahmaivedam, ātmaivedam, ityādīśrutibhyo yuktam evāhaṃ brahmāsmīty avadhārayitum |* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

⁴⁰ *kin tarhi vikārabhāvam āpanno vijñānāmarvaṃ pratipeḍe, sa ca vijñānātmā paramāsmād aryo 'naryaś ca, yenānyas tena saṃsāritvasambandhī, yenānanyas tenāhaṃ brahmeti avadhāranārhaḥ* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

⁴¹ *manaivāṃśaḥ. . .* BG 15.7.

⁴² *agner hi visphulīngo 'gnir evety ekatvapratyayārṇho dṛṣṭo loke* BĀUBh 2.1.20.

⁴³ *tasmād upakramopasamhārahīyam ayam artho niścyate paramātmakatvapratyayadradhimne utpattīsthitīlayapratīpādakāni vākyaṅīti* Ibid.

⁴⁴ *tasmāt ekatvapratyayadarhīyāyeva sarvavedānteṣu utpattīsthitīlayādīkalpanā, na utpatty akaraṇāya* Ibid.

examples of gold, jewels, iron, or fire-sparks do not propound difference in the form of creation and so forth.⁴⁵

While commenting upon BĀU 2.1.20, Śaṅkara is relatively close to Gauḍapāda in his terminology.⁴⁶ This reference aligns with the central feature of *Ābhāsa*, the model of the Advaita doctrine that accepts two degrees of reality. This model contradicts the generally accepted position that adopts three degrees of reality (Halbfass, 1995, 137-152). Remarkably, the notion of *Ajāti* or non-origination is reinforced by Śaṅkara's arguments, where he advocates the negation of origination as the conclusive meaning of even the passages that apparently propound creation.

Further advocating that the very phenomenal self is the creator, Śaṅkara cites the story of a prince, who, from his childhood, was raised by hunters and had no awareness of his princehood. This prince, following instructions, eventually realizes that he is a prince (BĀU 2.1.20.). In presenting this story, Śaṅkara refutes the view of part and whole, stressing that there is no partition in the Brahman, bringing him closer to the model of Advaita subsequently known as EJ: even in the state of creation the indivisible self does not undergo difference. The assumption of the prince as hunter is only an appearance (*ābhāsa*), due to superimposition. As to the question, then what is experienced, Śaṅkara shows that the purpose of the *Upaniṣads* is to remove all mental constructions.⁴⁷ Therefore, the common experience that relies upon a subject is due to the superimposition of name and form, with the self eternally free from modification.⁴⁸ The additional passages quoted by Śaṅkara in this context as the testimony are the fundamental instances cited by the subsequent philosophers in order to establish *Ābhāsa*.⁴⁹

The next problem raised by Śaṅkara frequently appears in later Advaita as a *prima facie* position for the EJ concept: why, then, is difference in the empirical self (*jīva*) accepted? In reply, he uses phrases like 'the difference consisting in [self] awareness is imagined' (*viññānāmabhedah parikalpyata*). The subsequent rejoinder addresses difference in actions and in instruction: If there is no duality, who could be the master and the one to be instructed? In the same way, what is the authority of the *Upaniṣads*, since even their authority is challenged when questioning everything other than self-awareness immediately experienced.

⁴⁵ *tasmāt svarāmaniloḥāgnivishphulīṅgādṛṣṭāntā notpatyādibhedapratipādanaparūḥ* Ibid.

⁴⁶ For example, one can compare the terminology of Śaṅkara such as *uccāvācān bhāvān* BĀU 2.1.14, or the concept of non-origination (*ajāti*) in the example of a blazing sparks of fire (*agnivishphulīṅga*) in BĀU 2.1.20.

⁴⁷ *tasmāt sarvakalpanāpanayanārthasārāparatvāt sarvopaniṣadām* BĀU 2.1.20 Śāstri ed., 167.

⁴⁸ *tasmāt nāmarūpōpādhanimitā evātmany asaṁsārādharmiṇi sarve vyavahārāḥ* Ibid.

⁴⁹ The passages include:

1. 'adapts its appearance to match that of each' (*rūpaṁrūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva*) KathU 5.5.9; 5.5.10. Trans. Olivelle 1998, 397.

2. 'as if reflects, as if pulsates' (*dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva*) BĀU 4.3.7. Olivelle translates this passage as: 'sometimes he reflects, sometimes he flutters'. See Olivelle, 1998, 111.

Śaṅkara's defense of the singularity of the self appears with minor modification in the writings of subsequent philosophers of the *Ābhāsa* model. All these issues surface in Madhusūdana's chapters on DS and EJ.⁵⁰ Śaṅkara addresses the issue concerning the validity of the scriptures, one of the major issues to be reconciled with the EJ doctrine, saying that, as long as the scriptures impart correct knowledge they are not invalid; and further, they impart correct knowledge of identity with Brahman.⁵¹ The concluding sentence of this passage reveals the higher state of realization that resembles the EJ doctrine.

'As it is said, all that exists is Brahman in essence. [The issue here is] whom to instruct, and who receives the fruit of instruction, since in the absence of the person to be instructed, the instruction of identity is meaningless'. Śaṅkara defends this, saying that several causal factors are necessary to perform an action, whereas the Brahman is free from limiting factors (*upādhi*), and so there is neither instruction, nor instructor. The last problem addressed is whether the agent becomes meaningless due to the meaninglessness of action. Śaṅkara replies that, due to the meaninglessness of agency, the solitary nature of the self is not challenged.⁵²

Śaṅkara asserts that, when name and form (*nāmarūpa*) are imposed, the difference belongs only to the limiting factors. Whatever is different from the self is name and form. Emanation and dissolution belong to name and form⁵³ and not to the self, since the self is different from name and form. Thus, for Śaṅkara, there are two truths: pertinent to the self and whatever is experienced as other than the self is name and form. This thesis suggests two different interpretations: one with instruction given in the realm of illusion, and the other, grounded in reality. The EJ doctrine with the world as imagined by the self is the higher teaching, in which even instruction or the *Upaniṣads* are asserted as not real.

If Śaṅkara was aware of the concept of *dr̥ṣṭīmātra*, did he then accept it in an absolute monistic sense as constant non-dual awareness only or in the general non-dualistic sense of illusory modes of perception in which *dr̥ṣṭi* does not refer to the reality? The analysis presented above demonstrates that he favors the position of illu-

⁵⁰ In Madhusūdana's AS, the chapter on *Ekajīva* immediately follows the chapter on DS; in these chapters, he identifies DS and EJ as belonging to a single model.

⁵¹ *pramāṇasya hi pramāṇatvam apramāṇatvam vā pramoṭpādanānutpādanānimitam, anyathā cet sambhādānām prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt śabdādau prameye | kiñ cātaḥ? yadi tāvad upaniṣado brahmaikavapratipattiṣamāṇaṁ kurvanti, katham apramāṇaṁ bhavedyuḥ* BĀU 2.1.20 Śāstri ed., 168.

⁵² *yad ukam - brahmaikavte yasmāy upadeśaḥ, yasya copadeśagrahaṇaphalam, tadabhāvād ekatvopadeśānarthakam iti- tad api na, anekakārakasādṛhyatvāt kriyānām kaś codyo bhavati, ekasmin brahmaṇi nirupādḥike nopadeśaḥ, nopadeṣṭā, na copadeśagrahaṇaphalam, tasmād upaniṣadāṁ cānarthakyañ codyate - na, svato 'bhuyupagamavirodhād ātmavādinām* Ibid.

⁵³ *yāni liṅgāny ātmabhedasādhanāya nāmarūpavanty upanyasyanti, tāni nāmarūpagatāni upādḥaya evātmanaḥ . . . yad yat paraḥ āmadharmatvenābhuyupagacchati, tasya tasya nāmarūpātmakevābhuyupagamatvāt, nāmarūpābhyaṁ cātmano 'nyatvābhuyupagamāt* Ibid.

sory perception. There are nonetheless some instances in Śaṅkara's writings, which may have contributed to the DS-*vāda* with an interpretation that difference is contemporaneous to illusion, like the world of dream before awakening.⁵⁴ Hacker points out that Śaṅkara uses *māyā* once with the meaning of 'non-existent' (*alīka*) (Halbfass 1995, 79). Congruent with Gauḍapāda's statement that *māyā* does not exist,⁵⁵ this stance prefigures the DS concept and negates any degree of existence of whatever is not the Absolute.

In another context, Śaṅkara states that the passage explaining the dissolution of earth and so forth in its material cause represents the conventional perspective. From the perspective of one who is realized, all these aspects dissolve into the very Brahman.⁵⁶ This position, nevertheless, defends DSE, with the solitary nature of awareness as the immediately recognized self.

Scholars have endeavored to solve the issue of positioning Śaṅkara in one specific model. In her discussion on *Avidyā*, Solomon points out that Śaṅkara teaches two different viewpoints:

Śaṅkarācārya has propounded his philosophy from two points of view—the higher or supra-empirical (*pāramārthika*) and the lower or the common-sense or empirical point of view (*vyāvahārika*) (Solomon 1983, 69).

The first viewpoint upholds phenomenality as a conventional means to the experience of truth. The second viewpoint upholds direct instruction of truth (Solomon 1983, 229). This fits with our observation that Śaṅkara utilized a dyadic model of instruction instead of defending a single method.

This dyadic model of instruction is explicit in subsequent Advaita literature. Fundamentally, the problems inherent to it concern

- 1) the locus and object of ignorance,
- 2) the method applied or the views built to support liberation, and
- 3) the role of *māyā*.

Excerpts from classical philosophers clarify this issue.

Maṇḍana counters the perspective that the very Brahman is the one that transmigrates and liberates, as he posits that the locus of ignorance is the individual selves, not the Brahman.⁵⁷ As the position that he refutes is explicitly Advaitic, it may be argued that two conflicting views existed from this time.

⁵⁴ *anupamarditabhedapratyayavat puruṣaviṣaye prāmāṇyopapatteḥ svapnādipratyaya iva prakṛtprabodhāt* CUBh II.23.1. Brückner identifies other such occurrences. Brückner 1979, 120.

⁵⁵ *sā ca māyā na vidyate* GK 4.58.

⁵⁶ *sā khalu vyavahārapēkṣā, pāṛthivādyaḥ kalāḥ pṛthivyādīr eva svaprakṛtīr apiyanti, itarā tu vidvatpratiṣṭāpēkṣā, kṛtsnaḥ kalājātaḥ parabrahmavidō brahmaiva sampadyata iti tasmād ādoṣaḥ* BSūBh IV.II.15.

⁵⁷ *aṭha brahmaiva saṃsarati brahmaiva mucyate, ekamuktau sarvamuktīprasāṅgaḥ* BS p. 12, line 4.

Sarvajñātman develops three methods, which are applicable to individuals with different levels of spiritual awareness:

- 1) *āropa-dṛṣṭi* (the analogical view),
- 2) *vyāmīśra-dṛṣṭi* (the mixed view), and
- 3) *apavāda-dṛṣṭi* (the exceptional view), which is also called the 'complete view' (*paripūrṇa-dṛṣṭi*).

Sarvajñātman interprets the first two views as applicable to the lower and higher levels of aspirants, whereas the third view belongs to the liberated ones (SŚ 2.81-83). For Sarvajñātman, the non-dualistic nature of the self can be realized through the method advocating transformation (*pariṇāma*), or by following the doctrine of false projection (*vivarta*); however, both are of the lower category if compared with the final view, the *apavāda* or *paripūrṇa-dṛṣṭi* (SŚ 2.84). The truth is beyond the views of *pariṇāma* or *vivarta* (SŚ 2.89). According to Sarvajñātman, the discussion concerning the plurality or singularity of the *jīvas* falls under the second category, the view that accepts the world as *vivarta* (SŚ 2.90). His position that even *vivarta* is not the ultimate Advaita perspective matches Abhinanda's characterization of *vivarta* as instruction intended for infants.⁵⁸ Hacker's placement of Sarvajñātman and Prakāśānanda under those following radical monism (*Radikalster Monismus*) [Hacker 1953, 47 (231)] tallies with the research of this study.

This categorization has the least to do with the reality. Rather, it deals with the approaches through which the reality is revealed. Śaṅkara treated this pedagogical issue by introducing two instructions relying upon 'phenomenal' and 'real' perspectives, while Sarvajñātman explained this in terms of *dṛṣṭis* or perspectives. Vidyāraṇya introduces this hierarchy in terms of three categories in which *māyā* is cognized:

- 1) *tuccha* (fictitious), accepted by those having *Śrauta* understanding,⁵⁹
- 2) *anirvacanīya* (inexplicable), understood by those who follow *yukti* (reason), and
- 3) *vāstavi* (real),⁶⁰ for those bound within the world.

⁵⁸ Prakāśānanda quotes this verse without identifying its source. This passage appears for the first time in RC of Abhinanda: *bālān prati vivartito 'yaṅ brahmaṇaḥ sakalam jagat | avivartinam ānandam āśhitāḥ kṛtināḥ punaḥ ||* RC, *Nāgapāśaparibhāṣa*, 116.

⁵⁹ Here the *śrauta* and *yauktika* do not seem to signify the followers of verbal testimony and the followers of reason. This verse probably demonstrates two distinct methods, the *śrauta* method and the *yukti* method. This interpretation also fits in a broader sense with Sarvajñātman's division of different methods discussed above. For further analysis of Advaitic methods of liberation, see Roodurmun 2002, 209-239.

⁶⁰ *tucchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavi cety asau tridhā | jñeyā māyā trībhīr bodhair śrautayauktika-laukikāḥ ||* PD 6.130. Prakāśānanda cites this verse (p. 177 in Caṇḍīprasād Śukla edition), referring to Gauḍapāda]. Apparently he was confused about the source of this verse.

The first two are clearly the Advaita perspectives concerning *māyā*.⁶¹ Thus, for Vidyāranya, two models within Advaita rest on their respective understanding of the nature and function of *māyā*.

Prakāśānanda categorizes *māyā* under *tuccha* (fictitious), and this is equated with objective phenomena in his non-dualistic doctrine. Asserting the fictitiousness of the world does not confirm any degree of reality; rather, this entirely negates any possibility of reality. For example, when Prakāśānanda uses *atyantāsat-saṃsāra* with the meaning 'fictitious world', Hacker concludes that the writer accepted the illusory nature of the world [Hacker 1953, 50 (234)].

The discussion in the preceding two paragraphs reveals that different Advaita philosophers have adopted different methods in order to interpret the truth and this tendency is visible as early as in the writings of Śaṅkara. In conclusion, Śaṅkara clearly was aware of several issues pertaining to the doctrine that 1) does not accept three degrees of reality, and 2) does not accept a plurality of *jīvas*. On this ground, it can be concluded that Śaṅkara considers the highest model, later known as DS, as the culmination of Advaita. Following the lines of Śaṅkara's exegesis that accommodates the concept subsequently identified as DS, pertinent issues were segmented into two chapters in Madhusūdana's AS, with the ontological and pedagogical issues under the section of EJ, and the epistemological issues in the DS- chapter.

Reading Śaṅkara in light of the subsequent commentarial tradition with conflicting theological positions reveals that certain epistemological and ontological problems addressed in the later classical writings are pertinent to the central Advaita categories, such as that of accepting *Avidyā*, interpreting reality in various degrees, or recognizing the phenomenal reality of *jīva*. Śaṅkara's approach to these issues, as has been pointed out, was varied and not single-pronged. His independent treatise, the US, is unmistakably closer to the writings of Gauḍapāda and the *Vārtika* of Sureśvara, with the philosophy of *Ābhāsa* remaining at the core of the exegesis. Remarkably, the model of Advaita under investigation, namely, the doctrine of DS, is significantly closer to this model than the *Avaccheda* or *Pratibimba* concepts. The next chapter explores the intricate relationship between the doctrines under investigation: the philosophies of *Ābhāsa* and DS.

⁶¹ Udayana discusses the possibility of predicating the non-existent. There are two sides: 1) the non-existent cannot be made the subject of any predication; 2) the non-existent is a possible subject of a negative predication. Udayana favors the position that rejects both an affirmative and negative predication about a non-real entity such as a rabbit-horn. See Chakrabarti pp. 302-304, in Matilal 1984. This position indirectly embraces *anirvacanīyatva* argument. The Buddhist position here has remained that the non-existent is a possible subject of negative predication. This mode of negation comes closer to the *alīka* category, in which something is negated in the absolute sense.

Chapter 4: *Ābhāsa* and *Dṛṣṭisrṣṭi*

The discussion so far has demonstrated that the closest Advaita model to compare with DS is *Ābhāsa*. While a full exploration of the *Ābhāsa* model is not the purpose of this study, it is nonetheless relevant to trace the basic components that constitute the *Ābhāsa* doctrine and find their parallels with DS in order to establish the thesis that DS resembles *Ābhāsa* in its treatment of fundamental issues pertinent to the philosophy of Advaita.

The *Ābhāsa* doctrine posits that what is seen is mere appearance, not different from a dream, with the Brahman being the only existent entity. When contrasted with the models following Padmapāda and Vācaspati, *Ābhāsa* is comparatively closer to Gauḍapāda's illusionism, even though several issues have been modified in *Ābhāsa*. The standard form of *Ābhāsa* accepts the ontic being of a single *jīva*, with this distinction between DS and *Ābhāsa* being so marginal that, if that single ontic being is the very Brahman, the witnessing subject, then it can be analyzed under *Ābhāsa*, whereas if that which imagines the world is called *jīva*, then it aligns with DS. To be more precise, the issues concerning phenomenology are more relevant to *Ābhāsa*, while the issues of immediate experience are directly linked with DS. To categorize *Ābhāsa* as a different topic in this discussion follows an historical rather than phenomenological analysis, since DS never produced independent literature, nor was understood to be ontologically different from *Ābhāsa*. The *Ābhāsa* doctrine analyzes the empirical world and the absolute reality as two degrees of reality, the phenomenal (*pratibhāsa*, a term closer to *ābhāsa*), and that which is the absolute (*paramārtha*).

As discussed above, Śaṅkara propounded some elementary points congruent with this doctrine. These elements can all be subsumed under *Ābhāsa*; however, it is only US which encompasses the doctrine of this model; and these issues require a separate treatment. As far as Sureśvara is concerned, his major writings—both the *Vārtika* on BĀUBh (BĀUBhVā) and the NS—fully support the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. While criticizing the Advaita philosophy, its opponents presented the *Ābhāsa* model as a *prima facie* position. This understanding continued even after the emergence of other models in Advaita, and is visible even in the texts such as *Satadūṣaṇī* of Vedāntadeśika which primarily refute the *Ābhāsa* model. Both Vimuktātman and Śrīharṣa defend the main tenets of Sureśvara, suggesting that *Ābhāsa* was the central Advaita doctrine, at least prior to Prakāśātman and Citsukhācārya.

Sureśvara, Vimuktātman, and Śrīharṣa are central figures in the history of Advaita, not only of *Ābhāsavāda*. To understand DS in its original form presupposes an understanding of the *Ābhāsa* doctrine as propounded and elaborated by these three masters.

When closely analyzed, there remains hardly any independent argument in DS that has not been explained by these three. To cover in depth the philosophy of each is not the purpose of the present paper. Therefore, this study analyzes only the central tenets common to DS, providing sufficient ground to claim either that DS merely modifies terms from *Ābhāsa* literature or that DS deals with some arguments within the larger doctrine of *Ābhāsa*.

Sureśvara

Sureśvara, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, plays a central role in the development of the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. Besides the Vārttika literature,¹ Sureśvara's originality can be seen in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. The texts attributed to Sureśvara adhere to the *Ābhāsa* doctrine.² There had been some confusion as to whether Sureśvara and Maṇḍana were the same person; however, this issue has been resolved and this study concurs with the research establishing that these two are separate philosophers with visible differences in their thought. This study centers upon only those select references that will suffice to establish that Sureśvara's philosophy covers most of the tenets of DS, to allow the claim that DS is merely a reflection upon specific issues covered by the ground philosophy of *Ābhāsa*.

An approach shared by *Ābhāsa* and DS is the explanation of reality in a dyad of absolute reality and conventional reality. Following this instruction, both *prātibhāsa* and *vyāvahāra* refer to the same degree of reality. Sureśvara spells out the dyad of *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* (TUBhVā 2.407), where the category of *prātibhāsa* is absent. Nevertheless, what is meant by *vyāvahārika* here is explained in terms of *prātibhāsika* elsewhere. The most pivotal point of DS is the existence of only the objects of cognition (*jñātaikasattva*), or the non-existence of that which is not an object of cognition (*ajñātasattvābhāva*). Following the definition of Madhusūdana, DS refers to the doctrine that negates the existence of the entities independently out of the domain of awareness (see chapter 9, pages 188-194). This definition tallies also with the understanding of Dharmadatta Śarmā (chapter 1, pages 33-36), and Appayya (chapter 5, pages 123-126) as well. Direct evidence that Sureśvara supports this specific concept would allow further investigation along the lines that the philosophy actually paves the path to the doctrine of DS. Sureśvara clearly states that there exists nothing not-known:

... *na vastv ajñātam asti hi* ||³
there exists no entity which has not become known.

¹ In addition to the BĀUBhVā, the Vārttika on *Taittirīyopaniṣad-Bhāṣya* is also attributed to Sureśvara.

² The commentary *Mānasollāsa* on *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistava*, and the Vārttika on *Pañcīkaraṇa* are also attributed to Sureśvara.

³ BĀUBhVā 1.4.240. I find it difficult to accept the translation of Jog and Hino in the passage *na vastv ajñātam asti hi*, "the (real) thing is not unknown". The subsequent verse reads *kūrmalomādi vastu*... (241), in which the term *vastu* does not refer to the "real thing", but rather to a fictitious entity.

rte jñānam na santy arthā asti jñānam rte 'pi tāt |

NS 2.97

The objects of knowledge do not exist in the absence of knowledge [although] there is knowledge even in absence of those [objects].

Sureśvara rejects an independent existence of objects free from the knower (*jñātr*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), even in erroneous perception.⁴ The triad of knower, knowledge, and known cannot be confirmed separate from awareness,⁵ while awareness is confirmed by itself, independent of any other means of knowledge. This argument further leads to the conclusion that in Sureśvara's epistemology, there is no possibility that there exists any entity that is out of the domain of awareness.

The next decisive point in Sureśvara's position connecting him with DS concerns the most generally accepted definition of *drṣṭisrṣṭi* as *drṣṭir eva srṣ-ṭiḥ* (creation is identical with 'seeing'), as given by Madhusūdana:

vyāvṛtṭyanugamau yasmād dviṭṭye sati vastuni |
drṣṭimātrātmavastuvāt kāryakāraṇavastunaḥ ||⁶

Since *vyāvṛtṭi* and *anugama* are [possible only] when there is the second entity, since the entities [in the form of] cause and effect are merely 'seeing' in their essence (*drṣṭi*).

Congruent with the second interpretation of *drṣṭisrṣṭi* where *drṣṭi* is identical to imagination or erroneous perception, Sureśvara explains:

kartur jñātur hi yā drṣṭiḥ sāvidyothārthalehinī |
tat pratyagātmadrṣṭyā tāṃ pratyākhyāyāsnute 'dvayam ||

BĀUBhVā 1.4.1432

The perception (*drṣṭi*), belonging to an agent of action or of knowledge, is enjoying (*iḥ*) entities rising out of ignorance. Removing that view by inward seeing, [one] attains that non-dual [state].

⁴ *jñānajñātratrekeṇa tamasy api na vidyate* | *meyaṃ vastu tato 'jñānam pratyakṣaṃ sapramātrātam* || BĀUBhVā 1.4.281. "With the exception of the knower and knowledge, a knowable object does not exist even in (the case of) ignorance, and so ignorance directly perceived includes its knower".

⁵ *yato 'jñātavasya saṃsiddhir jñātavasyāpi cārjasa* | *tata eva ca mānatvaṃ saṃvidarte na tat trayam* || BĀUBhVā 1.4.287. "By which (means) it is established [that something] is (-*iva*) not known, (by that very means) it is also instantly established [that something can be] known. And by that very [means it is] also [established, that therein lies] a means of knowledge (*mānatva*). Without consciousness, all the three cannot be established".

⁶ BĀUBhVā 1.4.1415. Another verse supporting this concept deals with the relationship of ignorance and the constant nature of knowledge:

drṣṭimātrātmamayāhātmyāt kāryakāraṇavastunaḥ | *nājñātam kiñcid apy asti nānapāstaṃ tamo 'py atah* || BĀUBhVā 2.4.443. "Since mere seeing is the reality of the entities of the form of cause and effect, there is nothing not known, therefore (*ataḥ*) [there is] also (*api*) no ignorance not removed".

One crucial argument that leads to DS is the assertion of EJ. Although relection of 'other mind', or empirical self, does not necessarily lead to DS, it is nevertheless one of the main supporting arguments found in the discussion concerning DS. Furthermore, Madhusūdana identifies DS with EJ. Therefore, in order to establish the relationship of DS with the thought of Sureśvara, the presence of the EJ concept in his writings can be anticipated. A passage from BĀUBhVā is noteworthy with this regard:

*vibhinnadrasṭṛdrṣtyāptir ghaṭāder iva nāmanah |
na cābhedē'sti saṃvyāptir aikāntmyād eva kāraṇāt ||*

BĀUBhVā 2.4.135

While there is the cognition (*āpti*) as it were (*iva*) of a pot and so forth by the seeing of various perceivers, [this is] not [the case] of the self. Neither is there any pervasion (*saṃvyāpti*) [to establish] the identity [of different selves], due to the very reason that [there is just] one [self].

*na ca draṣṭāmano 'nyo 'sti draṣṭrantaranīṣedhanāt |
na ca draṣṭor āvayor loke draṣṭṛdrṣtyarvasaṅgatih ||*

BĀUBhVā 2.4.136

There exists no perceiver different from the self since a different perceiver is negated. Neither will there be [reciprocity] of two perceivers in the world, since [one] is the subject of perception and [the other], the object of perception [of the perceiving subject].

Sureśvara defends the notion that *jīva* is the cause of the world. This concept is crucial to both the DS and EJ doctrines. Following these doctrines, the causality of the world rests upon the empirical self, bound in the world. Sureśvara, in defense of the concept that the individual self is the cause of the world, cites the following Upaniṣadic reference:

*saṃsāriṇo 'py asāmarthyā jagajjanmādikarmasu |
jagaddhetuvam anyāyāyā itī cen na śruter balāt ||*

BĀUBhVā 2.1.442

If the causation of the world pertaining to the transmigrating self is not appropriate because [the transmigrating self] has no power (*sāmarthya*), for actions of creating the world and so on, [then the reply is] no, [this is not so,] following the testimony of the Vedas.

*akṣādyagocaro yadvac chāstrād adhyavasīyate |
tadvat saṃsārikāryatvaṃ jagato gamyatām śruteḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 2.1.443

As on account of the Śāstra, [the self is] ascertained as no object of the senses, so (*tadvat*) the world should be understood as an effect of the transmigrating [self], since [this is] the testimony of the Vedas.

These instances suffice to suggest that in Sureśvara's understanding the causality of the world lies on the empirical self. What defines plurality in various bodies, following EJ, is the inner sense that constitutes difference. This issue is explicitly addressed by Sureśvara elsewhere (NS 2.47-48).

While discussing the passage KU 4.20, it has been argued that the doctrine of DS accepts total dissolution in the state of deep sleep. What exists when all external phenomena dissolves is the Brahman alone. So the concept that there is merely the self in the state of deep sleep brings Sureśvara one step closer to the doctrine of DS:

*tathā cāharahaḥ śāstram para ātmani ceti yat |
suṣupte brahmaṇo 'nyasya nāvakāśo 'sti duḥkhinaḥ ||⁷*

Following the authoritative teaching (*śāstra*) *aharah. . .*⁸ (every day. . .) and *para ātmani. . .*⁹ (in the supreme Self. . .), there is no possibility of an other suffering [self] than Brahman [to exist] in deep sleep.

*paramātmaikavṛttirvāt kuto jīvasya saṃsṛtiḥ |
svapnasañcāravat tasmā jīvasañcāra iṣyate ||¹⁰*

How can there be transmigration of a *jīva*, since [it is] of only a function (*vṛtti*) of the supreme self? The transmigration (*sañcāra*) of the individual self, therefore, is accepted as similar to (*-vat*) movement (*sañcāra*) in a dream.

The arguments that lead to the position of DS emerge from the analysis of illustrations that demonstrate the experiencing subject having false identity about oneself. Central to these examples is the one given by Dravidācārya of a prince raised by a hunter who is not aware of his princehood. Sureśvara elaborates upon this illustration in detail in BĀUBhVā 2.1.506-17. The sentences explaining creation, according to Sureśvara, parallel the hunterhood created by the ignorance of the prince:

*mohādhyastātmanvyādhatvān mohādhyastātrekataḥ |
rājaputratvasaṃprāptau nānyat kiñcid apeksate ||
yathā tathāyaṃ brahmaiva brahmāsaṃbodhamātrataḥ |
buddhīndriyaśarīrādāv ātmatvaṃ pratīpedivān ||¹¹*

⁷ BĀUBhVā 2.1.452. Liberation in the state of deep sleep is not addressed only in certain Vedāntic texts, it appears also in Nyāya literature. For instance, *suṣuptasya svapnādarśane kleśābhāvād apavargah*. NyS 4.1.63.

⁸ CU 8.3.2, 8.3.3, 8.3.5.

⁹ PU 3.7. The same phrase occurs in the next passage, PU 3.9, with a qualifier, *akṣara* (imperishable), for the term *para* (supreme).

¹⁰ BĀUBhVā 2.1.490. Śāstri (1990) has changed *svapnasañcāra* to *svapnasaṃsāra*. The subsequent verse deals with *sañcāra*; based on this, I have favored the original. The phrase, *svapnasaṃsāra*, is more common to the later Advaita texts, e.g., PD 6.8.

¹¹ BĀUBhVā 2.1.516, 517. This is a clear example that Sureśvara advocates the notion that this is the very Brahman that transmigrates, and gets liberation, the view refuted by Maṇḍana (Śāstri 1984, 12,

As 'hunterhood' is imposed [on the prince] due to ignorance, nothing other than the removal of ignorance is required to attain 'princehood'. In the same way, [the individual self] (*ayam*) [is] the very Brahman, which, just because of not knowing [its] Brahman [nature], assumes selfhood in the intellect, sense organs, the body and so forth.

Before addressing the issue of causation, it must be discerned whether or not Sureśvara accepts any cause-effect relationship with regard to the world. The Gauḍapādiyan *Ajātivāda* negates such a possibility.¹² In the context of establishing DS, the phrase '*avidyāyonayoh*' (of the origin of ignorance [alone]) is frequently repeated. This concept of causation resonates of the Gauḍapādiyan notion that origination is perceived just due to ignorance. There must have been early Advaitins other than Gauḍapāda to think that difference is perceived due only to ignorance, as Maṇḍana's reference, '*avidyopādānabhedavādin*'¹³ (those who advocate difference of the origin of ignorance [alone]), is not from GK. The following verse confirms Sureśvara's position on the issue of causality:¹⁴

*udbhūtiṣṭhitināśāḥ syur jagato 'raḥ pratikṣaṇam |
avidyāmātraheturvān nāmīṣām vidyate kramaḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 2.1.413

As emanation, sustenance, and dissolution of the world would occur [simultaneously] in every moment, this would be caused merely by ignorance, and so there is no sequence [pertaining to] them.

Although the discussion so far clarifies most issues necessary to establish the role of Sureśvara in propounding DS, this thesis nevertheless cannot be confirmed as long as Sureśvara is not explicit with regard to the nature of 'creation' as something conceptual which eventually results with an acceptance of the momentariness of whatever is perceived. There are some instances to support this argument:

*janisṭhityapyayā hy ete jagataḥ syuḥ pratikṣaṇam |
dhiyā janayate kartā karmabhis ceti hi śrutīḥ ||*

TUBhVā 2.148

Indeed, these [states of] creation, existence, and dissolution of the world occur every moment. The *Upaniṣad*ic testimony is that the agent creates with [an instrumentality] of cognition and action and [impression] (*ādi*).

*yathā viśuddha ākāśe sahasaivābhramaṇḍalam |
bhūtvā vilīyate tadvad ātmanīhkhilam jagat ||*

1.4). Madhusūdana cites a verse elaborating this view: *svāvidyayā hi para eva sa jīvabhāvam āgārya saṁsaratī līngasamāgamenaḥ brahmaiva saṁsaratī mucyate etad eva dauvārikaṁ bhavati saṁsaraṇam tu tasya ||* ARR p. 43, ll. 35-37.

¹² See King 1995, 87-140 for detailed analysis of Gauḍapādiyan *Ajātivāda*.

¹³ BS p. 10, line 13. See also *avidyākṛtītam eva prapañcaḥ* BS p. 20, ll. 7, 8.

¹⁴ For Sureśvara's reflection upon causality elsewhere, see TUBhVā 2.140-42.

NS 2.68

Just as clusters of cloud manifest and dissolve all of a sudden in the pure sky, here, in the self, the world [appears and dissolves] in the same way.

In these lines Sureśvara is explicit that creation of the world is momentary, imagined, and reciprocal to the concepts that correspond to the external entities. These quotations suffice to establish the link of Sureśvara with DS, when DS is interpreted with *drṣṭi* as momentary instances of cognition.¹⁵

This citation further reveals Sureśvara's influence on most concepts subsequently explicated as DS. As far as an application of the term *DS-vāda* or *drṣṭisrṣṭi* is concerned, Sureśvara has not used it. The absence of the term itself in Sureśvara's texts makes the situation intriguing: If PUBh can be dated prior to Sureśvara, he probably would have been aware of the terminology applied there. As discussed in the previous chapter, Śaṅkara certainly knew of two Advaita models. However, except for the rare use of the term *drṣṭisrṣṭa* (PUBh 6.4), there is no application of DS to denote the specific thought that the term designates in later Advaita. This being the case, the most logical position would be that Advaita adapted holding multiple views, whether or not the views were designated by specific terms from its early phase. As far the position of Sureśvara is concerned, the examples discussed above have clearly demonstrated his awareness of, and inclination to, the EJ model, his adherence to the view that the very Brahman is the support of ignorance, and that the world is 'seeing only'. Besides these, the components that constitute DS, such as dissolution of the world in deep sleep, subjective nature of illusion, and *jīva* as the cause of the world, are profoundly addressed in Sureśvara's writings. These facts further strengthen the claim that the concepts identified with DS appears much earlier than previously established, with most of its constituents systematically treated by Sureśvara.

Vimuktātman¹⁶

Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭasiddhi* (IS) is the first text to defend the *dr̥mātra* ('seeing only') and *Ekajīva* concepts in detail.¹⁷ Vimuktātman considers Avyayātman as his

¹⁵ See also NS 2.69, 2.78, 2.93, 2.95, and 3.30.

¹⁶ Vimuktātman can be dated between Sureśvara and Sarvajñātman, since he quotes Sureśvara "*tad uktaṁ vārttikakāraḥ*" IS 7.29 autocommentary, "*iti vārttikakāraḥ*" IS 8.2. autocommentary, whereas Sarvajñātman quotes him "*tad uktaṁ īṣṭasiddhikāraḥ*", Pañcaprakriyā, chapter 5, Kocmarek 1985, 136.23.

There is serious disagreement among scholars whether or not Sarvajñātman was a disciple of Sureśvara; see Kocmarek 1985, 7-11. Kocmarek dates Sarvajñātman to the second half of the tenth century. Schmücker's premise that Vimuktātman lived in the first half of tenth century (Schmücker 2001, 22) does not contradict this chronology of Sarvajñātman. However, other scholars such as Hiriyana or Veezinathan in Kocmarek 1985, 7, disagree.

master, but little is known about Avyayātman.¹⁸ He seems to be philosophically inclined towards Sureśvara. Vimuktātman popularized the doctrine of *Ābhāsa* in its more systematic form of 'seeing only'. He accepted only one reality, calling it *anubhūti*, 'experience', identified with awareness. This *anubhūti* is immediately experienced in all modifications of knowledge, there being no difference in the cognitive triad of perceiver, perceiving, and the object of perception. The prominence Vimuktātman gives to the issues of *Ābhāsa* raised by Sureśvara contributes to the development of DS thought to the extent that his discussion validates the arguments common to DS. He pays more attention to refuting the difference between what is seen and seeing itself, and to the denial of the establishment of identity, arguing that the establishment of identity presupposes the establishment of difference. Śrīharṣa's writings reveal the influence of Vimuktātman with regard to the development of the Vedānta doctrine of 'awareness only' (*saṁvinmātra*) through self-confirmation of awareness and through refusal of all the other possible categories suggested in other doctrines in order to refute difference, and by refuting the definitions of difference. In turn, Vimuktātman's doctrine of *dr̥mātra* reflects a significant influence by Sureśvara. Actually, Vimuktātman gave a concise, systematic structure of the doctrine that Sureśvara propounded, and this structure underpins the voluminous *Vārtika* literature. Vimuktātman pays significant attention to establishing each of the following: consciousness as 'seeing only', the indeterminable nature of ignorance, and the solitary nature of self-experience. Vimuktātman makes no direct reference to Padmapāda throughout his text, nor does he follow Maṇḍana while refuting difference, which shows that these contemporary Advaita masters had relatively little influence on his establishment of *anubhūti* or 'immediately experienced awareness alone'.

In developing his theory of error, however, Vimuktātman has also utilized the concept as developed by Maṇḍana. He initiates a discussion about error in the very first chapter of IS, immediately after discussing the nature of pure awareness; and this discussion extends to the fifth chapter of the text. Composed after the *Vibhramaviveka* of Maṇḍana,¹⁹ *Iṣṭasiddhi* is the second in the history of Advaita to address the nature of error and to analyze aspects of ignorance. This connection demonstrates the importance of a study of the influence of Maṇḍana on Vimuktātman, which is essential to solving the issues of epistemology in Advaita.²⁰

¹⁷ For further discussion upon the thought of Vimuktātman, see P. K. Sundaram 1968, 1980, 1982, and Schmücker 2001. Sudhāpāśūkekhara identifies the *Ekajīva* view criticized in *Darśana-sarvasva* with DS. See *Darśanasarvasva* P. 467, line 30.

¹⁸ The colophon in *Iṣṭasiddhi* reads as '... śrīmatparamahaṃsaparivrajakācāryasya śrīmad-avyayātmanahagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya vimuktātmahagavataḥ . . . ' in support of the notion that Avyayātman is the teacher of Vimuktātman.

¹⁹ Schmithausen 1965. Schmithausen not only analyzes this text, but also has established a correct reading of the fragments that he had collected.

²⁰ Even classical philosophers had difficulties in assigning provenance, particularly the views of Maṇḍana and Vimuktātman. Concerning origination of phenomenal world, *Vivaraṇa* presents four opinions already developed within the Advaita school of Śaṅkara, two of which are similar. The first concept accepts that individual selves manifest as Brahman in the form of the world, with ignorance belonging to the individual selves. The appearance of oneness is due to similarity, like the perception of two

The models of illusion developed by Sureśvara and Maṇḍana are similar enough to label as subjective; however, Maṇḍana accepts the plurality of the subjects which are the locus of ignorance, whereas for Sureśvara, it is Brahman itself that assumes subjecthood as the support of ignorance. *Jīvahood*, for Sureśvara, originates with Brahman due to ignorance located in Brahman. Vimuktātman defends the position that Brahman itself is the support of ignorance, and that the self-experience is not multiple when it is Brahman itself that experiences transmigration. Vimuktātman deals with this issue in the last three chapters (6-8) of *Iṣṭasiddhi*.²¹ These facts align Vimuktātman's philosophy more closely to DS, particularly the model suggested by Madhusūdana, which is equated with EJ.

Despite Vimuktātman's defense of the singularity of subject and of *dr̥mātra* (seeing only) he nowhere identifies his model as *DS-vāda*. He rarely uses *dr̥ṣṭimātra* (seeing only) (IS 25), while his favorite term is *dr̥mātra*, or just *dr̥ṣ*, which occurs repeatedly in the discussion dealing with awareness (*anubhūti*).

However, there is a long tradition linking Vimuktātman with DSE. While Pratyakṣvarūpa, in his *Nayanaprasādini* commentary on TP, assigns the EJ concept to Vimuktātman,²² Anubhūtiśvarūpa, in his commentary on IS, offers a full and detailed refutation of this opinion that Vimuktātman followed the EJ doctrine.²³ Clearly, when Anubhūtiśvarūpa refuted this premise, there was the already-established opinion that Vimuktātman followed EJ. Anubhūtiśvarūpa adds in his comments that the model of EJ doctrine which admits that the solitary awareness that attains *jīvahood* while being a single *Jīva* is acceptable; however, if EJ is interpreted differently, then that is merely

moons as perceived by many. In terms of its inherent nature (*svarūpa*), Brahman is mentioned as the cause, a view that seems closer to Maṇḍana. The next view accepts that Brahman itself, due to ignorance, appears (*vivartate*) in the form of the world, like a dream. Here the problem is to clarify the differences between these two views and to trace their histories and interrelationships. When comparing these two positions, Viṣṇubhaṭṭa (PPV 174-175) comments that two functions of ignorance are accepted, that of veiling the object of cognition and veiling only cognition. DS, in his opinion, is the position that accepts only the veiling of cognition, since there are no entities to correspond to cognition. Vidyāraṇya's VPS clarifies this to some extent, but he seems to have assigned these views to their respective authors without full analysis of the text. The first can be clearly attributed to Maṇḍana, while the second belongs to Vimuktātman. The rest of this chapter is simply reproduced by Vidyāraṇya from the *Vivaraṇa*. However, assigning *svarūpāpekṣayā ca brahma sarvajagatkāraṇam* (Brahman itself is the cause of all world with regard to its form), to Vidyāraṇya's position reflects a misunderstanding: the whole sequence of four opinions bears four differentiating terms in the *Vivaraṇa*, separated by the terms *kecit*, *anye*, *apare* and *matāntaram*. According to Vidyāraṇya, the last two terms, *apare* and *matāntaram*, belong to the last opinion. Vidyāraṇya's attributions remain problematic, as both views are ascribed to Maṇḍana, whereas the four distinctive terms have not been properly analyzed. Actually, those who consider Brahman as the cause of the world, following the *svarūpa* side, belong to Maṇḍana's school. This view attributed to Vimuktātman is generally considered as DS. In this way, *Ābhāsa* is relatively closer to the DS.

²¹ This is covered in the author's study on *Ābhāsa*, currently in progress.

²² *ekajīvavādibhir apy ayam artho 'ngikriyata ity āha - Iṣṭasiddhi*. *Nayanaprasādini* commentary on *Tatvaprādīpikā*, Yogīndranānda ed., p.592.

²³ *IS-vivaraṇa* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. Quoted in Revathy, 1990, pp. 365-366.

a 'doctrine imagined for self-satisfaction' (*tuṣṭivāda*).²⁴ This position, instead of refuting the EJ concept, further confirms that two possible models of EJ were known to Anubhūtiśvarūpa. It can be argued that Anubhūtiśvarūpa is referring to an earlier commentary upon IS when presenting contrasting opinions about EJ. Along the line of this argument, Jñānottama, while commenting upon IS, explicitly states that diversity is experienced due to ignorance pertaining to a single *Jīva*.²⁵ In Anu bhūtiśvarūpa's commentary on MU, he gives a gloss of his own refutation of this view.²⁶ Here, he rejects this view as belonging at all to the Vedāntas, stating that 'the doctrine of a single self suffering in the world is interpolated by worshippers of Tripurā, or Śālagrāma (stone) who oppose Advaita instruction'.²⁷ This criticism links the origin of EJ with the Vaiṣṇava tradition.

Following Vimuktātman, 'seeing' (*dṛg*) is awareness, free from modifications, free from difference, and beyond the triad of cognizer, cognition, and the object of cognition. This *dṛg* in its true form is the very self, and this is immediately perceived in all modes of perception. However, perceiving this awareness-in-itself is not sensory, as this cognizes even the senses. This is the immediate self-experience, which is solitary. Since this is only what is truly known, only the solitary self is what is immediately cognized, free from modifications. With this understanding of '*dṛṣṭi*', it is not an illusory perception manifesting and collapsing in each moment but rather it is the constant awareness-in-itself.

Śrīharṣa²⁸

Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* (KhKh) is counted as one of the three major texts in 'the higher path' (*mahā-prasthāna*)²⁹ in later Advaita. Due to its logical structure and pithy style, this book has remained cryptic, and some have even considered

²⁴ *sarvasya ca jīvasya cinnātralakṣaṇatvāt ekaḥ paraḥ ciddhātuh upādhiṣu jīvo bhavet | etādṛśaḥ ayam ekajīvanvāda Iṣṭasiddhikṛtā iṣṭaḥ anyas tuṣṭivāda iti santoṣṭavyam | IS-vivarāṇa. Quoted in Revathy 1990, 260. This citation relies upon the information given in the New Catalogus Catalogorum II, 260-261.*

²⁵ *ekajīvanvidyākalpitānekajīvanbhāvād ityārthaḥ | Vivarāṇa of Jñānottama in IS 6.19.*

²⁶ Anubhūtiśvarūpa in GK 3.3 See Shastri 1979, 282.

²⁷ *dṛṣṭidvayabahiṣkṛtas tv ayam ekasaṅsārivādaḥ traipurāsālagrāmādyarcanaparaiḥ brahma-vidyāparāṇmukhair utprekṣita ity upekṣaṇīyam Anubhūtiśvarūpa in GK 3.3. See Shastri 1979, 282-283.*

²⁸ Śrīharṣa is generally dated circa 1125-1180 CE. See Granoff 1978, 1-2.

²⁹ The construction of *Laghū-prasthāna* or 'short path', and *Mahā-prasthāna* or 'long path,' is very popular in Śaṅkara's monasteries. BS, BG, *Upaniṣads* fall under the first, in which Śaṅkara's commentary is also available; whereas by *Mahāprasthāna* three texts, KhKh, TP, and AS, are understood. This division must have occurred very much later. The list includes the text of Madhusūdana of the later 16th century. No textual reference is provided for this traditional stance.

Śrīharṣa as a *vaitanḍika*³⁰ that avoids establishing any thesis. Some dualists label all of Advaita as *vitanḍā*, but in the case of Śrīharṣa, this title is given by classical and modern scholars in a broader context. The KhKh embraces a DS-like approach towards categories as essentially 'not there'; and so, whether Śrīharṣa's effort actually 'lacking the establishment of one's own position' (*svapakṣasthāpanāśūnyaḥ*) needs to be settled. Among the three methodologies that Naiyāyikas have proposed, *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitanḍā*, Śrīharṣa places himself in the first category, which is considered to be a discussion undertaken only for the purpose of determining the truth (Granoff 1978, 205).

Concerning Śrīharṣa's doctrine, he posits a single thesis: only awareness exists, and that is self-confirmed, because this awareness-in-itself is independent of any other means of validation. Śrīharṣa also uses the self-luminosity of consciousness as the essence of self-validation. In this regard, Śrīharṣa follows the arguments of Sureśvara and Vimuktātman; however, he does not substantially address the ontological issues of an 'awareness only'. For Śrīharṣa, even self-awareness does not exist outside of pure 'consciousness only'. In this way, he is little concerned with the issues of bondage, liberation, and so forth.

The doctrine of 'awareness only', as accepted in different Advaita doctrines, has caused some confusion among scholars. The issues concerning the self-luminosity of consciousness, and the self-validation of this principle as applied in different idealistic philosophies had remained a subject of debate, even in the classical period of Indian philosophy. Phyllis Granoff, who has studied Śrīharṣa in the most systematic way from a modern scholarly perspective, has argued that Śrīharṣa is doctrinally closer to the Kashmiri Śaivites than to classic Vedānta writers (Granoff 1978, 49). There are several arguments supporting this view, and all need to be revised in light of the present study of the 'consciousness only' (*saṁvinnātra*) or 'seeing only' (*dṛṣṭimātra*) doctrine. This doctrine negates the possibility of any category other than *saṁvit* itself. The assertion is dubious that, since Abhinavagupta and Śrīharṣa have the same thesis to prove, Śrīharṣa was influenced by Abhinavagupta.³¹ A close investigation reveals that it is Vimuktātman whose thought influenced Śrīharṣa to posit 'consciousness alone' as a thesis that refutes all other categories suggested by realists. Sureśvara and Vimuktātman go to great lengths to refute 'difference', taking for granted that refuting difference is the only way to establish Advaita. As Vimuktātman has pointed out, even to establish identity leads to the Sautrāntika view. The approach of negation resonates with Nāgārjuna, but in such comparisons, the doctrine of 'consciousness only' must be taken into account. The influence of Vimuktātman manifests in Śrīharṣa's thesis and in the structure of his arguments. Vimuktātman is the first philosopher to establish consciousness-only with arguments refuting the philosophical categories acceptable to realists. His consciousness-only is 'experience' (*anubhūti*),

³⁰ For *vitanḍā* and *vaitanḍika*, see Granoff 1978, 204-208.

³¹ Granoff 1978, 209, translation note 1.

which is the canvas of the world picture.³² The project of Śrīharṣa in his KhKh is apparently to reconfirm the doctrine of *anubhūti* or *saṃvit* alone, adopting Vimuktātman's arguments in order to refute Udayana's theses.³³

Another concern of the present work is to address the nature of knowledge: i.e., whether objective knowledge is self-validated, or revealed by the witnessing consciousness. Significantly, the proponents of the *Ābhāsa* doctrine posit that objective knowledge is revealed by the witnessing consciousness. However, this self-revealing nature of objective knowledge has led Granoff to conclude that Śrīharṣa's argument is closer to the arguments in the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school and with the writings of Abhinavagupta. The first part of her argument is untenable: namely, that in both systems knowledge is self-revealing in its objective cognition. However, the self-validating nature of awareness remains difficult to assign to any particular historical figure, as can be seen through the texts such as the *Jyotiṛbrāhmaṇa* chapter in the BĀU. Yogācāra Buddhists, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, Trika Śaivas, and early Vaiṣṇavas like Vāmanadatta, all accept the self-validating nature of awareness, with the difference among them being their respective understanding of the nature of 'knowledge' itself. Yogācārins reject the existence of objectless knowledge while accepting that knowledge is self-reflexive, as do Prābhākaras, primarily Śālikanātha Mīśra. The issue of the creative aspect of awareness (*pratibhā*) is addressed by Trika Śaivas, mainly by Somānanda and Utpala, whose writings influenced the exegesis of Abhinavagupta. All of these, of course, have similar expressions; but their philosophy has a great divergence in the minor details, making each idealistic philosophy different from the other. Śrīharṣa does not regard *saṃvit* or *anubhūti* as the constantly pulsating, autonomous *saṃvit* accepted by the Trikas. It is not the essential nature of awareness to appear as many, since plurality, in terms of Śrīharṣa, has never been cognized. When nothing other than consciousness is confirmed, how can plurality be proved? All Advaitins agree that plurality is caused by ignorance, while Śrīharṣa is explicit in its application to immediate experience. All the philosophers advocating *Ābhāsa* agree upon this issue. 'Awareness only', as depicted in this stream of Advaita philosophy, is the non-pulsating form of awareness, and the ground of all cognitive

³² *yānubhūtiṛ ajāmāyānantāmānandavigrahā | mahad-ādijaganmāyācitrabhinīṇamāmi tām || IS 1.1.* This benedictory verse is comparable with the first two Sūtras of *Pratyabhi-jñāhṛdaya* (PH): *citūḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhiheru, and svechayā svabhītau viśvam unmilayati* PH 1-2.

Most striking is the metaphor of a canvas for consciousness, asserting this as the foundation of the world, compared with a picture. My argument is not to compare these two authors in order to claim influence of one over the other, but to demonstrate the similarity of *Ābhāsa* in the schools of Trika Śaiva and Advaita Vedānta. The metaphor of *citra* is commonly found in Advaita texts; a good example is the *Citrādīpa* chapter of Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī*. See PD 6. 1-6, 6.8-9. This example of painting can also be found in LAS: 10.402, 416, 432.

³³ There is a traditional conviction that Udayana defeated and humiliated Śrīkara, the father of Śrīharṣa, in logical debate. This led Śrīharṣa to resolve to defeat Udayana. Since Udayana was already dead by the time of Śrīharṣa, he proceeded to categorically refute Udayana's arguments in his KhKh. Although there is no historical evidence to support this story, it is nonetheless visible from the writings of Śrīharṣa that he was categorically refuting the theses of Udayana.

modes. Consciousness never comes to construction, although it is always solitary consciousness that is misunderstood as the world. Śrīharṣa, like Vimuktātman, when establishing *cimātra*, or *dr̥mātra*, defines even objective awareness as exclusively 'awareness only' in what is its true nature. This conclusion is reached by refuting both difference and identity in an object and the cognition thereof. When difference is refuted in its totality, what remains unchallenged is 'awareness' alone. If this is 'seeing-in-itself' (*dr̥ṣṭimātra*), then there is no room even for doubt to arise in this non-dual nature. Varadapaṇḍita's assertion that 'all the instances of knowledge are pure 'awareness only'' is the Vedānta doctrine which comes close to *dr̥ṣṭimātra* doctrine, even though a confusion had arisen from classical times as to whether this concept corresponds to the Buddhist Yogācāra doctrine.³⁴

This study also addresses the nature of difference and identity. Vedāntins have made major efforts to refute difference rather than to establish identity, whereas the Trika tradition admits identity, accepting that pulsation of consciousness manifests the existence of the world.³⁵ The epistemological twist given to the Vedāntic stance by Maṇḍana covers the issue of avoiding identity while refuting difference. This has led several Nyāya thinkers to postulate that Advaitins did not have a thesis of their own, but rather, were concerned with refuting other doctrines. However, they misrepresent the point of Advaita: if identity is admitted, the existence of difference will be indirectly confirmed. Nonetheless this, as well as the arguments concerning the self-evidence of awareness, is not the original concept of Śrīharṣa, but rather of Sureśvara as understood and elaborated by Vimuktātman, on whom Śrīharṣa relies. So, to fully understand this issue, the writings of Śrīharṣa need to be studied in light of the position of Sureśvara and Vimuktātman. Śrīharṣa's position of extreme non-dualism certainly has some similarities with the Trika tradition, particularly with regard to all instances of awareness as pure, and the existence of this 'awareness only'.³⁶ However, this concept is commonly found in the Advaita literature, from the *Ābhāsa* ideas of Śaṅkara's US to the systematic *Ābhāsa* doctrine of 'consciousness-only' as propounded by Sureśvara, with some specific problems as treated by Vimuktātman. Because of this genealogy, the issue of the influence of the Trika tradition needs to be readdressed, from the perspective that the *Ābhāsa* doctrine of Trika tradition contains some key concepts derived from the Advaita of Sureśvara. Historically speaking, Sureśvara predates even Somānanda, the first author of such a philosophical treatise in the Trika Śaiva tradition of Kashmir.

Śrīharṣa and Abhinavagupta definitely agree when explaining the nature of knowledge in all forms. The former, Śrīharṣa, accepts knowledge as *ghaṭapaṭādyātmaka* (of the form of pot and cloth), and the latter, Abhinavagupta, denies an ontologically independent object as different from cognition, (*jñānād vibhinno na hi kaścid arthaḥ*) (*Paramārthacarcā*, p. 4). But for Śrīharṣa, these forms are accepted as 'a figure of

³⁴ Granoff 1978, 221, footnote 52.

³⁵ Though there are instances of *spanda* in GK, the *spanda* there is that of mind, rather than of the divine nature. For example: *citaspaṇḍitam evedaṃ grāhyagrāhakaḥ eḍvayan* | GK 4.72.

To compare this with several similar expressions, see Granoff 1978, 231-233, footnote 103.

speech' (*upacāra*), as he rejects diversity in the very first level. Rejection of difference is the major argument throughout the whole of his text. While it is true that both accept consciousness-only, for Abhinavagupta, consciousness itself is manifest in all forms by its own inherent power, whereas for the other, there is no diversity, and since difference does not exist, there is no point in searching for its cause. Therefore, if someone nonetheless perceives difference, it is his ignorance. In accepting such monism, it is problematic to link Śrīharṣa with Abhinava, especially since there is an *Ābhāsa* school, propounded by Sureśvara and Vimuktātman, whose influence on Śrīharṣa can be traced in several aspects.

One point certainly warrants a remark: Abhinavagupta clearly defines "*advaita*" as that which establishes oneness in consciousness and its objects, and is therefore beyond the access of all minds.³⁷ Time and again, when *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* is considered as a *pakṣa* (view-point), it is identified as a doctrine for meditative purposes. However, the teachings of two different doctrines, aiming at different qualifications of seekers, cannot unite Śrīharṣa's thought with Abhinavagupta's. Historical analysis of the philosophical idea of 'seeing only', starting from the materials of the VP and concluding with the systematic doctrines, especially those of the rise and culmination of *Ābhāsa*, from the US of Śaṅkara, Sureśvara's texts, to Vimuktātman's doctrine, shows that, though scattered, there was one specific stream of thought which is now being studied. It has already been explained that Śaṅkara was aware of 1) two different methods for instructing Advaita, and 2) that 'consciousness-only' can be taught only to the highly advanced mind. This becomes all the more explicit when examining both Amarānanda's and Madhusūdana's writings. Śrīharṣa's defense of a single category of the self-aware nature of consciousness throughout the KhKh while dedicating the rest of the entire text to refutation of the categories of the dualists reconfirms his inclination towards the existence of and perception of the singular nature of awareness.

It is worthwhile to trace the influence of the *Ābhāsa* doctrine of Vedānta on the Trika doctrine. One of the most striking elements of the doctrine is found in the refutation of difference (*bheda*), which has remained one of the central chapters in the writings of Maṇḍana, Sureśvara, and Vimuktātman.³⁸ More precisely, the refutation of *bheda* in Abhinavagupta's writings is not from the pure ontic perspective, but rather from the epistemological analysis of cognition and its object. This analysis reveals a consequence in accepting difference in the empirical world.³⁹ These two strata alone — the non-existence of difference in an absolute sense and the continuation of difference in the state of ignorance — are the core of the Vedānta doctrine of two re-

³⁷ Abhinavagupta's commentary to the BG 7.11.

³⁸ Gauḍapāda accepts difference as located inside - GK 2.4, but the use of *bheda* in plural, as in *antah-sthānāt tu bhedānām* . . . GK 2.4; and in *bhedānām hi samavēna* - GK 2.5, corresponds to entities distinct from each other, rather than 'difference' as such. Gauḍapāda correlates this *bheda* with *vikalpa*, GK 2.11, or mental construction.

³⁹ Granoff draws parallels between the concepts of difference as advocated by Śrīharṣa and Abhinavagupta. See Granoff 1978, 248, footnote 162. This needs to be analyzed in light of the doctrine of Sureśvara and Vimuktātman.

alities. These distinctions can be traced to Ādiśeṣa, whose *Paramārthasāra* is based upon Vedāntic doctrine of Advaita thought and not upon the Trika tradition. It bears Vaiṣṇava elements, which is not in line with the Trika Śaivas; yet, Abhinavagupta's love for this text was so high that he imitated the re-composition of this text by changing the Vaiṣṇava elements to Śaiva elements, thus giving a Trika appearance to Vedānta. To further strengthen the argument that the nuances of *Ābhāsa* are not entirely original to the Kashmiri Śaiva doctrine, it can be noted that Abhinavagupta re-composed the text of Ādiśeṣa to include many of the elements of *Ābhāsa*, changing the terms that had linked with Vaiṣṇava tradition to Śaivite elements. Apparently, he lacked such texts in his own theological tradition.

It is more likely that the Advaita teachings based on 'Two Realities' may have initially begun with the assertion that there is one reality and whatever differs from this is 'false'. The doctrine of analyzing existence in two degrees of reality predates the method that examines reality in three degrees. Some technical terms, for example, the use of Ādiśeṣa's title *paramārtha* for that which is absolutely real, or Śrīharṣa's *samvṛtisattva*,⁴⁰ show intimacy with the Mādhyamika approach to interpreting reality.⁴¹

It is not reasonable to accept the line traditionally maintained by the opponents of Advaita that Śrīharṣa was a *Vaitaṇḍika*, having no thesis to prove,⁴² because Śrīharṣa made a great effort to establish the doctrine of 'awareness only'. If 'awareness only' were not a doctrine, then the whole of DS-*vāda* shrinks to mere *vitaṇḍā*, and 'consciousness-only' or 'seeing only' becomes a mere name of a contentless thought, showing contingencies in other doctrines while lacking its own central thesis. However, this is not the case. The Vedānta of *Ābhāsa* that subsequently survived in the form of DS is fundamentally the doctrine that there exists awareness alone. This Vedānta of two realities negates the reality of all the other categories.

Mokṣopāyaśāstra/Yogavāsiṣṭha

The position of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in the history of Indian philosophy is extremely complex. This text, although based on Advaita doctrine, came to be acknowledged within the scholastic Advaita Vedānta tradition only much later. The text in its early phase seems to have had a different name: *Mokṣopāyaśāstra*, which subsequently became known as *Yogavāsiṣṭha-Mokṣopāyaśāstra*, popularly *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (YV).⁴³

⁴⁰ Granoff 1978, 250, line 1.

⁴¹ The early Mahāyāna texts, such as *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkā*, and *Samādhirāja* apply two truths to interpret reality: *paramārtha* and *samvṛti*. Nāgārjuna rectifies the possibility of realizing the instruction of the Buddha without being aware of the distinction between *samvṛti* and *paramārtha*. *Mādhyamakakārikā*, XXIV 9.

⁴² As, for instance, Granoff does. See Granoff 1978, 249, line 19-20, Footnote 162.

⁴³ Slaje, 2000b. Studies by Walter Slaje and J. Hanneder on this text reveal that the text has undergone several reconstructions. For dating MÜS, see Hanneder 2005, 35-50.

Dated to the first half of tenth century, this text is commonly accepted in the Advaita tradition as one of the major texts for instruction (Hanneder 2004). In a much-later tradition among the Śaṅkara Mathas, YV is considered as a *prasthāna* (path) of learning Vedānta, complete in itself. YV appears in the mainstream of Advaita after the time of Vidyāraṇya. Recognized as a primary text of direct instruction, YV tallies with most of the nuances of *Ābhāsa* and DS. The essential doctrine of YV gives a unique picture of 'consciousness-only'⁴⁴ and among the sub-schools within Advaita, the model of *Ābhāsa* suggested by Sureśvara and Vimuktātman is comparatively closer to YV. However, the text does not tally with any specific model in total and so is original in its philosophy. For instance, while explaining two degrees of reality, or accepting the phenomenal world as mere appearance, the text tallies with *Ābhāsa*; yet when interpreting the plurality of *jīvas*, more closely aligns with the model of Advaita suggested by Maṇḍana. Nevertheless, texts such as GK, US, *Paramārthasāra*, ŚŚ, or the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* and the *Mānasollāsa* thereon, popular among the Śaṅkara-Muṭts are conceptually closer to MUŚ/YV. Later scholastic Advaita texts such as the *Aṣṭāvakra-gītā* and *Tripurārahasya-Jñānakhaṇḍa* are also stylistically and thematically related to the YV. 'Consciousness-only', for YV, is the doctrine of all doctrines; it is a meta-doctrine which is the presupposition for whatever doctrine is established (Slaje, 1993). Even though YV does not refer to DS as a *vāda* (doctrine), it is the first text to extensively explain DS, including the terminology.

This text gives direct reference to *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* several times. The use of *dr̥ṣṭi* or *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* in YV is analyzed in this study (section 3, chapter 8), which focuses on defining the term *dr̥ṣṭi*. It is not the purpose of this study to read the entire MUŚ/YV, but rather to trace the exact passages that illustrate the concept of DS.⁴⁵ Analysis of the selected references is meant to clarify the issues that concern the doctrine of DS within the broader perspective of Advaita. This research also aims to explore all pos-

⁴⁴ A few examples from select chapters can demonstrate the frequency in which this concept occurs in YV:

- asti cinmātram amalam anantākāśarūpi yat* | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 138.29.
sāntaṃ cinmātrasannmātram brahmaivedaṃ jagadvapuḥ | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 138. 34.
vijñaptimātradehās te na teṣāṃ janmakarmaṇī | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 142.24.
viśuddhājñānadehās te sarvātmānaḥ sadā sthitaḥ | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 142.25.
 ... *jīvanāṃ tathā cinmātrarūpiṇām* | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 142.40.
cinmātram ajaraṃ sāntam ekam evāmalaṃ sthitam | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 143.21
ciccamaikāramātre 'smin sargābhe bhūvarūpiṇī | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 143.30.
citi cetanānābīdyaṃ tathā sarga upasthitam | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 143.32.
saṃvidānā svayaṃ cūtvād dehaṃ veti kham eva khe | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 143.39.
ekaṃ tathā ca cinmātram svapne lakṣātmā tiṣṭhati | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 144.21.
cīdvayomi svapnasaṃvīrtir yā saiva jagad ucyate | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 144.22.
cīdvayoma saṃvinmātram yat paramāṇuvad ātatam | anādimādhyaparyantaṃ tad eva jagad ucyate ||
 YV Nirvāṇa 2, 144.25.
cinmātra eva bhuvanaṃ tvam ahaṃ cinmayaṃ jagat | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 144.27.
cinmātraparamāṇuḥ saī jagadātmāpy ayaṃ nabhaḥ | YV Nirvāṇa 2, 144.29.

⁴⁵ The electronic version of part of the MUŚ made this search possible, thanks to J. Hanneder for his generous effort.

sible understandings of the nuances that constitute DS as a specific model within the school of scholastic Advaita.

Several nuances of DS appear to constitute the core of the philosophy of YV. Since DS itself does not give a single picture, it is not the intention of the present author to reduce YV to an exposition of the DS concept alone. Nonetheless, the entire YV does reflect the broader doctrine of *Ābhāsa*. It may be that DS was one of the original arguments used to establish *Ābhāsa*, as this model of Advaita remains comparatively closer to all versions of MUŚ/YV and LYV. Subsequent philosophers of rival schools challenged the arguments of *Ābhāsa* as the sole Advaita doctrine. It is significant to find this conceptual intimacy of YV with the writings on *Ābhāsa*. A further element that brings YV closer to the scholastic Advaita thought of DS and elements of the *Ābhāsa* doctrine is its adherence to the arguments of the Yogācāra and Vi-jñānavāda Buddhist philosophers. Nevertheless, as this study argues time and again, a portion of a text cannot be separated from the entire body of the text and interpreted in a way that contradicts the ground philosophy that constitutes the entire text as one single unit. Following this argument, the texts mentioned above that follow the *Ābhāsa* doctrine need to be interpreted in agreement with the ground philosophy of Advaita Vedānta.

Originally, DS was not formulated only as a doctrine following a single *Jīva*.⁴⁶ The dichotomy of the real *Jīva* and false empirical beings persists in two distinct models of DS: if *Hiraṇyagarbha* is the single *Jīva*, instances of subjective awareness are *Jīvas*, and if the very empirical subjective awareness is the solitary *Jīva*, other similar instances are the appearance of the self (*Jīvābhāsa*). Following the second model, the world is merely a figment of one single perceiving mind. However, following the first model, the world is an imagination of the 'Golden Womb' (*Hiraṇyagarbha*) or the collective mind.⁴⁷ Both instructions fall under DS, yet YV seems to place emphasis upon the plurality of perceiving subjects, or the first model under consideration. The dream analogy has two distinct meanings in YV: the simultaneity of the appearance of entities and their existence, and the existence of only concepts, devoid of a corresponding external object.

Very few direct references to DS exist in all of the Advaita texts. For this reason it has been essential to link these instances together to establish a system for understanding this doctrine. Following are the select examples crucial for understanding DS as understood in MUŚ/YV.

MUŚ posits that creation is the perception of Brahmā or Prajāpati, which occurs when plurality is conceived:

⁴⁶ I have left *jīva* untranslated, as the term does not appear to be providing the same meaning when used by different philosophers even within the same Advaita school.

⁴⁷ The primary instances sufficient to support the concept that accepts *prajāpati* as the initial mind to envision the world are: YV 4.3.2-3; 3.2.45. This *prajāpati* is *vijñānaghana* YV 4.2.23; or *vijñānātman* 3.2.45; *svayambhū* 3.2.45, 51, 52. This is *manas* which is equated with *prajāpati* YV 3.2.54; 3.3.1; 3.3.25; 3.3.33, 34, 35; 3.4.45; or *citta* equated with *Prajāpati* 3.3.11, 13, 20.

sṛṣṭayo dṛṣṭayo brāhmyo nānātāmananāmakāḥ |⁴⁸

All creations are what Brahmā sees, having the nature of mutually constricting manifoldness.

This point supports the EJ model that accepts Hiranyagarbha as the solitary self imagining the world.

Another element found in both MUS/YV and the *Ābhāsa* writings is the position that the foundation of phenomenal appearance is existence (*sat*) alone. This concept of *sat* distinguishes the specific Advaita models under consideration from the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) or the momentary *vijñāna* as upheld by the Vijñānavādins. This *sat*-only is, nonetheless, called a void (*vyoman*) due to the non-existence of all that have name and form in this core principle. All conceptualizations, or sensory perceptions are found in this very ground-awareness:

sarvaṃ sat tac ca niḥśūnyaṃ na kiñcid iva saṃsthitam |
tatra vyomni vibhāntīmā nijā bhāso 'nga dṛṣṭayaḥ ||⁴⁹

All is being [only], entirely empty, there as if almost nothing. In that void [of existence], these perceptions which appear are subjective manifestations.⁵⁰

The very popular example of Vasubandhu, where the hair-bundle is perceived, occurs in MUS while interpreting creation by comparing it to false perception which is inborn with eye-disease:

yathā taimirikākṣasya sahaḥ eva dṛṣṭayaḥ |
keṣoṇḍukādivad bhānti tathemās tatra sṛṣṭayaḥ ||⁵¹

As one having eyes suffering from eye disease, the perceptions [which are] entirely innate appear in the form of a hair-bundle and so on; in the same way these creations [appear] in that [void] {*tatra*}.

Significantly, Sureśvara also favors this example.⁵² Amarānanda borrows this example from Sureśvara in order to discuss the DS concept.⁵³

Although MUS repeats time and again the notion that the objective phenomena do not exist in reality and appear merely due to ignorance, nevertheless, the concept of creation in MUS is difficult to link with that found in texts that follow the *Ābhāsa*

⁴⁸ MUS *Nirvāna* 6.206.10.

⁴⁹ MUS *Sūhiti* 4.31.33. The YV [*Sūhiti* 4.31.33] reads this as: *sarvaṃ sātamaṃ ca niḥśūnyaṃ na kiñcid iva saṃsthitam | tatra vyomni vibhāntīmā nijā bhāso 'nga dṛṣṭayaḥ* ||. The major difference is the reading *dṛṣṭaya* in MUS, whereas it reads *sṛṣṭaya* in YV. The interchangeability of *dṛṣṭi* and *sṛṣṭi* may have caused this amendment.

⁵⁰ *nijā bhāsaḥ*; this understanding remains unproblematic even when read as *nijābhāsa*.

⁵¹ MUS *Sūhiti* 4.31.34. YV reads the second line of this verse as: *keṣoṇḍrakādivad bhānti tathemās tatra dṛṣṭayaḥ* || Here, the verse repeats *dṛṣṭi* twice, probably not the way it was composed.

⁵² NS 2.95. Also compare with NS 3.30.

⁵³ NS 3.30 cited in SYPP 3.13.

model of the Advaita philosophy. The following instance suggests that 'creation' is merely 'unfolding' that which is dormant to awareness-in-itself:

prasāraṇāt pradṛṣyante sṛṣṭayo 'ntarगतās citāḥ |

MUS 6.131.87

By the projection of consciousness, creations that are inside [of it] come into appearance.

Following this perspective, it may be argued that plurality or creation is dormant to the ground-consciousness and is constantly unfolding-enfolding on this very ground.

In agreement with the citation above, MUS presents that 'creation' and '*sat*-only' are like the relationship of parts to the whole: as the whole pervades all its parts, this being-in-itself encompasses all that is creation.

ananyāvayavavyāptir yathāvayavini śhītā |
ananyā sṛṣṭir ābhāti tathānavayave śive ||

MUS 6.179.26

As there is a pervasion of the whole by [its] parts [which are] not different, in the same way creation, [being] not different, pervades the indivisible *śiva*-nature.⁵⁴

In both of these examples discussed above, ground-consciousness or being-in-itself are not mutually exclusive, neither is it essential for creation to unfold for reality to be recognized.

The discussion above has revealed that creation is 'perception' or viewing alone. A citation clarifies that the subject of this perception, the creator, is the *jīva*. This instance gives an alternative perspective of Hiranyagarbha as being both the agent of perception and the creator. This creation of the *jīva* is 'inside' or mental, not actually 'out there', or phenomenal:

sṛṣṭi(m) paśyati jīvo 'ntaḥ . . ||

MUS 6.179.28

A subject perceives creation within [himself].

Although the creation is actually 'inside', it appears as if 'out there':

anyatrānyatra tasyātha dṛṣṭayo 'nyās tathaiva khe |
kacanty asaṅkhyā dūrasthā mitho dṛṣṭāmasṛṣṭayaḥ ||

MUS 6.237.49

Now in the same way, innumerable creations — the perceptions of the self {*tasya*}, which, in essence, are mutually perceived — appear here and elsewhere [as] the 'other' in the void, [as if] located at a distance.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ This *śiva* nature is not to be confused with Śiva nature, the divine nature as propounded in the Trika tradition. Instead, '*śiva* nature' is a common term to express the highest state of absolute stillness; see *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* 1.2.

⁵⁵ Here the passage is open as to whether the term '*tasya*' is to be understood as referring to Prajāpati the meta-subject, or to the empirical subject. In most instances, YV accepts the *Prajāpati* model of

There is nothing except for void where the creation appears. Although the external world is mentioned in terms of void (*kha*, *vyoman*), this is not identical with the Mādhyaṃika position, as these passages do not reject the foundational existence lawareness principle.

The following verse confirms the same thesis, that 'awareness' is the foundation of all that shines forth:

*citi cārucamatkāraṃ camatkurvanti yat svataḥ |
svacamatkṛtayo 'naḥsthās tad etāḥ sṛṣṭīdr̥ṣṭayaḥ ||*

MUŚ 6.249.61

When the inner self-experience spontaneously relishes the *cāru* experience within consciousness, then these [become] the perceptions that are the created world.

The following verse confirms the same thesis that 'creation' is located in the empty space:

... sṛṣṭayo nabhasi sthitāḥ |

MUŚ 6.253.1

... creations are located in the empty space (*nabhas*).

The self, the foundation of creation, is free from movement, while to have creation is to have movement. These appearances occurring in the ground-consciousness are considered to be autonomous (*svataḥ*), as addressed above (MUŚ 6.249.61):

asminn akṣobhya evāntas taraṅgāḥ sṛṣṭīdr̥ṣṭayaḥ ||⁵⁶

The perceptions [which] are creations are [like] waves in the very waveless (*akṣobhya*).

A point to be analyzed here is the use of *sṛṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi*, in which the compound occurs in reverse order; some have compared this with the subsequent SD concept. But in the instances cited here (4.1.5.9 and 4.1.5.11), it is clear that there is no conceptual difference between the usage of SD and DS in MUŚ.

Although the examples analyzed above contain the compound *sṛṣṭīdr̥ṣṭi*, they do not use the term *dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭi*, which is found in the following passage from the YV version:

*khādrīdyūrvnādīrenyo dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭyā punaḥ punaḥ |
saivānyeva vicitreyam avidyā parivartate ||*

subjectivity, with *Prajāpati* representing the collective mind. But there are also instances that show acceptance of the EJ type of subjectivity, with creation caused by the empirical mind.

⁵⁶ MUŚ 6.209.46. The verse immediately following this compares creation to rain in water: *sarasy atīrase bhānti cidghanāmtavṛṣṭayaḥ | paramāṇau paramāṇāv atra saṃsāra-maṇḍalam ||* MUŚ 6.209.47.

This conforms the first model of DS where everything is 'consciousness only'. This is significant because even the previous verse is one of the direct references for DS.

YV.III.114.56

One and the same, *avidyā* turns repeatedly into the ranges of sky, mountain, upper sphere (*dyū*), land, and river, as if it were different, by way of creation corresponding to perception.

Noteworthy, this verse places *avidyā* in the center of causation, accepting the external appearance as the transformation of *avidyā*. The discussion so far reveals that whether or not DS is mentioned with this term, the text YV reveals a deep understanding of the concept that is subsequently recognized as the Advaita doctrine of DS. Furthermore, the texts VSM and the DS chapter of AS both cite YV, linking this concept with MUŚ/YV. Both Madhusūdana and Prakāśānanda consider YV as the source book of DS, however, neither quote any verse that contains the compound DS itself. Apparently both do not consider essential to locate the exact term in order to establish its interrelationship. The analysis of two Advaita assumptions: 1) that the world is the transformation of ignorance, and 2) that consciousness is the foundation of illusory appearance of the world as if outside though appearing only in the mind of the perceiver, leads to the establishment of DS, whether the concept itself is identified as DS or not. However, the stance that plurality is merely an unfoldment of the very consciousness, or that the 'world' is given with the perception outside, is uniquely pertinent to MUŚ, with ignorance emerging as the central category in scholastic Advaita in order to explain duality.

The verse commonly quoted by Prakāśānanda, Madhusūdana, and Sadānanda linking DS with Vāsiṣṭha is:

*avidyāyonyo bhāvāḥ sarve 'mī budbuḍā iva |
kṣaṇam udbhūya gacchanti jñānaikajaladhau layam ||⁵⁷*

All these entities have their origin in ignorance, comparable to bubbles that rise for a moment and dissolve into the ocean of 'awareness only'.

This verse accepts ignorance as the origin of all entities, mentioning their momentary nature, as well as their dissolution into consciousness. Strikingly, the three philosophers citing this verse emerge from different lineages. Prakāśānanda demonstrates his alignment with Sureśvara, Madhusūdana mostly follows the Vivaraṇa school, and Sadānanda utilizes this verse for a different purpose: to establish the *Avaccheda* model of Advaita. Clearly the authority of YV was widely accepted within the Advaita schools by the time of these philosophers.⁵⁸

Close examination reveals that the author of MUŚ/YV does not follow the model of DSE adhered to in Śaṅkara's scholastic Advaita. The following verse clarifies this:

⁵⁷ This verse appears in a spurious *Sarga* of a later redactional state (YV). Nevertheless, it satisfies the basic tenets of MUŚ, although it seems to have been taken from the RC, *Nāgapaśaparibhāṣa*, Verse no. 108. Slaje 1994.

⁵⁸ A closer examination reveals that the *Avacchedavāda* section of ADBS is developed from the VSM of Prakāśānanda.

*pratyekam eva yac cittaṃ tad evamrūpaśaktikam |
pṛthak pratyekam udītaḥ praticittaṃ jagadbhramah ||⁵⁹*

Every individual *citta* is characterized by such power that, in each *citta*, the error of the form of world has separately arisen for every individual (*pratyekam*).

According to this verse, the entire world is contained within the mind. The error of the form of world is separately arising in each mind. Furthermore, it is the power (*śakti*) of mind that constitutes the world. Nevertheless, when considering the position of Vasiṣṭha, the narrator is supposedly able to witness the worlds constituted in various minds. The concept of an all-governing or all-witnessing mind can be derived from the instances where creation is considered to be caused by Brahmā, arising due to his imagination. This thesis, nonetheless, confirms the momentary nature of the world. In this same sequence, the term *dr̥ṣṭi* is used as 'of the nature of destruction' (*naṣṭarūpiṇī*) further confirming the momentary nature of the entities of perception.⁶⁰ Vasiṣṭha states that some of these worlds, created by each individual, endure for a moment, whereas others may last for longer time. (YV 3.40.30). The phrase, 'Whatever a mind imagines, that it perceives' (*yad eva saṅkalpayati tad eva paśyati*) (YV 3.116.13), is the most common model discussed in YV. This form of DS can be compared with the *sahopalambha* doctrine, in which *grāhya* (objects of perception) and *grāhaka* (subject of perception) are simultaneously known.⁶¹ Nevertheless, YV never rejects the existence of awareness-in-itself as the ground of momentary appearance. YV confirms that whatever is perceived is the very perceiver himself, and the metaphor given for this is that of waves and water.⁶² Creation, according to YV, is merely an error, and what actually exists as the foundation upon which the illusory entities appear is Brahman itself. Particularly, the metaphor of eye-disease is given with regard to creation, whereas the metaphor of waves and the ocean is given for the ground awareness:

*na kadācana yan nāsti tad brahmaivāsti taj jagat |
tasmīn madhye kacantīmā bhrāntayaḥ sṛṣṭināmikāḥ ||
vyomni keṣaṇḍrakānīva na kacantīva vastuaḥ |
yathā taraṅgā jaladhau tathemāḥ sṛṣṭayaḥ pare ||*

YV 3.44.28-29

That which is never non-existing, that is the very Brahman; [and] that is the world. In that very [Brahman], erroneous perceptions which are called creation, shine forth. These creations are in the same way in the absolute, as waves in water, like hair-bundles in the sky, which do not appear, as it were, in reality.

⁵⁹ YV 3.40.29. MUŚ reads *tadevaṃśaktirūpakam*. In this sequence, the rise of the world separately in each mind is confirmed with the same phrase: *pratyekam evam udītaḥ*, verse 51, *pratyekam udīteyam*, verse 54.

⁶⁰ *yātā yāsyanti yānti etā dr̥ṣṭayo naṣṭarūpiṇīḥ |* YV 3.40.56; *dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭa* YV 3.108.10.

⁶¹ For treatment on *Sahopalambha*, see Iwata 1991, specifically pp. 17-18, 63-66, 181-182.

⁶² *yad evāmbu sa āvarto na tv asyāvarta vastusan | draṣṭāvāste dr̥ṣyam iva dr̥ṣyam na tv asti vastusat ||* YV 3.40.59.

Significantly, the illustrations are not properly categorized in either YV or the scholastic Advaita: the hair-bundle that appears in the sky due to the eye disease occurs in the same verse with the example of waves and ocean. The only possible argument that can be given to resolve these examples that can be interpreted in contrasting ways is that the YV follows the same dyadic model of instruction as does Śaṅkara, according to which what exists is 1) the single truth advocating consciousness only in all instances, and 2) two degrees of existence, advocating something as ultimately real and the other real only in the phenomenal sense.⁶³ The distinction made between waves and the ocean is a mental construction (*vikalpa*), as the perception of waves is not distinct from the perception of the ocean. While in perceiving waves and the ocean, both can be simultaneously perceived, this is not the case in the illusion of snake in a rope. However, the doctrine of 'consciousness-only' does not contradict either of these interpretations.

One of the central characteristics of DS has remained to defend the doctrine of EJ. Although MUŚ/YV is comparatively silent with regard to this particular issue, there are instances where Brahmā/Prajāpati/Hiraṇyagarbha is considered to be the meta-mind that governs all minds (YV Nirvāṇa 6.1.2). Hiraṇyagarbha as the single self and others as merely appearance of that solitary *jīva* identical with Hiraṇyagarbha is one of three alternatives of EJ suggested by Appayya. According to some instances found in the YV, creation is inherent to consciousness, like waves in an ocean, whereas the scholastic Advaita considers creation merely projected by ignorance. According to the model that accepts the world as latent to consciousness, to experience the modification of consciousness is to experience it as essentially inseparable from its substrate, as properties are inseparable from their substance. As there lies inherence in heat and fire, fragrance and a lotus, blackness and collyrium, whiteness and snow, sweetness and sugarcane, or luminosity and light, so is the case with the world and consciousness. Just as waves cannot be separated from an ocean, the world cannot be separated from the absolute consciousness (YV 6.1.3).

In general, YV favors ignorance as 'fictitious' (*tuccha*), rather than 'indeterminable' (*anirvacanīya*). This contributes to the understanding that ignorance is something which does not bear any degree of reality. In the doctrine of YV — as in the doctrine of Sarvajñātman⁶⁴ — consciousness is both the support and object of ignorance. Ignorance (*avidyā*) is identical with illusion (*māyā*), and it is fictitious. These common examples demonstrate that it is only conceptualization that creates distinctions between waves and water. In the same way, the distinction between knowledge and ignorance is also merely constructed (YV V.1.10). To be unaware of the self is the ignorance that arises when consciousness manifests in form of an object.

⁶³ For a discussion of the degrees of reality in MUŚ, see Hanneder 2005, 130-135.

⁶⁴ *āśrayatvaviśayatvabhāginī, nirvībhāgacūtir eva kevalā | pūrvasiddhatamaso hi paścimo, nāśrayo bhavati nāpi gocaraḥ ||* ŚŚ 1.319.

This is not the place to analyze the narratives (*ākhyānas*) in the YV, although the essential philosophy of the book lies hidden within them.⁶⁵ Our objective is to understand DS as articulated in its most original source. In the text, the story of Jīvaṭa illustrates how subjective experience changes simultaneously with the change in 'physical' identity. This example demonstrates that creation is contemporaneous with perception. Jīvaṭa identifies himself with Rudra, and while in this state of identification, perceives all the minds that he went through at the same moment, while simultaneously transcending all those experiences through the realization of the self. Placing himself (Jīvaṭa as Rudra) in the meta-mind, he knows in a moment all the minds that Jīvaṭa went through. And because of knowledge of the self, he is aware that none of these minds have ever appeared, neither have any of those instances ever happened.⁶⁶ The narrative of Lavaṇa presents the same picture, although the number of illusory lives is less. In this story, Lavaṇa imagines himself as a king who is compelled to be a *cāṇḍāla*. This narrative demonstrates the illusion of time whereby, from the perspective of Lavaṇa, merely two *muhūrtas* elapse, while from the perspective of the king into whom Lavaṇa is transformed, a whole lifetime has elapsed (YV 3.104-109). The experience of other lives both Jīvaṭa and Lavaṇa go through is merely an altered state of consciousness, and those creations are simultaneous to the perception of these phenomenal subjects.

The elucidation of DS in YV hinges on such narratives. Śaṅkara recollects the narratives of a king, raised by hunters, who thinks himself a hunter. When later instructed by others, the prince regains his identity. This narrative is one of early examples of the narrative elucidation of DS. Many similar narratives in the YV parallel its structure. For example, Gādhi finds himself a *cāṇḍāla*, then finds himself a king, and finally restores his self-identity with Gādhi.⁶⁷ However, what differs in this narrative is that the identity reversals in the narrative were not perceived as an illusion, but rather as reality in another locale. These narratives give an account of changing subjective identities. While each narrative reveals a new aspect of DS, one can nonetheless piece together a unified view of DS which accepts that, while all minds are phenomenally real and free to create whatever they desire, they are collectively tied to the meta-mind of Prajāpati, weaving their separate identities into solitary self-awareness. This is how the EJ functions from the perspective of YV.

It is necessary to compare the DS of YV with the DS presented in the scholastic Advaita of Śaṅkara and his disciples. The position of *Jīva* in YV is reciprocal with 'impression' (*vāsanā*), and so *Jīva*-hood collapses with the destruction of the latent impression of subjective experience (YV 6.55.39-41). This notion of *Jīva* allows for a plurality of *Jīvas* as well. Examples such as waves and the ocean, gold and its trans-

⁶⁵ For scholarly analysis of how the narratives of MUŚ interpret the philosophy of Advaita, see Haneder 2005, 60-96.

⁶⁶ YV *Nirvāṇa* 6.1.62-63.

⁶⁷ YV 5.44-49. One aspect to compare with the examples given by Śaṅkara and YV is that both the narratives have a hunter as the main character when one's self-awareness is altered. Several of the narratives of YV have the *cāṇḍāla* to demonstrate one's subjective awareness in a state of illusion.

formations, mainly support the 'identity in difference' (*bhedābheda*) model, which was originally linked with Bhartṛprapañca. While this position does not contradict mainstream scholastic Advaita, the DS doctrine relies primarily upon the doctrine of the single self (EJ).

The central notion of DS in YV is that consciousness perceives by its own nature, and when it perceives, it sees itself as if an object of perception.⁶⁸ Since this construction is not 'real', this model can be compared with the general *Ābhāsa* thesis where nothing ever really originates. Gauḍapāda presented this issue of origination in two ways, with the total rejection of any form of origination in adopting *Ajātivāda*, and accepting illusory appearance comparable to the dream state. Subsequent Advaita differs from this standpoint in the sense of either adopting the *Ābhāsa* model which interprets reality in dyadic form, or embracing three degrees of reality. The model of YV fits with that which either negates creation in advocating singular reality, or explains existence in terms of phenomenal and ultimate reality. The phenomenal world streams out from or collapses into 'pure being' (*sat*) alone (YV 3.1.10-11). This creation can be compared with mental construction, the difference being like that of gold and ornaments.⁶⁹ Examples such as gold and ornaments or waves and water appear everywhere in the text, and an equal number of examples use dream analogies. This fact suggests that both these models of creation are compatible with YV. Since mainstream Advaita Vedānta as well as YV accept this difference only within the instructional level, it can be argued that this inherent difference does not represent a significant challenge to the central doctrine of Advaita. Both are just models of instruction, or are examples given for the accomplishment of Rāma, the aspirant of the narrative. So what remains is 'consciousness-only', with amplification that all instructions are merely varieties of approach used to attain the same state.

Śataśloki⁷⁰

Śataśloki (ŚŚ) is another major source for understanding the development of DS. In commenting upon this text, Ānandagiri assigned it to Śaṅkara. In the later Vedānta tradition, this text appears among the twelve *Prakarāṇa* texts attributed to Śaṅkara. PUBh and this text, both assigned to Śaṅkara, use the term *drṣṭisrṣṭa*. ŚŚ is similar to YV in its method of instruction. The composition of both these texts probably occurred earlier than Prakāśātman, who was aware of the DS model. All arguments pre-

⁶⁸ *ātmānam evādaḥ drṣyam ity eva paśyati* YV 6.175.55.

⁶⁹ YV 3.1.17-18; 3.2.51; 3.7.40; 3.9.31.

⁷⁰ The credit of composing one hundred stanzas is given to Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkara, but the subject matter and style do not suggest that this Śaṅkarācārya is identical to Bhagavatpāda-Śaṅkara. ŚŚ is closer to the style of US, and this may be an effort to give teachings in one hundred stanzas, borrowing the idea from US, which presents its teachings in one thousand stanzas. *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* is another text that conceptually fits with the model under discussion; also ascribed to Śaṅkara, it likewise may not have been written by him.

sented here fit with *Ābhāsa* in a broader sense, and there is no instance that contradicts the DS concept throughout its one hundred verses.⁷¹

One of the main components in the text linking *Ābhāsa* with DS is the direct usage of the term *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭā*, in addition to the frequently used terms related to *Ābhāsa*. These comparatively early instances do not confirm that the term *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* refers to 'consciousness-only' rather than suggesting that these refer to the entities constructed by *dr̥ṣṭi*. When citing the example of error, ŚŚ uses this term, explaining that a mirage appears due to ignorance of the reflection of sunlight on sand, or a snake appears due to ignorance that it is a rope. In the same way, the text confirms, the world appears due to not knowing the self, and due to this reason the world is *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭā*.⁷² ŚŚ is more closely aligned with a single subject perceiving a plurality of origination within itself, due to ignorance of the self.⁷³

In order to synthesize the concept of ŚŚ, it is essential to analyze the examples given in its instructions, which can be divided into two groups:

- 1) those concerning the self and its illusory appearance, and
- 2) those concerning the illusory nature of the phenomenal world.

The author of ŚŚ asserts that the self is constantly aware of its innate nature, seeing in itself. The world manifests in the very self when the self is not properly seen, and dissolves when self-awareness arises. Terms such as *udaya* and *laya* describe this emergence and dissolution of the world within the ground of self-awareness.⁷⁴ The example of shell-silver in ŚŚ clarifies the nature of the world in which the perception of silver corresponds to ignorance of 'shell'.⁷⁵ The instances addressed above agree with the thesis that the self with the nature of awareness is the ground of creation, sustenance, and dissolution of entities.⁷⁶ Yet other examples that dovetail with the model of 'seeing only' or 'awareness only' in all modifications can be found in both VP and SYPP. The example that identifies all appearances, the mountain, the mon-

⁷¹ One can argue that these texts were written before the popularity of the *Vivaraṇa* and *Bhāmānī* traditions of Advaita exegesis. Sureśvara's *Ābhāsa* doctrine predates those other models, and subsequent Vedānta either blends all concepts, or favors those sub-schools. The case of *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistava*, assigned to Śaṅkara, is the same; it contains a *Vārtika*, 'Mānasollāsa', assigned to Sureśvara.

⁷² *yo yo dr̥ṣṭigocarō 'ritho . . . dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭāṃ kiledam* || ŚŚ 81.

⁷³ *ekas tatrāsty asaṅgas tadanu tadaparo 'jñānasindhuṃ pravṛṣṭo | viśmṛtyātmasvarūpaṃ sa vividha-jagadākāram ābhāsam aikṣat* || . . . *tam ekaṃ katham api bahudhā kalpayanti svavāgbhūḥ* || ŚŚ 27.

⁷⁴ The use of *udaya* and *laya* in the sense of the rise and dissolution of world echoes the *udaya* and *pralaya* found in *Spandakārikā* 1.1, corresponding to the *unmeṣa* and *nimeṣa*.

⁷⁵ *suktāu rauṇyaṃ ca rauṇye 'dhikaraṇan athavā . . .* ŚŚ 22.

⁷⁶ *jātaṃ mayi eva sarvaṃ punar api mayi tat saṃsthitaṃ caiva viśvaṃ, sarvaṃ mayi eva yāti pra vilayam iti . . .* ŚŚ 101.

astery, and so on, as pure consciousness, is one among many found in these texts propounding monism.⁷⁷

To fit with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine in general, ŚŚ accepts only two degrees of reality, something real and everything other than that being imagined, and comparable to magic.⁷⁸ Moreover, what really exists is 'seeing only' (*dr̥k*)⁷⁹. Terms like *vijñānamātra*⁸⁰ can be confused with the *Vijñaptimātra* of Yogācāra. However, these terms need to be understood from the same perspective as *dr̥k*, or 'seeing only'. This understanding needs to be consistent even in the passage 'the establishment of awareness' (*vijñānasiddhi*),⁸¹ as arguably, the text on Advaita Vedānta is not establishing momentary instances of awareness. Sureśvara frequently uses *vijñānātman* (the self of the character of knowledge) to refer to the self.⁸² These instances demonstrate that the application of *vijñapti* and similar terms in the Advaita literature describe the non-dual awareness of the character of the self and therefore differ from the Yogācāra application of similar terminology.

In order to compare DS with *Ābhāsa*, it is essential to analyze the way *Ābhāsa* is interpreted in ŚŚ. According to one explanation given here, *ābhāsa* refers to the appearance of various forms of the world.⁸³ Similar to *ābhāsa*, *vi+vbhā* is used to explain that the world is *bhāna* or appearance.⁸⁴ Instances such as the 'appearance of what is seen is error'⁸⁵ need to be analyzed in the context that the external entities are appearance alone,⁸⁶ and that the world comprised of name and form is 'appearance only' (*ābhāsamātra*).⁸⁷ Another instance, 'all this is non-existent, only appearance'⁸⁸ further places the text within the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. ŚŚ compares the self with the sun and ignorance with a cloud, and so *ābhāsa* is the conditioned state of the sun.⁸⁹

⁷⁷ *viśvaṃ yāvad vibhātī drumanaganagarārāmacaityābhīrūmaṃ, tāvac caityanyam ekam* ŚŚ 62.

⁷⁸ . . . *dr̥śyājātaṃ sakalam api mṛṣāivendrajālopaneyam* | ŚŚ 82.

⁷⁹ . . . *dr̥grūpa eva prabhur iha . . .* ŚŚ 93.

⁸⁰ . . . *naiva vijñānamātrāt* | ŚŚ 97.

⁸¹ . . . *tena vijñānasiddhiḥ* || ŚŚ 40.

⁸² See, for instance, BĀUBhVā 4.3.1545. Also the application of *vijñānamātra* in ĀP does not tally with the momentary awareness as explained by the Yogācāra Buddhists; see ĀP 2.1.352.

⁸³ *viśmṛtyātmasvarūpaṃ sa vividhajagadākāram ābhāsam aikṣat* | ŚŚ 27.

⁸⁴ *viśvaṃ yāvad vibhātī . . .* ŚŚ 62.

⁸⁵ *tena dr̥śyāvabhāso bhrama iti viditāḥ . . .* ŚŚ 39. This is further elaborated in ŚŚ 94.

⁸⁶ . . . *samanūd, bhāsante . . .* ŚŚ 53.

⁸⁷ *tatraivābhāsamātraṃ gaganam iva jale . . .* ŚŚ 54.

⁸⁸ *sakalam idam asadrūpaṃ ābhāsamātram . . .* ŚŚ 64.

⁸⁹ *no ced evaṃ vinārkaṃ jaladharapaṭalaṃ bhāsate tarhi kasmāt . . . na paraṃ bhāsakam . . .* ŚŚ 32.

There is another interpretation of *ābhāsa* suggested in ŚŚ, in which *ābhāsa* refers to 'appears as if' (*ivābhāti*).⁹⁰

Yet another etymological meaning of the term may be found where *ābhāsa* is *samantād bhāsa*, 'to shine all around'.⁹¹ Here, the root $\sqrt{bhā}$ along with the prefix *ā* means 'to appear' and 'to shine.' In the sense of the first meaning, whatever appears is false,⁹² and by the second, all that appears is the glory of the self-awareness. To support this second meaning even the *Upaniṣadic* passages such as 'by the light of the self' (*Muṇḍaka* 2.2.10) are exploited.⁹³ The self in this context is the illuminator (*bhāsa-ka*)⁹⁴ who sees the world by the illumination (*bhāsa*) belonging to him.⁹⁵

The relation between *Ābhāsa* and DS is further verified by the occurrence of both the term *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭa* and *ābhāsa*, as in the examples of shell and silver, or rope and snake.⁹⁶ Remarkably, these terms are used here to demonstrate the illusory nature.

Following ŚŚ, that which is neither being nor non-being does not constitute a third category; rather, it is the non-existence of the *tuccha*, or *ālīka* type. Rejection of the ontic being of illusion, or ignorance, is consistent in both *Ābhāsa* and DS (ŚŚ 23).

The phrase, 'illusion as the material cause' (*māyopādāna*), occurs once in ŚŚ, while explaining the world nature.⁹⁷ In this text, *Avidyā* and *Māyā* do not differ in their meanings. This resonates with the doctrine that accepts *Avidyā* as the cause of difference, as pointed out by Maṇḍana.⁹⁸ A frequently quoted reference from YV, 'entities are of the origin of ignorance' (*avidyāyonayo bhāvā*), does not differ in essence from *māyopādāna*, a fact that joins DS with the pre-Maṇḍana model of Advaita which accepts *Māyā* as the cause of the world.⁹⁹ Maṇḍana Mīśra elaborates the view

⁹⁰ ... parātmā ... bhūteṣūccāveṣu pratīphalita ivābhāti ... ŚŚ 52.

⁹¹ ŚŚ 53. See Monier-Williams 1995, page 126, for further discussion on the prefixal meaning of *ā*.

⁹² yat kiñcid bhāty asatyam ... mithyābhūtam pratītam bhavati ... ŚŚ 57.

⁹³ ŚŚ 38. The use of *bhā* in ŚŚ 27, and 41 fall in this category. This is further supported by verse 90, which was developed from *Muṇḍaka* 2.2.10, KU 2.2.15.

⁹⁴ ŚŚ 34, 37.

⁹⁵ ... svīyābhāsanūtarātmā paśyan saṃskārarūpān ... ŚŚ 78.

⁹⁶ yo yo dṛggocharo 'rīho bhavati sa sa tadā tadgatātmavārūpā-| vijñānopādāyānāḥ sphurati nanu yatāḥ śūktikājñānahetuḥ || raupyābhāso mṛṣāiva sphurati ca kīraṇājñānato 'mbho bhujāṅgo | rajjvājñānān nīmeṣaṃ sukhabhayaḥkd ato dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭam kiledam || ŚŚ 81, ... dr̥ṣṭyajātam sakalam api mṛṣāivendra-jālopaṃyām || ŚŚ 82.

⁹⁷ māyopādānam etat saḥacaritam iva brahmaṇābhāti tadvat | tasmīn pratyakratīte na kim api viśayībhāvam āpnoḥi yasmāt || ŚŚ 63.

⁹⁸ avidyopādānabhedavādīn BS 10.

⁹⁹ This position needs to be studied closely in light of the later discussion that 'ignorance does not exist'. These two statements, that ignorance does not exist and that the world is of the origin of igno-

of those accepting ignorance as the material cause. This reveals that they accepted the beginninglessness of ignorance while also accepting purposelessness of it.¹⁰⁰ Maṇḍana's rejection of this view demonstrates that this cannot be his model.

Naiṣkarmyasiddhi Candrikā (NSC) of Jñānottama

Little is known about Jñānottama.¹⁰¹ The commentator of *Laghuyoga-vāsiṣṭha* (LYV), Ātmasukha, identifies Vijñānottama as a writer following DS.¹⁰² It is likely that Vijñānottama is Jñānottama II, the commentator of NS and IS. Excerpts from these commentaries link Jñānottama to DS.¹⁰³ To identify these two slightly different names as belonging to one and the same writer, one passage suffices: the line cited by Ātmasukha in the commentary of LYV, referring to Vijñānottama, is actually from Jñānottama's NSC.¹⁰⁴

According to Dasgupta, Jñānottama's *Vidyāsī* (BSBh-vyākhyā) follows the EJ doctrine (Dasgupta 1975, 2: 82). Because Ātmasukha links Jñānottama with the DS doctrine, and since EJ and DS are identical, it can be argued that the authors of BSBh-

rance, are not contradictory if the world, as such, is identical with Brahman. The statement that the world is of the origin of ignorance does not confirm its origination, but rather negates its ontic being.

¹⁰⁰ anādir aprayojanā cāvīdyā... BS 10.

¹⁰¹ Hiriyanna posits that there were two Jñānottamas, the first being the teacher of the father of the second Jñānottama (NS, XXXV in Hiriyanna 1980). Jñānottama II wrote a commentary on NS, and he is probably the very Jñānottama who wrote a commentary on Iṣṭasiddhi. Traditionally, Jñānottama seems to be related to the *Sringerī* lineage of Śaṅkara's disciples, to which Sureśvara belonged. The Śringerī lineage of Śaṅkarācārya includes Jñānottama and Jñānaghana in its list, in the following sequence: Śaṅkara - Viśvarūpa - Nityabodhāyanācārya - Jñānagaṇā[ghanā?]cārya - Jñānottamācārya - Jñānagiryācārya - Siphagiriśivācārya - Īśvaratīrtha - Narasiṃhācārya - Vidyāśaṅkaratīrtha - Bhāraṅkṛṣṇatīrtha - Vidyāraṅyabhāraṅkī, and so forth. *Sringerīguruparamparā*, Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras XIV (a) 49. Hiriyanna has observed that, on the basis of the Gururājaraṅgamālā, Satyabodha and Jñānottama were the master and disciple. See Hiriyanna in NS XXXIV. If this genealogy is reliable, the two Jñānottamas were the 4th and 6th generations after Śaṅkara. If Śaṅkara is dated 650 CE, following Shastri, or 700 CE, following Thrasher, then Jñānottama II flourished not later than 850 CE.

¹⁰² *Vāsiṣṭhacandrikā* on *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha*, 114.

¹⁰³ One of the clear proofs for this is NSC 3.7. Here Jñānottama writes that " nāmarūpātmakaprapañ-calakṣaṇaḥ sarvo 'rīhaḥ pralaya iva susuṭpāvājñānāsanmātrāva-śeṣaṃ pralīyate, tataś ca prabodhasamaye punar udbhavaṅīti hi vedāntasiddhāntaḥ."

Vedānta doctrine states that every object/thing is characterized by *prapañca*, the character of which is name and form; it dissolves, remains mere *śai* as experienced in deep sleep like dissolution, and then, at the time of awakening, comes into being again.

¹⁰⁴ Ātmasukha writes: 'kalpitasya dvaitasya śūktikārajatāder iva pratibhāsamātrāsaṅgrāsyā pratibhāsadaśāyāṃ svakālpānādhīṣṭhāsanmātrārekeṇa svarūpeṇāvasthānāsambhāvāc ceti vijñānotamācāryavacanāt' *Vāsiṣṭhacandrikā* 114, while linking Jñānottama with DS. This line corresponds to NSC 3.7, p.113, ll.16-18.

vyākhyā and NSC are the same. This Jñānottama (the first) is given the honorific title 'Bhaṭṭāraka'. It is likely that Jñānottama II was also the author of the commentary on BĀUBhVā (Dasgupta 1975, 2: 48). He is identified as Jñānottama Miśra, which may be his name as a householder. The next Jñānottama, who wrote a commentary on BS must be a third Jñānottama, since he is a disciple of Citsukha (Dasgupta 1975, 2: 87).

Among the writers who emerged after Vimuktātman, Jñānottama's position aligns fairly closely with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine, which tallies with the aforementioned historical analysis. The texts for which he wrote commentaries, NS and IS, both propound the *Ābhāsa* doctrine, and the commentary *Vidyāsri* upon BSūBh follows EJ. This identification of Jñānottama as DS-*vādin* suggests that the later writers have identified some *Ābhāsa-vādins* as DS-*vādins* as well. This fact supports the argument that relates *Ābhāsa* with DS. To support the external evidence assigning Jñānottama as an early writer on DS, it becomes necessary to investigate passages within his own writings that match citations in others' writings, where they ascribe DS to him. NSC substantially supports this premise, even though the commentary on IS can be considered relatively less significant.

In NSC, while explicating Sureśvara's position, Jñānottama identifies 'not-knowing' (*anavabodha*), i.e., ignorance, as the cause of 'mental construction' (*kalpanā*). With this, he acknowledges the concept of the twofoldness of ignorance as 'not knowing' and 'knowing otherwise'. Whatever appears is *kalpanā*, a product of ignorance. Due to this *kalpanā*, the self is not seen, or is seen otherwise.¹⁰⁵ Duality, according to Jñānottama, is mental construction (*kalpanā*),¹⁰⁶ and the self is the foundation upon which duality is perceived.¹⁰⁷ The self, along these lines, is awareness-in-itself free from modifications, which nonetheless supports error in the form of the world.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, whatever is immediately experienced is the self only. In this analysis, phenomenal knowledge is equal to phenomenal error in that both are error. Jñānottama declares the self as the foundation of imagination in the form of the world, caused due to ignorance, which, in turn, cannot be defined.¹⁰⁹ He identifies this

¹⁰⁵ ... sarvasyāpi dvaitaprapaṅcasya svataḥsiddhatvāt svayamprabhatvād adviṭyo dvīṭya-śūnyo yo 'yam ātmā tasya tasmin yo 'navabodhaḥ svataḥ siddhatayā satatam advaitarūpeṇa prakāśaprāptau tathā prakāśādarśanāc chuktikārajatādivad viparītarūpaprakāśa-darśanāc ca tadāhetutayā kalpitā tanmātropādānavāt tasmin vīdyamāne tasya na nīrvṛti ity arthaḥ. . . NSC 1.1, p. 3.

Since the self-effulgent self is the cause for imagination [of dualities] like that of silver in a conch shell, as long as [vision] exists, for that duration, [the false perception] will remain.

¹⁰⁶ For the discussion on *vikalpa* and *kalpanā*, see Matilal 1986, 312-315.

¹⁰⁷ ... samastadvaitakalpanādhiṣṭhānabhūtatattva. . . NSC 1.3, p. 7. '... the self, which is the support of all the imaginations of duality. . .'

¹⁰⁸ ... sarvaprapaṅcavibhramādhiṣṭhānanityaśūddha. . . NSC 1.4, p. 7. 'the (self), eternal, pure. . . support of all errors in form of *prapaṅca*. . .'

¹⁰⁹ . . . vayanḥ tv āmanya adhyastānīrvacanīyājñānavijrmbhūtatayā tadāśrayaḥ saṃsāraḥ pratyagātmani parikalpita ity abhyupagacchāmāḥ NSC 2.97, p. 93.

twofold ignorance as mental modification (*vikṣepa*), thereby connecting this concept with the yogic understanding of ignorance.¹¹⁰

The advocates of the doctrines of *Ābhāsa* and DS stress that there is no ontologically independent self except for awareness-in-itself. The existence of this awareness is self-evident, and the very moment it is aware of itself, its existence is also presumed. In this sense, this is *sanmātra/cinmātra* (being in itself/awareness in itself), and whatever appears, other than this absolute self, is only mental construction, with this very awareness as its foundation.¹¹¹ In Jñānottama's understanding, the true Vedānta doctrine advocates the phenomenal world as the self only, and this self, in turn, is awareness only. Duality manifests due to ignorance of this very self-aware nature of awareness that is identical with the self.¹¹² According to Jñānottama, external objects, for instance a pot, are nothing but cognition (*buddhi*). Due to the transformation of cognition, forms appear, and even when these are forms being cognized, the self remains free from contact with duality.¹¹³ The eternal nature of the self is beyond change, while cognition, a product of ignorance, is not so. Remarkably, Jñānottama's analysis holds that the external world is a mere transformation of mind. He establishes an invariable concomitance of awareness with conceptualization, saying, 'self-awareness pervades all concepts that arise, [this awareness being] the awareness of the self; [existence of the] self is the existence of 'awareness only.'¹¹⁴ Jñānottama's refutation of difference is epistemological; there are no distinct in-

. . . We assert that the mentally constructed [phenomenal world] is in the self in itself [individual self] (*pratyag-ātmā*), because (this is) the manifestation of inexpressible ignorance imposed on the absolute self.

¹¹⁰ . . . asaṃbhāvanāvīparītabhāvanātmakavikṣepalakṣaṇapratibandha. . . NSC 1.67, p. 39. "the obstacle of the form of *vikṣepa*, of the nature of not reflecting and reflecting otherwise"

¹¹¹ . . . sadrūpāj jñānasvabhāvād āmano 'nanyatvād eva na pṛthak sattāprāptiḥ jaḍasya sambhavataḥ | nāpi pratyagātmābhedenā pratyagātmavāt siddhir jaḍajāḍayor abhedāyogāt | tasmād ahaṅkāradīr āmani kalpita ity arthaḥ NSC 2.45, p. 74.

'It is not possible for something insentient to exist and appear separately, as it is not different from the self, which is awareness in itself [and] existence in itself (*sadrūpa*). Nor is there evidence of sentience and insentience - like [that which exists] for the individual self - through non-difference from the individual self, because non-difference cannot be applied [to them].'

¹¹² asya dvaitendrajālasayātmājñānanīrvṛtyavād āmamātraṇ jagad ity vedāntasiddhāntaḥ NSC 2.68, p. 83. '... This is the Vedānta doctrine that the world is mere self because the magic of duality is activated (*nīrvṛt*), due to not knowing'.

¹¹³ kas tarhi ghaṭādijñānākāreṇa pariṇamata ity ata āha evaṃ ceti | āmanāḥ samastadvaitāsaṃsparśīve sati buddheḥ pariṇāmīvaṇ yuktaṃ ity arthaḥ NSC 2.70, p. 84.

'... Then what transforms in the form of knowledge of a pot and so forth? . . . Since the self is free from the contact of duality, it is appropriate for the *buddhi* to be transforming'.

¹¹⁴ . . . dhīyaḥ pratyayeṣu smṛtīviparyāsapramāṇātmakeṣu madhye kaścīd api pratyayaś caitanyenā-vyāpto nāsti. . . NSC 2.83, p. 87.

'... In all cognitions of the mind (*dhī*) such as memory, contrary knowledge, and true knowledge, there is not a single cognition that is not pervaded by consciousness. . .'

stances of awareness, neither is there a plurality of self-awareness.¹¹⁵ He stresses that the triad of cognition, (subject, object, and action of knowing), is merely a product of ignorance. Since awareness is free from mental modification, it is therefore free from any difference.¹¹⁶ Analyzing the example of the snake erroneously perceived in a rope, Jñānottama very clearly establishes that this is 'knowledge only', whether in the form of correct knowledge or in the form of false knowledge. Manifestation in different forms, for instance, a rope-snake, is imposed on this very self.¹¹⁷

The dichotomy of knowledge and knower dissolves in Jñānottama's metaphysics, with internal and external forms corresponding to the existence of awareness in itself. According to him, while existence and the appearance of the objects are mutually dependent, true knowledge—knowledge of the self or knowledge in itself—since it is self-aware—is not dependent upon others for its appearance. The existence of a pot, for example, cannot be established without a perceiving subject, whereas the witnessing self is self-evident, since this is self-reflexive knowledge in itself.¹¹⁸ Adopting this point, Jñānottama establishes a core definition of DS, later advocated by Madhu-

¹¹⁵ . . . *pratiṣṣayaṃ buddhayaḥ svato bhidyante tadvad avagatē cañanyasya na bhedo 'sti cidākāratvāṭi sarvāsām buddhivṛttinām. . .* NSC 2.86, p. 88.

' . . . Cognitions differ by themselves in each object; in the same way there is no difference of knowing, which is awareness, because all modes of cognition are of the form of awareness.'

¹¹⁶ . . . *pramāṭṭiprāṇeyapramāṭṭilakṣaṇāṅvibhāgaḥāṭṭasavabhāvasya pramāṭṭajñānasyājñānamātrānimitta-tvenānādisiddhātasavabhāvāvāsaṃbhavāt. . .* IS 107.

' . . . Because the veridical knowledge of the nature of what is comprised by the difference between the knower, that which is known, and knowledge, [this knowledge] is caused by mere ignorance, and so it cannot be the self-nature proved from beginningless time. . .'

¹¹⁷ . . . *yathā rajjvāḥ sarpātmataḥ rajjvām evādhyastā tadvad ātmādhīnasattāprāṭṭitikam ajñānam āmanya evādhyastam. . .* IS 107.

' . . . As the snakehood of a rope is imposed on the very rope in the same way [that] ignorance, having appearance of existence being dependent upon the self, is imposed in the self. . .'

¹¹⁸ . . . *jānānti jñānam draṣṭā | tam vinā na santi na pratiyante cāhankārādayo 'rthās | tām vināpi draṣṭāṭṭi pratiyate ca | tasmād arthānām sattāprāṭṭiyor nityasāpeḥṣatvāt | tebhyah svayamjyotiṣsvarūpaṃ nirapeḥṣasiddhikam ātmānam ghaṭādraṣṭāram ghaṭād ivāmunānato vivicād viviktaṃ kuryāṭi tataś ca dr̥ṣyaprapaṅcād ātmani niṣkṣṭe sati prapaṅcasya svātantryeṇa siddhyasambhavād ātmājñānopādānavena tadāśrayatvam arthāt siddhyati. . .*
NSC 2.97, p.93.

' . . . The knowledge of (*iti*) 'knows' [is] the perceiver. [*Jñāna* means knower, due to knowing]. The entities starting from *ahankāra* do not exist, nor are they cognized without the subject (*tam*). The perceiver exists and is cognized even without them. Therefore, the existence and cognition of objects are always dependent. That is why [one] should separate the self of the form of self-luminosity, established independent [of others], from those objects (*tebhyo*) by means of inference, like the perceiver of a pot [is separate] from the pot. So when the self is separated from manifestation (*prapaṅca*) of the nature to be perceived, the manifestation (*prapaṅca*) becomes established as a 'given' (*artha*), having (-*tva*) the self (*tar*) as [its] support by means of (-*tva*+instr.) ignorance of the self as its material cause, because the establishment of manifestation is impossible independent [of the self].

sūdana in AS as 'the existence of only what is known' (*jñātaikasattā*), or 'the absence of that which is not known' (*ajñātasattābhāva*).¹¹⁹

Jñānottama refutes arguments raised against the existence of a single self.¹²⁰ This fact suggests that the *Ābhāsa* concept was closely aligned with EJ. In the absolute sense, Advaita *per se* is the doctrine of identity of all selves as only one. The only way EJ can be distinguished from the common Advaita perspective is that it accepts singularity of the self even in the empirical sense, advocating the singularity of self-experience.

Following Sureśvara's precedent, Jñānottama divides *dr̥ṣṭi* into two: real and false. The absolutely real *dr̥ṣṭi* has self-nature as its object, whereas false *dr̥ṣṭi* manifests in the form of concepts.¹²¹ However, this twofold division does not prove the self-luminosity of internal objects, for instance, pain, pleasure, and so on. It equates the witnessing self with the first *dr̥ṣṭi* and mental construction with the second or transforming *dr̥ṣṭi*. Modification of consciousness is illuminated by the self-revealing absolute *dr̥ṣṭi*, which is free from modification. Pure *dr̥ṣṭi*, therefore, sees itself by itself, and that is all that exists.

In sum, the texts where the term DS appears align more closely with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. The evidence that 1) Vimuktātman is criticized as propounding EJ and 2) Jñānottama is credited for propounding DS and 3) the fact that Jñānottama commented upon IS, further links *Ābhāsa* and DS. The instances propounding EJ and aspects of DS found in the writings of Sureśvara and Vimuktātman further strengthen the thesis of *Ātmasukha* that links DS with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. These facts support the relationship of DS and the doctrine of *Ābhāsa*. This relationship also tallies with the instances found in MUŚ/YV and analyzed in this study.

¹¹⁹ This will be addressed in Chapter 5 of this section, while discussing the doctrine of DS as presented by Madhusūdana.

¹²⁰ *namu sarvabhūteṣu eka eva ced ātmā tarhi yugapad eva parasparaviruddhasukhaduḥkharāgaḍveṣabhrāntisamyagjñānādyaśrayatvam prasajyeta, tac cānupāpanaṃ tat katham uktaṃ "dr̥ṣṭi ekā sarvabhūteṣu"* (NS 2.47) *iti tarāha - na ca viruddheti | viruddhadharmāṅām apyavidyāparikalpātavād ekasmin dharmiṇi samāveśo nānupāpanaḥ . . .* NSC 2.50, p.75.

' . . . If there is a single self in all the *bhūta* (living beings), then there will be a consequence of the support simultaneously of mutually contradictory (factors such as) pleasure and pain, passion and envy, error and correct knowledge. This cannot be established. Then why is it said, is [there] one perception in all? The reply is, this is not contradictory. It is not impossible to establish that contradictory properties accumulate (*samāveśa*) in a single property-bearer, by the reason that these [properties are] imagined by ignorance (*avidyā*).

¹²¹ *dr̥ṣṭir dvidhā pāramārthiky apāramārthiki ca | tatra pāramārthiki dr̥ṣṭir ātmanaḥ svarūpam ity ācāṣṭe | yānyā śabdādyaḥkāranirbhāsavat janmavināśavat ca dr̥ṣṭiḥ sā svarūpabhūṭayā dr̥ṣṭyā bhāsyā . . .* NSC 2.91, p. 90.

' . . . *Dr̥ṣṭi* is of two types: real and not real, with the 'real' *dr̥ṣṭi* as the nature of the self, the next *dr̥ṣṭi* illuminating forms of a word etc., rising and extinguishing is that which is to be illuminated by *dr̥ṣṭi* of self-form (*svarūpa*).

Chapter 5 Emergence of the *Drṣṭisrṣṭi* Doctrine

This chapter examines the later classical Advaita philosophers who wrote either a complete text following the DS doctrine, or wrote a section on it. These writers include Amarānanda, Vidyāranya, Prakāśānanda, Appayya Dīkṣita, Madhusūdana, and Sadānanda. Although there are other Advaita philosophers who mention DS in their texts, the writers selected demonstrate the philosophical extent of the DS doctrine. These authors defend DS as a complete doctrine with direct textual references, recognizing DS as an independent doctrine. Furthermore, this selection relies upon the treatment on DS that has been identified with EJ.

Amarānanda¹

Svātmayogapradīpa (SYP) of Amarānanda, along with his auto-commentary *Prabodhīnī* (SYPP), has had less influence on the construction of Advaita thought, as this text has not come to the larger public. There is no significant reference to this text in scholastic writing; however, the text is significant in understanding DS. Amarānanda's text, unlike mainstream Advaita texts dealing with logical arguments, focuses on the yogic experience, and presents DS as a yogic method, making this work even more valuable for understanding the pedagogical aspect of Advaita. The author, Amarānanda, while composing this text, seems to have been motivated to make Vedānta accessible in simple language and in particular, to lead his reader to experience the non-dual nature of the self through certain yogas. As he had more interest in giving methods for liberation, he applied yoga in the context of Vedānta. Since this book carries direct evidence of DS, including its terminology, it becomes necessary to excavate the philosophical and pedagogical elements underlying the text

¹ The date of Amarānanda cannot be fixed with certainty, although the 13th century is given by Chidambaram, editor of the text. Even though he has analyzed many factors in fixing his exact date, a fact Chidambaram was seemingly unaware of is that Amarānanda cites Lakṣmīdhara's (1466-1539 CE) *Anubhāvapañcāśikā*. There is no hint that Amarānanda is aware of Prakāśānanda or Madhusūdana. Although neither Prakāśānanda nor Madhusūdana mention each other, a citation is available in AS from VSM, which helps to establish a chronology. The sources analyzed by the editor of SYPP are also remarkable in that they try to push back the date of Amarānanda to the 13th century. But to agree with this date it needs to be confirmed that the Lakṣmīdhara who wrote *Anubhāvapañcāśikā* was a different Lakṣmīdhara, but there is no evidence to support this. *Advaitamakaraṇa*, another treatise of Lakṣmīdhara on Advaita, is quoted by Brahmānanda Bhāraṇī (dated 1425 CE).

and establish its relation with other Vedānta texts in a broader context. To date, this is the first analysis of DS to bring this text into the dialogue.²

Amarānanda discusses DS in the first two chapters. The subsequent chapters align the identity of the self with the Brahman, and provide a system to realize this. Amarānanda's presentation shows his multiple interests: he collects ideas from *Purāṇas* and from a Kashmiri tradition; he gives Vedānta a yogic twist, and in this way has Vedāntic practice encompassing practical methodology, allowing Vedānta to extend from mere ideological debate to being a method for realization.³

While analyzing Amarānanda's understanding of DS, it is necessary to examine the relationship of the particular passage to the complete text. Because his text is devoted to a single concept, there should be no inconsistency in our understanding when relating this text with DS-EJ.

DS and the doctrine of origination share similar issues of concern. Since the very term *srṣṭi* explicitly means origination, this discussion must necessarily address it. Amarānanda presents an extremely subjective version of the doctrine of origination to explain worldly phenomena. However, when explaining origination, he mentions only that origination is equal to the magic of a magician. This magic is not that of the Lord, rather of an individual self, who imagines the world and so the world becomes projected. The way he presents 'the performance of magic and so on, by a magician', (*māyāvina iva indrajālasrṣṭyādīkā*) (SYPP 6.5), makes clear that origination is subjective and is comparable to the magic of a magician.

Amarānanda is not as precise in his writings as Prakāśānanda or Madhusūdana when assigning an interpretation of DS to a particular *Upaniṣadic* passage, since he incorporates all Vedānta into DS.⁴ Most important in this context is a particular occurrence of the term DS:

atra sām̐bhavī drṣṭir vedākhyo 'nugraho nidarṣitaḥ

Here the grace named as Veda is suggested, [which is] *sām̐bhavī drṣṭi*.

SYPP p. 8

² The editor of SYPP, Chithambaran, was also unaware of the fact that this text follows DS.

³ This may be one of the characteristics of the contemporaneous Advaita. Vijñānabhikṣu, for instance, has shown a similar tendency. Post-Śrīharṣa Advaita had to face one common criticism from opponents who said that the non-dualists have no thesis of their own, or that these are sceptics, and sometimes as *vaitaṇḍīka*. Even Citsukha's approach to give a complete picture of Advaita, and to reconcile different aspects of, rather than refuting other doctrines, is another remarkable factor.

⁴ Amarānanda holds that even Vedic passages like *sa iṅsata* from AīU 1.1.1 (he saw), '*sa imān nu lokān aṣṭjata*' AīU 1.1.2, (he created these worlds), and '*so 'kāmayata*' TaiU 2.6 (he desired), all support the doctrine of DS. Even though several readings are possible, Chithambaran, being unaware of DS, preferred *siddhadṛṣṭisrṣṭi*. One of the manuscripts supports a reading as *drṣṭisrṣṭi*. SYPP p. 8.

This term suggests the conceptual intimacy of DS with *sāmbhava-upāya*,⁵ as practiced by Trika Śaivas. Here, Amarānanda takes DS as a paradigm of methodology, a view given for practitioners as a way of meditation to achieve liberation, as is the case in the Trika tradition. What needs to be considered is the application of 'Veda' for this sort of grace, which resonates with the Śrauta view in Vidyāraṇya's terminology, which accepts illusion as 'fictitious' (*tuccha*).

Most remarkable in this context is that, for Amarānanda, DS is still not the highest method, since that distinction belongs to the practice of visualizing 'awareness only' as the entire world, based on an interpretation of DS that became the central tenet of Prakāśānanda's and Madhusūdana's etymological analysis of DS. The exact line of Amarānanda is:

*svapnaprapaṅcavad dṛṣṭisṛṣṭinyāyena yasya praṭiyate tasyaivaeti praṭītyupādhiḥ
saṃsāra ity anye . . . jñānātmano mama jñānaśaktivilasitaṃ sarvaṃ ity utamadhrī
manyate*

SYPP 13.14-18

Others [hold the view] that the world (*saṃsāra*)⁶ is imposed upon appearance, following the maxim of DS that [the world is] his to whom it appears, like the manifestation (*prapaṅca*) of dream. . . . One who has the best wisdom holds that the whole world is the play of the power of knowledge, [which belongs to] me, of the nature of knowledge.

This single line contains the central concept of DS as found in Prakāśānanda and Madhusūdana. Amarānanda hints that, when presenting DS as synonymous with dream and giving it a more exalted view, he understands that DS is not 'seeing only' (*dṛṣṭi-mātra*) or (*dṛṣṭir eva*), but rather 'simultaneous to perception' (*dṛṣṭisamakāla*). He does not consider DS as the highest view, but instead presents 'awareness only' in all instances as the higher doctrine. This, *samakāla* or mere *dṛṣṭi*, is absolutely the same issue discussed by Prakāśānanda in VSM, where the debate was originally formulated in response to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.

One line in SYPP reads: '*viśvasya viyadāder dṛṣyasya dṛṣṭidṛṣṭasya*' (of all the perceptible objects, beginning with sky, [which] are perceived by seeing).⁷ This line suffices to demonstrate that Amarānanda analyzes the phenomena as originating because of perception.

⁵ Compare: *guror ālokaṃtreṇa sparsāt saṃbhāṣaṇād api | sadyas sañjāyate hy ajñā pāsāpakṣaya-kāriṇi ||* Quoted in SYPP, p. 8 with *akīñciccintakasyaiva guruṇā pratibodhataḥ | jāyate yaḥ samāveśaḥ sāmbhavo 'sāv udāhṛtaḥ ||* *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* 2.23.

⁶ In this example, Amarānanda identifies *prapaṅca* with *saṃsāra*. Matilal translates *prapaṅca* as 'verbal proliferation' or 'amplification' or 'showing by verbal elaboration'. See Matilal 1986, 309-312.

⁷ SYPP 23.21. The term *dṛṣṭidṛṣṭa* may be a manuscript error, and the original term might have been *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭasya* (originated through perception).

The highest Advaita instruction according to Amarānanda is the position that all that appears is pure consciousness. So even the phenomenal world is identical with pure consciousness. Amarānanda states:

dṛṣyasya yathā sañvidaikatvaṃ sā prapaṅcavyavahārakāle 'pi

SYPP 44.12

As an object of cognition is (-*tvam*) identical with consciousness, consciousness [*sā*] is [there] even at the time of activities [with regard to] creation.

To defend the thesis that everything that is cognized is essentially 'knowledge alone', the following verse from SYP is significant:

*prakāśate cej jaḍatāsya kā syāt | jaḍasya na syāt sphuraṇaṃ yato 'taḥ ||
jñānātmakaṃ viśvaṃ idaṃ yadātmā | sphuraḍ yathā-jñānam ahaṃ tad asmi ||*

SYP 2.17

If [knowledge] illuminates, could there be insentience for it (*asya*)? Because [that which is] unconscious cannot illuminate, this world is therefore, essentially [only] knowledge. I, the essence of it, am this (*tad*), [which] appears according to knowledge.

It is explicit that this verse is composed under the influence of VP. Among the instances available in VP, the verse Amarānanda cites while commenting upon SYP 2.17 discloses that the philosophy under discussion is developed by reading VP closely, as the phrase in the verse cited above (*jñānātmakaṃ viśvaṃ idam*. . .) and the phrase found in VP (*jñānātmakaṃ idaṃ viśvaṃ* VP 2.6.50) are identical.

According to Amarānanda, pure consciousness as such appears in three forms: the subject of cognition, the object of cognition, and cognition itself. Along these lines, awareness is considered as the subject of knowledge due to limitation by the inner sense, cognition due to the limitation of the inner sense during the moment of engagement with objects, and the object of knowledge, when limited by ignorance that can be expelled by knowledge.⁸

As discussed above, Amarānanda presents the view that DS is not the opinion of those having perfect vision. Yet the higher vision for him is the existence of pure 'knowledge only' in all instances. It has been established that DS is understood with *dṛṣṭi* as both momentary knowledge and constant knowledge. In following the second interpretation, Amarānanda advocates the DS doctrine; however, when DS is interpreted following the first understanding, there exists another higher view. Amarānanda correlates 'momentary knowledge' with DS in the following example:

svapnadṛṣṭasyeva hi dṛṣṭir eva sṛṣṭiḥ

SYPP 47.6-7

For creation is nothing but (*eva*) seeing, like [the creation that is] seen in a dream.

⁸ . . . *sañvido hy aruḥkaraṇāvachchedena jñāṭṛtvaṃ, viśayagocarāntaḥkaraṇāvachchedena jñānatvaṃ, tadapanodyāvīdyāvachchedena viśayatvam*. . . SYPP 54.13-14.

Amarānanda's stance that creation is identical with seeing⁹ is one of the doctrines of DS that supports contemporaneity of an object and knowledge, not identity. But wherever discussions concern contemporaneity of cognition and the object of cognition, this discussion appears only in order to prove that the essential form of external entities is knowledge alone. This argumentation finally concludes with the interpretation of DS that identifies seeing and origination, *dr̥ṣṭir eva sṛṣṭiḥ*, where seeing, in itself, is creation.

There are some instances in which Amarānanda continues the early concept of two types of *dr̥ṣṭi*, in which one is pure *dr̥ṣṭi*, identified by various other terms, and another, the contrary seeing, also denoted by multiple terms. Amarānanda uses *paradr̥ṣṭi* (seeing the other), and *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi* (seeing the self), confirming that the world, perceived due to 'seeing the other', dissolves by seeing the inward self.¹⁰

This aspect can be compared with Sureśvara's interpretation of seeing in a dichotomy of seeing as the essential uninterrupted nature of the self: either there is seeing the world out or there is seeing the self, which, in other words, is the awareness of seeing itself. This dyadic nature of seeing can be traced from KāU (KāU 4.1), where the nature of the senses is described as flowing out, and the self is seeing inward, recognized when the flow of the senses streaming out is stopped.

Amarānanda forcefully endorses the central assumption of *Ābhāsa* doctrine, that the entire world that is perceived is nothing but mere *sat* or being alone.¹¹

Significantly, *sanmātra-cinmātra*, or 'existence only is *per se* awareness only', appears to be the central tenet of the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. This concept can be traced back to Auḍulomin, with *cittimātra*, or awareness alone, as the absolute reality.¹² Amarānanda elaborates that consciousness is recognized in various categories:

Consciousness is the lord. The world is of the nature of self-consciousness. Consciousness carries out the actions of the consciousness of the self by way of [its] powers. Consciousness, although error due to difference of results, agents, etc., [remains] consciousness. I am that consciousness [*sa*]. Consciousness itself, [of the nature of] being and bliss, is the deity.¹³

⁹ For instance, see the preface to the Hindi edition of VSM and Yogīndrananda's preface to *Tattva-pradīpikā*. This seems to be from the earliest Hindi writings on Vedānta. For another example, see Svāmī Nīśchalādāsa's chapter on DS.

¹⁰ *paradr̥ṣṭyā dr̥ṣṭasya viśvasya pratyagdr̥ṣṭyā layaḥ* SYPP 47.12.

¹¹ *sarvaṃ dr̥ṣyaṃ jagat sanmātram* SYPP 11.6.13.

¹² *citi tanmātreṇa tadātmakatvād ity auḍulomiḥ* BSū 4.4.6

¹³ *cid īśvaraḥ svātmacīdāmakam jagat | karoti cic chaktūbhīr ātmacīkṛtyaḥ || cit kāryakartrādībhīdā bhīramo 'pi cit | sū cāsmi satsaukīryacid eva devatā ||* SYPP 4.12.

According to Amarānanda, the maxim of DS explains self-awareness as the cause of world:

pratyakcāitanyasyaiva dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭinyāyena jagataḥ kāraṇatvam.¹⁴

Following the maxim of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*, the world is caused only by the consciousness of the individual self.

Apparently, Amarānanda does not consider DS as a complete doctrine but rather a maxim, which may be one of many within a single doctrine. Amarānanda uses this to explain non-duality, and in presenting this view, selects *avabhāsa* (appearance) to explain worldly phenomena as commonly perceived (SYPP 2.2). While explaining creation, in which the empirical world is equated with erroneous perception, there lies no difference between empirical and illusory phenomena. In support of this argument, he cites BĀU (4.3.10), the passage that uses *sṛjate* (creates for himself) to explain that dream entities are the creation of an empirical self.¹⁵

With regard to the causality of the world, the texts propounding *Ābhāsa* adopt two distinct interpretations: 1) awareness-in-itself in all modifications of the self, itself being perceived in instantaneous cognitive mode; 2) the world as the product of ignorance. The instances discussed above defend the first alternative, while Amarānanda also applies the second interpretation concerning manifestation of the world:

mūlāvidyāvīlāstasya sthūlasya jāgratprapañcasya SYPP 39.4

The gross world in the waking state is created by the fundamental ignorance.¹⁶

avidyayā jagat sarvam

SYPP 11.12

The entire world is [caused] by ignorance.

This position tallies with the thesis that considers ignorance as the only cause of the phenomena being perceived.

Creation, being the result of ignorance, has remained the central theme of DS. However, the way that Amarānanda expresses this theory reveals a trace of the influence of the other doctrines of Advaita, in which ignorance manifests in a hierarchy of

¹⁴ SYPP 38.17. In the same context *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭinyā* occurs in SYPP 39.7.

¹⁵ Self-construction in this creation of entities is revealed by the *ātmanepada* usage, *sṛjate*. In the context of whether *paśyanī* or *dr̥ṣṭi* is the most correct usage, it becomes even more clear that the subjective mode of creation is for itself, and the texts carefully use *ātmanepada*.

¹⁶ The acceptance of 'root ignorance' (*mūlāvidyā*) indicates that the author accepted ignorance as analyzed in a post-Vācaspati model of analysis, distinguishing *mūla* or 'original ignorance' and *nūlāvidyā*, 'the ignorance belonging to each empirical subject', or 'the ignorance underlying ignorance' as understood in the common sense. For the illusory nature of *avidyā*, see Phillips 1987, 3-23; for *avidyā*, *māyā* and related issues presented from the Advaita perspective, see Solomon 1983, 57-99; for the doctrine of *māyā*, see Shastri 1991, 18-41; for Śaṅkara's position concerning *avidyā*, see Ingalls 1952, 69-72.

degrees. But in the strict doctrine of *Ābhāsa*, such a hierarchy is not acceptable. This point suggests that Amarānanda was not closely following any of the particular sub-schools of Advaita in Śaṅkara's tradition, even though he was strictly adhering to DS.

Amarānanda accepts the singularity of the self, discarding plurality even in the empirical world:

sarvadeheṣv eka evātmety ātmādvaitam eva yuktaṃ

SYPP 27.4-5

Only non-duality of the self is appropriate because there is only one single self in all the bodies.

This apparently is the most radical form of EJ, the third model according to the categorization of Appayya. This again is one of the main features of *Ābhāsa*. Amarānanda stresses that, not only in the bodies that are living now, but also in the bodies of past and future, there exists a single self.¹⁷ Amarānanda distinguishes between people having a polluted view and those having a pure view, naming them as *malinamati* (stained mind) and *nirmalamati* (stainless mind) respectively. One who belongs to the first category cannot see the singularity of the self, whereas someone belonging to the second category is capable of immediately realizing this singularity.¹⁸ Another argument applied by Amarānanda to prove the singularity of the self in all the bodies is that the self is immeasurable, and therefore cannot be distinguished from one body to another.¹⁹ In this discussion, the appearance of a plurality of selves is explained in terms of *ābhāsa*, using the root *bhā* (SYPP 1.19). In the course of these discussions he uses *ātman* in the meaning for which other texts use *jīva*. Consequently, this can cause confusion. Since *bhā* (appearance) of entities is not used to demonstrate false appearance, as all that appears is pure knowledge, Amarānanda stresses that, what is non-being (*asat*) never appears, while whatever appears is mere being (*sat*).²⁰

In defense of this solitary self, Amarānanda follows Sureśvara's doctrine that the self is of the nature of seeing. Since the self, awareness-in-itself is self-revealed, it does not depend upon another cognition for its confirmation. By this very argument, the self is not an object of the means of knowledge. Since the self is self-revealing, it cannot be perceived as its counterpositive (*pratyogin*) based upon its prior absence.²¹

¹⁷ *bhūtabhaviṣyannāñjanmopātānēkadeheṣv eka ātmā* . . . SYPP 22.14.

¹⁸ . . . *malinamanibhīr anusandhānaṃ duṣkaram | viśiṣṭādr̥ṣṭanirmalamatayasa tu kecit prāgjanma-dehādīkam anusandadhāty eva ||* SYPP 22.15-16.

¹⁹ *tad aparimita ātmā sarvadeheṣu caikaḥ*, SYP 1.18, and the auto-commentary thereon.

²⁰ . . . *asadabhānāt bhāti yat tat sad eva |* SYPP 1.20.

²¹ . . . *dr̥grūpaḥ, dr̥grūpaḥ sa prakāśantarānapekṣatvāc ca pramāṇānām aṣṭayaḥ | ataḥ svaprakāśaḥ svaprakāśacitvāc ca svaprāgabhāvasyāśrayatvāyā pratyogūyā grahitum ayogyatvād avikṛtīḥ . . .* SYPP 23.21-24.3.

When Amarānanda interprets bondage and liberation as the play of the self, caused due to illusion,²² the scope of this self-revealing nature includes phenomenality.

Amarānanda's position that the *Upaniṣadic* sentences can produce self-realization merely from being heard aligns him with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine that differs from the position advocated by Maṇḍana.²³ All DS writers commonly adopted this position, whereas for Maṇḍana, *prasaṅkhyāna* (meditation) is essential to liberation.²⁴ However, this position needs further explanation. If Amarānanda thinks mere listening to the *Upaniṣadic* sentences reveals the reality or gives self-realization, why then does he think it necessary to propound yogic methodology? Strikingly enough, Amarānanda spends more energy presenting yogic methodology, rather than propounding non-duality with logical means. Some reasons can be suggested:

- 1) Amarānanda was not interested in dry logical debate as was Śrīharṣa. He acknowledges Advaita as a method to experience the self.
- 2) Amarānanda did not come from a strong logical background; however, he was raised in the environment of practicing Advaita for self-realization.
- 3) He considered alternative Advaita positions such as DS to be merely pedagogical methods, while the instruction of Advaita could preserve this through various 'yogic' methods.
- 4) Arguably, Amarānanda was influenced by YV. However, there is no direct reference to YV in SYPP. His position bridges the philosophies of YV and scholastic Advaita.

The instances discussed above suffice to support the claim that Amarānanda follows DS. However, it needs to be argued whether or not his doctrine of DS completely match the DS suggested by Prakāśānanda and Madhusūdana. There are some divergences, and the first concerns the difference of *māyā* and *avidyā*. That *māyā* and *avidyā* are different categories with separate roles is the concept that allows Amarānanda to establish a distinction between *Īśvara* and *jīva*, which is one of the

²² *brahma caikam api bhedabhūmikā-māyābhīnayaṭi svanāpīkām || mānameyaguruṣiṣyadevatām, jīvabandhanavimuktīlakṣaṇam ||* SYPP 4.1.

²³ This is the point leading the editor of SYPP to think that it follows the *Vivaraṇa*: study verse 113. However, this is the main argument of Sureśvara, extensively elaborated upon in NS and also in BĀUBhVā.

²⁴ Vācaspati Mīśra is credited with accepting meditation (*nīdīdhyāsana*) as the main aspect in self-realization, while Prakāśānanda, when elaborating upon Padmapāda's position, advocates that reflection and meditation are subordinate, and hearing the *Upaniṣadic* sentences is the main cause of self-realization:

1) *amṛtatvasādhanam ātmadarśanaṃ draṣṭavyetyanūdyā sādārihyena mananānīdīdhyāsanābhyāṃ phalopakāryaṅgābhyāṃ saha śravaṇaṃ nāmāṅgi vidhīyate* PPV, Subrahmanya Śāstrī ed., p. 18.

2) *mananānīdīdhyāsanayoḥ ca śravaṇāṅgatvam uttaratra vakṣyāmaḥ* Ibid.

3) *sarvathā tāvan mananānīdīdhyāsanābhyāṃ aṅgabhūtabhyāṃ saha śravaṇavidhānam asty eva* Ibid, p. 22.

major concerns in *Vivarāna*.²⁵ However, Advaita philosophers tend to not identify their sources, particularly the *Vivarāna* and the *Vārttika* exegesis, and it may be argued that Amarānanda adopts this very tendency that diminishes the emerging gap within the school of Advaita. Nonetheless, Amarānanda explicitly advocates the singularity of ignorance in the following passage where he clearly deviates from *Vācaspati* or *Vimuktātman*:

ekaṃ caitanyam ekāvidyēti vedāntapakṣāvalambena . . .

SYPP 25.23-26.1

Taking the support of the Vedānta doctrine that consciousness is one and ignorance is one.

This advances the following points:

- 1) That *māyā* has been considered identical with *avidyā*;
- 2) That the singularity of the equation *avidyā = māyā* is accepted;
- 3) That the term *anirvacantya* qualifies *māyā*, which has been used synonymously with *avidyā*.

However, the position of the twofold nature of ignorance in SYPP cannot be neglected. In the context of the causation of ignorance, as the point discussed above, his statement '*mūlāvidyāvīlāsitya*' (played by the fundamental ignorance), suggests twofoldness of *Avidyā*.

Texts show Amarānanda's prime concern as demonstrating mere knowledge in whatever is cognized as objects, and establishing that knowledge is never polluted by forms. The forms appear as long as ignorance lasts; once ignorance is gone, difference in knowledge also dissolves. There exists no form to differentiate, because difference does not exist in reality. This leads to the conclusion that all that is cognized in diverse forms is the very solitary awareness, without modification of object and the awareness pertaining to that object.

Amarānanda's writings show him at times to be quite a freethinker. For example, he presents a picture of *sac-cid-ānanda* as corresponding to the three states of awakening, dreaming, and deep sleep. Consciousness imposed on the transcendental state is the real state in all three states. This position shows how even the fourth state is imposed on the state of ignorance, which, even though real, is imposed as real in the state of ignorance, resulting in the conclusion that whatever is perceived is merely *kalpita* (imagined).²⁶

²⁵ *śadupādheś copādheyabhedān māyāvidyāvabhedah* SYPP 11.22.

²⁶ *āmanah kalpitāṅgarādīryavasāhābhāktve 'pi tadanugatya nūryarvenopacartikalpīcītvam eveti . . .* Following this line, he cites a verse in which he categorizes three states that correspond to the three modes of *sac-cid-ānanda*: *satā samastendriyājāgare 'ntaḥ | svapne ca yā citpracurā sacittā || suptau sukhātām sphuradātmamohā | yā tatra turyānugatāsmi sā cit ||* SYPP 2.3.

Amarānanda appears more inclined towards a yoga doctrine and practice that is purely non-dualistic.²⁷ This application of non-dualism in terms of the methodology for liberation shapes the pedagogy that can be applied in DS.²⁸ Amarānanda categorizes yogins as those who have desire and those who are liberated from desire. Following the categorization found in SYPP 2.14, the yogins with desire meditate upon divine aspects associated with properties (*saguṇa*), whereas the yogins without desire meditate on the formless *nirguṇa*. His last two chapters, *Devatāvīṃśikā* and *Yogavīṃśikā*, reveal the method of meditation, including worship of the divine form.²⁹ He adopts the eight limbs of Yoga as given by Patañjali, but offers his own non-dualistic interpretation for each of these, concluding that self-awareness, of the form of having no ego is *samādhi* (SYPP 135). Amarānanda presents various forms of yoga, such as *niṣkalayoga* (SYPP 14.12), *mantrayoga* (SYPP 144.4), *sparsāyoga* (SYPP 144.17), *bhāvayoga* (SYPP 145.3), *abhāvayoga* (SYPP 146.4), and *mahāyoga* (SYPP 146.20). Most of this yogic terminology is Amarānanda's contribution, including the understanding of even the common forms of yoga, for which he gives his own interpretation. The very title of the text, *Svātmayoga*, clearly reveals its yogic inclination.

Significantly, this discussion reveals that, even for Amarānanda, DS is not a dry intellectual exercise, but rather a method to reveal one's self-nature. This connects the two different streams of Advaita accepted by Śaṅkara with the elements of teaching non-duality based on different models. These varying positions can be traced to texts that even predate Śaṅkara.

Vidyāranya

Vidyāranya defends EJ in *Vivarānaprameyasamgraha* (VPS),³⁰ but does not pay much attention to DS.³¹ The case of *Anubhūtiprakāśa* (AP), by the same author,

²⁷ Amarānanda identifies himself as Yogīndra. He addresses other masters of his lineage with the honorific title of Yogīndra. This may be due to their inclination towards Yogic methods for self-realization.

²⁸ Elements of yoga are palpably present in SYPP 2.14.

²⁹ Like many other non-dualists, Amarānanda is also spiritually inclined to Viṣṇu. However, he is totally indifferent to contemporaneous Vaiṣṇava movements. This inclination towards Viṣṇu may have encouraged him to write a commentary on VP. A Vaiṣṇava theology based on monistic teaching very possibly flourished until the time of Amarānanda. On the other hand, the popularity of Advaita philosophy may have influenced Vaiṣṇava theologians, and this may be the case with Amarānanda. Neither scenario has been conclusively established.

³⁰ *sa cāyam ātmā sarvaśarīreṣv eka eva* VPS 189; *yas tvam māṃ prati banhamokṣavyavasthām prcchasi sa tvam eka eva sarvakalpanādhiṣṭhānabhūtaś cidekarasa ātmā tvadanye muktā mucyamānā mokṣyamālās ca sarve jīvās tvadavidyayā svapna iva kalpitāḥ* VPS 243; *na ca jivānām anyonyabhedābhāve 'pi jivabrahmaṇor bhedas syād iti mantavyam* VPS 265.

³¹ He shows his awareness of DS, propounding that the dissolution of the world for one in deep sleep as mentioned in the texts corresponds to the primary meaning when following DS:

differs in the sense that it addresses DS. Vidyāraṇya takes for granted that the dialogue between Ajātaśatru and Bālākin³² exemplifies the doctrine of DS.³³ In the ninth chapter of AP, attributed to the exposition of KU, Vidyāraṇya mentions DS as 'the sudden path' to realize the self. This is one of the rare instances where the classical philosophers cite the *Upaniṣads* as a source that propounds DS. The major point herein is the discussion of the state in which even I-sense (*ahaṅkāra*) becomes dissolved. Vidyāraṇya compares this with a side entrance used for visiting a king.³⁴ He argues that this is an expedient path because, while the process of clarification of the meaning of *tat* and *tvam*³⁵ takes time, DS does not require the purification of *tat* and *tvam* since it directly reveals the identity of the empirical self with the Brahman.³⁶

As the story of Ajātaśatru and Bālākin is not understood in the same way by all commentators, it is necessary to show how Vidyāraṇya interprets this passage in order to link it with DS. The story proceeds with a sleeping man whom the king calls by his name. He does not wake up while addressed by his name but awakens when being shaken (AP 9.11-16). The king then teaches him that the individual is the conscious one (*cetana*), which could not have been *prāṇa*, given that while *prāṇa* was functioning, the man was not aware of having been called (AP 9.16-19).

Vidyāraṇya states in this context that, while sleeping, the senses and their objects are dissolved into *prāṇa*,³⁷ and for the one who sleeps, the world also dissolves into *prāṇa*.³⁸ Vidyāraṇya defines deep sleep in the context of DS as the dissolution of the world, including the sense of I-ness.³⁹ In other words, the dissolution of *karma* occurs in deep sleep (the term used here is *supti*) and the rise of *karma* emerges when awakening from deep sleep (AP 9.43-45). When the time of experiencing *karma* comes, then I-sense (*ahaṅkāra*) emerges; and from that the senses, being the instruments of experience, arise. The world comes again into existence through the rise of the senses (AP 9.51-54ab). This creation is spoken of as *prāṇīkī*, of mere appearance.⁴⁰ This

dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭisamāśrayaṇe tu suptapurūṣaṃ prati sarvalayo mukhya eva setsyati VPS 62.

³² KU 4.20; BĀU 2.1.16-20.

³³ AP 9.48-50.

³⁴ *alpavāre svāmibhaktō haṣṭād rājānam iḥṣate | dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭyanubhūtyarthī vetty ātmānaṃ tathā haṣṭāt ||* AP 9.48cd-49ab.

³⁵ This refers to "tat tvam asi", a major Upaniṣadic sentence of reflection to establish identity of the individual self with the Absolute. The *suddhi* (lit. purification) is interpreted in various ways by Vācaspati, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda. However, *suddhi* is an approach closer to the Vivaraṇa school.

³⁶ *tvampadārthaṃ sōdhayitvā vākyād bodho vilāmbate | tasmād ihājātaśatrur bālāker avilambataḥ ||* *pratyagbrahmarvabodhārthaṃ dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭim avocata ||* AP 9.49cd-50ab.

³⁷ *viṣayendriyajātām yat tat prāṇe pravilīyate |* AP 9.33ab.

³⁸ *suptābhīprāyam āśrītya parātmani jagallayaḥ ||* AP 9.36cd.

³⁹ *sāhānkārasya jagato vilayaḥ suptir ucyate |* AP 9.39ab.

⁴⁰ *seyaṃ prāṇīkī sr̥ṣṭis tasmā jātā tataḥ svayam ||* AP 9.54cd.

point confirms that, even in Vidyāraṇya's understanding, DS accepts only two degrees of reality: *prāṇīkī* (apparent) and *vāstavī* (real).

Vidyāraṇya explains in AP that the passages propounding creation are intended merely to establish the identity of the self with the Brahman in the deep sleep state.⁴¹ When Vidyāraṇya explains that in each moment, there may be origination, sustenance, and disappearance of the world, since this has mere ignorance as its cause and is therefore without sequence, it becomes clear that the notion of creation as contemporaneous with perception, or the appearance of concepts in the form of the external world is the understanding Vidyāraṇya has while propounding DS.⁴²

One of the major works of Vidyāraṇya, VPS, remains silent concerning DS. Although Vidyāraṇya is well aware of this concept, while writing the VPS, he does not concentrate on this. This fact suggests that, in Vidyāraṇya's understanding, DS was not the fundamental argument to explain the Vivaraṇa view. In other words, if Vivaraṇa were the source of DS, Vidyāraṇya would not miss the opportunity to explicate it since he demonstrates his awareness of this concept elsewhere. There is one instance in VPS where the term DS occurs. Vidyāraṇya's remark in this context is noteworthy in that, by following DS, everything dissolves for the sleeping person.⁴³

The next instance in which Vidyāraṇya provides insight into this concept is his assignment of a view to Vimuktātman, according to which there is a single subject who immediately experiences. The issues here concern the problems inherent in accepting a single subject of experience. To establish bondage and liberation in the EJ doctrine, Vidyāraṇya admits that both bondage and liberation are mental constructions. The self in its essence is 'awareness only'. This being the case, bondage as well as liberation, are only mere mental constructions and equal to dream. To solve the possible argument rejecting the scriptures that mention the liberation of Vāmadeva and so on, Vidyāraṇya posits that this description serves to inspire one to make an effort to know the self. He exhibits doubt as to whom bondage and liberation belongs, by arguing that just as a liberated one does not feel that he was ever bound, so an ignorant one does not know that he is bound. When one is realized through instructions following the scriptures and masters that each one, according to the experience of each subject, is the very self, doubt cannot arise. A common element in both Vivaraṇa commentary and the texts following Ābhāsa model is the rejection of any external means to be instrumental for self-realization, and Vidyāraṇya elaborates upon this concept.⁴⁴

⁴¹ *yaḥ suptau nīcītaḥ svātmā tasya brahmatvasiddhaye | jagatsr̥ṣṭir varīyate 'smāi sr̥ṣṭau dr̥ṣṭārta ucyate ||* AP 14.56.

⁴² *udbhūtiṣṭhītināṣāḥ syur jagato 'sya pratīkṣaṇam | avidyāmātrahetutvān nāmīṣaṃ vidyate kramāḥ ||* AP 14.60.

⁴³ *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭisamāśrayaṇe tu suptapurūṣaṃ prati sarvalayo mukhya eva setsyati* VPS 1.1 p. 97 of Kṛṣṇānanda ed.

⁴⁴ *sampad* is a process of Upaniṣadic meditation, generally referred as *sampat-upāsana*. The Upaniṣadic notion of *Vidyā* and *Upāsana* seems to be ways of visualization.

Drawing upon the testimony of an *Upaniṣadic* passage, 'that which is not reflected upon by the mind, but which is the instrument for mind to be reflected upon,' Vidyāraṇya demonstrates that there is no possibility of meditating upon the self, as the self is not an object of mind.⁴⁵ This negation of meditation brings this view closer to the *Ābhāsa* doctrine, since in the *Avaccheda* doctrine of Vācaspati, meditation grants immediate realization. Following these arguments, the very Brahman, which is eternally liberated, is reflected upon as attaining *jīva*-hood and transmigrating in the world because of ignorance. That very Brahman liberates itself when it gets self-realization.⁴⁶ Here, the attainment of liberation is also metaphorical, since, if there were no bondage, how could real liberation occur?

Following the steps of Śāṅkara and Sureśvara, Vidyāraṇya uses *dr̥ṣṭi* in the sense of consciousness in itself, though this is less frequent.⁴⁷ Concerning DS itself, Vidyāraṇya presents both interpretations of DS: that origination is of *virāt*, wherein the perceiver of the world illusion is universal consciousness. And the position where he perceives the world is that of the individual subject and this very seeing of the world is what he calls *sṛṣṭi*, or creation. Following this analysis, what constitutes DS is seeing as creation.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ *yan manasā na manute yenāhur mano matam* | Kenopaniṣad 1.5.

⁴⁶ *upapattis tv ekātmavādībhir asmābhir eva kaitāñcid vaktuṃ śakyate | tathā hi yas tvaṃ māṃ prati bandhamokṣavyavasthāṃ pṛochasi sa tvam eka eva sarvakalpanādhiṣṭhānabhūtaś cidekarasa ātmā tvadānye muktā mucyamānā mokṣyamānās ca sarve jīvās tvadavidyayā svapna iva kalpitāḥ vāmādevādīmuktīśrutis ca tvatprarocanāya brahmavidyāpraśamsāritāḥ |*

evaṃ ca sati kasya bandhamokṣāv ity eṣa sandehas tava tāvat saṃsārasāśāyāṃ mokṣasāśāyāṃ vā na jāyate | evaṃ pratyekaṃ tattatpuruṣādṛṣṭyā sa sa evāmeti guruśāstrābhyāṃ bodhite sati na kasyāpi sandeha udeti kim atvānupapannam | ato 'khaṇḍaikarasātmavāde 'nupapatyabhāvāt tapareṇa śāstreṇāmatatve bodhite sadya evāvīdyātaikāryayoḥ svapnavai pravilīnayoḥ sator advitīye brahmaṇi sampadādī-rūpeṇopāstikriyāyāḥ ko 'vasarāḥ | ata eva śrutir brahmaṇa upāsyatvaṃ niṣedhati | yan manasā na rūpeṇopāstikriyāyāḥ ko 'vasarāḥ | ata eva śrutir brahmaṇa upāsyatvaṃ niṣedhati | na ca vedyat-vavad upāsyavim api syād iti mantavyam | anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhiti śrutayā vidyat-vasyāpi niṣedhāt | . . . evaṃ ca sati nityamuktaṃ brahmaiva svāvidyādiḥpranībimbitaṃ sajjīvabhāvam āpadya saṃsaratī svavidyayā ca vimucyate ity uktāṃ bhavati VPS 362-364.

⁴⁷ Main examples: *ghaṭādyābhāsadr̥ṣṭis tu svapne 'nhasyāpi dr̥ṣyate | cakṣur dr̥ṣṭivinaśe 'pi yā dr̥ṣṭiḥ sāv cīdātmadr̥k* || *Bṛhadāraṇyakavarttikasāra* 1.4.1006; *vāsanāpratyayau dr̥ṣṭi svapnājagad-avasthayoḥ | yayasau niryadr̥ṣṭiḥ syāt sāv sūptau ca na naśyati* || Ibid 1007.

⁴⁸ *sṛṣṭyā kriḍaty avibhrānta aindrajalikavad virāt | svapnadṛṣṭyeva vibhrāntaḥ klīṣṇāti mānavāḥ || Bṛhadāraṇyakavarttikasāra* 1.5.6; *yena yad dr̥ṣyate tat tu tena sṛṣṭam svakarmaṇā | dr̥ṣyasya bhrāntirūparvād darśanam sṛṣṭir ucyate* || Ibid 7; *sṛṣṭam jagad virājedam sadāvapaśumānuṣam | martyenāpi jagat sṛṣṭam savirāṇnara-devatam* || Ibid 8.

Prakāśānanda

The position of VSM in Advaita literature

Contemporary scholars have credited *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (VSM) of Prakāśānanda as the source for the DS concept, and this text has consequently received significant attention. Among the classical philosophers, Appayya Dīkṣita cites VSM as the source (*ākara*) for DS and EJ concepts.⁴⁹ An almost identical sentence found in both AS and VSM⁵⁰ allows one to argue that even Madhusūdana was aware of this text and utilizing it while composing his masterpiece, AS. In addition to Appayya, Nīśchaladāsa links DS to Prakāśānanda.⁵¹ These facts tally with the popular opinion that aligns DS-*vāda* with Prakāśānanda.

VSM provides more information on DS than does Madhusūdana's writings, even though Madhusūdana mentions DS as the major Vedānta doctrine.⁵² Although Prakāśānanda does not consider one particular text to be the primary source book for DS, the fact that he cites YV (6 verses)⁵³ and BĀUBhVā (3 verses)⁵⁴ suggests that he closely read these texts while writing VSM. These citations support the argument that DS derives from primary sources, rather than from Prakāśānanda alone. He additionally quotes Sarvajñātman while advocating pure consciousness as the support and object of ignorance (VSM 14.4-5). Further linking Sarvajñātman with DSE, LC cites SŚ as one of the major sources for this concept (AS 537.19). A close examination of the text of Sarvajñātman supports this argument.⁵⁵

⁴⁹ *dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭiviyutpādanaprakriyā prapañcas tv ākaragrantheṣu draṣṭavyaḥ* -SLS 355.

⁵⁰ Compare: VSM p.30, ll. 6-8 and AS p. 465; also VSM p. 31, ll.1-2 and AS 465.

⁵¹ *Vṛttiprabhākara*, 361-363.

⁵² *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 49, 12.

⁵³ *avidyāyonayo* . . . VSM p. 38 (Śāstrī ed.); *tasmīns* . . . p. 57; *yasya cittamay* . . . p. 57; *aho nu citraṃ yat satyaṃ* . . . p. 178; *aho nu citraṃ padmotthair* . . . p. 178; *yasyānubhava* . . . p. 185.

⁵⁴ *yaccāpnoti* . . . VSM, p. 74; *pranāṇam* . . . 109; *tatvamasayādi* . . . 136.

⁵⁵ *Bālabodhinī* in AS, Chapter in DS, and Yogīndrananda in the preface of his edition of *Saṅkṣepaśāstrīraka*. An additional citation further strengthens the conclusion that Sarvajñātman is closely linked with DSE: Ananta Paṇḍita links YV and SŚ when comparing the illusory nature of the waking state with dreams SN, p.162. For comparison: *yathā svapnamuhūrte syāt saṃvatsarāśata-bhramāḥ | tathā māyāvilāsothe jāyate jāgare bhramāḥ* || YV, and *sūpto jantuḥ svalpamātrepi kāle, koṭi paśyed vṛttsaṃvatsarāṇām | koṭi paśyed evam āgāmi-nāñ ca, jāgratkāle yojayet sarvam etat* || SŚ 2.130). Apparently, subsequent philosophers were closely reading SŚ while composing chapters on DS and EJ.

Prakāśānanda cites two verses from the *Rāmacarita* of Abhinanda.⁵⁶ Here, Prakāśānanda takes the position that the instruction of *Vivarta* is inferior, interpreting the world with at least two degrees of existence: illusory and absolute. This subordination of the pedagogical approach of instructing non-duality by relying on two degrees of reality confirms the single degree of reality of the Brahman alone.

Prakāśānanda refutes the position where Maṇḍana considers *jīva* as the support of ignorance.⁵⁷ He also refutes Vācaspati's view⁵⁸ that there are two ignorances.⁵⁹ Prakāśānanda subsequently defends the EJ doctrine,⁶⁰ and while arguing against the existence of what is not cognized, he refutes the possibility of the third category of reality.⁶¹ With regard to the instrumentality of self-realization, Prakāśānanda advocates that this is through the hearing of the *Upaniṣadic* sentences that the self-realization arises.⁶² This position is against what has been advocated by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati.

While presenting the topic of the existence of only what appears, Prakāśānanda enters into a debate about difference (*bheda*), immediately raising core issues of epistemology concerning the perception of difference. He finally concludes that what is self-evident is mere knowledge (*vijñānamātra*) (VSM 43-54). That Sureśvara also paid much attention to the same issue establishes a link of DS with *ābhāsa*. Previously, Sureśvara elaborately treated the epistemological issues concerning difference and its non-perception, as well as the self-awareness of consciousness.⁶³ Prakāśānanda aligns himself with Sureśvara even when he is discussing the notions regarding the scope of the means of knowledge.⁶⁴ Therefore, instead of reading Prakāśānanda independently, his treatise VSM demands a closer study in light of the writings of Sureśvara and Sarvajñātman.

Even though the self-revealing nature of the self is a category shared by all models of Advaita,⁶⁵ it is crucial in the rise of the doctrine of DS. The self-awareness of con-

⁵⁶ In addition to 'avidyāyonayo...' Prakāśānanda cites: *bālān prati vivarto 'yaṃ brahmaṇaḥ sakalam jagat | avivartitam ānandaṃ āsthitāḥ kṛtinaḥ sadā* || RC, 31.116; Cited in VSM 173. For the relationship of Rāmacarita and LYV, see Hanneder 2005, 45-47.

⁵⁷ VSM 3-7, and the autocomentary that follows.

⁵⁸ Dasgupta 1975, 2: 109.

⁵⁹ VSM 8, and autocomentary.

⁶⁰ VSM 8-9, and autocomentary.

⁶¹ VSM 10-14, and autocomentary.

⁶² *iatra vadanti śravaṇādyaḥyābhyaśajaniāśābdañjñānasamudbhūtabhvanāpracayasacivam antahkaraṇam eva āmasāḥśātkāre karaṇam | . . . tan na, āgamasyaiva ātmani aparokṣa-jñānañjanakatvāt* | VSM 94-95.

⁶³ BĀUBhVā 1.1. 917-985.

⁶⁴ VSM 63.4-8 and SB 938-941.

⁶⁵ This issue will be addressed separately in the second volume of this study.

sciousness as self-validation of the self is the argument mainly derived from the literature on *Ābhāsa*.⁶⁶ An additional component that brings Prakāśānanda closer to the *Ābhāsa* model is his position with regard to the means for liberation. While refuting the Maṇḍana/Vācaspati model of Advaita pedagogy in which inner-sense and meditation plays vital role, Prakāśānanda shows his awareness of Sureśvara's arguments. The example, 'You are the tenth' (*daśamaḥ tvam asi*),⁶⁷ as the direct instruction that gives self-realization is that favored by Sureśvara.⁶⁸ Prakāśānanda cites BĀUBhVā to conclude the debate with regard to the means of realization.⁶⁹ The issue raised afterwards, refutation of difference, also resonates of the arguments given by Sureśvara.⁷⁰

Prakāśānanda adopts a definition of falsity as that which underlies all three modes of time (*trikālabādhyatva*). This usage, however, has been generally credited to the Vivaraṇa school,⁷¹ linking Prakāśānanda even more closely to Prakāśātman. However, it is not because of exposure to the Vivaraṇa that Prakāśānanda adopts this definition, but rather, he draws it from Sureśvara's literature.⁷² This fact also reveals that the definition of falsity, commonly attributed to Prakāśātman, is derived from Sureśvara's writings.

Prakāśānanda does not place himself fully within any of the models of the school of Śāṅkara. Among the terms of *ābhāsa*, *pratibimba*, and *avaccheda*, the term most frequently used in VSM is the first one. The very first instance of the use of the root

⁶⁶ Prakāśānanda's structure of argumentation can be compared with that of Sureśvara. Compare VSM 66-67 and BĀUBhVā 1.1. 981, 985, 999.

⁶⁷ This example of ten people crossing a river, and after having crossed it, they start counting, forgetting to count oneself, so always counting nine. Then somebody explains to them "you are the tenth" and they realize it in the same moment of explanation. This example demonstrates how meditation or other means are not required to realize that which is the very self. When the self is not known and one suffers and a teacher instructs "you are that" one immediately realizes one's self nature. Vidyāranya favors this example; see PD 7.21-27, 7.58-61.

⁶⁸ VSM 95-96, and *Sambandhavārtika* 208.

⁶⁹ *pramāṇam apramāṇam ca pramāṇbhāsaḥ tathaiiva ca | kurvanti eva pramāṇ yatra tadasaṃbhāvanā kṛtāḥ* || BĀUBhVā 1.4.874; and 2.1.552. Quoted in VSM 108-109. Apparently, this verse is important to Sureśvara, as he repeats it twice throughout the text. This discussion is closer to NS. VSM 108.4-6 is comparable to NS 3.7-8. There is a third, conceptually similar verse: *pramāṇam apramāṇam ca pramāṇbhāsaḥ ca yad bhavet | caitanyākāram evaitat prathate sarvam eva tat* || BĀUBhVā 2.4.124.

⁷⁰ *ajñānam* . . . is closer to BĀUBhVā 1.1.179, 181. The succeeding paragraph is closer to BĀUBhVā 1.1.183.

⁷¹ . . . *ādyaṃ syāt pañcapādhyuktaṃ tato vivaraṇodīve | cisukhīcaṃ caturthaṃ syād antyaṃ ānandabodhajaṃ* . . . IC 206.

⁷² The verse runs as: *tattvamasyādivākryonihāsanyagdhījanmamātrataḥ | avidyā saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti bhaviṣyati* BĀUBhVā 1.1.183. This fact suggests that the *ābhāsa* doctrine had been more influential than other models, and that Prakāśātman extracted his definition of falsity from BĀU, and BĀUBhVā 1.1.183.

$\sqrt{bh\ddot{a}s}$ in this text occurs while explaining that the nature of consciousness is perpetually illuminating.⁷³ Another instance can be found in Prakāśānanda's claim that, whenever knowledge appears, it appears with an object that it corresponds to.⁷⁴ In this sequence, use of the terms *pramāṇa* and *tadābhāsa*, i.e., *pramāṇābhāsa*, suggests Sureśvara's influence.⁷⁵ Identifying the empirical subject, Prakāśānanda uses *caitanyaābhāsa* (the appearance of consciousness) (VSM 101), a term synonymous to *cidābhāsa*. Sureśvara had already frequently used both these terms to refer to the appearance of consciousness in the form of the subject.⁷⁶ Elaborating upon the concept of *ābhāsa*, Prakāśānanda argues in this sequence that the formless consciousness can have an appearance, citing the example of the reflection of the sky in water. To interpret reflection, he favors the term *ābhāsa*, although *pratibimba* is more commonly used in such a context.⁷⁷ These examples further support the argument that Prakāśānanda closely read the texts that follow *ābhāsa* while composing his VSM, further demonstrating that the nuances of DS need to be studied in light of the *Ābhāsa* school of Advaita thought.

The Philosophy of Prakāśānanda

Two levels of instruction

There is common agreement among scholars that the text VSM strictly follows DS. Remarkably, however, there is no use of the term DS-*vāda*, or even the very term DS, throughout the whole text. Even the commentator Jivānanda is silent about DS in his lengthy commentary on the text.⁷⁸ The available terms closest in meaning are *prāṭimātra* (VSM 43.5; 54.4), *vijñānamātra* (VSM 54.6), and *dr̥ṣṭimātra* (VSM

⁷³ ... *svayamprakāśaparipūrṇānandasvarūpeṇa bhāsamāne 'pi caitanyamātram eva bhāsatē. . . ānandasvarūpeṇa eva bhāsamānatvād iti vadāmaḥ |* VSM 10-11.

⁷⁴ ... *saviśayasyaiva bhāsamānatvāt, anyathā niṣprakāraḥ eva bhāseta |* VSM 15.

⁷⁵ Compare. . . *pramāṇatadābhāsābhyām eva tadutpādanasambhāve viśayānapekṣaṇāt* VSM 51, Śāstrī ed. with BĀUBhVā 2.1.552-553. Prakāśānanda even cites this passage in VSM p. 109, Śāstrī ed.

⁷⁶ For the use of *cidābhāsa*, select references from BĀUBhVā are: BĀUBhVā 4.2.93 ; BĀU-BhVā 4.3.416; BĀUBhVā 3.4.105; BĀUBhVā 4.3.361; BĀUBhVā 4.3.99; BĀUBhVā 4.3.373; BĀUBhVā 3.7.37. For the use of *caitanyaābhāsa*, select references from BĀUBhVā are: BĀUBhVā 4.3.442; BĀUBhVā 3.8.128; BĀUBhVā 4.3.356; BĀUBhVā 2.4.346; BĀUBhVā 4.3.358; BĀUBhVā 4.3.385.

⁷⁷ Ānandagiri and Vidyāraṇya both incorporate the *Ābhāsa* literature within the *Vivaraṇa* School. This has caused misunderstanding at a very deep level; Prakāśānanda's treatment of *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba* as identical is not free from this. His inclination towards the *Vārtika* manifests the affinity of his thought with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine.

⁷⁸ There is, however, a verse in the commentary where the term *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭa* occurs: *svapnavad dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭaḥ san sarvavyavahṛtikṣamaḥ |* Jivānanda's commentary on VSM, *prapañco nātra doṣo 'sī tasya parihṛtatvataḥ ||* Jivānanda on VSM, 51. There is no reference, nor is any attribution cited. This was possibly composed by a previous commentator, which Jivānanda synthesized into his own text.

56.1.4; 57.6). It is essential to explore how Prakāśānanda applies these terms, and in which context.

Paul Hacker has explored Prakāśānanda's doctrine specifically while analyzing *vivarta*. He has posited that *prāṭimātra* or *vijñānamātra* are similar to the Yogācāra use of the DS concept. Hacker translates '*prāṭimātra*' as '*nur als Vorstellung*', and by this and similar expressions of Prakāśānanda, he was led to the statement that Prakāśānanda is returning to Buddhist idealism (Hacker 1953, 49:233). Both Advaita Vedānta and Yogācāra Buddhism are close enough to be compared on several points. However, in order to identify the concept Prakāśānanda is addressing with any other idealistic thought, it is essential to comprehend the complete doctrine as set forth by the author. A part of a text cannot be interpreted in contradiction with its overall premise. It is unlikely that an author gives a thesis in one part of his text that does not agree with the rest of his oeuvre.

In order to establish the conclusive meaning of the specific terms and concepts addressed by Prakāśānanda, the method of two truths can be proposed, in which one is appearance and the other, absolute. Using this method, the present study argues that Prakāśānanda adopts the elementary approach in the initial stage based upon the level of the applicant. And, the terms giving one level of meaning in the initial stage will in turn provide higher meaning in another stage. To support this argument, the text of Prakāśānanda requires thorough investigation.

For Prakāśānanda, there is no category higher than non-dual awareness. If he established *vijñānamātra* as his doctrine, with *vijñāna* understood as momentary awareness, he would then be contradicting the Advaita doctrine and adopting the *Vijñānavāda* of the Buddhists. However, *vijñānamātra*, if it is referring to reality, or to the nature of the self, cannot be 'momentary consciousness', because according to Advaita, the self of the nature of awareness is changeless in all modes of time.⁷⁹ This dissonance becomes even more conspicuous when these terms can mean both momentary and constant awareness. The term *dr̥ṣṭimātra* appears within the lines where Prakāśānanda uses *vijñānamātra*. However, he states before concluding his text: *ātmano 'vilupta-dr̥ṣṭisvabhāsasya*, 'of the self, which is of the nature of ceaseless seeing' (VSM 172). Clearly, this *dr̥ṣṭi* which is constant and of the character of the self cannot be identified with the momentary awareness.

Adopting the twofold strategy of first rejecting difference between the object of awareness and awareness itself, and then leading to the non-dual nature of awareness in its conclusive sense, Prakāśānanda's pedagogy applies two steps. The initial step rejects the difference of object and the knowledge corresponding to that specific object. Prakāśānanda argues:

⁷⁹ Consciousness (*vijñāna*), according to Yogācāra, is not the ultimate reality; this rather is the root problem. See Lusthaus 2002, 533. The Advaitic *vijñāna*, in contrast, is the ultimate reality. For Yogācāra, the world is not mental projection, but rather, "what they claim is that we mistake our projected interpretations of the world for the world itself." Lusthaus 2002, 534.

pratyetavyapratītyoś ca bhedaḥ prāmāṇikāḥ kutaḥ?
pratītmātram evaitad bhāti viśvaṃ carācaram ||
jñānajñeyaprabhedena yathā svapnaṃ pratīyate |
vijñānamātram evaitat tathā jāgraccarācaram ||

VSM 18-19

How [could] the difference between appearance and the object of appearance be valid by means of knowledge? This world, sentient or insentient, manifests as appearance only. As a dream appears with a distinction [between] knowledge and [what is] known, this sentient or insentient waking world, in the same way, [is] merely awareness alone.

It can be argued that, while referring to the world, the terms *vijñānamātra* or *dr̥ṣṭimātra* or *pratītmātra* refer to something that is not real but rather projected due to ignorance. This being the case, these instances support the meaning of momentary awareness. However, he comes to a different understanding of *vijñānamātra* at the end of the sequence of arguments where he rejects difference. Although the refutation of difference appears to be projected toward rejecting the difference between cognition and the object corresponding to that cognition, there is no instance to support that he allows difference inherent to cognition, or in awareness-in-itself. His strategy is to reject 1) the difference between object and its knowledge at the phenomenal level, leading to the thesis that only awareness is what is cognized, that non-dual consciousness-in-itself manifests due to *vivarta* in multiple forms, and 2) the difference in instances of awareness so that the non-dual awareness remains self-confirmed, while the phenomenal experience of difference falls under the category of ignorance. The perception of the world, according to Prakāśānanda, is similar to perceiving cloth, while thread, the essential nature of the cloth, is compared with the self. His position is to demonstrate that plurality is the result of ignorance, and when this thesis is proved, he concludes that being the product of ignorance does not provide any degree of existence. When he propounds that the world is the product of ignorance, he adopts the *vivarta* method of analysis. But soon afterwards, he rejects the *vivarta* stance, saying that this method is for naïve individuals and that the reality has never appeared otherwise. This text, then, supports the argument that Prakāśānanda accepts only two truths,⁸⁰ accepting no distinction between conventional and illusory realities.⁸¹ He clarifies that this assertion of causality refers only to what is perceived due to error and is not intended to describe the reality.⁸²

This approach allows the interpretation of terms such as *pratīti* or *vijñapti* with the meanings of both momentary and constant awareness: when referring to the world,

⁸⁰ *sarvasya dvaitasya prāṇīkasattvam . . . VSM 29; prāmāṇikāve 'pi prapañcasya bhrāntabuddhisiddhau āntaravaiśaṃyam āśrītya vyāvahārikasattvābhīdhanāvirodhāt VSM 30.*

⁸¹ *brahmāṅgikāṅgī kṛtsnaṅgī kāryajātaṅgī jñānaṅgī jñeyarūpaṅgī tat sarvam avidyākam eva | iti prāṇīkam eva sattvaṅgī sarvasya iti siddham | VSM 38; avidyākalpiasya jagataḥ VSM 43.*

⁸² *ajñānam api jagatkāraṇaṅgī śruyā vivakṣitaṅgī, tasya bhraṇamīnītamātratvenaiva uktaṅgī kāryakāraṇavādasya vedāntabāhīrbhūtatvāt vivartasyaiva vidāntatvāt | kiṅ jagataḥ kāraṇam iti pṛṣṭe prāṇī-pratībhānīvṛttimātraprayojanatayā ajñānaṅgī kāraṇam iti abhīhitavāc ca | VSM 122-123.*

these terms refer to momentary awareness, while, when referring to the reality, they refer to the non-dual self, of the nature of constant awareness. Therefore, when Prakāśānanda uses *bhānamātra*, the commentator on VSM elaborates upon the meaning of *bhāna* as *prakāśa* and *caitanya*.⁸³ The common meaning of *bhāna* would be 'appearance', referring to false projection, but since what appears is ultimately the very self, then this term, in its inner sense, needs to be understood with the high meaning as well. Elsewhere, Prakāśānanda uses the term *vijñāna* to refer to the self. This understanding fits even with the use of *khyāti* (appearance), where he uses *nirvākaipakakhyāti* to refer to the reality (VSM 169). In his application of the term, *pratīti* for example, it connotes duality, accepting the dichotomy of object and its cognition. However, while referring to the reality, there is no difference between *pratīti* and the self.⁸⁵ In this context, Prakāśānanda states that the doctrine of *Vivarta* is instructional for naïve individuals and does not actually explain the truth.

In agreement with the thesis being discussed, Prakāśānanda uses the term *dr̥ṣṭi* in both cases, referring to momentary false appearance as well as to the constant non-dual awareness. There are instances where *dr̥ṣṭi* is qualified by *dvaita* (VSM 154, 172, 167), using *dr̥ṣṭi* in the sense of perceiving duality, while there are other instances where he qualifies *dr̥ṣṭi* with *phala* (result), indicating that the very *dr̥ṣṭi*, in its conclusive sense, refers to the self free from modifications:

dr̥ṣṭeḥ phalarūpāyā ātmasvarūpāntarbhāvena tatpariṇāmatvānupa-patteḥ

VSM 168

Since *dr̥ṣṭi* of the form of effect is included in the very form of the self, a change in that *dr̥ṣṭi* cannot be established.

Ekajīva

Though VSM does not utilize the term DS, there is explicit use of *EJ-vāda* (VSM 16). Prakāśānanda consistently advocates the *EJ* doctrine throughout the entire text. On the grounds that subsequent philosophers address him as a propounder of *DS* while he himself elaborates upon *EJ* and remains silent on *DS*, no objection can be made that Prakāśānanda's philosophy fits with *DSE*, the doctrine that accepts *DS* and *EJ* as identical. The arguments found in VSM in defense of the *EJ* doctrine echo the arguments of *Vimuktātman* (IS, Chapters: 5-8).

Prakāśānanda cites *Śvetāśvatara* 4.5 (VSM 17) in order to establish that there is only one ignorance. He advocates that the very Brahman assumes the *jīva*hood due to ignorance (VSM 16). The immediate problem, raised indiscriminately by both oppo-

⁸³ VSM, Bhaṭṭācārya edition, 1935, 89.

⁸⁴ *advaitam ātmaiva kevalo vijñānaghana VSM 73; "vijñānam ānandaṅgī brāhma"* cited in VSM 83.

⁸⁵ *adhīṣṭhānaṅgī tatpratītiś ceti dvayam eva dr̥ṣṭānte, atirīkṣapratītiḥpratyetavyayor asattvasya vyutpādanāt | dārṣṭāntike tu adhīṣṭhānaṅgī tatpratītiś ca dvayam api ātmaiva, svayamprakāśe pratītyantarānabhyupagamāt | VSM 170-171.*

nents and proponents of Advaita, is the issue of bondage and liberation when accepting the singularity of *jīva*. However, for Prakāśānanda, both bondage and liberation are similar to those states occurring in a dream, which are therefore not phenomenally real. This, then, does not constitute a problem (VSM 19).

Entities do not exist out of the domain of knowledge.

All the philosophers writing on DS generally agree on the maxim that entities exist within the domain of knowledge, or that an entity out of the domain of knowledge does not exist. In his writings, Prakāśānanda demonstrates awareness of this maxim when he utilizes it to reject the existence of external entities.

Prakāśānanda defends this concept by using the terminology of *ajñātasattva* (the entity of [what is] not-known) (VSM 101). He takes *ajñātasattva* as an antonym of *prāṭīka*, the entity that is appearing only.⁸⁶ On this ground, he comes to the conclusion that:

jagataḥ prāṭīksamakālinam eva sattvam ucitam

VSM 43

[It is] appropriate [that] the existence of the world is contemporaneous only with appearance.

The position that rejects the existence of an entity out of the domain of knowledge needs to be studied in light of the philosophy of Prakāśānanda's predecessors. He reaches this conclusion by a series of arguments that refutes difference. All of these arguments appear in systematic form in the IS of Vimuktātman, while Prakāśānanda simply synthesized these arguments.⁸⁷

For Prakāśānanda, the existence of what is cognized only, or the non-existence of that which is not cognized, does not lead to a simultaneous relationship between knowledge and what is known; rather, it leads to the validity of 'awareness only', whereby whatever is known is different from the essential knowledge nature which is the only reality. These arguments, if closely analyzed, resemble those presented by Vimuktātman while refuting the *sahopalambha* doctrine.

The problem with accepting the existence of entities within the domain of knowledge concerns recognition, because in the recognitive mode of awareness, what is required is the existence of an entity that is previously known, along with the entity being cognized at the moment of recognition. For this type of awareness to exist, what is essential is the possibility of an enduring entity even when it is not known. Prakāśānanda, however, posits that the recognitive mode of awareness is similar to the identity of erroneous perception by different people seeing a snake in a rope. If, Prakāśānanda argues, ten different people see a snake in a rope at the same moment, is

⁸⁶ ... kim ajñātasattvaḥ kim vā prāṭīkam eva | VSM 28; sarvasya dvaitasya prāṭīkasattvam aparityajya... VSM 29.

⁸⁷ Compare IS 3-27 and VSM 43-54.

that same snake seen by all? If this perception, including this identity of the entity erroneously perceived, is false, so also is this recognitive mode of awareness, replies Prakāśānanda (VSM 30-31).

The arguments, 1) that there are two levels of instruction and the model that instructs accepting the appearance of external entities is for less advanced aspirants, with one single reality of self-awareness in the higher sense of reality, 2) that there is no plurality in self-awareness and therefore this is solitary, and 3) that there exists nothing that is out of the domain of knowledge, conclusively place Prakāśānanda at the forefront of the DS doctrine. This synthesis, nevertheless, supports a dyadic understanding of DS, one as a model for the working level, and the other, the real instruction which is also the culmination of the instruction given in the basic level. And, the higher instruction is also 'no instruction', since, according to this perspective, there lies no instruction in the core of the reality.

Appayya Dīkṣita⁸⁸

Appayya Dīkṣita's *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* (SLS) is a significant text for understanding the varied doctrines within Advaita Vedānta. Appayya does not pay much attention to the DS concept; in fact, he only mentions it in passing while explaining causation of the phenomenal world. Though short, the notes Appayya provides present the basic concept clearly. Appayya, like Prakāśānanda or Madhusūdana, aligns the EJ doctrine with the DS thought.

Appayya presents one view while explaining causality of the phenomenal world, where the *jīva* alone is the cause of everything, because it is he who imagines everything, starting from being the Lord, like a perceiver of a dream.⁸⁹ Kṛṣṇānanda, in his commentary on SLS, identifies a DS-*vādin* as a follower of this view. This view is presented subsequent to the views of Sarvajñātman and Prakāśātman. According to Kṛṣṇānānkāra, this opinion is an alternative to *avaccheda* and *pratibimba* concepts, according to which Lordship is the first imagination of an individual self (SLSK 70-71). This statement opens the possibility of equating DS with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine, since the most established doctrine besides *pratibimba* and *avaccheda* is the *Ābhāsa* doctrine, credited to Sureśvara.

Another remarkable opinion presented in this sequence is that of Prakāśānanda. According to Appayya, the perspective discussed in the text *Siddhāntamuktāvāli* is

⁸⁸ Historians have long endeavored to fix the date of Appayya, and the latest position is that three persons have the same name. See V. Raghavan on *Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference* 1940, 176-180. The Appayya under consideration, the author of SLS, is generally dated circa 1550. See Dasgupta 1922, vol. II, p.218-220. Potter dates Appayya as 1585. See Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol.1.1. p. 593.

⁸⁹ *jīva eva svapnadraṣṭvat... svasminn īśvaratvādisarvakalpakatvena sarvakīraṇam ity aṅgi kecī* | SLS 70-71.

that the *māyāśakti* (the power of illusion) is the material cause, not Brahman. Brahman is mentioned as the material cause only in a metaphoric expression, based on the argument that Brahman is the support of illusion (*māyā*).⁹⁰

The first view can be found in SLS in an extended form when the 'singularity of *jīva*' is found when addressing the issue of the number of *jīvas* (SLS 122-127). Here, the singularity of the self is compared with Karṇa's assumption that he was the son of Rādhā, since he did not realize that he was in fact the son of Kuntī. Whether Karṇa is aware of it or not, what is significant is that he always remains the son of Kuntī. This example is noteworthy even in the sense that this category of illusion does not fit within the definition of either *pratibimba* or *avaccheda*, but instead, it most closely aligns with *Ābhāsa* and DS. The example given here fits the allegory of the prince taken care of by a hunter, as narrated by Śaṅkara in BĀUBh, which includes the statement that Brahman itself transmigrates due to ignorance, and is liberated by knowing itself.⁹¹ Appayya Dīkṣita cites a verse from BĀUBhVā to further support this position. In this verse, *jīva* is the originator (*kalpaka*) of all phenomena, including *īśvara*. Most noteworthy here is the attribution of the doctrine of a single subject (EJ) to Sureśvara. Kṛṣṇānanda explains that this single *jīva*-hood of the very Brahman may be seen by analyzing BĀUBhVā.⁹² The identification of this concept with BĀUBhVā is important for exploring the origins of DS—since this story of the hunter and prince is the central example of *ābhāsa* (appearance)—and provides further evidence for equating this concept with DS.

Appayya presents the following three models of EJ:

- 1) *ekaśarīraikajīva* (there exists a single body and a single *Jīva*);
- 2) Hiraṇyagarbha is the single *Jīva*.⁹³ When presenting this second model, Hiraṇyagarbha is called 'the reflection of Brahman' (*brahmapratibimba*), showing its connection to the *pratibimba* concept, whereas in order to denote falsity of the infinite, *Jīva*'s manifestation in form of appearance (*jīvābhāsa*) is used (SLS 126).
- 3) *aviśeṣānekaśarīraikajīvavāda* (a single *Jīva* has many bodies without any significant difference) (SLS 126-127). The example given here is that of a Yogi who imagines various bodies by the knowledge of *kāyavyūha*. The concluding sentence of this excerpt identifies this view with the followers of yoga.⁹⁴ Concurring with this

⁹⁰ *siddhāntamuktīvalīkṛtas tu māyāśaktir evopādānam na Brahma tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam abāhyam, na tasya kāryam karaṇam ca vidyate, ityādiśruteḥ jagadupādānamāyā-dhīṣṭhānātvena upacārād upādānam* SLS 78.

⁹¹ *brahmaiva svāvidyayā saṃsarati, svaīdyayā mucyate* is the line quoted for evidence in SLS 122.5-6.

⁹² *bhāṣyavārttikaparyālocanayā pratibimbabhāvādirahūtasya pūrṇābrahmaṇa eva jīvasve siddhe satīty arthaḥ* SLS-Kṛṣṇānānkāra 123.20-21.

⁹³ This fact suggests the *Upaniṣad*ic base of EJ doctrine is *Puruṣavidhābrahmaṇa*. BĀU 1.4.

⁹⁴ Yogic perception is a wide topic, addressed in several schools of Indian philosophy. Prakāśānanda, however, identifies this view with Nyāya. See VSM, p. 23.

identification, the YS of Patañjali explains that the yogin can project himself into many selves.⁹⁵

Among these three positions, the second and third positions may not be considered to be strong arguments in support of DS, whereas the first category clearly propounds DSE. A view Uddyotakara cites 'when the Lord is awake the whole world acts; when He rests peacefully, everything closes itself',⁹⁶ is similar to the second or the third position. If DS is understood as the doctrine that encompasses both these concepts, this will cover most of Advaita literature. To limit the scope of the DS under discussion, it needs to be clarified that the self which is immediately experienced is the only self in the most standard form of DS. Whenever DS is criticized, it is not criticized as the doctrine that accepts Hiraṇyagarbha as a single *Jīva*, but rather as a view that accepts the empirical self as the only self in existence. However, what is apparent is that Appayya, by allowing three models of the doctrine of *ekajīva* and by identifying EJ and DS, widens its scope.

The passage in which Appayya deals with DS (SLS 350-356) sheds further light on several aspects of the concept. As Madhusūdana defined it, Appayya, too, connects 'the existence of only the entities which are known' (*jñātaikasattva*) with DS, in that there exists nothing that is not-known.⁹⁷ According to Appayya, creation appears or occurs simultaneously with mental perception.⁹⁸ The *drṣṭi* addressed in this context does not refer to sensory perception, because, according to the concluding remark of the sentence under consideration, even experience in the waking state is not a sensory one.⁹⁹ With *kalpita* frequently used in DS texts, Kṛṣṇānanda's understanding of this term as *prātibhāsika*¹⁰⁰ is illuminating. Arguments that concern the six entities counted as beginningless occur twice in SLS, in the context of discussing creation as contemporaneous to its perception (SLS 351-352). Śaṅkara is brought forth as an authority to establish the view that the sentences that explain creation do not propound creation *per se*, but rather confirm the identity of the world with the Absolute.¹⁰¹ The passage explaining *jyotiṣṭoma* is cited as further evidence of DS (SLS 355).

Appayya ascribes to Prakāśānanda a further interpretation of the DS concept that accepts creation as identical with perception, and for evidence, cites one verse from

⁹⁵ *nirmānacittāny asmitāmātrān* YS 4.4.

⁹⁶ *yadā sa devo jāgati tadedam ceṣṭate jagat | yadā svapiti śāntātmā tadā sarvaṃ nīlīti ||* Uddyotakara on Nyāyavārttika, NyS 4.1.22.

⁹⁷ *kalpitasyajñātasatvam anupapannam* SLS 350.

⁹⁸ *drṣṭisamasamāyān sṛṣṭim upetya* SLS 350.

⁹⁹ *jāgradgajādyanubhavo 'pi na cakṣuṣa ity āhuḥ* SLS 350.

¹⁰⁰ *kalpitatvopagama itī prātibhāsikatvopagama ity arthaḥ* SLS-Kṛṣṇānānkāra 350.27.

¹⁰¹ *ādhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ niṣprapañcabrahmapratīpatīr bhavattī tatpratīpatyupāyatayā śrutiṣu sṛṣṭi-pralayoparyāsaḥ, na tātparyeṇeti bhāṣyādyudghoṣaḥ* SLS 353-354.

VP.¹⁰² Gaṅgādharendra, while summarizing the position presented by Appayya, states that those who consider the world as a mere form of knowledge are the followers of the *Smṛti*.¹⁰³ Even though Appayya and Gaṅgādhara relate this verse to the VP, it is not cited by Prakāśānanda.¹⁰⁴ Appayya is thus aware of two different interpretations: one presenting the argument that considers the existence of the world as contemporaneous perception, and the next accepting the testimony of VP on the identity of *dr̥ṣṭi* and *sr̥ṣṭi*. However, it is more likely that Appayya had some text other than VP in front of him while writing a compendium on the various models of Advaita Vedānta.

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The final point in this analysis of SLS concerns the nature of liberation. According to Appayya, the EJ doctrine propounds that the manifestation (*prapañca*) of the difference between *jīva* and *īśvara*, and so forth, which is imagined by one's own ignorance, dissolves with the rise of knowledge, giving rise to the final state of consciousness which is not differentiated by any particulars.¹⁰⁷ Appayya rejects this concept and instead establishes that *īśvara-bhāva* (lordship) is revealed in liberation. Before concluding his book, Appayya assigns the view of liberation he presented as EJ to the view of Auḍulomin.¹⁰⁸ Although no further material is available to establish the view of Auḍulomin, it is noteworthy that he is refuted by Bādarāyaṇa. This can be taken as a pivotal point in conceiving of Advaita as a meta-doctrine sufficiently flexible to maintain different doctrines within, in which even the arguments of Kāśakṛtsna cannot be forgotten (SLS 533-534). Kṛṣṇānanda justifies this, writing that the accu-

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¹⁰³ *dr̥ṣṭir eva hi viśvasya sr̥ṣṭir ity aparā vidhā | jñānasvarūpam evāhur ity etai smṛtyāntikāḥ || Vedāntasiddhānta-sūktimañjarī* 2.45.

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¹⁰⁵ *bhāṣyaṅkāḍiṣu tadadhyāse kāraṇatritayasampādanādīyamo vyarthaḥ* SLS 358.5-6.

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Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī

Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi: As Presented by Madhusūdana

Madhusūdana's exposition of DS and EJ is crucial in understanding the ramifications of DS within Advaita. He adheres to the *Vivaraṇa* stream of Advaita that includes the Vārttika literature within. The acceptance of both *Ābhāsa* and *Pratibimba* as a single doctrine can also be as early as Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā*, giving rise to the observation that the need for congruence within the doctrines was also a current issue before Vidyāraṇya flourished. The approach of Anandagiri falls into the same category. In this context, there are some points that make Madhusūdana the essential figure in the study of DS. He recognizes DS as EJ, refuting all arguments raised against DS and the single-subject doctrine as explicated in Vyāsafīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta*. He synthesizes different concepts in a single text, while refuting the text of his predecessor. The chapter on pure consciousness as the locus of ignorance in AS sheds enough light on common issues within DS and *Ābhāsa*, demonstrating that they both accept pure consciousness as the support and object of ignorance. As Madhusūdana is not a follower of the DS-*vāda* in all aspects, only the sections of his texts that shed light on DS-related issues will be closely examined.

In order to understand the contribution of Madhusūdana to DS, it is essential to explore what materials can be found in his writings and in the writings of his opponents including Vyāsafīrtha, whose text Madhusūdana countered. It is additionally valuable to trace the influence of Madhusūdana's writings upon his followers.

Excerpts from *Siddhāntabindu* (SB), AS, and *Advaitaratnaraṣaṇa* (ARR) give insight to his writings. SB highlights some essential factors concerning the position of DS in the Vedānta mainstream. After giving a gloss on various streams of Advaita, Madhusūdana concludes in the *Siddhāntabindu* that DS is the main Advaita doctrine (SB 224-237). Prior to reaching this conclusion, he analyzes a number of important doctrines and opinions, beginning with Sureśvara, and including those of Sarvajñātman, Padmapāda, and Vācaspati.

Madhusūdana's final position in this context further strengthens the same twofold argument on EJ that either 1). Image-consciousness (*bimba-caitanya*) concealed by ignorance is *īśvara* and consciousness as counter-image (*pratibimba*) in ignorance is

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jīva; or 2). Pure consciousness not concealed (*anupahita*) by ignorance is *Īśvara* and the consciousness concealed by ignorance is *jīva*. He considers this as the main Vedānta doctrine called EJ, identical with DS-*vāda*.¹¹⁰

As presented in this analysis on DS-*vāda*, the very self immediately experienced is the material and instrumental cause, due to self-ignorance. The external world that is being perceived is mere appearance (*prāṭītika*), and the erroneous conception of difference in the self is due to difference in bodies. Both bondage and liberation are imaginations of this very self: the very self imagines himself as bound, strives for liberation, and becomes free from bondage. In truth, the self is eternally free from bondage. As bondage is a construction of the self, so also is the process of liberation, since, in reality, the self is never bound. The Purānic source that explains the liberation of Śuka, for example, is merely an eulogium. The term 'tat' (that) in the major scriptural sentence 'tat tvam asi'¹¹¹ presents consciousness not concealed by ignorance through the terms such as endless (*ananta*), truth (*satya*), and so on.

The notion of the liberation of a single self as discussed in DSE needs to be viewed from the perspective of *Ābhāsa*. Now it becomes clear that the doctrine of *Ābhāsa* as propounded by Madhusūdana accepts a single witness-consciousness in all bodies, even though awareness manifests itself in each body. This witness consciousness is identified with *Īśvara*. *Sākṣin* is identical to the single *Jīva*, which Madhusūdana posits as the second doctrine of DS. Among the doctrines discussed here, the only one accepting a plurality of ignorance is the view credited to Vācaspati. DS has many points of disagreement with these views. The closest concept to DS as presented in the commentarial literature is that of Sureśvara. It is noteworthy that while presenting different views, Madhusūdana does not equate DS with the *Ābhāsa* doctrine of Sureśvara, even though he shows awareness of several convergences in these doctrines. It cannot be denied that his understanding of *dr̥ṣṭi* influenced the *Vivaraṇa* School, and this will become clear when discussing the meaning of DS as understood by Madhusūdana, who has similar, but not identical, doctrines in his mind while writing on DS.

ARR is another treatise of Madhusūdana which sheds further light on our understanding of DS. There is nowhere an unequivocal statement of DS in ARR, for, when explaining creation or empirical reality, Madhusūdana does not follow a single doctrine. When he states that the sentences propounding creation are propounding the illusory nature (ARR 2.18-19), he is not following the *Vivaraṇa* doctrine that *māyā* belongs to *Īśvara*. Therefore, this refers to some category beyond ordinary illusion, because, according to this position, 'consciousness only' is the highest reality and the world is imagined. The object of perception is equated with *māyā*, which, according

¹¹⁰ *mukhyo vedāntasiddhānta ekajīvaavadākhyāḥ | imam eva dr̥ṣṭisṣṭivādam ācakṣate | Siddhāntabindu in Daśasloki* 1, Subrahmanya Shastri ed., p. 262.

¹¹¹ This widely-known citation from ChU occurs as follows: ChU 6.8.7; 6.9.4; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3.

to the Advaita understanding, is as unreal as a dream.¹¹² Most remarkably, he places the statement of Śaṅkara between the statements of Sureśvara and Sarvajñātman, both of whom do not make a distinction between the empirical and the illusory. Thus, for Madhusūdana, the 'superimposition' (*adhyāsa*) of Śaṅkara corresponds to Sarvajñātman's example of mirage.¹¹³ The point which aligns him with DS is his definition of reality. All in all, Madhusūdana gives nine definitions of empirical reality, demonstrating various positions that he defends. Some of these definitions cover both the empirical and illusory states within the domain of *vyāvahārika*. This last point of Madhusūdana tallies with *Ābhāsa* and DSE, since in the doctrines of Padmapāda and Vācaspati, the empirical truth cannot be equated with an illusory truth, both bearing different degrees of reality.

The commentarial literature also supports the relationship of *Vāsiṣṭha* and the *Vārtika* with the DSE concept, made on the basis of the original texts. *Gurucandrikā* (GC) and *Laghucandrikā* (LC), two commentaries on AS written to criticize the re-establishment of duality and criticism of non-duality in the *Taraṅgiṇī*, which is itself a commentary on *Nyāyamṛta* that refutes the views of Madhusūdana, also contributes, to an extent, to our understanding of some tenets of DS. One line in AS refers to the textual evidence 'this is clearly mentioned in the *Vāsiṣṭha*, *Vārtika* nectar, and also in the source'¹¹⁴ without explicit clarification of what is meant by *Vārtikāmṛta* and *Ākara*. GC cites BĀUBhVā (1.5.119-122) as *Vārtikāmṛta*,¹¹⁵ which helps identify the *Vārtika* of Sureśvara as 'the *Vārtika* nectar'. By *Ākara* GC understands Śaṅkara's commentary on BS.¹¹⁶ While commenting on the DS chapter, GC quotes three verses from SŚ.¹¹⁷ Both GC and LC identify GKBh and the commentary of Ānandagiri as the source of DS.¹¹⁸ Two remarkable aspects regarding the DS model developed by Madhusūdana are that (1) DS is the highest Advaita method, and (2) *Vāsiṣṭha* is its primary source. The second point clearly demonstrates the influence of YV on the

¹¹² ... *cimātrasya paramārthasatyatvāt prapañcasya ca māyākalpātvena ... svapnavad anṛtatvāt* ARR 5.18.

¹¹³ *tad uktaṃ vārtikakṛdbhiḥ ... āropyaḍhiṣṭhānayoś ca sambandhābhāvo bhāṣyakāraih pratipādīyah ... vivṛtaṃ caitat sañkṣepasārīrakakāraih* ARR 5.19-23.

¹¹⁴ *vāsiṣṭhavārtikāmṛtādāv ākare ca spaṣṭam evoktam* AS 537. In the *Siddhāntabindu* on *Daśasloki* 8, Madhusūdana cites the *Vārtika* of Sureśvara, using this same phrase '*vāsiṣṭhavārtikāmṛta*' *Prakarāṇadvādaśi*, P.342, 1.1.

¹¹⁵ GC 345.

¹¹⁶ GC 345.

¹¹⁷ GC 345-346. The verses cited are from SŚ 2.162-163 and 2.83. It is noteworthy that the author of GC does not favor the title *Saṅkṣepasārīraka* but prefers *Śārīrakasañkṣepa*: GC 203, 205, 262, 345, 346; even though he uses this title also in verse 32; however, LC quotes this with the title *Saṅkṣepasārīraka*: LC 46.

¹¹⁸ GC 345, LC 537.

later scholastic Advaita.¹¹⁹ The incorporation of YV in scholastic Advaita and the appearance of the model of DS occur almost simultaneously in history. These facts suggest that the emergence of two distinct models of Advaita in the later scholastic period is the result of ongoing internal exegetic exercise as well as the assimilation of other Advaita streams of thought.

Influence of Madhusūdana

In addition to the commentators who wrote on *Advaitasiddhi* (AS), Ananta Paṇḍita, Sadānanda, and Dharmadatta Śarmā demonstrate the deep influence of Madhusūdana on their writings. Specifically, the section discussing DS in the *Svānubhūtinātaka* of Ananta Paṇḍita is a close reproduction of Madhusūdana's DS chapter.¹²⁰ The extent to which Ananta Paṇḍita paraphrases AS indicates that he is greatly influenced by Madhusūdana. While addressing DS, he adds very little to the materials previously established by Madhusūdana. Dharmadatta's *GūTT*, analyzed in the first chapter of this study in order to demonstrate the distinction between DS and SD, is a commentary upon Madhusūdana's writing. Most of the nuances of DS pointed out by Dharmadatta utilize the same DS section of AS. These facts suggest that Madhusūdana was considered an authority since the first half of the 17th century.

The description of EJ appearing in the *Bodhaikyāsiddhi* (BoS) of Acyutarāya with a citation from SB further supports the argument that Madhusūdana's writings on DS and EJ are considered as authoritative in the subsequent Advaita literature. Acyutarāya describes DS while in the context of propounding the model of EJ that supports the singularity of the empirical self (BoS, Ch. 7). Although he recognizes the possibility of having DS even when adopting the doctrine of Vācaspati (BoS 7. 25), his direct citation of AP (BoS 7.23, 7.27) and SB (BoS 3.21, 6.10, 7.38) in order to establish DS within the parameters of EJ confirms that he is in agreement with Madhusūdana regarding the categorization of the streams of Advaita philosophy. While other exegetes tend to cite KU or VP while establishing DS, Acyutarāya cites Gauḍapāda as an authority (BoS 7.10). The examples that Acyutarāya cites in BoS are not new to the discussion of DS, and do not expand its literature.

Madhusūdana and the Dualists

The vitality of Indian philosophy lies in its ability to bind similar concepts into streams of thought and develop a vibrant dialogue with rival schools, appropriating and transforming the scope of philosophical awareness. This tendency can be found even when reading specific concepts such as DS. The writings of Vyāsaśrītha and

¹¹⁹ The position of *Vāsiṣṭha* also requires explanation. Explicitly, by the term *Vāsiṣṭha*, the text *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is meant. In their writings, Prakāśānanda, or Madhusūdana refer to this text as *Vāsiṣṭha*, and Vidyāranya identifies it as *Vāsiṣṭha-rāmāyaṇa*.

¹²⁰ Compare *Svānubhūtinātaka* pp. 16-20 and the DS section in AS.

Vanamālin, the dualist philosophers before and after Madhusūdana, demonstrate their awareness of the issues related to DS. In order to understand the philosophy of DS as understood by its opponents, the central elements found in these criticisms warrant examination.¹²¹ Such study additionally demonstrates the constructive impact of philosophical argumentation upon rival schools that consolidated their arguments in this process, while finding limitations in the positions of their opponents.

First, Vyāsaśrītha's criticism of DS. In the example in KU, king Ajātaśatru awakens a sleeping man. Vyāsaśrītha, in a similar example, states that when Caitra sleeps, there is no body or mind within his domain of awareness. The body of Caitra is being experienced by Maitra, another subject in the waking state. The experience of Maitra that 'this is Caitra's body' is due to superimposition caused by ignorance, since the experience of 'body' is personal and so is not confirmed by another subject. If the body of Caitra does not exist when Caitra does not cognize, a problem emerges: then, how is there the recognition such as 'this is my body' in the case of Caitra experiencing his body or 'this is Caitra's body' for others who recognize him later? The reply given is that the recognition is like the recognition of a flame, which appears to be the same in subsequent moments.¹²² Both these examples that illustrate DS continue to appear in subsequent writings on Advaita. The statement of 'my body' is taken as an example of subjective experience. An underlying problem with the solipsistic position of a single 'mind only' emerges with the introduction of a second mind to demonstrate that it does not share the experience of the first mind. The example of the minds of Caitra and Maitra illustrates the doctrine of a second mind with the notion that my body is not with the person in deep sleep, rather it is imposed by the person in the waking state, as demonstrated by the fact that Caitra does not have a bodily experience even while Maitra is attributing a body to Caitra.¹²³

¹²¹ Nimbārka, while refuting DS, states that the position of DS is not acceptable, since the visualization of the Lord bears fruit, demonstrating the causal efficiency of the entities of appearance: *drṣṭisrṣṭir api naiva sammatā | darśanāt tava phalam yataḥ sthitam || sārthako bhavati yatra śabdakaḥ | sarva eva paradevatātmani || Kṛṣṇastavarāja* of Nimbārka 22. This indicates that Nimbārka follows the definition of reality that is based upon causal efficiency. This single citation, however, does not shed further light on the dualists' encounter with the doctrine of DS.

¹²² *caitre supṭe taddehādīkam taṃ prati nāsty eva | jāgrato maitrasya tu tad bhrāntyā bhūti | prayabhijñā tu so 'yaṃ āpa ityādivat bhrāntir iti* NA 467, Yogīndrānanda ed.

While Caitra sleeps there is no (experience of) his body, etc. for him. Through an error this (body of Caitra) appears to Maitra who is awake. The recognition (as this is the very Caitra, etc.) is an error like 'this is the very flame'. Vyāsaśrītha's citation of the passage of KU further supports this argument. See Yogīndrānanda 1984, 467.

¹²³ The issue regarding the altered state of subjective consciousness can be discussed further. There are two hypotheses necessary for understanding the problem under consideration. One is when Maitra gets the subjective notion of Caitra. The second is, Caitra is replaced by his double. In the first case, the others do not agree upon Maitra's subjective experience as Caitra, and in the second case, others accept the double as Caitra, but the double itself does not have any subjective experience.

Vyāsāfirṭha presents two models of the DS doctrine. The first one is as propounded by Madhusūdana, who, while criticizing Vyāsāfirṭha, establishes that there are six beginningless entities beyond the domain of DS. The second concept accepts entirely everything under DS, except for consciousness.¹²⁴ This second model is comparatively closer to the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. Within the second concept, the possibility of developing the strata of six beginningless entities¹²⁵ exists on the basis that ignorance is accepted as beginningless. This parallels the relation of ignorance with pure consciousness, having *jīva*hood as a precondition to ignorance.

A fundamental principle in Śāṅkara's doctrine is the notion of superimposition (*adhyāsa*). When DS is accepted, Vyāsāfirṭha points out that the doctrine of superimposition cannot be accepted, because in order to impose *x* upon *y*, two entities are required. This leads him to declare that, if DS is true, Śāṅkara is false. Except for consciousness free from modifications, there exists nothing else in the doctrine of DS. So, how can the doctrine of superimposition be reconciled with DS?¹²⁶ Furthermore, superimposition is mentioned as that which is caused due to not knowing, and in the case of DS, there is no entity that is not known.¹²⁷ If knowledge has different objects—such as 'this' (*idam*) and 'silver' (*rūpyam*) in the case of 'this is silver', when the silver is erroneously cognized — one knowledge cannot sublimate another and cause erroneous perception.¹²⁸ Moreover — following the DS doctrine — even

¹²⁴ *dr̥ṣṭvānyasya sarvasya dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭīve* NA 460-461.

¹²⁵ *jīva īso viśuddhā cit tathā jīveśayor bhūda | avidyā taccitor yogaḥ śad asmākam anādayaḥ ||* While establishing DS, Madhusūdana quotes this verse in AS without mentioning its source; Sastri's edition of AS, p. 534, ll. 2-3. Following this verse (cited above), *Jīva, Īśvara*, pure consciousness, the difference between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, ignorance itself, the union of ignorance with pure consciousness; these six are counted as beginningless. This model follows the *Vivaraṇa* school; otherwise, *jīva* and *Īśvara* were not separate from pure consciousness (*viśuddhā cit*). In the model of a single *jīva*, the very *Jīva* imagines himself as *Īśvara*, the concept which reduces one separate category. Under this model, there is no separate category of the creation pertaining to an individual and to that of the Lord. But the model Madhusūdana defends follows these six beginningless categories, while Prakāśānanda or Amarānanda are silent about this concept.

¹²⁶ As categorized in later scholastic Advaita, two different definitions of *adhyāsa* remain problematic: the first is *taṣṭha-lakṣaṇa* (indifferent definition), and the second, *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* (internal definition). *sukādamāṁśasyāpi rūpyavad idam rūpyam iti jñānāt prāg asaivtena samprayogādāhetu-trayaṅanyatvarūpasyādītyāsaṭaṣṭhalakṣaṇasya, satyasya mithyāvastusam̐bhedaiva-bhāsavatīrasvarūpalakṣaṇasya cāyogāc ca |*

[In the example of silver that appears, where there is actually only a shell], there is no '*idam*' or '*this*' part, or any silver before having knowledge that '*this is silver*' [and therefore] even the *taṣṭha-lakṣaṇa* (modal definition) of *adhyāsa* (superimposition) as 'caused by three causes like sense-object contact etc.', and *svarūpalakṣaṇa* (substantial definition) as 'the appearance of the true object being conjoined with the false object' would not fit. NA 461.

¹²⁷ *idam rūpyam iti jñānakāle sukātvāder abhāvenādhyāsasya tadajñānakāryatvādīprakṛtyāvirodhāc ca* NA 462.

¹²⁸ ... *idam rūpyam iti jñānāyor bhinnaviśayatvena bādhyabādhakabhāvanūpapattes ca. . .* NA 462-463.

sublatory knowledge is considered to be false. The problem arises: how can one false knowledge be more reliable than another when the knowledge of *x* sublates the knowledge of *y*?¹²⁹ This problem raised by Vyāsāfirṭha appears to be the most difficult one for Madhusūdana to resolve. Although Madhusūdana does not defend the *taṣṭha* type of definition, pointing out that this is for those who possess a lower aptitude for realization, he defends the second, or *svarūpa* type of definition, wherein the appearance of a real thing is in the false form. If pure 'consciousness only', free from modification, is accepted as the doctrine of DS, there is no necessity for defending this position. As Madhusūdana defends another version of DS, in which all is only false appearance, then in this case, his defense of the *svarūpa* definition fits.

Another counter-argument made by Vyāsāfirṭha on DS is that this doctrine cannot establish recognition. Whether recognition is a valid means of knowledge or is not within the domain of valid means continues to be an issue in the ongoing debate in classical Indian philosophy. The process of recognition depends upon two aspects: one is mental and the other is sensory. When it is established that 'this is that very Devadatta' then there exists the possibility that one Devadatta is in memory and another Devadatta is being directly perceived. Vyāsāfirṭha points out that there will never be such knowledge if knowledge differs in each moment.¹³⁰ Madhusūdana replies this problem with an illustration of the recognition of a flame, which is different in each moment. This reply definitely aligns his argument closely with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. In this sense, the charge of Vyāsāfirṭha that DS appropriates the Sautrāntika doctrine of momentariness seems to have some validity.¹³¹ His next argument against DS is similarly important. He argues, if in each dissolution or in each deep sleep one merges into the very nature of the self and then comes back, what is the value of liberation, as eventually even a liberated one returns to transmigrating?¹³² To solve this, Advaitins admit the effect of impressions (*vāsanā*), which cause a return to the waking state for as long as there is impression.

Vanamālin criticizes the DS section of Madhusūdana in the context of establishing Mādhva dualism.¹³³ The *Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭibhaṅga* (refutation of DS) section of his text,

¹²⁹ ... *rūpyātibādhasyāpi dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭīvena tena rūpyāder mithyāvāsiddhes ca |* NA 463.

¹³⁰ *pratyabhijñātvirodhāc ca, dīpādaḥ parimāṇādibhedakasyeveha bādhasyābhāvat, tadabhāve 'pi bhrāntirve ca ghaṭāder apy ekasminn api kṣaṇe bhedasāmano 'pi pratikṣaṇam bhedasya ca prasāṅgāt | so 'yaṅ devadatta ityādīdr̥ṣṭāntena tattvamasāyādaḥ jahadaṣṭhalakṣaṇayaiḥyaparavoktyayogāc ca, atīrabhedasyāpi dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭīvena tajjñānasya bādhatvāyogāc ca |* NA 464-466.

¹³¹ *yac ca bauddhābhimataṣṭhaṅkavāsiddhyartham. . .* NA 461.

¹³² ... *suṣuptīpralayādaḥ jīvabrahmavibhāgasyāpratītatvenāvīdyamānatayā pratyahaṅ prapīpralayam ca muktasya punarāvṛtīyāpātāc ca, suptam̐ prati saṅskārāder apy abhāvena tasya punarudbodhāyogāc ca |* NA 463.

¹³³ Vanamāliniśra flourished between 1575-1650 CE. He explicitly mentions Vyāsāfirṭha (1478-1539 CE), and Dīdhiti of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi (1477-1547 CE). Dates are given in his manuscripts: *Mārutamaṅḍana* (1685 CE), and *Śrūtisiddhāntadīpikā* (1692 CE). For further details see Khuperkar, 1968, Introduction, XXIV. He is mentioned as having written at least fifteen texts. The major texts

Śrutisiddhāntaprakāśa, demonstrates his familiarity with Madhusūdana's writings, although this section hardly contributes any new elements to the already-established debate. It is nonetheless noteworthy that Vanamālin accepts illusory appearance, including erroneous perception within the domain of DS.¹³⁴ This claim deviates from the general assumption of the Mādhyama that all that comes to knowledge is real. Wherever he has not added new material, he follows the same lines of NA. He also observes that DS leads to the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness by accepting that what is empirical is equal to dream. He argues that if DS is followed, pure consciousness, which the scriptures equate with knowledge, equals a dream-creature, and so will be false.¹³⁵ The consequence Vyāsaśrī had shown in the *svartūpalakṣaṇa* of Brahman was re-established in AS. Namely, when we say 'this is silver', there are two parts: one part is 'this', and the other is 'silver'. In the context of error, the 'this' part is the foundation of the cognition as 'silver', and it is the 'silver' that is falsely perceived, not 'this' part. This is the common Nyāya theory of error accepted even by Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas. Vanamālin states that if the part 'this' is to be real, then there is also 'the property of being perceived' (*drśyatva*).¹³⁶ To accept any object as perceived constitutes a fallacy, following DS. He further adds that, in the moment when there is a conception that 'this is silver,' no shell exists, along the lines of DS (since only 'that which is known' exists). It is therefore not possible to state that superimposition is due to ignorance of that i.e., shellhood, for instance.¹³⁷ In this type of error, it is not likely that, even after correct knowledge, false perception continues. The case with the perception of two moons or a hair-bundle could be different, in that these objects persist even after knowing that these are 'false'. In such cases, the appearance of the real object comes only after the cause of the generation of false perception ceases. This is significant in the context of the debate as to whether a realized one continues to perceive the world. The common reply is that, due to impression, perception continues. A stance which simultaneously accepts that impressions exist even though not known, and that there exists only what is known, is contradictory in itself.¹³⁸

In the sequence of this discussion, Vanamālin responds to some arguments of Madhusūdana. Madhusūdana's explication on the passage, 'when this [man] was asleep here' (*yatraiṣa sūpto 'bhūt . . . BĀU 2.1.17*), brings the discussion to time, rather than space, with regard to deep sleep. Vanamālin finds this explanation difficult, because the passage, while remaining silent about time, continually mentions 'the space within the heart' (*. . . ya eṣo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāśa . . . BĀU 2.1.17*), so that the

among them are: *Brahmasūtrasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, *Madhvamukhālaṅkāra*, *Śrutisiddhāntatīpikā*, *Śrutisiddhāntaprakāśa*, *Nyāyāmṛtasauṅgandhya*, and *Śrutisiddhāntasaṅgraha*.

¹³⁴ *prapañcabhinna eva tadāṅgikāraucityāt Śrutisiddhāntaprakāśa*, 111. 9.

¹³⁵ *śrutibodhyaśuddhacīto 'pi svāpnikavan mīṭhyātvāpateḥ ca* Ibid, 111. 14-15.

¹³⁶ *idamaṃśāvaccinnasya satyatve tatra drśyatvāder vyabhicārāpateḥ* Ibid, 111: 18-19.

¹³⁷ *idaṃ rūpyam iti dhūkāle śukrīvāder abhāvenādhyāsasya tadajñānakāryatvādimatahāneś ca* Ibid, 111: 19-20.

¹³⁸ *ajñātasya'pi saṅskārādeḥ kāraṇātmanāvasthānāṅgikāre ardhajarāṇīnyāsyañucitavena dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭimatasyaivānādaratīyatvāt* Ibid, 111: 23-24.

meaning Madhusūdana has derived can hardly be true. After refuting the views of Madhusūdana, he adds his own opinion, writing that the individual self, though of the form of bliss and awareness, is veiled due to ignorance and so suffers in the world; nonetheless, due to the grace of the Lord, he eventually becomes free from ignorance and liberates with the revelation of complete bliss. With these developments, Vanamālin shows his independence from the Vaiṣṇava predecessors in his philosophy. These criticisms demonstrate the central position that Madhusūdana's AS held in the later scholastic Indian philosophical debate.

Sadānanda

Among the post-Madhusūdana works, *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* (ABS) of Sadānanda alone provides unique information about DS. Contrary to the other positions, the model of Advaita which Sadānanda identifies with DS follows Vācaspati's doctrine of *Avaccheda*, in which subjective consciousness is identified as the limitation of pure consciousness. If Sadānanda is correct, then the fundamental premise that DS is aligned with *Ābhāsa* rather than the *Avaccheda* doctrine of Vācaspati requires revision. It is therefore necessary to analyze the DS and *Avaccheda* doctrines following the understanding of Sadānanda.

The ABS, being a relatively late text, does not provide much information concerning the DS-doctrine; however, the passage in which Sadānanda discusses both *Avaccheda* and DS clearly illuminates his understanding thereof. First, it appears that the author sees a possibility of connecting DS with *Avacchedavāda*.¹³⁹ Solomon concludes that this was Sadānanda's primary position regarding DS (Soloman 1985, 92-93). Investigation of ABS shows that Sadānanda treats the *Pratibimba*, *Avaccheda*, and DS doctrines separately.¹⁴⁰ The identification of DS with the *Avaccheda* doctrine, as suggested by Solomon, is problematic when considering that Sadānanda identifies DS with EJ and interprets the *Avaccheda* doctrine as adopting multiple *jīvas*.

A comparative study of ABS and VSM reveals how the texts were composed with growing misunderstandings of the later classical writers. The whole chapter of *Avacchedavāda* in ABS derives from VSM with only a few minor changes.¹⁴¹ In the process of developing *Avacchedavāda*, Sadānanda removes verses from VSM and alters only a few words. While relating DS to any specific model of Advaita, it is necessary to analyze how Prakāśānanda defines himself in relation to other models. It is unlikely that he would align his thought with *Avacchedavāda*, because he speaks primarily against the doctrines of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, who are the proponents of this

¹³⁹ *bhavatu avacchedavādapūrvakadr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivādah | sr̥ṣṭid̥ṣṭisammatapratibimbavāde tu katham nīrvāhaḥ* ABS 264.

¹⁴⁰ See ABS 247-250 for *Pratibimbavāda*, 250-258 for *Avacchedavāda* and 258-264 for *Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*.

¹⁴¹ Compare: VSM 29.1-30.2 and ABS 252.10-252.18; VSM 30.6-32.2 and ABS 251.17-252.10; VSM 32.5-38.5; ABS 252.19-254.11; VSM 164.7-167.3 and ABS 255.18-258.15.

model of Advaita. If what Sadānanda means by *Avacchedavāda* is the same doctrine as that propounded by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, then all the references he gives to elaborate the doctrine will turn against himself. In conclusion, ABS has caused a series of misunderstandings in Vedāntic studies by assigning DS-*vāda* to Maṇḍana and Vācaspati rather than resolving the issues.

In this sequence, it is essential to excavate what is understood by Sadānanda as DS. Sadānanda opens the chapter concerning DS in his ABS presenting various positions accepted by Śaṅkara, and presents an illustration of highest doctrine the example in which Karṇa, the son of Kuntī, considers himself to be the son of Rādhā. While discussing this example, Sadānanda quotes Sureśvara,¹⁴² which shows the relationship of the doctrine of subjective illusion with Sureśvara's teachings as a commonly recognized fact on later scholastic Advaita. Sadānanda cites a verse in this very sequence that accepts the doctrine of *vivarta* as an instruction only for naifs.¹⁴³ This verse, however, was assigned by Prakāśānanda to the *Smṛtis*.¹⁴⁴

While introducing verses from VP, Sadānanda relates them to the DS doctrine, confirming that this Vaiṣṇava text is central to the establishment of this concept.¹⁴⁵ This same verse is also cited by Appaya Dīkṣita to establish DS (SLS 355). Both Sadānanda and Appaya consider VP as one of the sources of DS.

On the basis of this evidence, it becomes clear that the *Avaccheda* doctrine Sadānanda had in mind did not match the one of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. All the tenets regarding causation, the support and object of ignorance, the number of individual selves, and the means of liberation differ from the doctrine of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. While explaining the doctrine of *Avaccheda*, he cites the verse '*avidyāyonayo. . .*' (ABS 254).¹⁴⁶ He cites VSM to explain the existence of merely known entities.¹⁴⁷ In summary, the doctrine of *Avaccheda* propounded by Sadānanda is much closer to the *Ābhāsa* doctrine of Sureśvara.

¹⁴² *rājasūnoḥ. . .* BĀU, *Sambandhabhāṣyavārtika* 33-34. In this very sequence Sadānanda cites another verse from BĀUBhVā 1.4.1157.

¹⁴³ *bālān prati vivarto 'yaṃ brahmanāḥ sakalaṃ jagat | avivartitam ānandam āsthitāḥ kṛtinaḥ sadā ||* ABS 259.

¹⁴⁴ VSM 173. This verse first appears in RC 31.116.

¹⁴⁵ *jñānasvarūpam evāhur jagad etad vicakṣaṇāḥ | arthasvarūpaṃ bhṛāmyantaḥ paśyanty anye kudṛṣṭayaḥ || tasmān na vijñānam ṛte stī kiñcit | kvacit kadācit dvīja vastuḥjātam || vijñā-nam ekaṃ nī-jakarmabheda-vibhinnacittair bahudhābhūpeyam || yadā samastadeheṣu pumān eko vyavasthitaḥ | tadā hi ko bhavān ko 'ham ity evaṃ viphalam vacaḥ || sītanīlādibhedena yathaikaṃ dṛśyate nabhaḥ | bhṛāntadṛṣṭibhir ātmāpi tathaikaḥ san pṛthak pṛthak ||* ABS 262.

¹⁴⁶ However, it does not appear that he was using a primary source while citing this verse, since the immediate discussion relates to VSM, the text in which this verse appears.

¹⁴⁷ *ātmastatvaiva dvaitasya satā nānyā yatas tataḥ | ātmān eva jagat sarvaṃ dṛṣṭe dṛṣṭam śrute śrutam ||* ABS 255, VSM 56, p. 164.

Conclusion

On the basis of the facts that have surfaced in this chapter, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the categorization of 'seeing' found in Sarvajñātman's writing, based upon one's intellectual ability to grasp the nature of the reality, can be compared with the views that have been addressed in sequence by Amarānanda. This similarity is further confirmed by the fact that Amarānanda acknowledges Advaita as a yogic approach, with the very title of the text, *Svātmayoga*, suggesting this, along with the plethora of terms connected with yoga that he coins. This hierarchy indicates that the various models developed by the Advaita exegetes are the ways reality can be recognized by different levels of aspirants, rather than being exclusive theories where different interpretations of the same reality cannot be simultaneously valid. Amarānanda's reliance upon VP in order to establish the doctrine of DS also explains that, for the specific interpretation of DS to be consistent with the instances found in SYPP, it must accept *dṛṣṭi* as pure awareness and not as illusory appearance.

We can conclude on the basis of the elements found in Vidyāraṇya's writings and discussed in this chapter that:

- 1) The KU passage that is traditionally recognized as the source of the concept of DS has deep sleep at the core of its hermeneutics and leads to the doctrine that accepts the existence of only that what is cognized.
- 2) The issue that leads to the emergence of DS philosophy is epistemological, with analysis of what has been immediately cognized remaining at the center of argumentation.

Another significant aspect surfaced in the description above is that Prakāśānanda's approach connects the *Ābhāsa* and DS doctrines through his reliance upon Sureśvara's philosophy on one hand and the influence of YV on his writing on the other. Appaya's gloss as well as the VSM of Prakāśānanda both confirm EJ as an essential element of the doctrine of DS. Although Madhusūdana's interpretation of *dṛṣṭi* opens up several possibilities of understanding the doctrine of DS, he is nonetheless consistent in relating the DS and EJ doctrines. In light of the doctrine of DS found in the writings of his predecessors, it may be more reasonable to reexamine the contradictory elements found in Sadānanda's writings, rather than assigning the concept of DS to some specific models, as this identification contradicts with the development of this concept that had remained consistent in connecting this philosophy and *Ābhāsa* in the writings prior to Sadānanda's time.

This investigation demonstrates that, although the later classical writers did analyze Advaita within distinct frameworks, the early Advaitins were silent about these differences. Comparatively speaking, the *Ābhāsa* model is closer to the DS doctrine and the terminology favored by the philosophers propounding *Ābhāsa* can be considered as the source for the subsequent emergence of DS and EJ doctrines. The claim of the dualists that the DS doctrine fits with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness echoes the rhetoric that Advaita philosophy is Buddhism in disguise. This undermines the subtle distinctions and ignores the central tenets that have remained constant in the flux of the history of Advaita.

The passage from KU that advocates the origination of the world from the self that undergoes deep-sleep has remained at the core of this analysis. If the concept of EJ is propounded on this ground, this is not the model of Hiranyagarbha, as the passage does not explain the cosmic self going into deep sleep, but rather, identifies the very individual self. However, with examination of pertinent citations from VP, these passages can support the Hiranyagarbha model of EJ as well. Subsequent Advaita exegetes identify EJ with DS. In order to examine such identification, it is essential to know how the concept of DS has been applied in a dynamic historical context. Although this chapter has analyzed specific concepts related to DS, a separate treatment is required in order to understand what exactly is meant by the term DS when used by different philosophers. The third section of this volume focuses upon this issue.

III: THE MEANING OF *DRṢṬISRṢṬI*

Chapter 6: Early Sources

The tradition of Vedānta relies upon the *Upaniṣads* as the fundamental texts. Various interpretations that include dualist and non-dualist thought stream out from the *Upaniṣadic* exegesis. Linguistic analysis plays a vital role in establishing the parameters through which these contrasting understandings emerge. An examination of how the *drṣṭisrṣṭi* is used throughout the history of Advaita philosophy is necessary for understanding the varied nuances of its subtle meanings. Between the 8th and 16th centuries, philosophers writing their treatises in the non-dualistic model of Vedānta tradition developed a wide range of interpretation of this specific term *drṣṭisrṣṭi*. This diversity highlights the importance of comprehending this term within the parameters defined by classical philosophers. A lack of serious attention paid to this concept in contemporary studies has led to misleading conclusions concerning the history and philosophy of DS. In an effort to correct these misconceptions, this chapter begins with an exploration of the history of the terms *drṣṭi* and *drṣṭisrṣṭi* in their philosophical context. The focus of this chapter ranges from the exegesis of *drṣṭi* as manifest in the writings of various commentators upon *Upaniṣadic* passages, to the composition of independent texts elaborating on this notion.

Before beginning to explore in any systematic manner the various interpretations of *drṣṭisrṣṭi*, it is important to consider the manner in which specific instances of language used within the context of Indian philosophical discourse end up being shaped by whatever particular theory of language that the text in which they appear happens to espouse. In essence, the theory of meaning as accepted in the school under discussion needs to be considered when determining the meaning of particular terms in the given school. *Drṣṭi*, or rather that to which it refers, is itself not exactly 'a concept', but rather claims to be the pure awareness which supports all concepts. Thus it should be considered, not as a thing-in-itself, but rather as a device for indicating some other end, the nature of which it can neither contain nor explicate. At best, DS should be seen as a structure within language that provides a method for escaping from language and its limitations in their entirety. The aim of DS, ironically, is to employ DS in a manner that brings one into an awareness of the actual relationship between the perceiver and the perception, with the recognition that when such an awareness is contained, DS, the vehicle by which it was recovered, is itself recognized as inaccurate and irrelevant.

The 'seeing' of the self

Classical exegetes often justify their interpretation of specific concepts and technical terms by tracing the *Upaniṣadic* evidence. This necessitates an exploration of the possible use of the term *dr̥ṣṭi* in the *Upaniṣads*. The term *dr̥ṣṭi* occurs in the following passage:

paśyan vai tan na paśyati, na hi draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭer viparītopo' sti
BĀU 4.3.23¹

While seeing, he does not see that, there is no cessation of the seeing of the agent of perceiving.

This passage plays a central role in the development by classical philosophers of the concept that awareness is constant seeing in itself and is considered as absolute pure consciousness. BĀU 3.4.2 uses this term again: 'you cannot see the agent of the act of seeing' (*na dr̥ṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ paśyeh*). In this instance, *dr̥ṣṭi* is not the Absolute, higher than the perceiver, but instead has an agent that perceives. This perceiver can be compared with 'witnessing awareness' (*sākṣin*), as per the concept frequently found in post-Śaṅkara Advaita terminology.² In another *Upaniṣadic* usage, the term *dr̥ṣṭi* does not correspond to consciousness in itself, but rather to its modification, which is considered to be the light within a man. Following this meaning found in the CU, *dr̥ṣṭi* can be compared with 'sensation', and is of the same category as 'hearing' (*śruti*), in which the act of knowing (*vi+√jñā*) is due to *dr̥ṣṭi*.³ Among the citations of *dr̥ṣṭi* found in the *Upaniṣads*, the KU passage is the reference most directly equating *dr̥ṣṭi* with 'awareness':

tasyaiśaiva dr̥ṣṭir ead vijñānam
KU 3.3

This indeed is the seeing of the self {*tasya*}, this is awareness.

References found in the *Upaniṣads* suggest that the term *dr̥ṣṭi* denotes two types of seeing, the first, free from mental construction, and the second, of the character of mental modification. In the first case, *dr̥ṣṭi* is awareness, the essential nature of seeing, and in the second meaning, it is the perception or conception seen by an agent of

¹ This passage deserves to be translated differently from the perspectives of Bhartṛprapañca, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara. The problem in revealing this subtle difference in a plain translation is not new; over the centuries, commentators of BĀU have faced this problem in reconciling this text with their respective understandings of *dr̥ṣṭi*.

² Gupta argues that the concept of the 'witnessing self' (*sākṣin*) is a later development. See Gupta 1998, 19. However, a reference suggests the existence of this concept from the later *Upaniṣadic* time:
eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḥyaḥ, sarvavyāpī sarvabhūtānītarāmā | karmādhyaḥṣaḥ sarvabhūtādhivāsaḥ sākṣi cetā kevalo nirguṇaś ca || Śvetāśvatara 6.11.

In this *Upaniṣadic* passage, *sākṣin* is unitary and divine, rather than individual and transmigrating. The Advaita interpretation of the witnessing self is identical with consciousness, whereas Rāmānuja identifies the self as the possessor of consciousness. BSṭ 2.3.18.

³ ... *yad idam asmīn antaḥ puruṣe jyotiḥ | tasyaiśa dr̥ṣṭiḥ | CU 3.13.7-8.* 'This light which [is] within the *puruṣa*, this [is] the seeing of *puruṣa* {*tasya*}.'

perception. This dichotomy underlies the serious debate between the dualists and non-dualists that resulted in distinct understandings of the DS-doctrine.

The writings of Auḍulomin that advocate the doctrine of consciousness alone as the ultimate reality are lost, except for citations by Bādarāyaṇa. Bādarāyaṇa presents 'consciousness only' as the state of liberation, following the Advaita model of Auḍulomin.⁴ Scarcely any information about this philosopher exists, except for the citations of Bādarāyaṇa and commentaries by various exegetes on those passages. It is evident that Bādarāyaṇa does not agree with this particular understanding of *citīmātra*, as it appears as a *prima facie* position. Presumably Auḍulomin followed some sort of 'identity in difference' (*bhedābheda*) model of instruction (Nakamura 1983, 382-383). Following one of the meanings to be discussed, if *dr̥ṣṭi* is understood as consciousness, *dr̥ṣṭimātra* is simply a variation of the term *citīmātra*.

The early debate in Vedānta that cites Auḍulomin concerns the nature of the self as understood by the thinkers in terms of the *Upaniṣadic* tradition. Bādarāyaṇa suggests that, besides the realization of pure consciousness, natural bliss reveals when one becomes liberated. In contrast, the concept attributed to Auḍulomin seems to accept 'consciousness only', avoiding bliss as the primordial nature of the self. Śaṅkara subsequently reconciles these two concepts so that the attributes of a liberated self are seen from the phenomenal perspective (*vyavahārāpekṣayā*), whereas 'consciousness only' emerges from the perspective of realization (*paramārthataḥ*) (BSṭBh 4.4.7).

Bādarāyaṇa's use of the term *dr̥ṣṭi* does not refer to pure consciousness, but rather denotes 'visualization', or 'viewing something'.⁵ According to most commentators, including Śaṅkara, the term *brahmadr̥ṣṭi* occurring in BS refers to the practice of viewing oneself as Brahman. The notion of this *dr̥ṣṭi* is that one imposes certain ideas upon oneself, and this visualization culminates in the viewer being one with the object of visualization.

The model suggested by Auḍulomin, i.e., the self as merely *citi* (consciousness) alone, and confirmed subsequently by Śaṅkara as the statement considering reality, can be compared with the model of liberation suggested by Patañjali in his YS. Patañjali separates consciousness from the constituents of Prakṛti, and attainment of isolation (*kaivalya*),⁶ according to Patañjali, is 'abiding in one's own form' (*svatūpa pratiṣṭhā*), which is identical to the power of consciousness (*citiśakti*) (YS 4.34). This

⁴ *citi tanmātreṇa tadātmakatvād ity auḍulomiḥ* BSṭ 4.4.6.

⁵ ... *taiḥ dr̥ṣṭyupadeśāt* ... BSṭ 1.2.26; *Brahmadr̥ṣṭir utkarṣāt* BSṭ 4.1.5.

⁶ *kaivalya* is generally understood as liberation. This term does not convey the same semantic resonance as *mokṣa*, which literally means liberation. The term *kevala*, having the suffix *valac* in the meaning *svārtha* (itself or oneself) from the base *ka*, is basically 'to rest upon oneself'. See the entries *kevala* and *kaivalya* in Apte 1996; Larson 1969, 12, 13, 17, 93-94, 201-206, 208, 274-275.

is the true nature of the self. The self in Sāṅkhya terminology is *puruṣa*, the term *ātman* being more common to Vedānta schools.⁷

Puruṣa, in Patañjali's terminology, is often connected with *draṣṭṛ* (perceiver) or *drś* (seeing).⁸ *Drś*, or 'seeing only',⁹ is synonymous with *puruṣa*,¹⁰ which is *draṣṭṛ* (perceiver).¹¹ Significantly, 'seeing' is equated with the 'perceiver', and 'the aware' subject becomes 'awareness' itself. The perceiver in its original nature is *dr̥śīmātra* in its *śuddha* or 'isolated form', while continuously perceiving 'mental constructions' (*pratyaya*). In Patañjali's terminology, this *pratyaya* can be replaced by *vytti*. He never uses terms from the verbal derivation of *√drś* to demonstrate mental modification, while the terms derived always identify the essential nature of the self.

Seeing as linguistic act

The first palpable impact of BĀU 4.3.23 can be traced through the grammarian's concept of *paśyantī*.¹² Classical Sanskrit grammarians ranging from Bhartṛhari to Maṇḍana identify speech (*vāc*) as having three categories: *paśyantī*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*, with *paśyantī* considered to be the highest.¹³ To understand how *paśyantī* could have been considered as the primordial and absolute word principle, the constantly seeing nature, it is necessary to accept *paśyantī* itself in two forms: 'unveiled' (*[vi]śuddhā*) and 'veiled' (*āvṛtā*).¹⁴ The higher, or unveiled, aspect of *paśyantī* is beyond 'empirical use' (*loka-vyavahāra*).¹⁵ However, this does not suggest that, in Bhartṛhari,

⁷ The concept of *puruṣa*, including the term itself, is not necessarily of Sāṅkhya origin. The Advaitic notion of *puruṣa* appears to have been developed upon the foundation of the Vedic hymn to the cosmic *Puruṣa* (compare Ṛgveda 10.90, and the *Puruṣavidhābrāhmaṇa* section in the BĀU). This monistic concept of *puruṣa* does not elaborate upon the dualistic notion of *Puruṣa* as addressed in the school of Sāṅkhya. *Puruṣavāda* may have been an early name for the school of Advaita. For instance, Mallavādin, in his *Dvādaśāraṇayacakra* (specifically part I, pages 202-233), does not criticize the Sāṅkhya concept in his chapter on *Puruṣa*; rather he criticizes the Advaita doctrine.

⁸ YS 2.6; 2.17; 2.25. Remarkably, the use of these terms is located only in the second chapter of YS.

⁹ Several writers translate *dr̥k* as 'subjective consciousness' or 'subjective power of consciousness,' even though no subject is inherent in this term. If we follow Patañjali's analysis that *dr̥k* is the self, then it is not subjective awareness, but the 'awareness in itself.'

¹⁰ Vyāsa's commentary decisively identifies *puruṣa* as *dr̥k*, YS 2.6 as *puruṣo dr̥kśaktiḥ*.

¹¹ *draṣṭā buddheḥ pratisamvedī puruṣaḥ*. Vyāsaśāstra on YS 2.17.

¹² The - *niṣ* suffix (*śid gaurāḍibhyaś ca* PS 4.1.41) corresponds to *vāc* (in feminine gender), whereas *paśyan* in the *Upaniṣad* corresponds to *draṣṭṛ* (in masculine gender).

¹³ Later grammarians, such as Nāgeśa, categorize speech into four, adding *parā* to be the highest. Coward 1990, 49-52, 61-63, 154-55; Iyer 1992, 98-180; Sastri 1991, 1-33.

¹⁴ . . . *āvṛtā viśuddhā ca* Harivṛṣabha on VāP 1.143.

¹⁵ *param tu paśyantīrūpam anapabhraṃṣaṃ asaṅkīrṇaṃ lokavyavahārātītam* Harivṛṣabha on VāP 1.143.

there exists another category higher than *paśyantī*, a separate category regarded as *para-paśyantī*.¹⁶ Here, *paśyantī* is of the paradoxical nature of concealing succession in its non-dual nature, and at the same time, embodying the potency of succession.¹⁷ It is formless, and exists simultaneously in the form of objects of cognition.¹⁸ It reveals both the limited objects [of cognition], and the state in which all cognized objects are dissolved.¹⁹

'The word-principle' (*śabdātātva*), as depicted by Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha, can be compared with the 'seeing' inherent to the self with its dormant agency, as propounded by Bhartṛprapañca, where non-duality embraces duality within itself. The section on Bhartṛprapañca in this chapter will address the issue of 'seeing' as engaged with agency. This non-dual 'seeing' as the word-principle is distinct from Sureśvara's understanding, where 'seeing' is the intrinsic nature of the self, devoid of physical or mental actions. These contrasts will be closely examined in the section addressing Sureśvara's position. Comparatively speaking, the 'self', as propounded by Bhartṛprapañca and the word-principle as explained by Bhartṛhari come closer to the example of the ocean and the waves, where both these states can simultaneously reside. 'Seeing', as presented in the dichotomy of 'seeing itself' and 'seeing out' or 'perceiving difference' frequently used by Śāṅkara and Sureśvara and repeatedly addressed in MUŚ, is comparable to Bhartṛhari's concept of *paśyantī*. In the best example that explains phenomena following this doctrine, waves and the ocean manifest difference as mere 'verbal construction' (*vikalpa*), because the outward form of *paśyantī* is only a language construction, causing differentiation of the non-dual Absolute which is beyond verbal expression.

'Seeing': As presented by Śāṅkara

The term *dr̥śiṣṛṣṭa* occurs only once in Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Praśnopaniṣad*.²⁰ However, the term *dr̥śi*, and other derivations of the root *dr̥ś*, occur frequently in other commentarial writings of Śāṅkara. The usage of this term in Śāṅkara's BĀUBh, and US is noteworthy in the present discussion.²¹ As used in these texts, the term has two meanings:

¹⁶ This suggestion is influenced by the traditional division of speech into four levels. For instance, see Aklujkar 1995, 6; 2001, 470 (note 29).

¹⁷ *pratisamhṛtākramāṇāṃ saty apy abhede samāviṣṭākramaśaktiḥ paśyantī* | Harivṛṣabha on VāP 1.143.

¹⁸ . . . *sanniviṣṭajñeyākārā pratilīnākārā nirākārā ca* | Ibid.

¹⁹ . . . *paricchinārthapratyavabhāsā saṃsr̥ṣṭārthapratyavabhāsā praśāntasarvārthapratyavabhāsā cety* | Ibid.

²⁰ PU 6.4.

²¹ If minutely analyzed, doubt emerges as to whether the prose and verse parts of US belong to the same author. Mayeda points out that these appear differently in different manuscripts, and have a history of having had separate commentaries. See Mayeda 1992, Preface XV. All citations concerning *dr̥śi* occur only in the verses; the prose part lacks any single instance. The application of meditation

1) *Dṛṣṭi* or *dṛś*, demonstrating the Absolute, whose nature is seeing. This is awareness in itself [hereafter: D₁]. The term *dṛṣṭi* is found in this meaning in the *Upaniṣads* and also in *YS*.

2) Two *dṛṣṭis*: The first is real and the next is false; the first is free from modifications and the next undergoes modifications. The first is confined to self-reflective seeing, and the other is directed outward. The first is not stained by ignorance, whereas the second is the product of ignorance. [hereafter: D_{2a} and D_{2b}].

When *dṛṣṭi* or *dṛś* occurs in Śaṅkara's texts in the first meaning, i.e., as D₁, this refers to self-evident awareness (*dṛś*) and is synonymous with the terms denoting the consciousness that is solitary and that which cannot be sublated.²² In this specific usage, *dṛśi* (seeing) refers to the constant nature of the self where there is no experience other than 'seeing the self'.²³ This ever-constant *dṛśi* engenders no illusion; this 'seeing' is experienced immediately and is self-luminous, and is considered as the nature of the self turned towards itself.²⁵ To give an example of seeing as the real nature of the self, *dṛśi* is compared with 'empty' space that is one, indestructible, and all-pervasive.²⁶ This *dṛśi* is not a product of illusory appearance (*ābhāsa*), since it is free from modifications.²⁷ According to Śaṅkara, 'mind' appears when something other than seeing-in-itself appears as if it is 'seeing'.²⁸ As this 'seeing-in-itself' is free from dualities and is beyond the dichotomy of subject and object of perception, *dṛśi* experiences itself by itself only, and this is of the nature of inward experience. This distinction between inner and outer experience is the origin of cognition as false experience, which is generally known as experiencing something.²⁹ It is clear from this context that, when Śaṅkara mentions the *dṛśi* that pervades everything, these are mental constructions pervaded by awareness. This *dṛśi* is non-dual in the sense that there is no division of awareness into the form of subjective and objective awareness. This 'seeing' is aware, as awareness is its inherent nature, and as there is no dichotomy, this is aware only of itself. In order to highlight this non-dual character of see-

(*parisankhyāna*) that appears in the third chapter of *US* does not tally with 'hearing' as the immediate means of realization along the lines of Śaṅkara. However, what can be argued is this *parisankhyāna* is not identical with the *prasanikhyāna* of Maṇḍana.

²² *dṛśir ekaḥ svayaṃsiddhaḥ phalatvāt sa na bādhyate* *US*, Metrical part, 2.3 cd.

²³ *dṛśirūpe sadā nitye darśanādarśane mayi | kathaṃ syātām tato nānya isyate 'nubhavas tataḥ ||* *US*, Metrical part, 12.9.

²⁴ *sadā dṛśi* *US*, Metrical part, 17.29 d.

²⁵ *upalabdhiḥ svayaṃjyotir dṛśiḥ pratyak sadākriyaḥ ||* *US*, Metrical part, 18.26 ab.

²⁶ *dṛśisvarūpaṃ gaganopamaṃ paraṃ, sakṛdvibhātaṃ tv ajam ekam akṣaram | alepakaṃ sarvagataṃ yad advayaṃ tad eva cāhaṃ satataṃ vimukta om ||* *US*, Metrical part, 10.1

²⁷ *na dṛśer avikāritvād ābhāsasyāpy avastutaḥ |* *US*, Metrical part, 18.44 ab.

²⁸ *adṛśir dṛśirūpeṇa bhāti buddhir yadā tadā |* *US*, Metrical part, 18.83 ab.

²⁹ *dṛśir evānubhūyeta svenaivānubhāvātmanā | tadābhāsatayā janma dhiyo 'syānubhavaḥ smṛtaḥ ||* *US*, Metrical part, 18.205.

ing, Śaṅkara prefers to use *dṛśi*, a term expressing only the meaning of its verbal root, *√dṛś*, without suffixal meanings.³⁰

In order to understand the subsequent development of the concept of DS, it is essential to compare this first use of *dṛṣṭi* with the general terms that are used to refer to different Advaita schools. These terms derived from *dṛś* appear in the classical discussions alongside terms derived from *bhā*, for instance *ābhāsa*, but there are no terms matching *pratibimba* (reflection), or *avaccheda* (limitation). Unlike the *pratibimba* doctrine of *Vivaraṇa*, where *pratibimba* is regarded as real, Śaṅkara's texts use reflection in the sense of false appearance, which is also the meaning of *pratibimba* in the *Ābhāsa* school (Mayeda 1992, 37).

D_{2a} and D_{2b} comprise 'seeing' with gradation, in a hierarchy of 'higher' and 'lower'; the former 'seeing' refers to the true nature of consciousness while the latter to false knowledge. 'Seeing' is not interrupted in both the states, whether it is free from modifications as in its higher form, or is undergoing modifications as in the lower stage. D_{2b} can also be replaced by *lokadṛṣṭi*,³¹ that which is originated and also supposed to collapse, whereas the D_{2a} is not originated by any cause, and so is constant.³² In addition to derivations from *dṛś*, the same concept is also expressed by the term *jñāna* (knowledge). In this categorization, the knowledge that has an object has a beginning and an end, and is compared with dream, whereas the objectless knowledge, which can be compared with D_{2a}, is constant.³³ No causal factors (*kāraṇa*) originate the higher *dṛṣṭi*, which is everlasting and so is free from any interruption. The lower *dṛṣṭi*, which is perceived by the higher *dṛṣṭi*, imagines origination.³⁴ Sometimes the lower *dṛṣṭi* is identified by the term *vṛtti* (modification of mind).³⁵ D_{2b} is constantly seen by the 'seeing' that belongs to the self (D_{2a}).³⁶ These *vṛttis* refer to

³⁰ The suffix in *bhāva* expresses only the meaning of the verbal root. (*bhāva eva hi dhāvartha ity avacchinna āgamaḥ |* *VāP* III.1.22. The term *dṛśi* implies no meaning other than the act of seeing as expressed by the verbal root. Following classical linguistic philosophy, in the context of *tīn*, *kartṛ* (agent), *karma* (object), *saṅkhyā* (number), and *kāla* (time), fall under the meaning of the suffix. In the case of *sup*, a suffix denotes *svārtha*, *dravya*, *līnga*, *saṅkhyā*, and *kāraṇa*.

³¹ *vyavadhānād dhi pāroksyaṃ lokadṛṣṭer anātmanaḥ | dṛṣṭer ātmasvarūpaivāt pratyakṣaṃ brahma tat smṛtam ||* *US*, Metrical part, 17.39.

³² *yo vedāluptadṛṣṭivam ātmano . . .* *US*, Metrical part, 12.13. *aluptā tv ātmano dṛṣṭir . . .* *US*, Metrical part, 12.15. *ātmano dṛṣṭyā nityayā* *US*, Metrical part, 13.6

³³ *janmaj jñānavijñeyaṃ svapnajñānavad isyate | nityaṃ nirvīcyaṃ jñānaṃ tasmād dvoitaṃ na vidyate ||* *US*, Metrical part, 9.7

³⁴ *aluptā tv ātmano dṛṣṭir notpādya kāraṇair yataḥ | dṛṣṭyā cānyayā dṛṣṭyā janyatāsyāḥ prakalpiāt ||* *US*, Metrical part, 12.15. *athonmīlyātmano dṛṣṭiṃ brahma prāpnoty anadhta-gaḥ ||* *US*, Metrical part, 17.56cd.

³⁵ *yā tu syān mānasī vṛttis cakṣuṣā rūparañjanā | nityam evātmano dṛṣṭyā nityayā dṛṣyate hi sā ||* *US*, Metrical part, 13.6. *cakṣur yukta dhiyo vṛttir yā tāṃ naśyann alupadyak |* *US*, Metrical part, 17.34 ab.

³⁶ *yā tu syān mānasī vṛttis . . . nityam evātmano dṛṣṭyā nityayā dṛṣyate tu sā |* *US*, Metrical part, 13.6.

both forms of mental modification: appearing as external objects, and referring to dream, memory, etc.³⁷ Another instance where *vṛtti* is used is in the context of dream to refer to internal modification. This is not equivalent to the seeing that refers to the self, but rather falls under the category of *D_{2b}*.³⁸ The difference in this inner modification is that it is sometimes called *vāsanā* (impression).³⁹ *D_{2a}* is the witnessing awareness (*draṣṭṛ*) of an agent of seeing, which is objectless, uninterrupted, and so constant; while the other, *D_{2b}*, is interrupted and is momentary.⁴⁰ *D_{2a}* is revealed by itself, and so is not known by any means of knowledge, whereas *D_{2b}* is dependent upon a means of knowledge.⁴¹ The *dr̥ṣṭi* which is derived by means of knowledge, i.e., *D_{2b}*, is equated with ignorance.⁴²

The doctrine of DS based on two realities resembles the Ābhāsa doctrine within the Advaita school of Śāṅkara. The bi-leveled *D_{2a+b}* establishes a doctrine of two realities, in which one is higher as well as real and the other lower and false as well. *D₁* is awareness in its very nature, never undergoing any modification. This parallel supports the comparison of the DS doctrine with the doctrine of Ābhāsa propounded by Sureśvara.

D₁ is in alignment with the use of *dr̥ṣṭi* found in BĀU 4.3.23, and so demonstrates a consistency of meaning from the time of the *Upaniṣads* to the later writings of scholastic Advaitins. Similarly, the notion of *D_{2a+b}* is based upon BĀU 3.4.2. The development of this bi-leveled *dr̥ṣṭi* (*D_{2a+b}*) can be traced to the grammarian's concept of *paśyanti*, which manifests as 'inside and outside' or 'real and false'. Instead of using *D_{2b}*, YS uses *pratyaya* or *vṛtti*. Śāṅkara frequently uses both *pratyaya* or *vṛtti* alongside *dr̥ṣṭi* in the meaning of *D_{2b}*.⁴³ Except when commenting on Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtra, Śāṅkara does not use *dr̥ṣṭi* for 'viewing' or 'visualizing' (*D₃*).

The above schema of seeing, with rare instances that support the categories in which *dr̥ṣṭi* has been recognized in the early history of Advaita, becomes relevant and grounded upon evidence in Sureśvara's writings. There is no doubt that Sureśvara's exegesis relies upon the concept of Ābhāsa, with his interpretation of *dr̥ṣṭi* being no exception. This, along with Sureśvara's critique on Bhartṛprapañca's concept of seeing, will be examined in the next chapter.

³⁷ *tathānyendriyayuktā yā vṛttayo viśayāñjanā | smṛti rūgādīrūpā ca kevalāntar manasya apī ||* US, Metrical part, 13.7.

³⁸ *mānasya tadvad anyasya dr̥ṣyante svapnavṛttayah |* US, Metrical part, 13.8.

³⁹ US, Metrical part, 11.10; 15.24.

⁴⁰ *draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭis tato nityā suddhānantā ca kevalā | anityā sāvīsuddheti gṛhyate 'trāvīvekataḥ ||* US, Metrical part, 13.8.

⁴¹ *svayaṃ labhāsavabhāvarāyā labhās tasya na cānyataḥ | anyāpekṣas tu yo labhāḥ so'nyadr̥ṣṭisamudbhavaḥ ||* US, Metrical part, 17.6.

⁴² *anyadr̥ṣṭis tv avidyā syāt tan nāso mokṣa ucyaṭe ||* US, Metrical part, 17.7; *anyadr̥ṣṭiḥ śarīrasthas tāvanmātro hy avidyayā ||* US, Metrical part, 17.55ab.

⁴³ Mayeda is of the opinion that Śāṅkara prefers *pratyaya* to *vṛtti*. See Mayeda 1992 62, notes 31-34.

Chapter 7

Sureśvara's Interpretation of *Dr̥ṣṭi*

Sureśvara's thought contributed greatly to the idealistic concept later known as DS-*vāda*. The exegesis of *dr̥ṣṭi* remains one of the focal points in Sureśvara's writings. The key passage for the analysis of *dr̥ṣṭi* is the BĀUBhVā. Close examination of the relevant passages will reveal that Sureśvara's understanding of *dr̥ṣṭi* primarily relies upon the doctrine of Ābhāsa that accepts two realities.

In order to establish Sureśvara's understanding of DS we must analyze those instances where Sureśvara is either explicitly using the term *dr̥ṣṭi* or is, even in the absence of the term, nonetheless clearly propounding the doctrine related to it. Through this analysis, what becomes clear is that, Sureśvara understands *dr̥ṣṭi* in the same way as Śāṅkara has understood it:

1) *D₁* or constant awareness.¹

2) *D_{2a+b}*. (Here, *D_{2b}* appears with considerable supporting rationale, in contrast to earlier uses of the term. It is the seeing of that which is not the self.)²

Of these *dr̥ṣṭis*, the first is a continuation of the usage found in BĀU 4.3. However, Sureśvara utilizes *D₁* less than Śāṅkara and instead extensively uses *D₂*, often, in fact, presenting, *D_{2a}* as *D₁*. Since Sureśvara's Ābhāsa doctrine admits two realities, *D_{2a+b}* matches it more effectively. Sureśvara uses the term *dr̥ṣṭi* with other meanings besides the two analyzed here. Significant among them are the use of *dr̥ṣṭi* to refer to a philosophical viewpoint (BĀUBhVā 2.1.438), and its application in the meaning of visualization or meditation (TUBhVā 1.61). This study focuses on reading the history of *dr̥ṣṭi* along the lines of the doctrine of DS that accepts singularity of the immedi-

¹ . . . *bhāvasiddhiḥ ca dr̥ṣṭitaḥ* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1437; 1438; 4.3.1480; *vastu eva dr̥ṣṭir atrāto na kriyā nāpi kārakam* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1601; *ekaiveyam ato dr̥ṣṭir janmahānādivarjitaḥ |* BĀUBh-Vā 4.3.1631; 4.3.1753; *kūṭasthadr̥ṣṭāv ekasminn avibhakte . . .* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1518.

² *nityadr̥ṣṭi* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1474; 1515, *nityā dr̥ṣṭi* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1462; *draṣṭṛdr̥ṣṭi* 4.3.1470; *draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭi* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1421; 1424; *dr̥ṣṭir avinaśvari* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1425; *āgamāpāyino draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭis tatsākṣiṇi tu yā . . . tasyā lopo . . .* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1426; *kūṭastha-dr̥ṣṭir evātra* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1432; *kūṭasthaikasadr̥ṣṭi* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1634; *pratyakdr̥ṣṭi* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1433-34; 1472, 1732, 1734, 1814; 1.4.37, 65, 696, 698, 703, 1182, 1472, 1732, 1734, 1814; *āmadr̥ṣṭi* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1476; *dr̥ṣṭā dr̥ṣṭikriyākārī* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1545; *dr̥ṣṭikāritvāt* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1580; 4.3.1635. Even though most of these examples mention one *dr̥ṣṭi*, the citations always specify which particular *dr̥ṣṭi* is real, implying a second, false *dr̥ṣṭi*.

ately experienced self, constant awareness as its essential nature, and all that is perceived as 'other' as appearance alone. Therefore, non-philosophical application of this term is not under consideration.

For Sureśvara, as for Śāṅkara, discussion concerning *dr̥ṣṭi* begins with the same passage in *paśyan vai* . . . (BĀU 4.3.23). If this passage is understood from Sureśvara's perspective, this will mean 'even though the self is mentioned as not seeing, this reference is merely to reject an agency in seeing; but in reality this is constantly seeing, since the seeing inherent to the self does not collapse'. This is one of the rare *Upaniṣadic* passages where the term *dr̥ṣṭi* occurs in the sense of the Absolute. A closer examination of Sureśvara's *Vārīka* upon BĀU 4.3.23 supports the specific understanding of DS as constant 'awareness only', rejecting any creation as such.

Sureśvara opens his discussion by presenting the ground of self-luminosity (*svayamjyotiṣṭva*) of the self (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1377-1411). The general understanding of this passage in Śāṅkara's school is that the self continually sees at all times and in all states, including deep sleep, even though there is no sensory activity there. Sureśvara, when dealing with the question of whether senses are required for seeing, replies that senses are essential for seeing the factors causally involved in perception (*kāraka*), but not in seeing that which is free from any causal factor.³ The *dr̥ṣṭi* by which the perceiver is self-validated as the perceiver cannot perish.⁴ This understanding initiates an exploration of the twofold nature of *dr̥ṣṭi*:

- 1) seeing of the perceiver, and
- 2) the seeing of objects, as two poles of seeing as such.

Following Śāṅkara, who developed this twofold seeing on the basis of *paśyan na paśyati* "does not perceive while seeing", Sureśvara systematizes his own structure of twofold 'seeing':

- 1) seeing the phenomena (D_{2b}), and
- 2) seeing the seeing itself [D_{2a}].

Here, it is crucial to note that D₁ and D_{2a} are only narrowly separable. However, D¹ presents the monistic doctrine of 'consciousness only', free from the dichotomy of real and false. Furthermore, D₁ is free from the subjective gaze (*pramāṭṛ-dr̥ṣṭi*), and so is not subjective seeing, but seeing as such; whereas D_{2a} is the subjective seeing or the *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi* (inward seeing), which is relative to seeing objects. D_{2a} is seeing the self and, as such, is real, while D_{2b} is seeing something other than the self, and therefore is false. In both cases, there is no cessation of seeing, whether the self is seeing its true nature or seeing false entities.

Sureśvara, while commenting upon BĀU 4.3.23, explains that the term *dr̥ṣṭi*, for instance, refers to knowledge or awareness in itself:

³ . . . *draṣṭuh kārakasya samikṣyaṇe | karaṇāni vyapekṣyaṇe na tv akārakavikṣaṇe ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1415.

⁴ *yasmād draṣṭur hi yā dr̥ṣṭir yaya draṣṭā prasidhyati | tasyā viparīlopo 'yaṅ hetvabhāvān na yujyate ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1421.

pañcaśrotrādibhiḥ sāksāj jānāmūti samikṣyate |
sabādān iha loke 'to dr̥ṣṭyāder jñānavācyatā ||

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1770

As in the phenomenal world through five [sense organs] such as hearing, [it can be] seen that [I] directly know sound and so forth; therefore, terms such as seeing (*dr̥ṣṭi*) have the meaning of awareness (*jñāna*).

To further support this meaning, Sureśvara immediately cites a passage that confirms the very self as one that knows sense-objects such as sound or form.⁵ Here the strategy of Sureśvara appears to confirm the constant non-dual awareness as the reference of the terms 'seeing', 'hearing', and so forth. This usage reinforces the meaning of pure awareness as immediately cognized in all instances of sensory perception.

To prove that 'seeing' is imperishable, Sureśvara refutes a syllogism on its perishability. The syllogism is: the *dr̥ṣṭi* of the Self is perishable (thesis), since it is a *dr̥ṣṭi* (probans), like the subjective *dr̥ṣṭi* (example). Here in the probans, there is perishability (*nāśayogyatva*) as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), since this, in the phenomenal *dr̥ṣṭi*, is pervaded by the probandum, while self-consciousness is not pervading the probans.⁶ In other words, why Sureśvara considers this *dr̥ṣṭi* to be imperishable is because perishability and origination are possible only for an entity that has a cause (*hetumadvastu*). The witness (*sākṣin*) is not caused by anything and so it cannot disappear.⁷ The third reason given in this sequence is that even 'disappearance' (*nāśa*) cannot be proven without having awareness, so the *dr̥ṣṭi* of a perceiver cannot perish.⁸ Sureśvara identifies *dr̥ṣṭi* as the very essence of the perceiver, which is perceived through inward seeing (*pratyag-dr̥ṣṭi*), that is, through itself. Therefore, it cannot perish.⁹ According to Sureśvara, the lower *dr̥ṣṭi* belonging to a perceiver is perishable since its subject (the perceiver, *pramāṭṛ*) is also perishable. However, the *dr̥ṣṭi* by which the disappearance of a perceiver is perceived cannot be negated.¹⁰ This *dr̥ṣṭi* continues because it is the witness of the disappearance of the perceiver, even though the *dr̥ṣṭi* of the perceiver has an origin and so is bound to perish.¹¹

⁵ BĀUBhVā 4.3.1771 is a partial citation except for *iti ca śrutisāsanam* from *Kāṭhaka* 4.3.

⁶ *āmadr̥ṣṭir anityā dr̥ṣṭivāt pramāṭṛdr̥ṣṭivat, atra nāśayogyatvam upādhiḥ, laukikadr̥ṣṭau sādhyavyāpakāḥ, āmacaitanye sādhanāvvyāpakāḥ.* This follows Subrahmanya Śāstrī's note in his edition of BĀUBhVā, p.1077.

⁷ *nāśopādādayo dharmā hetumadvastuno yataḥ | nirhetusākṣiṇo na syur āgamāpāyisākṣitaḥ ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1422.

⁸ *nāśādi na svayaṃ sidhyed vinā nāśādisākṣiṇā | nāto viparīlopaḥ syād draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭeḥ kadācana ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1423.

⁹ *draṣṭur ātmaiva yā dr̥ṣṭiḥ pratyagdr̥ṣṭyā samikṣyate | tasyā viparīlopo 'tra na kathaṅcana yujyate ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1424.

¹⁰ *ātmavātmīyabhūtasya yā dr̥ṣṭir avinaśvati | draṣṭur vināśinas tasyā nocchittir upapadyate ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1425.

¹¹ *āgamāpāyino draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭis tatsākṣiṇi tu yā | draṣṭrādīlopasākṣitvāt tasyā lopo na yujyate ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1426.

As a result of the premises that have been established, a new problem arises for Sureśvara, namely, the explanation of the passage . . . *draṣṭur dṛṣṭer* . . . (the *dṛṣṭi* of a perceiver) (BĀU 4.3.23). The reason is that this *dṛṣṭi* is caused by a perceiver, and whatever is caused, must have its end. Sureśvara replies that this passage does not mean that the lower *dṛṣṭi* is caused by a perceiver. Sureśvara equates D_2 with *draṣṭṛ*, taking for granted that *dṛṣṭi* is an essential characteristic of the perceiver. This leads him to conclude that the *dṛṣṭi* that perceives a perceiver is the meaning here of *dṛṣṭi*, not that the *dṛṣṭi* is caused by a perceiver.¹² Anandagiri defines *draṣṭṛ* as the changeless *dṛṣṭi*, stating that 'the agent of perception' is not the meaning of *draṣṭṛ*; instead, it constitutes the imperishable seeing, not the perishable agent.¹³ The imperishable inward seeing called *pratyagdṛṣṭi* is that which sees the perceiver and which was in existence even before the rise of perceiverhood (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1433-1434). Since this inward seeing is even before the rise of subjectivity (*pra-mūṛṭā*), what is constant is *pratyāñc*, not the subjective awareness, because *pratyāñc* is the very nature of inward seeing in itself.

Sureśvara was aware of the problem of the negation of *dṛṣṭi*, as indicated in the passage 'does not see'. Absence, according to Sureśvara, is of the form of *bhāva*, and by this, he intends to establish that the negation of seeing does not lead to the absence of seeing as such.¹⁴ In his statement that 'non-being is [a form of] being' (*abhāvasya ca bhāvavāt* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1437), the context does not clearly identify in which sense non-being can be of the form of being (*bhāva*). It is not explicit whether the statement addresses the substratum of negation as a positive entity (i.e., negation of x in the locus y , and y exists), or if negation presupposes the affirmation of the entity which is being negated (i.e., negation of x in T presupposes the being of x in T_1); however, the argument seems to be a linguistic one, because *abhāva* contains the element of *bhāva*. At any rate, negation presupposes something in existence to be negated, and such an existent presupposes a subject to be validated as existent. The subject presupposes *dṛṣṭi* in order to be a subject, because it is awareness that confirms the being and non-being of all existence, including subjectivity itself. This *dṛṣṭi* cannot perish, since it is what is presupposed in the existence of anything. Another element

¹² *nanu vipratīṣṭidhoktir bhavatehābhidhīyate | na vinaśyati sā dṛṣṭir draṣṭus cety atri-sāhasam || karṣṭikāryābhisambandho draṣṭur dṛṣṭer itīryate | tataś cāparilopo 'syāñ kāryatvān nopapadyate || nanu na lupyate iti vacanān na vilopsyati | naivam yato mitiprāptam vaco nāśam na vārayet || siddhasya vyāñjakaṃ mānaṃ na tu taikāraṃ yataḥ | ukter nāto 'vi-nāstivam draṣṭur dṛṣṭer iheṣyate || naiṣa doṣo yato draṣṭuḥ śrutir āha viśeṣaṇam | draṣṭur dṛṣṭer iti tato draṣṭā naiveha kāraṇam || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1428-1432.*

¹³ *kūṣṭhadṛṣṭir evātra draṣṭṛśabdhenocyate na dṛṣṭikartā, ato draṣṭā sāksī na kartary avirodhaḥ. Śāstraprakāśikā, BĀUBhVā 4.3.1432.*

¹⁴ *abhāvasya ca bhāvavād bhāvasiddhes ca dṛṣṭitaḥ | dṛṣṭau nābhāvasāñkātāḥ sarvasiddhes tadan-vayāt || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1437.*

This stance fits with the Prābhākara and Sāṅkhya notion that *abhāva* is not a separate category. Narayanan 1992, 109.

presented by Sureśvara in this debate concerns deep sleep; *dṛṣṭi* is required for even deep sleep to be logically confirmed (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1438).

A linguistic problem is addressed at this point in Sureśvara's exegesis. In both the expressions *paśyan* and *draṣṭṛ*, the terms end with the suffixes *śatṛ* and *ṭṛc*. Both these terms derive from the root $\sqrt{dṛś}$, suggesting that, for Sureśvara, the verbal action of *dṛṣṭi* must have an agent. How, then, can it be said that this *dṛṣṭi* is independent of an agent, the action, and the object of seeing? The reply Sureśvara gives is that the meaning of *dṛṣṭi*, the primary derivative of *dṛś*, differs from the meaning of the verbal root *dṛś*. There is no action in deep sleep, but still there is *dṛṣṭi*, and so this *dṛṣṭi* cannot have action in its meaning. This, as well, is free from suffixal meaning (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1439-1440), since this constant non-subjective seeing cannot be an agent or an object; neither can it be multiplied, nor can it be modified in time. In reply to the question why '*paśyan*' is used for deep sleep even though there is no action, Sureśvara gives the example of the term, *ākāśa* (empty space). The term *ākāśa* literally means to provide space, but space does not actively offer (*dāna*) space, due to the fact that space has no agency to provide space. It is the nature of *kāraṇa*, that is, active without acting.¹⁵ *Kāraṇa*, according to Sureśvara, cannot be defined as 'of the form of functioning' (*kurvad rūpa*), since its functioning form (*kurvad rūpa*) is not known before the completion of action. So in all cases, *kāraṇa*s are inactive in their own form (*akurvadrūpa*).¹⁶ He negates the possibility of another definition of *kāraṇa* as 'that endowed with potency' (*śaktimat*), pointing out that the mutual dependency of potentiality and its result (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1445-1447). A further problem concerning the suffix *ṭṛc* is that it is applied to momentary entities. This being the case, how can there be everlasting *dṛṣṭi* belonging to *draṣṭṛ*? As a solution, Sureśvara suggests that the sun be called 'giving light' (*prakāśayitṛ*), or space as pervading (*vyāpṭṛ*).¹⁷ The *dṛṣṭi* of inward seeing (*pratyak*) is proved¹⁸ by the witness who is aware of its not-seeing as well as seeing. Here *dṛṣṭi* is used as synonymous with *pratyagdṛṣṭi*,¹⁹ *draṣṭṛdṛṣṭi* (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1470), *ātmadrṣṭi* (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1476), and *nityadrṣṭi* (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1474, 1515). Anandagiri favors *kūṣṭhadṛṣṭi* in this meaning,²⁰ although

¹⁵ *karṣṭikāraṇaṃ no cet suṣupte vidyate katham | paśyan draṣṭur iti vacaḥ kūṣṭha upapadyate || yathāvakāśadātṛ iti bhāṇyate niṣkṛtyaṃ viyāt | śatṛṭṛjantavacaśa tathātmā bhāṇyate dhruvaḥ || svabhāvaḥ kāraṇaṃ ca yad akṛtveha kurvate | akurvatkāraṇaṃ tasmāt kurvato 'tisayaḥ kutaḥ || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1441-1443.*

¹⁶ *prakṛ kriyāyā viniṣṭatteḥ kurvad rūpaṃ na labhyate | yato 'to 'kurvad eveha syāt sarva-trāiva kāraṇam || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1444.*

¹⁷ *nanu bhāṅguradhānvarthe ṭṛcprayoḃo jagaty api | draṣṭṛśabdābhilāpyasya nityā dṛṣṭiḥ katham bhaver || noktavāt parihārasya sūryādāv api darśanāt | prakāśayitṛ savitā vyāpṭṛ vāpi viyāt tathā || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1462-1463. Here these examples are to be taken conventionally.*

¹⁸ *paśyāmīty asya sāksitvaṃ praṭico gamyate yathā | na paśyāmīti cāpy asya tathāivehātma-sāksikam || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1469.*

¹⁹ BĀUBhVā 4.3.1472, 1732, 1734, 1814, 1.4.37, 65, 696, 698, 703, 1182.

²⁰ *Śāstraprakāśikā* (ŚP), BĀUBhVā 4.3.1410, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1438, 1467, 1469, 1470, 1476, 1477, 1478-79, 1488, 1493-94, 1496, 1497, 1498, 1506, 1515 1520, 1527, 1567, *kūṣṭha-sāhaikarasadrṣṭi* in 1634.

Sureśvara rarely uses this term.²¹ For Sureśvara, 'the conception outside' (*parāgdhī*) is an antonym to *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi* (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1734), whereas Ānandagiri uses 'gross view' (*sthūladr̥ṣṭi*) as opposite to *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi*.²² Both Śāṅkara and Sureśvara use the term *pratyaya* in the meaning of D_{2a}.²³

Exegesis of *paśyan na paśyati*

In the statement, '*paśyan na paśyati*', Sureśvara postulates that the negation of perception in the self-nature refers to the actionless self. The foremost point of his exegesis is that this negation refers to the negation of all causal factors (*kāraṇa*). As the witnessing nature of the self is understood in the experience 'I see', 'I do not see' is witnessed by the self in the same way. For the people who have lost their eyesight, there is the experience of perception in dream. Sureśvara presumes this as an example to establish that there is another constant *dr̥ṣṭi* of the self, distinct from the seeing of the perceiver. This seeing is constant, and is witnessed by mere *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi*.²⁴ Here again, Sureśvara's usage of *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi* demonstrates 'seeing in itself', not subjective seeing. Because this *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi* observes even D_{2a}, *pratyagdr̥ṣṭi* cannot be different from D₁, which is not just the *dr̥ṣṭi* inherent in the self (*pratyag-ātman*), but specifically, 'seeing in itself'. By this very non-transformative, non-instrumental seeing, the self is regarded as constantly seeing. Furthermore, what needs to be clarified is that for Sureśvara, there is no self as such, other than 'seeing in itself'. So, confirmation of the self and confirmation of seeing are not two separate functions. This constant seeing, this perceiving of all subjective and objective modifications in all states of consciousness, is itself the 'self'.

Sureśvara argues that, although the seeing of an object requires causal factors like an agent, object, and instrument, the seeing of the self requires only the self, since this type of seeing is free from causal factors.²⁵ The self is seen when the self is seeing

²¹ In this sequence Sureśvara once uses *kūṭasthadarsana* for the Self in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1500 and *kūṭasthadr̥ṣṭi* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1518. *Kūṭasthya* appears twice in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1581.

²² ŚP, BĀUBhVā 4.3.1517.

²³ BĀUBhVā 1.4.1007; NS IV.23.

²⁴ *paśyamīty asya sākṣīvaṃ praīco gamyate yathā | na paśyamīti cāpy asya tathāivehātma-sākṣīkam || utkṛtācakṣuṣaṃ cāpi dr̥ṣṭiḥ svapne 'nubhūyate | draṣṭīdr̥ṣṭyatīrekeṇa nityā dr̥ṣṭir ato mama || jyotiṣān api taj jyonir asmaddhīparimosaṇāt | tamorūpan ivābhūti bhānur naktamdr̥ṣṭām iva || yata evam ato dr̥ṣṭir nityabvāmana īṣyatām | anīyatvasya sarvasya praty-agdr̥ṣṭyekasākṣītaḥ || tayāsādhanayā dr̥ṣṭyāparīṇāmasvabhāvayā | paśyan evāyam ātmāste taddr̥ṣṭeś codyahetutaḥ || paśyamīti yathādr̥ṣṭir ātmadr̥ṣṭyaiva jāgare | na paśyamīty api tathā nityadr̥ṣṭyaiva vīkṣase || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1469-1474.*

²⁵ *paśyan kumbhādīkam vastu dehānto grāhako yathā | dr̥ṣṭyā sambādhyate draṣṭā draṣṭīrvasya tad-āśrayāt || akāraśvabhāvātvaṅ naivaṃ vṛttam mamātmanaḥ | ātmadr̥ṣṭir ato grāhyā prayan-mātrānurodhinī || yathokūṭāsthāprasiddharvad vaiśabdho 'tra prayujyate | tan na paśyati-śabdena kāra-akatvaṃ niśidhyate || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1475-77.*

itself without any instruments,²⁶ and there cannot be even a partial division into different causal factors, as in the common example 'Devadatta kills himself'. In order to kill himself Devadatta uses weapons and his own body-parts to produce a result that is substrated in Devadatta himself. In the case of self-seeing, there cannot be a partial division into the perceiving of one part of seeing by another part of seeing. Seeing is undivided. It is without the causal factors that constitute an 'action'. Thus, from the statement 'does not perceive while seeing', Sureśvara derives the single meaning of a non-dual self-luminous self, free from causal factors.²⁷

In his discussion of the phrase, 'does not perceive while seeing', Sureśvara clarifies the negation of seeing as seeing in terms of negation. The apparent contradiction of seeing and not seeing is understood in terms of the existence or non-existence of causal factors, but the passage does not indicate that there exists such a contradiction in the very seeing. There can be no instrumentality in the case of seeing in itself, whereas seeing the other depends upon causal factors. The statement 'does not perceive' only negates the causal factors, not seeing itself.²⁸ Further, it confirms a single seeing, free from causal factors, while negating agency and so forth (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1492). Since awareness is free from causal factors and is innermost to all, [the self] does not actively perceive anything even when it is 'seeing'.²⁹

Sureśvara further clarifies this apparently paradoxical statement by pointing out that since awareness is free from causal factors—in that it is the innermost essence of all causal factors of perception—it nonetheless pervades even that illusory reality which is other than 'awareness only' (*tat*).³⁰ After analyzing that the self does not perceive in the deep sleep state, Sureśvara demonstrates that this self is not perceiving even in the waking and dreaming states.³¹ Here again, the rejection of perception is solely intended to reject an agency of the self: although perception occurs while in waking or dreaming states, there is no agency in the self to make a statement that the self actively 'perceives'.

Sureśvara, after giving a commentary on *paśyan na paśyati*, addresses the variant that occurs in the *Mādhyandina* recension, which reads *paśyan vai tad draṣṭavyam*

²⁶ *sādhānānām asāmagryāt sāmagryāc ceḥa kartari | na paśyanīkṣata iti viruddhārthi yathocyate || Ibid. 4.3.1486.*

²⁷ *aikāntyaivādināvaśyam eko meyo 'ritha īsyate | meyāntarābhīyupagame na hy aikāntyaṃ prasīdhyati || Ibid. 4.3.1485.*

²⁸ *paśyan na paśyanti atra na tathāmani yujyate | dr̥ṣṭmātrāvīkriyātmatva ekatvākāra-kavataḥ || yata evam ataḥ paśyanī ity asyaivottaraṃ vacaḥ | na paśyati viyākhyānaṃ kāra-ka-niṣedhanam || Ibid. 4.4.1487-88.*

²⁹ *citer akāraśvabhāvāc ca sarvāntaratamatavataḥ | kārtsnyāt tad anyayāthāmyāt paśyan api na paśyati || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1493.*

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ *na paśyati yathā prājña ukāhetvaviśeṣataḥ | tathāvaitad grahītvayan svapnājāgrad-avasthayaḥ || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1494.*

(this should be known as seeing).³² By the term *draṣṭavya* found in this version, Sureśvara understands the entity in the form of subject, object, and action of perception.³³

Sureśvara applies *dr̥ṣī*, the term favored by Śaṅkara, to express awareness in itself. This *dr̥ṣī* is free from the divisions of seeing and not seeing.³⁴ When Sureśvara discusses *darśana* (cognition) and *adarśana* (non-cognition), he posits both of these as lower states of awareness, in which the first, i.e., 'perceiving' (*darśana*), is equivalent to knowing otherwise (*anyathāgrahaṇa*), or perceiving within the triad of perceiver, perception, and object of perception, while the absence of perception (*adarśana*) identifies ignorance about any particular object. In this sense, Sureśvara's *darśana* and *adarśana* are closer to Gauḍapāda's *svapna* and *nidrā*.³⁵ According to Gauḍapāda, *svapna* refers to the state of the subject who is perceiving the entities otherwise, whereas *nidrā* identifies the subjective state of not knowing the reality. The distinction between 'knowing otherwise' and 'not knowing' is clear in this passage.

Sureśvara repeatedly confirms that there is no cessation of awareness. He first defines *na paśyati* as a *prima facie* view and *paśyan vai* as a reply, confirming that there is no cessation of the seeing of the witness (*na hi draṣṭur*). According to Bhartṛprapañca, yet to be discussed in this study, this passage is not problematic since he does not interpret the first, i.e., *paśyan vai tan na paśyati*, as a confirmation of 'seeing only'; it is only Sureśvara who needs to justify why the text should twice confirm non-cessation. According to Sureśvara, this twice-repeated negation of cessation confirms non-cessation in the form of destructions, both 'with cause remaining' (*sānvaya*) and 'without cause remaining' (*niranvaya*).³⁶ With this interpretation, the first negation negates destruction of the effect only, with the causal form not being destroyed, whereas the second negation negates destruction in its causal form as well. This understanding allows Sureśvara to explain that seeing in itself is constant in all states, waking, dreaming, and deep sleep. To demonstrate this constant seeing nature,

³² Sureśvara actually discusses the single term *draṣṭavyam*, without mentioning that this is an exposition on a variation; Ānandagiri subsequently identifies this passage as belonging to the variant from *Mādhyandina*:

paśyann ityādī kāṅvapāṭhaṃ vyākhyāya paśyan vai tad draṣṭavyam ityādimādhyandinapāṭhe draṣṭavyasabdārtham āha | Ānandagiri on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1490.

³³ *grahītgrahaṇagrāhyaṃ vastu draṣṭavyam ucyate* | *pramāṇadr̥ṣṭiyogyarvār pramātrādyātma-vaṣṭunaḥ* || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1490.

³⁴ *darśanādarśanoktibhyām avibhāgātmake dr̥ṣīḥ* | Ibid 4.3.1492.

³⁵ *anyathāgr̥hṇataḥ svapno nidrā tattvam ajānataḥ* | GK 1.15.

³⁶ *dvīprakāro vīnāśaś ca dvīrhetukayā niśidhyate* || *niranvayo vīnāśo 'sya na hūy ukryā niśidhyate* | BĀUBhVā 4.3.1496-1497, and *paśyann evāyam atrāste sānvayānānvayau dhruvaḥ* | *nāśau yasmād atāḥ siddha ātmā kūtasthadarśanaḥ* || Ibid, 1500. Here Ānandagiri characterizes these two types of destruction as complete annihilation (*niravaśeṣa*) and destruction of effect only: . . . *niravaśeṣanāśavāt sāvaśeṣanāśasyāpy ayogāt*. Ānandagiri on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1497, corresponding to destructions that include the causal factor, and the destruction of effect without the causal factor being destroyed.

Sureśvara applies the term *kūtasthadarśana* (constant seeing),³⁷ out of which *kūtastha* evolves as a common term demonstrating the changeless nature of consciousness in subsequent Advaita.³⁸

Sureśvara allows for the possibility of these two negations on the basis that it contains two theses (*pratijñā*). On this ground, he suggests that the second negation both explains and validates the first negation.³⁹ Again, this way of interpretation contradicts Bhartṛprapañca's understanding of BĀU 4.3.23.

Sureśvara concludes that the seeing nature of the self is not interrupted in dreaming and waking states. The question arises, why is the self cognized in the form of cognition in the waking and dreaming states? His reply is that it is virtuous and vicious acts that leave the traces of impression that give rise to the notions that alter the subjective experience. In this discussion, Sureśvara makes a striking argument: it is only 'impression' (*vāsanā*) in the dream state that causes a perception of duality, and this cause of duality is destroyed in the deep sleep state. When he accepts the dissolution of even impressions (*vāsanās*) in deep sleep, he apparently concurs with one of the arguments the proponents of DS/EJ defend, that there exists only awareness-in-itself in the deep sleep state, accepting the existence of the veil of ignorance that allows the rise of *vāsanā* to give a further vision of difference.⁴⁰

Finally, Sureśvara gives his interpretation of 'dvītiya' (the second) in the passage under discussion, . . . *na tu tad dvītiyam*. According to him, this passage negates duality in the state of deep sleep:

nāmarūpādibhedena vibhaktam yat tamo dr̥ṣe, tat tu dvītiyam. . .

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1518-19

The darkness [i.e., ignorance] of seeing [i.e., awareness] which is differentiated in the form of name, form and so forth; that is the second.

Sureśvara explicates that there is no association of the self with ignorance in the state of deep sleep.⁴¹ According to him, the very changeless self manifests in the deep sleep state. He establishes this by reason of the 'absence of ignorance and so forth

³⁷ *paśyann evāyam atrāste sānvayānānvayau dhruvaḥ* | *nāśau yasmād atāḥ siddha ātmā kūtasthadarśanaḥ* || Ibid, 1500.

³⁸ A very common example for this can be the *kūtasthadīpa-prakaraṇa* in PD.

³⁹ *pratijñāvacaś dve vā paśyann ityādinodite* | *na hūi hetuvacaś dve syātām uttare tayoḥ* || *paśyann evāsta ity asyāḥ pratijñokteḥ prasiddhaye* | *hetur na hīvivacanam uttarasyāpi cor-taram* || *niranvayavīnāśasya niśedho 'tra vivakṣate* | *prathame hetuvacaś parināmas tathottare* || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1503-1505.

⁴⁰ *sajātīyaprayuktaṃ yad buddhyantaṃ rūpam āmanaḥ* | *dharmādīhetukaṃ prājñe tad dhvastaṃ karmaṇaḥ kṣayaḥ* || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1510. *svapne 'py etat trayam nābhūd vāsanā-mātrahetutaḥ* | *kim u vādvastanīḥśeṣadvaitahetau suṣuptage* || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1512.

⁴¹ . . . *na prājñe 'nanvayāt tamaḥ* || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1517.

[that] is mentioned'.⁴² The being or non-being of ignorance in the state of *samprasāda*, identical with the blissful experience in deep sleep, is one of the early points of dispute within Advaita sub-schools. Here, Sureśvara suggests that the self is revealed in its reality while in deep sleep. If this premise is without flaw, the model of DS which accepts the rise and fall of the objective world in the states of entering and emerging from deep sleep exists in Sureśvara's thesis. As for Sureśvara, it is vice or virtue that give rise to cognition,⁴³ and because of this, awareness (*dr̥ṣī*) perceives external objects by the inner sense associated with the instruments of action, such as the sense of hearing and so forth.⁴⁴ The construction of the triad of perceiver, perceiving, and perceived is due to ignorance and identical in the waking or dream state, while the triad collapses in the state of deep sleep.⁴⁵ In deep sleep, this triad unifies with ignorance, leaving no trace of duality.

In summary, Sureśvara interprets BĀU 4.3.23 as affirming that the self is of the nature of constant 'seeing'. He interprets all other modes of perception, such as hearing or touching, as the very immediate awareness which in itself is the self, beyond which nothing exists. This immediate experience is considered to be 'external' due to impressions caused by actions, which in turn are caused by ignorance. In reality, since there is no dichotomy of subject and object, there is no act of 'seeing' as such. Thus, by negating agency of the self, Sureśvara argues that the non-dual 'seeing', free from causal factors and hence free from modification, is confirmed by itself.

Bhartṛprapañca's position and Sureśvara's response

Since Bhartṛprapañca's writings are no longer extant, the only way to understand his thought is through the literature that criticizes his position. Sureśvara's BĀUBhVā is one of the main sources for establishing the position of Bhartṛprapañca. Sureśvara opens the debate with the statement that others explain the passage under discussion differently.⁴⁶ Sureśvara initiates his refutation with the honorific 'this is the exposition of the wise,'⁴⁷ apparently showing his respect. However, in other instances, such as 'this is the exposition of those who flatter themselves as wise,'⁴⁸ he becomes sarcastic. Ānandagiri identifies the opponent being criticized as Bhartṛprapañca.⁴⁹

⁴² *avidyāder abhāvokryā*. . . Ibid 1520.

⁴³ *buddhyādeś ca samutpattau dharmādy evātra kāraṇam* | Ibid 4.3.1529.

⁴⁴ *śrotādikāraṇopetaṃ yato 'ntaḥkāraṇaṃ dr̥ṣe | bāhyārīhadarśane hetuḥ kauṣastīryān na tad akṣaram* || Ibid, 4.3.1527.

⁴⁵ *draṣṭṛdarśanaḍṣyātibhedo 'vidyāprakalpitah | yato 'to mohavidhvastau draṣṭṛdy ātmani nekṣate* || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1512.

⁴⁶ *anye punar imāṃ grāhiṇāṃ anyathaiṃ yathoditāt | vyācakṣate*. . . BĀUBhVā 4.3.1537.

⁴⁷ *vyākhyānam etas sudhīyam*. . . BĀUBhVā 4.3.1566.

⁴⁸ *evaṃ pañḍitammanyā*. BĀUBhVā 4.3.1645.

⁴⁹ *yad vai tad ityādeḥ svavyākhyānam ukṭvā bhartṛprapañcavyākhyānam utthāpayati* ŚP on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1537; *bhartṛprapañcavyākhyānam upanyasya sthūladhībhir ādaraṇīyatvam darśayan*

This identification requires no further verification, because whenever the doctrine of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*) is presented, Sureśvara identifies Bhartṛprapañca as the author.⁵⁰

To explain *yad vai tan na paśyati*, Bhartṛprapañca must have felt the need to show a connection with its preceding passage that addresses deep sleep, with the explanation that in the state of *prājñā*, awareness (*dr̥ṣī*) is in the form of mere luminosity (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1517-1539). In this context, since the self is of the nature of luminosity, why does the self not perceive in deep sleep? He explains in reply that, in the succeeding passage, *paśyan vai*, the self is confirmed as actually seeing. Sureśvara explicitly and concisely recapitulates Bhartṛprapañca's position:

*yad vai na paśyati evam ātmānam atīśānkase |
tan mā śānkār yataḥ prājñāḥ paśyann ātmātra vartate ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1541

As [you]⁵¹ doubt in the extreme that the self does not see, [you] should not doubt that, because here [in the deep sleep state] is *prājñā*, the self, which is constantly seeing.

In the words of Sureśvara, Bhartṛprapañca gives reasons why the text reports that [the self] does not perceive while seeing:

*draṣṭā dr̥ṣṭīkriyākārī vijñānātmā punān iha |
buddhyupātasya rūpāder vijñānaḥ ca tataḥ param ||
tatrāpi ca dhīyo vṛtter grāhyagrāhakarūpataḥ |
ghaṭādimeyaviṣayāt pūrvotpannakriyātmanah ||
kriyāntarasya nirvṛtau draṣṭā tatrāpi pūruṣaḥ |
dr̥ṣṭakāṭh puruṣe tatra yā rūpādyanurodhinī ||
kriyābhāvo 'vaganīstho vijñānātmakakartṛkaḥ |
tasyā dr̥ṣṭeḥ kriyāyā hi draṣṭṛdharmaṭvataḥ sadā ||
draṣṭur viparilopo 'tra manāg api na vidyate |
guṇisthityanurodhivād guṇānām agnīdāhavar ||
yata evam ato yāvad ātmā draṣṭā na naśyati |
na ūvat syāt samucchedo draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭes tadāśrayāt ||
mataṃ guṇivinaśena tadguṇo 'pi vinaiḥṣati |
agnyādyauṣṇyādivac cen na draṣṭur asyavināśataḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1545-1551

Here [in the deep sleep state] *draṣṭā*, the subject (*punān*), of the essence of awareness (*vijñānātmān*), [is the one] who performs the act of seeing. Cognition

duṣṭavāṃ sūcayati ŚP on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1566; . . . *svamatam ukṭvā bhartṛprapañcamatam āha*. . . ŚP on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1625.

⁵⁰ For instance, *bhartṛprapañcaprasthāna*. . . BĀUBhVā 1.4.1164; *bhartṛprapañcabhāṣyasya*. . . BĀUBhVā 1.4.1188.

⁵¹ The complete passage is in dialogue form between Yājñavalkya and Janaka. The second person addresses Janaka, and the person replying is Yājñavalkya.

of form and so forth, obtained by intellect (*buddhi*), follows the [act of seeing].⁵² Even when performing another act [of cognition of form and so forth], [the very] subject (*puruṣa*) [is] an agent of seeing the function (*vynti*) of mind in the form of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, which is an action that has arisen prior to the rise of the objects of cognition, like a pot. The power of seeing which corresponds to (*anurodhinī*) form and so forth, is in the subject (*puruṣa*); even [in the state of cognizing objects], the essence (*bhāva*) of action, belonging to the knower (*ava-gantṛ*), is performed by the very conscious self (*viññānātman*) alone. Because that act of seeing is certainly a property of the subject of seeing (*draṣṭṛ*), [it is] constantly present. Here [in deep sleep] there is not even a slight cessation of the subject of seeing (*draṣṭṛ*), [and] the properties are in agreement with the presence of the property-bearer, like that of fire and burning. Therefore, since this is so, as long as the self, the subject of seeing, does not collapse, there will be no cessation of the [act of] seeing by the subject of seeing, as [the act of seeing is] dependent upon the [subject of seeing] {*tat*}. If it be urged that, due to the destruction of the property-bearer, there will be also destruction of its property, for instance fire and heat, this cannot be so, because this subject of seeing has no cessation.

This exposition reveals several aspects of the lost treatise of Bhartṛprapañca. The self, in its true nature, is not depicted in a passive mode, as did Śaṅkara and his successors; rather, it has an inherent nature of agency. This agency is constantly endowed with the act of knowing, and the self, then, is not of the knowledge nature, rather of the knowing nature. Here the subject (of awareness) is an agent of knowing, not the witness, free from agency. For Bhartṛprapañca, a self devoid of knowledge and action is unimaginable, like fire devoid of light and heat. Following his arguments, the self is not merely *dr̥k*, rather the potency of *dr̥k* (*dr̥kśakti*).⁵³

While addressing the position of Bhartṛprapañca, Sureśvara replies to the question, "why the self does not collapse?" by saying that to destroy oneself by oneself does not fit in the case of a single being. What is possible in the case of fire and wood is that fire can extinguish wood,⁵⁴ but this is an example in the realm of duality. Seeing and the self are compared to sun and light, that is, essentially the same.⁵⁵

Bhartṛprapañca replies to the question, why does BĀU 4.3.23 read 'does not see' (*na paśyati*) if the case is that the self is constantly seeing?

⁵² Ānandagiri categorizes two actions as: *na kevalam jñānasyaivātmā kartā, kin tu tatphalasya saṃved-anasyāpi*. The self is not merely the agent of knowledge, but also an agent of sensation that is the result of knowledge {*tat*}. ŚP on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1546.

⁵³ Thrasher indicates that Maṅḍana was aware of the schools of Vedānta that attribute several *śaktis* to Brahman; Thrasher 1993: 65. The concept discussed in BS 55.23-56.19 can be compared with the *śaktivāda* discussed here.

⁵⁴ *yenāsyāśaṅkyate nāśas tenāsyāpravibhāgataḥ | saṃbhāvyate na nāśo 'sya naśtur nāśāvibhāgataḥ | na ca tenaiva tasyaiva vināśa upapadyate | aikāmyād dvaitaviṣaye yathāgnīndhanayoḥ tathā || BĀU-BhVā 4.3.1554-1555.*

⁵⁵ *ādityaraśmivad grāhyaḥ dr̥ṣṭṛ apy avināśinī | BĀUBhVā 4.3.1556.*

*tat tu dvītyam nehāsti draṣṭavyam yat samāśrayāt |
viśeṣabuddhyabhivyaktir jāgradbhūmāv ivēksate ||
nanu draṣṭavyam asty eva dvaitādvaitātmakatvataḥ |
brahmaṇo 'sya katham nāsti draṣṭavyam iti bhāṣyatām ||
draṣṭavyam syād vibhaktam tan navibhaktam yathoditam ||
yadi hy anyat tato draṣṭur dr̥ṣyam tat syād vibhāgavat |
tataḥ paśyed vibhaktam san na tv evam iha vidyate ||
paśyam evāyam atrāste draṣṭavyāsambhavāt sadā |
na paśyatīti draṣṭoko na tu dr̥ṣṭivinaśataḥ ||
jvalann api yathā vahnir nānabhyaḥhitam indhanam |
dahaṭṭha tathā draṣṭī nāprāptam dr̥ṣyam iksyate ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1561-1565

However, such a different object of perception (*draṣṭavya*)⁵⁶ does not exist here [in the state of deep sleep], on the basis of which a manifestation of a particular cognition could be seen as in the waking state. [If it be argued that] there is indeed an object of perception because [in your doctrine the reality is] of the essence of identity in difference (*dvaitādvaitātmaka*), [you] should explain how Brahman has no object to perceive. [The reply is that] Brahman {*tat*}, when differentiated, would be the object to be seen, but not undifferentiated as discussed before. If, in the case {*hi*} [where] that object of perception different from the agent of seeing (*draṣṭṛ*) would be endowed with parts, [the *draṣṭṛ*] would perceive [it] as being separated from him (*tataḥ*). But here [it] is not like this. This [*draṣṭṛ*] is constantly seeing in the state of deep sleep {*atra*}. Because an object of perception is always impossible [in this state], therefore the agent of seeing is mentioned as 'does not see', but not because of the disappearance (*vināśa*) of seeing. As fire, although burning, does not burn the fuel which is not placed forth here [in the state of deep sleep] the agent of seeing does not perceive objects of perception which are not already known (*prāpta*).

Sureśvara rejects this position by saying that this is out of the domain of both reason and the scriptures.⁵⁷ In his view, this 'is seeing' is just in response to 'does not see', but knowledge of this witnessing self does not arise, as does occur with other particular instances of knowledge:

*paśyam eveti ced etad vastu yāthātmyam ucyate |
itihamsatattva ity uktyā katham draṣṭuḥ kriyocyate ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1570

If the statement "[the self] is constantly perceiving" confirms reality (*vastu*), how can the statement 'of this essential nature' [with reference to the passage *paśyam* . . .] denote action [inherent to] the perceiving self.

⁵⁶ When Sureśvara presents the view of Bhartṛprapañca, he repeatedly uses the term *draṣṭavya*. Following Ānandagiri's precedent, the *Mādhyandina* redaction includes the term *draṣṭavya*, while it does not appear in the *Kāṇva* version. See Olivelle 1998, 517, notes on 3.23.

⁵⁷ *yukyākṣarabahiṣṭharvān. . . BĀUBhVā 4.3.1566; . . . idam asambaddham na yuktyākṣarasam-trayam BĀUBhVā 4.3.1567.*

*draṣṭradhīnā kriyādṛṣṭir iti ced bhavato cyate |
katham viparilopo 'syāḥ kriyārve sati vāryate ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1571

If you state that the act of seeing [depends] upon an agent of seeing, [then] if this is an action, how could cessation of this [action] be prohibited?

*abhūadṛṣṭikartṛtve draṣṭṛtvaṃ draṣṭur iṣyate |
prādurbhāve tathāsatyāḥ kriyāyās ca kriyātmā ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1572

If there is an agency of seeing which was not [already in existence], [then] the being of a perceiver (*draṣṭavya*) would be acceptable for a *draṣṭṛ*; then, in [the case of] the rise of that, the action which [in reality] does not exist would be an action.

In essence, Sureśvara's objection is that there cannot be an act that will not ultimately collapse, and if the seeing of *draṣṭṛ* is an act, it will collapse as well. To be an action, in his understanding, implies the absence of the specific action before the specific event. Sureśvara says that it is incongruent to state that two meanings are present in the statement *yad vai*, namely, that the first part of the sentence is a proposition and the second part negates this.⁵⁸ He understands that it is already known that the self does not perceive in deep sleep; this passage only confirms that there is no cessation of the seeing nature. This exegesis admits a single injunction.⁵⁹

Sureśvara argues whether, by the term *draṣṭṛ*, the subject (*pumān*) is established because it performs the act of seeing, or because it is an entity of the essence of seeing. He rejects the first position with the argument that the self in essence is changeless, and due to its changelessness (*kauṣasthya*), the self cannot be an agent of such action.⁶⁰

In Sureśvara's thesis, the self is neither an agent of the act of seeing, nor is it the enjoyer of the result of that act. The result, in this context, is to be an agent of knowing something.⁶¹ To illustrate this, Sureśvara gives the example of a crystal, which, in

⁵⁸ *na paśyanti prāptatvān nāpūrvō 'rtho 'vabodhyate | na paśyanti ato 'nūdyā paśyanti iti vidhīyate ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1559-1578.

⁵⁹ This indicates the 'manifoldness of assumptions' (*kalpanāgaurava*), which, in Indian logical system, undermines the argument. This is contradictory to 'lightness of imagination' (*kalpanālāghava*), which is decisive when establishing a theory. Matilal 1968, 5, 83, 130.

⁶⁰ *kim ayam dṛṣṭikārtvāt pumān draṣṭeti bharyate | dṛṣṭyātmakam vā kim vastu draṣṭeyā atra vivakṣyate || na tavad dṛṣṭikartṛtvaṃ kauṣasthyād ātmavastunah | kauṣasthyasiddhau hetuṃs ca prāg avocam anekāśaḥ ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1580-1581.

⁶¹ *buddhyupātasya rūpāder vijñāṭṛtvaṃ na cāmanah | bhokṛtvaṃ api tasyeha caitanya- bhāsavarmanā ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1583.

contact with resin, appears similar in form to the resin.⁶² He explains that this is merely transformation of the crystal that appears to adopt the color of resin while not being resin itself, because the crystal is actionless. The self, in the same way, does not get involved, either as an agent or as an enjoyer of the act of seeing.⁶³

Sureśvara's argument against Bhartṛprapañca's notion that seeing and the agent of seeing are like property and property-bearer is that the change in the property is seen even without the change in the property-bearer, as in the case of black hair turning white.⁶⁴ Sureśvara finds even the example of fire and the burning inherent to fire problematic, as these are inseparable. He demonstrates that there is fire in wood in an unmanifested form, but there is no heat.⁶⁵ Ānandagiri adds the example of a crystal, which contains 'fire' even though this is not hot.⁶⁶

Sureśvara finds Bhartṛprapañca's understanding problematic regarding *draṣṭṛ* as an agent, since all agents eventually die. Moreover, he accepts that causal factors and action are mutually caused,⁶⁷ which implies that both will simultaneously collapse. With regard to this position, Sureśvara explicitly accepts the *sahopalambha* argument that in any cognition, subject and object are mutually given.⁶⁸

Sureśvara elaborates how action cannot be imposed in the cases when an action never occurs, and when it is ever-present:

*nityam na bhavanam yasya yasya vā nityabhūtā |
na tasya kriyamānatvaṃ khapuspākāśayor iva ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1596

That which never exists and that which is eternally present, each [of them] in essence (-*tva*) cannot be brought into the action [of existence], such as that of a sky-flower [which never exists] or of the sky [which is eternally present].

⁶² The Sanskrit term *alakta* refers to red juice or lac obtained from red resin of certain trees. The most common example to appear with crystal is a red flower *japā*. Here, Sureśvara may have only meant 'redness' by *alakta*.

⁶³ *maṅger eva vikāro 'yaṃ yālaktādisarūpatā | nālaktakāder vikṛtir niṣkriyatvād iheṣyate || raktavādī- prasiddhyartham vikriyām na prapadyate | alaktakādīḥ sarvatra yathāivaṃ hy ātmavastv api ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1584-1585.

⁶⁴ *guṇisthityanurodhītvam na ca sarvatra vikṣate | guṇānām keśakṣṇatvaṃ vyeti keśeṣu satv api ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1586.

⁶⁵ *agneḥ ātyarūko nāśo bhavatāpi na mṛṣyate | na coṣṇatvaṃ sato 'py agneḥ kṣāṣhādāv upalabhyate ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1587.

⁶⁶ *araṇimaṇiprabhṛtiṣu tasya sattvāt. . . Śāstraprakāśikā* on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1587.

⁶⁷ *draṣṭuś cāpi na nityatvaṃ kriyodbhūtinimitataḥ | kriyākarakayor rūpam itaretarahenukam ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1592.

⁶⁸ Iwata 1991, 15-20, 41-42, 180.

Here, Sureśvara's rejection of action refers to the rejection of origination, which leads to the doctrine of non-origination, the focal point of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda.⁶⁹

Sureśvara proposes two further reasons for not ascribing agency to the self:

*utpattyaḍau tu yac chaktaṃ śaktimātrāmanā sṭhitam |
tad eva hetvapekṣam sad utpattyaḍi prapadyate ||
utpattyaḍāv aśaktatvāt kauṣasthyāḍ ātmavastunaḥ |
advitīyatvataś cāsyā notpattyaḍi prasidhyati ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1597-98

Only that which is capable of origination, being there in the form of mere potency, depending on [its] cause, attains origination and so forth. Because the self in essence is incapable of origination and so forth, because it is changeless, and also because [the self has] no other [to be its causal factor], [therefore] origination [of the self] and so forth is not established.

Thus Sureśvara leads his arguments on the changeless nature of the self to the conclusion that the self is devoid of properties, such as power. He consolidates his interpretation of the solitude of the self by demonstrating that it plays no role in the process of origination. On this ground, Sureśvara concludes that *dr̥ṣṭi* (awareness) is merely an entity (*vastu*) having only existence, which, due to the fact that it neither acts nor functions as a causal factor, is defined as eternal.⁷⁰

Sureśvara demonstrates how the negation of mere objects of perception in deep sleep does not fit:

*tamasy avasthīto paśyañ jñātr̥jñānatamāṃsi hi |
prapadyate vivekena yathā kumbhāḍivikṣaṇe ||
na prājñe tu tato 'yuktaṃ dr̥ṣyamātranīṣedhanam |
grāhaka-grahaṇa-grāhyabhāvābhāvāḍy apahnuteḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1608 - 1609

[One] who is in the dark knows the knower, a knowledge [of darkness], and darkness [itself as the object of knowledge] separately, as in the case of perceiving a pot and so forth; but this is not [the case] with regard to awareness [in the deep sleep] state (*prājñā*). Therefore, it is not correct to negate only the object of perception, because [in deep sleep], the perceiver, the perception, the object of perception, being and absence,⁷¹ and so forth, all are negated.

⁶⁹ GK 4.4-8, 11-13. See King 1995, Chapters 3-4 for a comparative study on the Abhidharma and Gauḍapādiyan notions of non-origination (*ajātivāda*).

⁷⁰ *vastu eva dr̥ṣṭir atrāto na kriyā nāpi kārakam | tasmāḍ evāvināśitvāḍ iti hetur ihoditāḥ ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1601.

⁷¹ Anandagiri finds it difficult to explain *bhāvābhāva*. By *bhāva* he understands birth, and by *abhāva* he understands destruction "... *bhāvābhāvau janmanāśat*". Sureśvara must have had Vaiśeṣika ontology in mind when explaining in terms of *bhāva* and *abhāva*. But his understanding of *sattā* is not the Vaiśeṣika one, because this *sammātra* embraces even *abhāva* for Sureśvara.

Sureśvara's next disagreement concerns Bhartṛprapañca's doctrine of identity in difference (*bhedābheda*):

*vibhaktam avibhaktam vā vastu vastvantarāśrayāt |
sarvaikatve vibhāgo vāvibhāgo vā na yujyate ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1613

An entity is different or identical [when] it takes the support of another object. When all is only one, neither difference nor identity is plausible.

This position brings Sureśvara from the discussion of D_{2a+b} to D_1 . However, he cannot simply support a doctrine of D_1 only, because the succeeding passage, 'something else distinguished from that' (*tato 'nyad vibhaktam . . .* BĀU 4.3.23), requires an interpretation in accordance with the philosophy given in the first part of the same passage. While explaining the latter part, *tato 'nyad vibhaktam*, Sureśvara seems to have relied on the Mādhyaḍina redaction, because he explains the term *dr̥ṣṭavya* in this context.⁷²

Sureśvara justifies this interpretation by rejecting the opponent's argument that has the fault of repetition (*punarukti*):

*dharmāḍinām vibhaktatvam avibhakte 'pi dharmiṇi |
evaṃ na punaruktatvam dr̥ṣṭavyāḍeḥ prasajyate ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1619

Even if it is the case that the property-bearer (*dharmin*) is not differentiated, there is [still] difference in the property (*dharma*) and so forth. Thus there is no consequence of the repetition [of the same concept] of the passage *dr̥ṣṭavya* and so forth.

Anandagiri elaborates that, by the term *dharmin* Sureśvara means the self, and by the term *dharma*, he means the I-sense (*ahaṅkāra*), which is mentally constructed upon the self.⁷³ This description of the self as 'seeing in itself', with its properties mentally constructed as other than that, facilitates Sureśvara's application of the doctrine of Ābhāsa with its model of two degrees of reality. This acceptance of appearance as false on account of being mentally composed and entirely other to the one true, single reality, places the establishment of identity in duality (*dvaitādvaitmakatva*) outside the domain of the means of knowledge.⁷⁴ Another noteworthy fact is that, when describing the concept of identity in difference, Sureśvara uses the term *dvaitādvaita*. The context makes it clear that this term is not used strictly in the sense of the later *dvaitādvaita* school of Vedānta.

Sureśvara presents the definition of *dr̥ṣṭi* according to Bhartṛprapañca:

⁷² *dr̥ṣṭavyo dr̥ṣṭiyogyo 'riho hy anyo 'naryaś ca yujyate |* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1617.

⁷³ *dharmiṇy ātmani kalpanāḍhiṣṭhāne vastuto vibhāgahāne 'pi mahadahāṅkāradānām āvidyānām miho . . . Śāstraparakāśikā* on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1619.

⁷⁴ *dvaitādvaitmakatvañ ca pramāṇān nopapadyate |* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1621.

*draṣṭur iti tṛjantena kartṛtvam abhidhīyate |
draṣṭā kasyetyapekṣyāyāṃ drṣṭer ity abhidhīyate ||
drṣṭir ity api bhāvaḥ syāt samāptir yā kriyāmanaḥ |
phalāśrito 'sau bhāvo 'tra drṣṭiśabdena bhāvyate ||
phalaṃ prakāśanaṃ jñānaṃ tatkartṛtvaḥ ca vastunaḥ |
pratyekam ucyate 'traitadvākyeṣv eteṣu vastunaḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1625 – 1627

The [term] *draṣṭur* expresses agency by the *īrc*-suffix. With reference to the [grammatical] requirement, the perceiver 'of what'? – it is said: 'of seeing'. The term *drṣṭi* is *bhāva* [an abstract noun], which is an accomplishment of [seeing, that] is itself an action in essence. The term *drṣṭi* in this passage denotes *bhāva*, which takes the support of its consequence. The result is an illumination of an object, which is [i]self knowledge and an agency of knowing [*tatkartṛtva*]. Here, in the sentences of this [sequence], the correspondence of each [knowledge and the means of knowledge to their respective objects] is mentioned.

Sureśvara has no new argument to refute this definition; however, he strengthens his view of the false appearance of agency and action and reiterates all the terms in this passage that he uses to confirm his *Ābhāsa* doctrine: 'in reality' (*paramārthataḥ* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1628), 'generated due to ignorance of the self' (*pratyagajñānaḥetuja* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1629), 'giving an appearance' (*-avabhāsitva* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1630), 'appears as if' (*-vad bhāti* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1630), and 'due to delusion of the self' (*ātmanohataḥ* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1630). Concluding this discussion, Sureśvara presents his own definition of *drṣṭi*:

*ekaiveyam ato drṣṭir janmahānādivarjitā |
bahuvajanmanāsādi yāty avidyonthasaṅgateḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1631

Hence *drṣṭi* is one only, free from generation and destruction and so on. Due to its relation (*saṅgati*) arising [from] ignorance, [*drṣṭi*] attains plurality, generation, destruction, and so forth.

*bāhyadrṣṭyādyupādhiṣṭhā pratyagātmaikalakṣaṇā |
drṣṭir drṣṭyādivācyeha vināśādinīṣedhataḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1635

The *drṣṭi* which is founded upon the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) such as external perception, and which [possesses] is identical (*eka*) in character to the inward self mentioned here [in this passage] [*iha*] by the terms such as *drṣṭi*, because the destruction and so forth [of seeing in itself] are negated.

The first of these two interpretations presents the solitude of *drṣṭi* alone, accepting the role of ignorance in perceiving duality. Here, what is clear from the context is that generation, for example, is mentioned in an epistemological context. So what is really generated is only perception, not the object corresponding to perception. This becomes more explicit in the second instance, where the inward nature of *drṣṭi* is confirmed by negating external perception. As what exists is 'seeing only', the self is of

the form of 'awareness only' (*vijñaptimātrarūpa*)⁷⁵ or *jñaptimātra*.⁷⁶ The context makes it clear that these terms signify the everlasting nature of awareness, and not the momentary consciousness arising in each instance of cognition. Nonetheless, the use of these terms indicates that Sureśvara relied on the Buddhist Vijñānavāda terminology in order to explain his philosophy.⁷⁷

The passage BĀU 4.3.23-31 needs to be interpreted in the context of an analysis of *drṣṭi*. This passage must have a unitary meaning, since it occurs in an uninterrupted sequence. This does not solely concern seeing (*drṣṭi*); but additionally identifies smelling (*ghrāṇi*), tasting (*rasayati*), touching (*sprśan*), or cognizing (*vijñānan*) among other faculties of knowing. If the meaning of *drṣṭi* is 'pure consciousness', then the meaning of these other terms cannot be totally different and so refers to pure consciousness as well. As the functions of 'seeing' or 'cognizing' directly refer to the absolute consciousness, this precludes a separate hierarchy of consciousness. In other words, all sense functions are, in fact, pure consciousness alone, understood as different due to ignorance. This identification of sensation with consciousness culminates with the doctrine of 'seeing only' (*drṣṭimātra*).

In his discussion of 'reflecting' (*mati*) (BĀU 4.3.28) and 'cognizing' (*vijñāni*) (BĀU 4.3.30), Sureśvara elaborates upon the separate functioning of the inner sense within consciousness. He states that, although these two can be included within the same category of 'seeing' (*drṣṭi*) and so forth, they function independently and so are separately discussed.⁷⁸ This distinction is not to create a hierarchy of consciousness, but rather to treat separately the faculties through which consciousness is revealed. This separate treatment upon the inner modifications of consciousness rather supports the dissolution of the hierarchy of consciousness as 'inner' and 'external'.

In Bhartṛprapañca's opinion, the properties of burning and heat are mutually different, whereas each of these properties are identical to fire. Following this example, Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the passage under discussion would be that the vari-

⁷⁵ *naiṣa doṣo 'tra vijñaptimātrarūpe paramātmani |* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1633.

⁷⁶ *yata evam ato jñaptimātram evābhidhīyate |* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1634.

... *jñaptimātraṃ syād arthaḥ teṣāṃ prasiddhitaḥ |* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1769.

⁷⁷ Sureśvara uses terms having the same meaning, such as '*saṃvitimātra*' BĀUBhVā 4.3.1741, '*saṃvitsadrūpamātra*' BĀUBhVā 4.3.1743, '*jñānamātra*' BĀUBhVā 4.3.1757. All these terms denote the constant nature of *drṣṭi*, and so are equivalent to *drṣṭimātra*.

Concerning the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda use of *vijñaptimātra*, Schmithausen observes that this term appears as early as Sandhinimocanasūtra (350 CE?), Schmithausen, 1973. The interpretation of this concept seems to have a different meaning to different currents of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra. Schmithausen, 1967. Indian and Chinese commentaries differ in their understanding of the term, *vijñānapariṇāma*. Ueda 1967, 155-165. Schmithausen further notes the use of a similar term, *vijñaptimātra*, in Laṅkāvatārasūtra. See Schmithausen, 1992.

⁷⁸ *antarbhāve 'pi drṣṭyāḍau mativijñānāyor iha | svāntaryeṇāpi tadvyuteḥ siddher bhūyaḥ pṛthag-grahaḥ ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1636.

ous sense-faculties are distinct from each other, but are identical to the agent of seeing.⁷⁹ Sureśvara's objection further demonstrates that the assessment of such difference is logically fallacious:

*na ca svarūpe bhedo 'sti kasyacid vastunaḥ kvacit |
svarūpāc cānyato bhedaḥ pramāṇābhāsagocaraḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1648

There is no difference of an entity in itself in any mode of time. A difference [of an entity] from its own and from another [lies] in the realm of fallacious means of knowledge.

This becomes the focus of the subsequent discussion on 'difference' (*bheda*). Both Vimuktātman and Śrīharṣa use the same argumentation that difference in an entity's very own essence cannot be proved, and that difference known in relation to other objects is not confirmed by means of knowledge. Sureśvara's other arguments refuting difference are based on the refutation of difference and identity in the universal and the particular.⁸⁰ The third argument is based upon whether difference is an absence or separateness (*prthaktva* in BĀUBhVā 4.3.1662-1677). Vimuktātman subsequently gives a complete structure of the arguments based on this logical foundation.⁸¹

This discussion leads Sureśvara to finally conclude that there is no difference in 'experience' (*anubhūti*):

*nānubhūtiḥ prāṅcīyam abhedād bhedaḥ ikṣate |
svarūpāvvyatirekāc ca nāpi cānātmanikṣate ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1678

Because there is no difference in itself (*prāṅci*) [or in the self nature], awareness (*anubhūti*)⁸² does not perceive difference. Neither does [awareness] perceive [difference] in other than itself (*anātman*), because there is no difference (*vyatireka*) from its own form [of what is cognized].

Sureśvara explains how the experience of difference in the awareness of 'form' or 'sound' can be discarded:

*dharmibuddher na dharmeṣu buddhibhedaḥ prajāyate |
deśakālādya bhinnatvād ekātmatvāc ca samvidaḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1685

⁷⁹ *dahanauṣṭyādivad vahner vibhinnāḥ syuḥ parasparam | draṣṭṛdṛṣyādayo dharmā bhinnābhinnānmanā sthitāḥ ||* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1637.

⁸⁰ BĀUBhVā 4.3.1649-1661. To translate *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as universal and particular is not without problems. See Halbfass 1992, 114-115. for further elaboration.

⁸¹ IS 1-25, auto-commentary on IS 1.1.

⁸² The first verse from IS, where Vimuktātman refutes difference, opens addressing *anubhūti*, of which difference, or identity in difference, is refuted. It is probable that Vimuktātman has taken this term from this very passage of Sureśvara.

From the knowledge of a property-bearer results no difference in the knowledge regarding [its] properties, because awareness is not differentiated from space, time, and so forth, and because it is of a single nature.

It has already been noted that, for Sureśvara, separate instances of awareness, such as 'form' or 'sound' are the properties (*dharmā* or *guṇa*)⁸³ of awareness, being differentiated by erroneous perception, like a rope perceived as snake or the perception of two moons (BĀUBhVā 4.3.1687).

Sureśvara finds it problematic that the *dṛṣṭi* which perceives outward entities also perceives the self:

*draṣṭavyādyanusārīnyā pratyaimohaprasūtāḥ |
dṛṣṭyā viruddhadiksthasya prāṅci darśanaḥ kutaḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1727

How can the self in itself (*pratyak*) in an opposite direction be seen by seeing, since the *dṛṣṭi* which corresponds to the entities to be perceived (*draṣṭavya*) and so forth, is born of the delusion of the self in itself?

This passage posits two distinct types of seeing: inner and outer. Sureśvara accommodates this by dividing *dṛṣṭi* into inward-seeing and outward-seeing, where the first is identical with the witnessing self whereas the second is the product of ignorance. The etymological meaning of *sākṣin* as that which is 'directly known' (*sākṣād avasīyate*) and the interpretation of *dṛṣṭi* as 'immediately cognized awareness-in-itself' makes this identification possible:

*draṣṭuḥ prāṅci yat sākṣāt pratyagdṛṣṭyāvasīyate |
dṛṣṭyādījanmanāśādisākṣy abhedātmakaḥ svataḥ ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1732

The witness, — for instance, of *dṛṣṭi* and so forth, of generation, cessation and so forth, — which is directly known by itself through inward seeing (*pratyagdṛṣṭi*) in the self of the perceiver is self-evidently (*svataḥ*) of a non-dual nature.

This is the 'seeing-in-itself' which is immediately witnessing (*sākṣinī*), not the seeing that belongs to some other witnessing self:

*svapnaprabodhāyor yadvad dṛṣṭir asyātmanaḥ svataḥ |
mātrādivikriyāgrāmasākṣiṇī sāvinaśvarī ||
prājñe 'pṛyaṇ tathāivāste kāyasthāikātmālakṣaṇā |
bhāvabhāvāu tv avidyāder viśeṣaḥ kevalas tv iha ||*

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1753

As in the dreaming and waking states, the self sees the self by itself. [Seeing] witnesses all transformations such as the perceiver (*mātr*). This [*dṛṣṭi*] [*sā*] [is] im-

⁸³ Halbfass deals with the problems concerning the translation of *guṇa*; Halbfass 1992, 113-114. Some other terms used for translating *guṇa* are 'attribute' and 'quality'; Halbfass finds the term 'quality' highly misleading.

perishable. The same character of the single, changeless self resides also in the *Prājña* (the self awareness of deep sleep). Both the existence and absence [of existence] are merely a characteristic (*viśeṣa*) of ignorance in [the state of] deep sleep (*iha*).

Sureśvara's criticism reveals that Bhartṛprapañca had accepted *śakti* under his doctrine. The passage below makes it clear that Bhartṛprapañca understood the self, or Brahman, as *śaktimat* (endowed with power), and the phenomenal world as a transformation of this *śakti*.⁸⁴

ārgādiśaktibhedānām cakṣūrūpādibhedataḥ |
vikāraikalpanaitena nyāyenāmanya apākṛtā ||
kāryalingād dhi śaktinām astirvaṃ kāraṇatvataḥ |
yato 'vaganyate nāto 'kārake śaktir āmani ||
śaktiśaktimātor aikyaṃ tayor bhedaṃ na yuktitāḥ |
pratipattunā kvacit chakyaṃ prakṛtipratyayārthayoḥ ||
prakṛtyarthe 'thavāyaṃ syān matub yad vā tato 'nyataḥ |
pakṣāśiddhir hi pūrvasmīn bhedaṃ naikyaṃ tashottare ||
āmāvidyaiva naḥ śaktiḥ sarvaśakyasya sarjane |
nāto 'nyathā śaktivādaḥ pramāṇenāvasthyate ||
aśaktaṃ śaktimac chaktyā śaktiḥ śaktimatā iathā |
asaktaiti⁸⁵ kathaṃ yogyaṃ anyonyaṃ hetvasambhavāt ||
śaktayaḥ santi bhūyasyas tayor api mataṃ yadi |
tatrāpi nūyacodyatvād anavasthā prasajyate ||

BĀUBhVā 4.3.1780-86

The hypothesis (*kalpanā*) [with regard to] the transformation of different *śaktis* in the self according to (-*taḥ*) the differentiation of sense-organs and their respective objects (*cakṣūrūpa*) is refuted following this maxim. Since only by the probans (*liṅga*) of effect is the existence of potentialities understood—in that [they are] the cause—in the self, therefore, there is no potency which is free from causal factors. The identification of power and that which is endowed with this potency (*śaktimat*) can never be understood with reason, because there is difference in the meaning of base and suffix, i.e., *śakti* and *matub* [to whom it belongs];⁸⁶ [and it is unknown] whether the suffix *matub* is in the meaning of the base (*prakṛti*) or in another [meaning]. In the first case, the thesis cannot be proved, and in the latter, there is no identity because [there is] difference [between base and suffix]. When

⁸⁴ *nāto 'nyathā śaktivādaḥ pramāṇenāvasthyate |* BĀUBhVā 4.3.1784.

Both Sureśvara and Ānandagiri identify this as a doctrine that follows *śakti* (*śaktivāda*). *bhedābhedaḥkalpābhyāṃ śaktivādo nāpavādam arhati.*

Śāstraprakāśikā on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1774; *āmāvidyānirīkṣaśaktivādo na . . . ŚP* on BĀUBhVā 4.3.1775.

⁸⁵ The text reads *aśaktaiti*, which results in the meaning that 'power is powerless due to that which is endowed with power' (*śaktiḥ śaktimatā . . . aśaktā*).

⁸⁶ *tadasyāstyasmīn iti matub* PS 5.2.94. Here the genitive case *asya* also covers the locative *asmīn*. When Sureśvara identifies Brahman as *śaktimān*, regarding ignorance as *śakti*, he follows even the second understanding, as he accepts the Brahman as the locus of ignorance.

power in all its aspects is generated, the very ignorance of the self is the power [that manifests] for us. Therefore, the doctrine of *śakti* cannot be proved in another way by means of knowledge. That which is powerless is endowed with power because of *śakti*; but how can power be separated from that which is endowed with power? This being the case (*iti*), how can there be mutual union, since there is no [logical] reason? If [this is] the doctrine that even the potent and potency (*tayoh*) have many potencies, then because they are equally objectionable (*tulya-codyatvāt*) there will be the consequence of infinite regress.

This passage closely hews to the original KU concept where all that exists dissolves in *prāṇa* when in the state of deep sleep, and the senses and sense objects emanate from the very inner self. This discussion provides relevance in the context of explaining *drṣṭi*. The first part of this study established that the scholastic Advaita philosophers trace the concept of DS from KU. Bhartṛprapañca's position addressed here brings him closer to the concept addressed both in KU 4.20 and BĀU 2.1.17-20.

This concept of *śakti* closely aligns with the notion of *śakti* among the Mīmāṃsakas. The passage *paśyan na paśyati* is briefly discussed by Pārthasārathī Miśra,⁸⁷ where he claims that the terms *drṣṭi* and so forth are meant to express *jñāna-śakti*, 'the power of knowledge'.⁸⁸ According to him, this passage confirms that no objects are perceived, heard or experienced in deep sleep, even though all sensory powers are present. Pārthasārathī is aware of the Advaita interpretation of this passage, where *jñānamātra*, 'knowledge only', is the meaning of *drṣṭi*, as he argues that there is no use of 'smelling' (*ghrāti*) and so forth, in the meaning of 'consciousness only'. Following the view of Pārthasārathī, only *śakti*, or 'potency' remains in the state of liberation, not any consciousness.⁸⁹ The passage of Bhartṛprapañca discussed above also leads to the same conclusion. This 'seeing' that is endowed with potency can be compared with the Trika notion of *śakti* as well as the *avidyā-śakti* found in MUŚ/YV and Maṇḍana's writings. The next chapter will demonstrate how the concepts of seeing as a linguistic act and seeing as consciousness free from modifications manifest as the doctrine that adopts pure consciousness in all instances of cognition. The subsequent discussion will clarify how MUŚ/YV present yet another picture where the concept of 'seeing' as pure consciousness free from modification is almost absent, while the illusory nature of appearance remains at the core of the understanding of 'seeing'.

⁸⁷ *Śāstradīpikā*, 127-128, in Jhā ed., 1915.

⁸⁸ *na hi vijñātur tejñānaśaktyabhiprāyam vispaṣṭarvañ cāsyā śaktyabhiprāyatvam ghrāṇādi-śaktāv eva prarocanārtham | na jñātur śaktyabhiprāyam eva | tasmā jñānaśaktyabhiprāyam idaṃ | ātmāno ya darśanaśaktiḥ | na śaktivaikalpyāt, śaktis tu na kadācid api lupyata iti. . . jñānaśaktyaparilopa eva svayaṃ eva śrutyā śaktiparatvaṃ. . . anayā ca śrutyā sarvavijñāna-śrutyayā śaktyabhiprāyā vyākhyātāḥ | jñānaśaktimātrasyāvasthānam |* *Śāstradīpikā* 127-128.

⁸⁹ . . . *muktāu śaktimātram avatiṣṭhate na jñānam iti . . . Śāstradīpikā* 130.18.

Chapter 8

'Seeing' in Śivadrṣṭi and Mokṣopāya

Somānanda and Utpala on Paśyantī

Sureśvara's critique of Bhartṛprapañca resembles Somānanda and Utpala's critique of Bhartṛhari.¹ Specifically, Sureśvara is critical of Bhartṛprapañca's argument that the self is actively seeing (*paśyan*), a position which resembles the analysis of Bhartṛhari (and Harivṛṣabha in the commentary of VP 1.1) that speech (*vāc*) is constantly conceptualizing (*paśyantī*). According to Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha, language is the primordial nature of the self; it is continuously (*paśyantī*) constructing the world by means of words. Further, there is no perception in the phenomenal world that is not accompanied by language.² However, for the Śaivites, the concept of *paśyantī* differs from the original concept of Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha. For the grammarians, *paśyantī* is the Absolute and is equated with Brahman, whereas for Śaivites, it is not the Absolute; it is merely a state of knowledge³ which presupposes a state of desire. In order to compare this concept among the Sanskrit grammarians, the Advaitins, and the Trika Śaiva philosophers, it is relevant to discuss *paśyantī* as understood by Somānanda and Utpala.

Paśyantī, when reflecting (*āmṛś*) the world, is associated with the power of action. However, it is still far removed from the supreme Śiva nature, because of a predominance of knowing.⁴ *Paśyantī* is described as having the character of 'extinguished external appearance' (*praśāntapratyavabhāsā*) bound within time, having '[its] sequence contracted' (*pratisamhṛtakramā*) since it is described as something that 'possesses the power of sequence even though there is no difference within [itself]' (*antaḥ saty api abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī*).⁵

¹ For contemporary scholarship on *paśyantī*, see Padoux 1990, 188-204.

² *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād rte | anuvidham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate |* VP 1.123.

³ *athāsmākaṃ jñānaśaktir yā sadāśvarūpatā | vatyākaraṇasādḥnūnāṃ paśyantī sā parā sthitiḥ ||* ŚD 2.1.

⁴ *paśyantī yady api nādarūpatayā viśvam āmṛśanti kriyāśaktirūpatayā samanvitā, tathāpi paśyantī iti darśanaprādhānyāt upacaritajñānaśaktirūpatave 'py āśriyamāṇe paramaśvarūpatayā ayanatādravartitā na tu paryantadaśasau jñānaśakteḥ sadāśvarūpatavāt parāparavyavasthātra | teṣāṃ pumaḥ sā parāvasthā matā | sadāśvarūpatave ca kriyāśaktir api na parityaktā* Utpala's commentary on ŚD 2.1.

⁵ These are quoted by Utpala in the commentary of ŚD 2.1.

According to the grammarians, as understood by Somānanda, *paśyantī* is the very self; thus, all bodies share the single *paśyantī*. The state of inward seeing (*antaḥ-paśyadavasthā*) is of the character of awareness, which in itself is formless.⁶ Utpala describes this state as the state of enjoyerhood, free from the character of what is known, and this is mere awareness (*caitanya-mātra*). This (*paśyantī*, which is the very self) sees itself as the entire world. In this way its action of seeing becomes manifest.⁷ Free from the subject and object of cognition (*grāhya-grāhaka*),⁸ and due to impression (*vāsana*) in the form of ignorance, *vāc* in itself manifests (*vivṛti*) in the form of knowable entities.⁹ Entities (*artha*) have consciousness (*saṃvit*) as their support, for what is not known cannot exist (*asaṃviditā asanta eva*). Knowledge without reflection is not knowledge at all.¹⁰ The beginning of an entity (*artha*) coming into being is of the character of awareness (*bodha*).¹¹

This passage presents the concept of *paśyantī* precisely in the same way DS is explained by later scholastic philosophers, as *jñātaikasattā* 'the existence of known-only' or *ajñātasattāvabhāva*, 'the non-existence of what is not known.' The concept of a single *paśyantī* as the experience in all the bodies can be compared with the EJ doctrine of a single self, following the model that proposes Hiranyagarbha.

The problem discussed by Sureśvara while refuting the notion of Bhartṛprapañca in the passage *paśyan na paśyati* is also raised by Somānanda: *paśyantī* is a feminine participle in the present tense.¹² The verbal root *ṛś* in *ātmanepada* giving rise to the question: What [object does it] see? If the reply is that [it sees] appearances which are externalized (*bahirbhūta*), then the issue emerges as to whether or not the seen entities are real or false. Utpala questions both possibilities:

Even when the false is seen due to beginningless ignorance, this (*paśyantī*) will be false. The relation of *paśyantī* is not possible even due to ignorance. Ignorance, since it is indeed accepted as ignorance, is therefore false.¹³

⁶ *su evātmā sarvadehavyūpakatvena vartate | antaḥpaśyadavasthāiva cidrūpatvam arūpakam ||* ŚD 2.3.

⁷ Utpala explains . . . *yāvat paśyanty anantakam as anantaṃ sarvaṃ eva viśvaṃ paśyati yena darśana-kriyārtho 'syāḥ pūryate* Utpala on ŚD 2.4.

⁸ *sarvagṛhyagrāhākākaravarjitaṃ* Utpala on ŚD 2.5.

⁹ . . . *saiva bahir vāsanayā kramāt | ghaṭādirūpāir vyāvṛtā grhyate cakṣurādīnā ||* ŚD 2.7. In terms of Utpala: *parato 'pi bāhyārthavāsanayā avidyārūpāyā krameṇa ghaṭapaṭādyākārair vivṛtā saiva vāk cakṣurādīnāḥ grāhyabhāvam āpadyate |* Utpala on ŚD 2.7.

¹⁰ *tathā hi sarve 'rthāḥ saṃvidi pratiṣṭhām upayānti, asaṃviditā asanta eva | saṃvic ca vimarśasūnyā saṃvid eva na bhavati |* Ibid, 2.20

¹¹ *bodhanayo hy arthasattāprārambhāḥ* Ibid, 2.20.

¹² The gender endings *śatṛ* and *sūnac* are the primary derivatives in the meaning of present tense (*laṭ lakāra*). For discussion, consult *laṭaḥ śatṛsūnacāv. . .* PS 3.2.124.

¹³ *anādyavidyāvāsād api asatyadarśane mithyātvam tāvad asyāḥ sthitam, avidyayūpi saṃbandho na tasyā ghaṭate, avidyā hi avidyātvabhūyupagamād evāsatyā.* Utpala on ŚD 2.23.

Somānanda tackles the problem regarding the seeing nature as false: if *paśyantī* is false, it would contradict the fact that this is Brahman, taking the position of the grammarian that *paśyantī* is Brahman.¹⁴ It is proper to say that the primordial language (*paśyantī*) creates the external entities first, and sees them afterward. However, it is a contradiction that something real creates something false.¹⁵ The subsequent problem, raised as an argument by opponents while refuting DS, addresses the notion that there exists only what is known. Does *paśyantī* create things already known, or does it know afterwards the things created before? In Somānanda's opinion, it is not appropriate to accept that *paśyantī* creates something unknown.¹⁶

It also becomes relevant to ascertain whether *paśyantī* has any relation to ignorance. Somānanda queries whether ignorance is the property of *paśyantī* or not. If ignorance were the property of *paśyantī*, then it must be polluted. If it were the property of something other than this linguistic act of seeing (*paśyantī*), then it would contradict the doctrine of non-duality.¹⁷

Somānanda finds the position problematic that *paśyantī* is endowed with ignorance. The problems raised here resemble those raised against the Advaita model that accepts pure consciousness as both the support and object of ignorance. Both *Ābhāsa* and DS models are congruent with this argument. The questions raised are twofold: first, can ignorance be expressed in terms of existence or non-existence? And second, is *paśyantī* capable of seeing ignorance or not? The essence of the problem is: if *paśyantī* does not see itself, then it is unconscious. And, if this is the case, *paśyantī* would not perceive any object, since everything is caused by ignorance. If *paśyantī* has seen ignorance, then ignorance should be considered as something already known.¹⁸ Furthermore, if ignorance is unknowable, how can one know what is inexpressible?¹⁹ According to both the grammarians and the Vedānta non-dualists,²⁰ the probans (*hetu*) of the cognition of difference demonstrate that ignorance cannot be known by inference.²¹

¹⁴ *asatyā yadi paśyantī paśyantī brahma citratā* | ŚD 2.24 ab.

¹⁵ *bahirbhāvān visṛjyādau paścāt paśyati sātha kim* || *saryā sṛjaty asatyāni vicitram abhidhīyate* | ŚD 2.24cd-25ab.

¹⁶ *jñānān sṛjaty asau tātān vā neti jñāteṣv adarśanam* || *ajñāteṣu na sṛjyati syād...* | ŚD 2.25cd-26ab.

¹⁷ *avidyāsyāḥ svadharmāḥ kiṃ paradharmo 'ihavā bhavet* || *svadharmatve 'syā mālinyaṃ paradharmo 'pi kasya sā* | *parasya sāstrāniṣṭasya...* | Ibid, 2.28cd-29ab.

¹⁸ *tattvānyatvair avācyā vā yady avidyābhidhīyate* || *paśyantya lakṣitāsau vā na vā yadi na lakṣitā* | *paśyantī jñāyam āyāti lakṣitā tarhi lakṣitā* || Ibid, 2.30cd-31.

¹⁹ *avācyatvena bhavatāṃ tasyā rūpaṃ kuto gatam* | *alakṣitasvarūpāyā avidyātvaṃ katham sthitam* || ŚD 2.32.

²⁰ For this, Utpala gives evidence from VP 1.32 and 1.41, how inference is not acceptable in this context. Ibid, ŚD 2.33.

²¹ This is formally directed here against grammarians, but in fact, Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha remain unclear regarding the nature of ignorance, in contrast to Sureśvara's position that ignorance cannot be

The next series of problems raised against *paśyantī* are similar to those raised against the EJ doctrine: if asking the grammarians, is there a single *paśyantī* in all bodies, or is it distinct in each form? If it is just one, then how can it be *paśyantī* (seeing), which implies seeing something, since there will not be an object distinct from the seeing subject? After stating that all is non-dual, if there is something false for *paśyantī* to perceive, then the aforementioned problem will occur, that the very *paśyantī* will be false.²² From the grammarian's perspective, if *paśyantī* is constant seeing, then, as a present participle, it has to see something at present which will be created in the future.²³ However, can there be any difference between *paśyantī* and the entities objectified by *paśyantī*?²⁴ If the reply is yes, then non-dualism is not tenable, and if no, then this *paśyantī* will be perceiving itself by itself, imagining parts within the single one. As is the example with Devadatta killing himself, imagining parts within the case, even with *paśyantī* bisecting itself into subject and object. However, this position is not acceptable to the grammarians, since the *paśyantī* they have understood cannot be divided, being partless.²⁵ The next objection raised is: if *paśyantī* sees the self, then does it see what was not seen before, or does it see what has already been seen? It cannot be the case that the self is not seen before. If this 'seeing' is merely seeing something that has already been cognized, then this act cannot be considered to be a new mode of cognition.²⁶ The self cannot be different from this 'seeing' (*paśyantī*) for *paśyantī* to perceive.

This discussion regarding the nature of ignorance is significant in the present context for multiple reasons. First, the grammarian's notion of *paśyantī* comes in elaborate form, yet does not seem distinct from the Upaniṣadic discussion concerning the nature of the self which does not perceive while seeing. From the perspective of both the grammarians and the Advaitins, the problems concerning existence and knowledge are similar. Many of the arguments are just a slight variant from that of their predecessors. What is fundamental is both streams of argumentation lead to DS, as long as they agree to the point that something unknown does not exist. The question is raised, what allows the entities to be perceived as external to the perceiving witness? The reply of both the grammarians and Sureśvara is the same, that it is *vāsanā* or 'mental

proved by inference. These differences in definition further lead to the premise that Somānanda is silently criticizing Vedāntic non-dualism while criticizing the grammarian's school.

²² This is glossed from ŚD 2.43-47ab and the commentary by Utpala that follows.

²³ *bhaviṣyantaṃ vartamānaṃ katham paśyanti avāgatam* || *anyādigdeśagenānyadigdeśe saty adarśanam* | ŚD 2.47cd-48ab.

²⁴ This issue is dealt in ŚD 2.48cd-51, and the commentary by Utpala that follows.

²⁵ *ātmānāṃ sāvātmānaṃ paśyantī nirvibhāgaḥ* | *bhāge karaṇarūpavāt pāratantryaṃ jaḍānatā* || *ātmānāṃ ātmānāṃ hanti devadatto yathā tathā* | *bhaviṣyaty atra tatṛsya svāṅgair eva vibhāgitā* || *hasiādeḥ karaṇatvaṃ hi mastakādeśe ca karmatā* | *kartā manaḥ svāvayavi nāmūrtīyā idaṃ punaḥ* || ŚD 2.52-54.

²⁶ Somānanda's understanding in this discussion that *pramāṇas* reveal something not already known parallels the definition of *pramāṇa* in the school of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. This definition seems acceptable also to the proponents of Sāṅkhya. See Chatterjee 1978, 61-68.

impression' that gives rise of the notion of objects outside. Comparatively, the *paśyanī* of grammarians is closer to that of Bhartṛprapañca where the self constantly perceives, which implies its active agency even in the state of not seeing any objects. In conclusion, the concept of *paśyanī* articulated by Somānanda and Utpala presupposes a higher category of consciousness as its ground, which differs from the position of the grammarians who take *paśyanī* itself as the supreme state of the self.

Mokṣopāya / Yogavāsiṣṭha: The rise of DS as a doctrine

Dṛṣṭi in *Mokṣopāya/Yogavāsiṣṭha*

The *Mokṣopāyaśāstra* (MUS),²⁷ or the subsequent redaction, *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (YV) is one of the main sources for the concept of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi*, including the use of the term itself.²⁸ Understanding the meaning and application of *dṛṣṭi* in MUS/YV is, therefore, significant for the reasons (1) that the model of Advaita this text proposes is somewhat different from mainstream Advaita of the Śaṅkara lineage, and (2) that this is the text where the term DS explicitly occurs. Furthermore, this understanding supports a comparison of different models of idealistic thought prevalent in classical India. An investigation shows that the text seems to have mainly preferred the second meaning, as identified below, that there exists a real *dṛṣṭi* and a false *dṛṣṭi*, but a few examples lead to a separation of the meaning of this term into four possible sections. However, this inquiry does not include instances of the use of the term in its non-philosophical sense.

- 1) *Dṛṣṭi* = pure awareness.
- 2) Two *dṛṣṭis*. One is correct and the other, false. This is comparable to the *samyakdṛṣṭi* or the correct view, and *dṛṣṭis* (imagination), which are false.
- 3) *Dṛṣṭi* = visualization [D₂]. The visualization under consideration is *brahmadṛṣṭi*. BS is the first text to use *dṛṣṭi* in this meaning, and YV clearly uses this term in the meaning of *brahmadṛṣṭi*. BĀUBhVā does not deal with *dṛṣṭi* in this meaning.
- 4) *Dṛṣṭi* = momentary awareness [D₄]. Mental construction is contemporaneous to this momentary awareness, and there exists no external object to correspond to this *dṛṣṭi*.
- 5) *Dṛṣṭi* = philosophical viewpoints.²⁹

²⁷ I have utilized MUS as a primary source in my discussion. In addition, I have consulted the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* redaction of the text as well.

²⁸ Although the term *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi* is not found in the MUS version, nevertheless, the usage of *dṛṣṭāmasṛṣṭi* or *sṛṣṭidṛṣṭi* is visible.

²⁹ A Buddhist influence can be suggested in the meaning of *dṛṣṭi* as a philosophical viewpoint. *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* uses *dṛṣṭi* for sixty-two viewpoints: *vilagna dṛṣṭigahaneṣu nityam aśīti nāstīti thatāstīti nāstīti dvāśaṣṭīdṛṣṭikṛtānīśraytvā asantabhāvaṃ parigṛhya te sthītāḥ | Saddharma II. Gāthā 65. MUS*

The previous analysis has demonstrated that when an author uses *dṛṣṭi* to indicate two levels of reality, the first level signifies the one true reality. However, when no hierarchy is intended by the term *dṛṣṭi*, the term then refers to pure awareness. The higher level of *dṛṣṭi* is always free from error, and is solitary.³⁰ This *dṛṣṭi* refers to pure awareness.³¹ What distinguishes D₁ from D₃ is that D₁ is Brahman itself, not the visualization of Brahman. In instances where the appearance of external objects is accepted, *dṛṣṭi* occurs to qualify awareness.³² The compound *ciddṛṣṭi*, by expressing mutual identity with the *karmadhāraya*-type of compound, reveals this very meaning.³³ Bhāskara's commentary on this point further strengthens this argument, when he defines *jñānadṛṣ* as the *dṛṣṭi* known as knowledge (*jñānākhyā dṛṣṭi*).³⁴ Śaṅkara and Vimuktātman both favor *dṛṣ* for *dṛṣṭi*, as does Bhāskara. Strikingly, there are not many instances of *dṛṣṭi* in MUS that refer to 'awareness-in-itself'.

The second type of *dṛṣṭi*, the relative seeing, occurs most frequently in MUS with many ramifications:

D _{2a}	D _{2b}
<i>samyagdarśana</i>	<i>asamyagdarśana</i>
<i>ātmadrṣṭi, brahmadṛṣṭi</i>	<i>dehadṛṣṭi</i>
<i>parādrṣṭi</i>	(No equivalent such as <i>aparadrṣṭi</i> is found.)
<i>vijñānadṛṣṭi</i>	<i>jñeyadrṣṭi</i>
<i>saddṛṣṭi, saryā dṛṣṭi</i>	<i>asaddṛṣṭi, bhramadrṣṭi</i>
	<i>dṛṣyadrṣṭi, arthadrṣṭi</i>

In this bipolar *dṛṣṭi*, the first is correct, and the second, false. The correct *dṛṣṭi* is not the correct perception of something, but rather is the *dṛṣṭi* or awareness which is free from modifications. This is not 'seeing only' of the first type, but is the relative *dṛṣṭi* that requires something false. Therefore, all that comes in contrast to 'seeing-only' is false. D_{2a} is correct, and this in itself is the supreme *dṛṣṭi*, in relation to which there is no duality.³⁵ *Sad-dṛṣṭi* and *asad-dṛṣṭi* can also be included in this sequence.³⁶

also uses *dṛṣṭi* in the meaning of *dṛṣṭānta* or illustration. See *Pāṣāṅkhyāna*, MUS 3.2.1-56. For discussion, see Hammeder 2005, 28.

³⁰ *ekaiva kevalaṃ dṛṣṭir anapāyāgatabhramā | vidyate sarvavicchreṣṭha sarvasreṣṭhā samunnatā || MUS 6.25.1.*

³¹ *vastutas tv aśya khoryyādī nāsadrūpaṃ na sanmayam | dṛṣṭir dṛṣyam ivābhāti brahmaivaitat samaṃ sthītam || MUS 6.25.1.47.*

³² *... idaṃ śāntam anābhātam ananyad asad ātmani | citi dṛṣṭau tamasi khe cakrakādīva bhāti te || MUS 6.300.14.*

³³ *... svabhāvato 'syās ciddṛṣṭer ye unmeṣanimeṣaṇe | jagadrūpānubhūtes tāv etāv astamayodayau || svabhāvataḥ yatnarahitam | aśyāḥ ātmaivena purasthāyāḥ | ciddṛṣṭeḥ cidākhyāyāḥ dṛṣṭeḥ | MUS, Sthiti 33.23 and Bhāskara's commentary thereon.*

³⁴ *jñānadṛṣṭaṃ vinā cinmātrajñānākhyāṃ dṛṣṭim vinā ... MUS, Bhāskara on Sthiti 7.11.*

³⁵ *jagad aṅgam anābhāsam adṛṣyāṃ dṛṣyavat sthītam | parayā dṛṣyate dṛṣṭyā tad brahmaiva nūramayam || MUS 6.226.1.*

The correct seeing is even called *parādr̥ṣṭi*,³⁷ with false entities that are perceived due to 'deformity in perception' (*dr̥ṣṭi-vairūpya*), described with an example of an eye-disease that gives rise to false appearance.³⁸ This is *bhramadr̥ṣṭi*,³⁹ or erroneous perception, which gives the idea of the world. Appearance is 'a gentle touching by way of seeing' (*dr̥ṣṭivilehana*).⁴⁰ YV declares that what is erroneously perceived (*mīthyādr̥ṣṭi*) has no existence in any mode of time.⁴¹ The 'correct view' sees creation as a mere vibration of awareness, the antonym of which is 'incorrect view' (*asamyak-dr̥ṣṭi*).⁴² What is false is referred to as *dr̥ṣyadr̥ṣṭi*, the view of what is seen.⁴³ Even *arīhadr̥ṣṭi*, used in a compound, can be analyzed in terms of 'the entities in the form of mere conception'.⁴⁴ *Dehadr̥ṣṭi*, for instance, is of the category of the external, which is not of the essential nature of awareness.⁴⁵ Opposite to *saṃsāradr̥ṣṭi* is *vijñāna-dr̥ṣṭi*, which can also be found with a qualifier, 'suddha', i.e., free from constructions.⁴⁶

³⁶ ity asty anto na saddr̥ṣṭer asadr̥ṣṭeṣ ca vā kvacit | asyās tv abhyuditaṃ buddham abud-dham prati vānagha . . . MŪŚ Sthiti 3.15.

³⁷ ye parāṃ dr̥ṣṭim āyātā dr̥ṣyaśrīpāradarśinaḥ | na vidyamānam apy asti teṣāṃ vedanam ātatam || ye parāṃ dr̥ṣṭim āyātā viddhi teṣāṃ apāṃ iva | arūpālokamananam spandam aspandanam sadā || ye parāṃ dr̥ṣṭim āyātā viddhi teṣāṃ apāṃ iva | spandam aspandanam sarva(ṃ)m avedanavaśād iva || MŪŚ 6.179.14-16; ye parāṃ dr̥ṣṭim āyātā saṃsṛteḥ pāradarśinaḥ | na te karma praśaṃsanti kīpaṃ nadyaṃ pibanti iva MŪŚ 6.179.18; aīha cidvyomatāṃ prāpīaḥ parāṃ dr̥ṣṭim ahaṃ gataḥ | saraisam-ayasamprāptau vyomanimalatām iva || MŪŚ 6.225.4.

³⁸ dharaṇy avidyamānaiva saṅkalpād dr̥ṣyate tathā | dr̥ṣyate dr̥ṣṭivairūpyād yathā vyomani pūchikā MŪŚ 6.29.41; timirāvṛtadr̥ṣṭināṃ yathā keṣoṇḍukādi kṛe | sphuraty evaṃ jagadrūpaṃ anātmāny eva tiṣṭhatām MŪŚ 6.166.11; tadā tv ahaṃ taimirikākṣadr̥ṣṭa-keṣoṇḍukāniva jaganty apaśyam MŪŚ 6.216.61.

³⁹ tartvasadrūpam akhilaṃ śānye veṭālako yathā | bhramadr̥ṣṭyā tu sadrūpam ity ahanā jagadgatīḥ || MŪŚ 6.46.9.

⁴⁰ aho nu citraṃ nirbhīti citram ujvalam utthitam | svaraṅjanaṃ jagad iti sthītaṃ dr̥ṣṭivilehanam || MŪŚ 6.60.33.

⁴¹ mīthyādr̥ṣṭiḥ prekṣitā ca na kadācana vidyate | mṛgatīṣṇāmbhasā kena ghaṭakāḥ paripūrītāḥ || MŪŚ 6.99.10.

⁴² sargaś citspandanātrātmā samyagdr̥ṣṭau vilīyate | ude(ṭi) asamyagdr̥ṣṭiātmā rajjau sarpabhrāmo yathā || MŪŚ 6.105.61.

⁴³ dr̥ṣyadr̥ṣṭir ityaṃ bhrāntir ākāśaumarmañjarī | cidvyomāṅgakam eveti tatrāham anubhūtvān || MŪŚ 6.217.26.

⁴⁴ kiṃ nāma kāraṇaṃ brūhi sargāḍau bhītivastunaḥ | abhāvād arīhadr̥ṣṭināṃ cid evantaṃ prakāśate || MŪŚ 6.350.17.

⁴⁵ idaṃ cetanam evāhaṃ nāhaṃ dehādīdr̥ṣṭayaḥ | iti nīsoḍyavān yo 'ntar na sa mukhyati karṇicit . . . MŪŚ 6.253.32.

⁴⁶ saṃśoṣaśālaṃ cetāḥsuddhaviññānadr̥ṣṭibhīḥ | bhṛṣaṃ vikāsam āyāti sūryāṃsubhir ivāmbujam || MŪŚ Mumukṣu 14.8.

This view of oneself, *ātmadr̥ṣṭi*, when known, destroys the fear of transmigration,⁴⁷ and can be attained when the error caused by ignorance is removed.⁴⁸ In these examples MŪŚ seems to differentiate the 'innate' from the 'essential.' Whatever comes to the level of appearance is of the innate nature of awareness, but awareness is not essentially of the form of plurality.

The third meaning of *dr̥ṣṭi* seems to have been first used by Bādarāyaṇa. In subsequent Advaita, this becomes the *vṛtti-caitanya* (consciousness in form of mental modification), which culminates in *phalacaitanya* (awareness of the form of result). Since the Absolute is nameless and formless, it cannot be conceptualized. A subsequent problem emerges that, if the Absolute cannot be realized since it cannot be conceptualized, liberation becomes impossible. Advaita tackles this problem by asserting that there exist two strata of consciousness, consciousness-in-itself, and consciousness in modifications. 'Consciousness in itself' is the highest of meditations, which MŪŚ identifies as the single *dr̥ṣṭi* that does not reside in the faulty mind.⁴⁹ When the term appears in the sense of a support of mind in which a Yogin abides, this seems to be the very meaning of *brahmadr̥ṣṭi*.⁵⁰ The *bahuvrīhi*-compound, *suddhaviññāna-dr̥ṣṭi*, supports this very meaning, when we read 'pure knowledge' as the qualifier.⁵¹ In this model of *dr̥ṣṭi* as pure awareness, the world is only the vibration of awareness. The 'error' in form of the world is, thus, the vibration of pure awareness, and this pure awareness is *dr̥ṣṭi*.⁵²

D₄ resembles D₂₆ in the general sense in that neither of them indicates the real seeing. While both D₄ and D₂₆ are both categorized as 'viewing the world', the former kind of viewing highlights the momentary nature of the world appearance. To be more specific, the world is described as a scene-by-scene projection of impermanent appearances, all of which are non-ultimate, existing only in temporary relationship to the mind that perceives them. However, MŪŚ does not always adopt this type of relativist perspective. In other passages it embodies the perspective of ultimate reality and states that all that appears is Brahman itself.

⁴⁷ ātmadr̥ṣṭir adṛṣṭaiś saṃsārabhayaḍāyini | dr̥ṣṭā sañ samagrūṇāṃ dukkhānāṃ kṣayakāriṇi || MŪŚ 6.10.28; brahmeti dr̥ṣṭavata eva tavātmadr̥ṣṭyā bhūyo 'pi kiṃ bhramaṇam aṅgam asaṅgam eva || MŪŚ 6.52.19.

⁴⁸ ajñānaṃ bhramaṇaṃ tyaktvā satyāṃ dr̥ṣṭim avekṣya ca | dhīratām alam ālambya ghaṇaṃ bhramaṇam ityaṅget || MŪŚ 6.30.37.

⁴⁹ savaṇo na sthītiṃ yāti malavaty aṃśuke yathā | ekā dr̥ṣṭiḥ sthītiṃ yāti na mlāne cittake tathā || MŪŚ 4.17.22.

⁵⁰ na bhūtaṃ na bhaviṣyac ca cintayāmi kadācana | dr̥ṣṭim ālambya tiṣṭhāmi vartamānām ihātmanaḥ || MŪŚ 6.27.8.

⁵¹ saṃśoṣaśālaṃ cetāḥsuddhaviññānadr̥ṣṭibhīḥ | bhṛṣaṃ vikāsam āyāti sūryāṃsubhir ivāmbujam || MŪŚ Mumukṣu 14.8.

⁵² yathā mukāvalīthaṃsadarśanaṃ kṛe svabhāvajam | dr̥ṣṭer evaṃ cidacchāyāḥ saṃvitspandaj jagad-bhramaḥ || MŪŚ 6.134.11.

The *dr̥ṣṭi* in this category, (D₄), equals *vbhā*, or *vā+bhā*, and all examples of D₂₅ in which *dr̥ṣṭi* is equated with *ābhāsa* can therefore be identified with it. This is the phenomenal appearance, whose substrate is 'being' and 'awareness', with awareness as the only reality.⁵³ This meaning is further clarified by Bhāskara's use of *pratīti* for *dr̥ṣṭi*.⁵⁴ A comparable term is the 'shining of seeing' (*dr̥ṣṭibhāṣā*), which corresponds to 'what appears is through seeing'.⁵⁵ Whatever appears is merely *ābhāsa* in the *dr̥ṣṭi*, which implies that there are *dr̥ṣṭis* in the substrate of *dr̥ṣṭi*. These are *dr̥ṣṭis* that merely appear in *dr̥ṣṭi*, with two degrees of seeing:

- 1) seeing the externals, and
- 2) seeing the perception of externals.

The inner *dr̥ṣṭi* is considered as real while external manifold appearance is considered as false.⁵⁶ The texts compare this *dr̥ṣṭi* with eye disease and state that it must be removed.⁵⁷ Bhāskara explains that *dr̥ṣṭi* in this case are the 'rays of eyes',⁵⁸ which form the shape of external objects. The notion of *dr̥ṣṭi* in this sense encompasses all mental constructions.⁵⁹ Bhāskara explains that even *jīva* is a type of conceptualization (*kalanā*),⁶⁰ which results in non-duality. MUŚ stresses that nothing is to be changed, and that *dr̥ṣṭis* correspond to appearance. Nothing is changed in the essence of the Absolute, even when there are various appearances.⁶¹ It is mental construction which gives rise to fear.⁶² The entities to be known are *dr̥ṣṭis*,⁶³ suggesting that there is one only perceiving subject, and that all perceptions are constructed by the very

⁵³ sarvaṃ sat tac ca nihśūnyaṃ na kiñcid iva saṃsthītam | tatra vyomni vibhāntīmā nijā bhāso 'nga dr̥ṣṭayah || MUŚ Sthiti 31.33.

⁵⁴ yataḥ tatra vyomni cinnātrākāṣe | imāḥ puraḥsphurantiyaḥ | dr̥ṣṭayah jagadrūpāḥ pratīta-yaḥ . . . Commentary upon MUŚ Sthiti 31.33.

⁵⁵ khe dr̥ṣṭibhāṣāṃ sphuranaṃ yādṛṣaṃ tādr̥ṣaṃ jagat | viparyasyaty aviratam abodhāl lakṣyate sthīram || MUŚ 6.302.2.

⁵⁶ ābhāti maukūkaguṇaḥ śaradambarāntar dr̥ṣṭāv asatya uditō 'py atisatyarūpaḥ | bhrāntiā yathā nabhasi vīspūratāṃ tathaiṣāṃ sañkhyāṃ vidhātum iha ko jagatāṃ samarthaḥ || MUŚ 6.237.62.

⁵⁷ yathā taimirikākṣasya sahaajā eva dr̥ṣṭayah | keṣoṇḍukādivad bhānti tathemāḥ tatra sṛṣṭayah MUŚ, Sthiti 31.34

⁵⁸ . . . dr̥ṣṭayah netraśmāyāḥ keṣoṇḍukādivat keśakūrcādivat | bhānti sphuranti . . . Bhāskara on MUŚ, Sthiti 31.34.

⁵⁹ . . . akhīlakalanādr̥ṣṭiṣu puraḥ | śamaṃ yāntiṣv antaḥkaraṇāgḥaṇānāv ūhitarasaṃ | dhiyā dr̥ṣṭe tattve ramaṇam aṇaṇam jāgatam idam MUŚ, Mumukṣu 12.21.

⁶⁰ yataḥ akhīlakalanādr̥ṣṭiṣu samastajīvādikalanārūpāsu dr̥ṣṭiṣu . . . Bhāskara on MUŚ, Mumukṣu 12.21.

⁶¹ . . . jñānaṃ nājñānatām eti chāyā nāyāti tāpatām | sad brahma nāsad bhavati vicitrāsv api dr̥ṣṭiṣu . . . MUŚ 6.6.16.

⁶² . . . svasaṅkalpopayātāsu bhūti sambhramadr̥ṣṭiṣu | palāyate 'py asatyāsu veatīṣv iva bālīkā . . . MUŚ 6.34.82.

⁶³ . . . jñātāraṃ jñeyadr̥ṣṭīnām kartāraṃ sarvakarmaṇām | MUŚ 6.43.10.

subject as well as appearing to the very subject. All views come into appearance through error.⁶⁴ No object corresponds to *dr̥ṣṭi*, which means the self is free to create by mere perception.⁶⁵ In this context, *dr̥ṣṭi* occurs in MUŚ in a compound with *dr̥ṣṭya*.⁶⁶ In some cases, the use of *dr̥ṣṭya* (object of perception) is interchangeable with *sṛṣṭi* (creation), for instance, where *sṛṣṭi* is mentioned as being originated by *dr̥ṣṭi*.⁶⁷ Appearances are the very nature of awareness, or seeing, and MUŚ compares appearance to a tree and its parts.⁶⁸ The example of dream strengthens the same thesis that dream entities are nothing else than consciousness appearing in the form of a dream.⁶⁹

In reply to the question, why the world does appear when there is only awareness, MUŚ states that the appearance of plurality is like a modification of a single space in terms of the space within a room, a jar, and so on, or [rain] water in the [sea] water—all is Brahman in Brahman that is seen.⁷⁰ The instances of appearance seen in the form of the world (*jagadr̥ṣṭi*) are like parts of the body,⁷¹ and so are nothing but awareness itself.⁷² Liberation, according to this *dr̥ṣṭi* concept, is the removal of *sañsāradr̥ṣṭi* (seeing *samsṛti* or transmigration). It is definitely not the destruction of seeing or *dr̥ṣṭi* itself.⁷³

The use of *anubhūti* in MUŚ⁷⁴ as pure awareness, being the equivalent of *dr̥ṣ* or *dr̥ṣṭi*, resonates with its use in IS.⁷⁵ It is remarkable that the common meanings of

⁶⁴ . . . na tad asti jagaty asmin yan na sambhavati bhrame | vicitrās triṣu lokeṣu dr̥ṣyante vastudr̥ṣṭayah . . . MUŚ 6.65.17.

⁶⁵ bhavyaḥ paśyati śāstrārtham eva pūrvāparānvitam | na dr̥ṣṭiṣvīyayaṃ vastu yat paśyati karoti tat || MUŚ 6.209.3.

⁶⁶ . . . śāmyantīmāḥ pariñātāḥ sakalā dr̥ṣyadr̥ṣṭayah | yathā marunadīvegavāgrahaṇabuddhayaḥ || MUŚ 6.252.23.

⁶⁷ . . . pāsānākhyānam etat te kathitāṃ kāryakovidā | anayemāḥ sphuṭā dr̥ṣṭyā sṛṣṭayo nabhasi sthīrāḥ || MUŚ 6.253.1.

⁶⁸ There are further examples to support this, for instance, *svasamvedananetra* (the eye of self-reflection). . . yathā paśyati vṛkṣaḥ svaṃ patrapuṣpaphalādīkam | svasaṃvedananetreṇa tathaitad dr̥ṣṭāvān ahaṃ . . . MUŚ 6.219.7.

⁶⁹ . . . bahucinnātrakaṃ vidhī tad yathā svapnadr̥ṣṭiṣu | puraṃ bhavan nijād rūpān na kadācana bhīdyate MUŚ 6.253.3.

⁷⁰ . . . brahmaṇy eva paraṃ brahma jagadr̥ṣṭyaiva sañsthītam | suddhākāśam tvākāṣe jale jalam ivāmalam . . . MUŚ 6.71.19.

⁷¹ jagadr̥ṣṭir iyaṃ jñāsyā śarīrāvayavopamā . . . MUŚ 6.208.16.

⁷² sañvinmātramayāny eva dr̥ṣṭāny api ca kāñcīti . . . MUŚ 6.217.55.

⁷³ viśrūntiḥ sañsāradr̥ṣṭīnāśadvāreṇa viśrāmaḥ. MUŚ, Bhāskara on Mumukṣu 12.9.

⁷⁴ cidākāśam ahaṃ svaccham anubhūtir iti sphuṭā | yasyāstam āgatā rūdhaṃ taṃ jīvanāṃ saṅgaṃ viduḥ || ahaṃ vedanamātrātmā kāñi dehendriyāṃ me | labdhātmanam iti svasthaṃ pravilumpanti nāpadaḥ . . . MUŚ 6.253.21-22.

dr̥ṣṭi as 'seeing' or *anubhūti* as 'experience' are expressing awareness in itself in this usage, revealing that the awareness in itself is what is commonly perceived in phenomenal perceptions. This fits with the aforementioned BĀU use of *paśyan*, which refers to the absolute awareness.

The problems concerning 'Paśyan' (seeing) in MUŚ

In the *Nirvāṇa* and *Utpatī* chapters of MUŚ, '*paśyan*' is also used in the specific sense of 'seeing in itself'. Since this has been a crucial point in the classical debate of Bhartṛhari, Bhartṛprapañca, Sureśvara, and Somānanda regarding 'seeing', it is relevant to analyze the understanding of MUŚ regarding '*paśyan*' to understand the development of the concept in its linguistic, epistemological, and ontological contexts.

MUŚ proposes that the one liberated while living (*jīvanmukta*) perceives the phenomenal world in its true (*yathāsthita*) nature and he is endowed with 'correct-view' (*samyagdarśana*).⁷⁶ Following MUŚ, those persons who are liberated are functioning in the world, they are at peace and dwell in the nature of 'light' (*satva*). As they constantly perceive the light of awareness, they do not have any impression (*vāsanā*) of duality or identity. The text metaphorically explains that the liberated ones offer the entire world as wood to the fire of consciousness although they remain active in the world.⁷⁷ The metaphor of fire for consciousness and wood for world suggests the inner sacrifice.⁷⁸ MUŚ explains *sākṣin* as *ābhāsa* when compared to a 'lamp' and its burning. As illumination is of the nature of a lamp, so also is the illumination of the world of the nature of this *sākṣin*. For the one who is liberated while living, the world is the dance (*ṛtita*) of 'power' in the theater located in the city of absolute emptiness. The liberated one perceives this play and resides within it as if a 'witness'.⁷⁹ This exam-

⁷⁵ The lengthy auto-commentary in the first verse of IS, chapter 1, abounds with instances of the use of *anubhūti* in this sense.

⁷⁶ *samyagdarśanasampanno jīvanmuktapadaṇ gataḥ | yathāsthitam idaṃ paśyan karmabhir na nibadhyate || MUŚ 6.155.6.*

⁷⁷ *sāntā vyavaharanto 'pi satvasthūḥ saṃyatendriyāḥ | nityaṃ paśyanti cījyotir na dvaitaikyena vāsanāḥ || antarmukhatayā sarvaṃ cidvahnau trijagatīṅgam | juhvanto 'ntar viceṣṭante mūḍhavac chūṭalāsyaḥ || MUŚ 6.2.45-46.*

⁷⁸ Contemplation on 'consciousness only' is prescribed for those striving for self-realization as a substitute for external rituals. BG refers to such a practice:

śrotvādīnāndriyāṇy. . . āmasaṃnyanayogāgnau juhvati jñānadīpīte || BG 4. 26-27.

BG identifies this practice as higher than external rituals (BG 4.33). This practice is referred to as an inner sacrifice in the Trika system:

mahāśūnyālaye vahnau bhūṭākṣaviṣayādikam | hūyate manasā sārḍhaṃ sa homaś cetanāsrucā || Vi-jñānabhairava 149. sarvāṅgaḥ haviḥ | jñānam annam | Śivasūtra 2.8-9.

⁷⁹ *sākṣiṇi sphāra ābhāse dhruve dīpa iva krīyāḥ | saty etasmin prakāśyante jagaccitraparamparāḥ || paramākāśanagarāṇḍīyamaṇḍapabhūmiṣu | suśaktiṅgtaṃ saṃsāraṃ paśyanīḥ sākṣivat sthīā || MUŚ 6.41.11-12.*

ple further strengthens the notion of '*paśyanti*' in MUŚ, where 'seeing' is the true nature of the self that 'perceives' the world, while at the same time knowing the non-substantiality of anything other than consciousness itself. This *ābhāsa*, however, is the 'shining forth', which is 'constant' (*dhruva*), differing from the common understanding of *ābhāsa* that it is a false appearance. This 'shining of the world' conjoins with the shining of the witnessing awareness. This witnessing awareness perceives the world in the form of 'consciousness only', free from difference.⁸⁰ Even in MUŚ the *Upaniṣadic* concept of 'does not perceive while seeing', '*paśyan na paśyati*,' remains constant.⁸¹ While perceiving entities, the realized person (*jñā*) is compared to a lamp – the actionlessness in the subject here brings MUŚ closer to Śaṅkara/Sureśvara than Bhartṛprapañca.⁸² As to the question why, then, the subject perceives objects, the reply is, 'due to impression', which is the same response appearing in MUŚ as in BĀUBhVā.⁸³

When analyzing *paśyan*, the author of MUŚ seems to have been influenced by the grammarians' use of *paśyanī*, the 'seeing nature' of speech (*vāc*), although, in MUŚ, it is not the linguistic awareness, but rather, seeing in itself.⁸⁴ While envisioning the notion of plurality in terms of subject and object-in-itself, this solitary awareness nonetheless remains in its fundamental nature. These instances, nevertheless, do not support a conclusion that MUŚ follows model of a single perceiving subject, as there are instances in MUŚ that suggest plurality in subjective awareness.⁸⁵ It is noteworthy that the notion of a 'subject perceiving duality' is interchangeable in MUŚ with the

⁸⁰ *padārthān avibhāgena paśyan buddhyādivarjitāḥ | cinnārabālo ramate sargakṛṣṇanakaḥ svayam || MUŚ 6.123.62.*

⁸¹ *trayaṃ etat tu yāvasthā trayeṇānena varjitā | paśyantīvāpy apaśyanti sāvasthā paramoditā || MUŚ 6.206.6; and also dr̥ṣyam paśyan svam ātmānaṃ na draṣṭā samprapaśyati | prapañcākṛantasamviteḥ kasyodeti nīḥ sthitiḥ || MUŚ, Sthiti 18.26; as well as ākāśaviśado draṣṭā sarvago 'pi na paśyati | netraṃ nijam ivātmānaṃ dr̥ṣṭibhūtam aho bhramaḥ MUŚ, Sthiti 18.28.*

⁸² *jñā yathāsthita evāste paśyan dīpa ivākriyāḥ | amanomānananano manomananavān api MUŚ 6.353.13.*

⁸³ Compare the MUŚ passage: *jīvo yadvāsanāsāras tad evāntaḥ prapaśyati | svapna evātra dr̥ṣṭānto dīrghasvapnas tv idaṃ jagat || MUŚ Sthiti 16.27* with Sureśvara's passages: 1) *svapne 'py etat trayam nābhūḍ vāsanāmātrahetutaḥ | kim u vidhvastanīḥṣeṣadvaitahetau susuptage || BĀUBhVā 4.3.1512.* 2) *Buddhyādeś ca samutpattau dharmādy evātra kāraṇam | Ibid 4.3.1529.* Compare also with Somānanda's ŚD and Utpala's commentary thereon: . . . *saiva bahir vāsanayā kramat | ghaṭādirūpāir vyāvṛtā gr̥hyate cakṣurādīnā || ŚD 2.7; parato 'pi bāhyārīhāvāsanayā avidyārūpyā krameṇa ghaṭa-paṭādyākārair vivṛtā saiva vāk cakṣur-ādīnāṃ grāhyabhāvam āpadyate Utpala's commentary on ŚD 2.7.*

⁸⁴ *śiṣyate śīrasamsārakalanākanātmikā | bhṛṣṭabijopamā sattā jīvasya citināmikā | paśyanī nāma kalitā tyajanti ceryacarvaṇam | manomahābhāranirmuktasāradākāśakośavat || suddhā cid bhāvānātrasthā ceryacī cāpalatād gatā | adūraviprakṛṣṭaiṣā padopanatīpāvanī. MUŚ 6.38.11-13.*

⁸⁵ *bhūḥpasaṅkalpajīvanāṃ pratyekeṃ taj jagat pṛthak | paśyanti te ca nūnyo 'nyam rudrajñānād ite tataḥ || MUŚ 6.68.22.*

terms *citta*⁸⁶ or *jīva*.⁸⁷ The text is not consistent in maintaining 'cit' as Absolute or pure awareness, and *jīva* as the individual subject. When MUŚ uses *cit* as 'that which perceives duality', this is *citta* or *jīva*, abandoning a hierarchy of consciousness.⁸⁸ As in the discussion of *paśyantī*, so here the entities seen are seen within the mind.⁸⁹ YV compares the grammarian's *paśyantī* with *citi* in the sense that as all words are in indivisible form in *paśyantī*, so are the worlds in consciousness itself (*citi*).⁹⁰

Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi as a compound

MUŚ/YV is the first and most prominent text to use the compound *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi*. However, because this compound rarely occurs, it is not possible to determine that this term is used to denote an independent thought. Compounds like *dṛṣṭātmāsṛṣṭi* (creation having the nature of perception)⁹¹ are synonymous to DS, since the context confirms this. This example, 'the origination having the nature of what is seen', indicates the momentariness of creation, showing the transitory nature of perception. This compound also demonstrates the closeness with one model of DS that accepts *jñātaikasatā* (existence of only that which is known). The use of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi* in MUŚ confirms the transitory nature of creation.⁹²

⁸⁶ *pratyekam uditam cittam svasvabhāvodarasthitam | idam ittham samārambham jagat paśyad vinasatyati || MUŚ Sthiti 17.17.*

⁸⁷ *pravṛtibhāṅgo ye jīvās te tanmātrapadaḥ gataḥ | tanmātraikataya sargūn mithaḥ paśyanti kalpitān || MUŚ Sthiti 18.5.*

⁸⁸ *śaṅḍaḥ pratyekam evāntar yathā rasacamatkṛtīm | svādayaty evam eṣā cit pṛthak paśyati sam-sṛṣṭiḥ. MUŚ Sthiti 18.38.*

⁸⁹ *antar evākkhilaḥ kaścit paśyaty avikalaḥ jagat | tatratikālaḥ kalanād unmajjati nimaḥjati || svapnāi svapnāntaram tatra tathā paśyan punaḥ punaḥ || mithyāvaṇṇesu bhūtiḥ śīleva śikharacyutā || svayam antaḥ prapaśyanti ye jagajjīvasambhramam | taiḥ kaiścit tat tathā dṛṣyam asat svapnavad āśrītam. MUŚ Sthiti 18.54-57.*

⁹⁰ *sītā yathāsyām paśyantyaḥ śabdā ghaṇḍāpādayaḥ | jātañāḥ sthūṭāḥ sargās tathānanye mahācītiḥ || paśyantyaḥ eva paśyantimayā bhānti tayaiva ca | yathā śabdās tathā sargās citaiva citi cimmayāḥ || MUŚ 6.336.41-42.*

"*Paśyantī* can reflect worldly word forms and can also totally transcend them. Even though it may come into contact with the sequence and often egocentric word forms of *vaikhari* and *madhyamā*, it remains pure, untouched, and spiritual in nature. To those who are trapped in ego knots and impure word usage, *paśyantī* may appear to be mixed up and contaminated. But in reality it is not." Coward 1990, 48.

⁹¹ *anyatrānyatra tasyātha dṛṣṭayo 'nyās tathaiva khe | kacanty asaṅkhyā dūrasthā mitho dṛṣṭātmāsṛṣṭayaḥ || MUŚ 6.237.49.* 'In the void, the creations with the essence of mutually seeing appear elsewhere; and elsewhere, innumerable are the seeings of him {*prajāpati*}.'

⁹² *khādriḍyūrvinādiśreṇyo dṛṣṭisṛṣṭyā punaḥ punaḥ | saivānyeva vicitreyam avidyā pari-vartate || YV 3.114.56.* 'Following DS, the sky, mountain, *dyū*, *ūrvī*, river, each goes on changing (*parivartate*) as if the same and as if different, which (in turn) is mere ignorance.'

The next compound *sṛṣṭidrṣṭi* (SD) clearly indicates the imaginative aspect of *dṛṣṭi* in the process of origination.⁹³ In this context, creation emerges from itself (*svataḥ*), further showing how *dṛṣṭi* in MUŚ is understood as a self-creative phenomenon. However, this use of the term SD would be modified by the later exegetes Appayya, Viṭṭhaleśa (the author of *Candrikā* commentary upon AS), and Dharmadatta (the author of GTĀ). SD, in these later scholastic Advaita texts, refers to the doctrine of Advaita that accepts the external ontic being of the entities of perception. Following this doctrine, mere perception does not give rise to phenomenality and the external entities exist whether they are cognized or not. In contradistinction to this later usage of SD, the MUŚ author utilized the compound *sṛṣṭidrṣṭi* as a direct synonym of DS. A specific example from MUŚ verifies that the act of 'perceiving creation', *sṛṣṭidrṣṭi*, occurs as a plurality, with each of the perceptual creations as waves in the ocean of consciousness.⁹⁴ In order to build a more comprehensive picture of the concept of non-dual awareness in classical Hindu philosophical writings, the next chapter on the scholastic interpretation of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi* needs to be read in light of the models of 'seeing' found in the Kashmiri texts that have been addressed in this chapter.

⁹³ *citī cārucamatkāraṃ camatkurvanī yat svataḥ | svacamatkṛtayo 'nāsthās tad etāḥ sṛṣṭidrṣṭayaḥ || MUŚ 6.249.61.* 'In consciousness, perceptions of the form of creations make a wonderful show, [making] the self-show inside'.

⁹⁴ *nikāṭā dṛṣyatām yānti stambhasthāḥ śālabhañjīkāḥ | asmīn akṣobhya evāntas taraigāḥ sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭayaḥ || MUŚ 6.209.46.*

Chapter 9

Scholastic Interpretation of *Drṣṭisrṣṭi**Drṣṭisrṣṭi* in *Svātmayogapradīpa*

Since citations of the term *drṣṭisrṣṭi* are rare and exegetes have often used it with divergent meanings, it is necessary to evaluate the instances where this terminology occurs. Amarānanda's *Svātmayogapradīpa* consistently applies this term. One can glimpse the meaning of *drṣṭisrṣṭi* in SYPP 1.2, where the term *drṣṭi* is described as *aprākṛtacicchaktirūpā*, 'of the character of the power of unconstructed awareness' (SYPP 8.1). The first occurrence of DS in SYP reveals that it is a method applicable only to the higher category of aspirants.¹ In confirmation of this proposition, the term *sāmbhavi drṣṭi* is presented in this text in exactly the same meaning as that of the term *sāmbhava-upāya* used in the Trika tradition. Another use of the term DS in SYP further supports this meaning by enumerating three views:

- 1) Creation as a play of God,
- 2) *Jīva*, due to ignorance, imagines everything including God, and
- 3) The world exists only to whom it appears.

According to the first view, God is separate from the self, and the self and the world are governed by him. The second opinion is that the world, including God, is created by *jīva*'s ignorance and the third, or the highest view, is that everything is the play of the power of knowledge of the self, of the nature of knowledge. These three views are successively regarded as higher than the previous.² Amarānanda compares the three examples given in a course of instruction with these three views: the view of the first category is like the instruction to Rāma that he is himself the lord Viṣṇu,³ when Rāma thinks of himself as only a human being. The second view is like the instruction to

¹ *drṣṭisrṣṭyāstrayaṇāt . . . SYPP 8.6 . . . atra sāmbhavi drṣṭiḥ . . . SYPP 8.7 . . . evaṇvidhā drṣṭir uttamādhikāriṇiṣyā ca jñeyā . . . SYPP 8.20*

² *atra t' svarasyaiva lilayā jī vādibhāvaḥ saṃsāra iti kecit, jīvanām evānādyavidyayā jagadīśvarādīkalpanā saṃsāra ity eke | svapnaprapaṅcavat drṣṭisrṣṭinyāyena yasya pratiyate tasyaivetī praty-upādīhikāḥ saṃsāra ity aṇye | yad vā āmano anyam īśvaraḥ tatparatantram ca jīvaṃ jagac ca manyate prathamadhīḥ | mamaivānādyajñānāt īśvaro jagac ca kalpitam iti madīyamadhīḥ | jñānātmano mama jñānaśaktivilāsitam sarvam ity uttamadhīr manyate | SYPP 13.13-18.*

³ This clearly indicates the influence of YV:

Karṇa that he is not Rādhā's son, but rather of Kuntī.⁴ The most exalted view presented here is similar to Amarānanda's story of the ten fools who cross the river and count just nine: the tenth, who is counting, forgets to count himself. This illustration confirms that instructions merely establish what is already there, just like reassuring the tenth person.⁵ Amarānanda states:

*drṣṭisrṣṭinyāyena jagataḥ kāraṇatvaṃ janmādyavasthātrayāśrayatve 'py avikāri-
tvaṃ ca*
SYPP 38.17-18

Causation of the world and changelessness, even in being the locus of the three states of origination and so on, follows the DS maxim.

According to this example, the world is not caused by ignorance but by self-awareness which persists in all the modes of creation, maintenance, and dissolution. This meaning is possible if the compound is understood in the first of the meanings of the term *drṣṭi*, where this term refers to pure consciousness. This fits with another use of DS, in which a dream metaphor is given for creation.⁶ This metaphor does not suffice to demonstrate the falsity of creation, but to show its nature as mere knowledge. The line '*svapnadṛśyasyeva hi drṣṭir eva srṣṭiḥ*' (origination is seeing itself, like the entities to be seen in dream), is a part of the commentary of the following verse:

*cidātmabhittau nijacyacitram | līlārasai rañjitatātilyā ||
yā nirmalonmilayati svatantrā || nīmīlayaty apy adṛśāmy ahaṃ sā ||⁷*

I am that stainless, autonomous [awareness] who, with the brush of mind colored with the fluid of mere appearance, reveals the picture of the objects of self-consciousness [found] in the surface of consciousness, and also conceals [this picture] due to not perceiving.

This verse again aligns Amarānanda closely with the Trika Śaiva doctrine.⁸

*śāpavyūjjavaśūd evam rājaveśadharo hariḥ | āhṛtājñānasampannaḥ kiñcijñāno 'sau bhavat prabhuḥ ||
cidānandasvarūpe hi rāme rājivalocane | YV 1.1.55-56; renāpi śapito viṣṇuḥ sarvajñatvaṃ tavāsti yat |
kāñcikālaṃ hi tat tyaktvā tvam ajñānī bhaviṣyasi || YV 1.1.60.*

⁴ This example is based on the *Mahābhārata* story in which Karṇa, a hero who fought on the side of hundred Kaurava brothers, had no idea that he is a son of Kuntī, the mother of five brothers; rather he thought himself a son of a charioteer.

⁵ Sureśvara favors this example; see BĀUBhVā 1.1.208-211, 1.4.600-604, 4.4.629; NS 3.64, 3.68-69, 4.33-34.

⁶ *svapnadṛśyasyeva hi drṣṭir eva srṣṭiḥ . . . SYPP 47.6-7.*

⁷ SYP 2.10. I have changed *adṛśyā* to *adṛśā* in the present edition on the basis of auto-commentary. The auto-commentary explains *adṛśā* as *adṛśā nīmīlayati ca tac citram adarśanena tirobhāvayati, drṣṭyasya hy adarśanam eva ca saṃhāraḥ susuptivad ity arthaḥ |* There is even a meter break in reading *adṛśyā*. The next emendation is *tīlyā*, which, in the original reading, is *kūlyā*. To complete the metaphor of painting, it is essential to have a brush, which could fit with the metaphor of fluid and so forth. But if *kūlyā* is to be read instead, then the meaning will be ' . . . through the channel of'.

⁸ This verse compares favorably to two aphorisms: *citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuḥ* and *svecchayā svabhittau viśvam unmilayati Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* 1-2. For the concept of *unmilana* and *nīmīlana*, see *Spandakārikā* 1.1 and the *Spandanirṇaya* of Kṣemarāja thereon.

In the following sequence, one example matches D₂: *paradr̥ṣṭyā dr̥ṣṭasya viśvasya pratyagdr̥ṣṭyā layaḥ* (SYPP 47.12), 'Dissolution of the world [occurs] when the view of the self is perceived by the view of another'.

The conclusive meaning of DS found in SYPP tallies with the understanding of Kāśmīraka Sadānanda. When analyzing DS in his AdBS, he compares the world to a dream, identifying both waking and dreaming states as mental construction. He aligns the world with *dr̥ṣṭi* in this sequence, saying that there is no valid means to differentiate the object of perception from *dr̥ṣṭi*. Continuing with this very exalted use of *dr̥ṣṭi* as pure consciousness, Sadānanda quotes a passage from VP, which confirms that the world is nothing but consciousness, and it is this awareness-in-itself that is known in various forms.⁹

DS as understood by Vyāsāfirṭha

Among the critics of DS, Vyāsāfirṭha is the most systematic, having composed a complete treatise to refute the doctrine of DS.¹⁰ This criticism of DS clarifies how its opponents understood the doctrine. Vyāsāfirṭha understands DS to indicate the momentariness of perceived entities. He begins refuting, not the model of DS which accepts origination as identical to pure awareness, but rather that model which accepts origination as synchronous to perception. His example demonstrating the doctrine of DS follows: when Caitra is asleep, he is not aware of his body and so forth. Maitra's understanding that 'this is Caitra's body' is illusory. The recognition that 'this is my body' or 'this is Caitra' is due to error.¹¹

Vyāsāfirṭha argues that there are two ways of understanding DS:

- 1) There are six entities that do not fall under the discussion of DS, such as *jīva*, *īśa*, and so on; and
- 2) Everything except for pure consciousness is within the domain of DS.

⁹ ... *dr̥ṣṭir eva viśvasr̥ṣṭiḥ | dr̥ṣṭasya dr̥ṣṭibhede mānābhāvāt tad uktaṃ viśvapurāṇe – jñāna-svarūpaṃ evāhur jagad etad . . . tasmān na vijñānam ṛte 'sti kūcit . . . vijñānam ekam nījakarmābheda-vibhinnacittair bahudhābhūyupetaṃ* ABS 262.7-13.

¹⁰ See the *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭibhaṅga* section of NA.

¹¹ *yac ca bauddhābhīmatākṣaṇīkarvasiddhyartham uktaṃ viśvasya dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭiḥ | caitre sūpte taddehādīkam taṃ prati nāsty eva | jāgrato maitrasya tu tadbhṛntīyā bhāti | pratyabhijñā tu so 'yaṃ dīpa īyādivat bhrāntir iti* | NA 458-460 in Yogīndrānanda's edition.

To establish the momentariness favorable to the Buddhists, *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* of the world is mentioned. While Caitra slept, there is no experience of his body, etc., for him. Due to illusion of [Caitra] {*ta*}, [the body of Caitra] appears to Maitra, who is awake. The recognition [that this is that very Caitra] is an illusion, like 'this is that very flame'.

But even in his second doctrine, *pratīti* in the term *pratītimātraśarīra*, 'the entities having a body which is mere appearance,' does not mean the same as Prakāśānanda's understanding of *pratītimātra*. *Pratītimātra* in Vyāsāfirṭha's thesis is 'momentary appearance [of the external entities] only', whereas Prakāśānanda understands *pratītimātra* as 'appearance of [the instances of] awareness only'.¹² This meaning of DS leads Vyāsāfirṭha to argue that there will be no difference in different entities, like a pot or cloth, because all of them are falsely cognized as different but are otherwise the same. Even though Vyāsāfirṭha does not elaborate on his objection as to why there would be no difference, the argumentation in other chapters between Mādhvins with Advaitins is that Advaita does not accept difference in awareness. And since entities of experience exist only for the moment of experience—according to DS as understood by Vyāsāfirṭha—the consequence is that a single object, if known in different moments, should be different and not identical.¹³

For Vyāsāfirṭha, DS is synonymous with *kalpita* (imagined), suggesting that acceptance of the existence of entities from the perspective of DS leads to the acceptance of things as mental constructions.¹⁴ This fits with one of the meanings of *dr̥ṣṭi* elaborated mainly in the MUŚ.

Remarkably, Vyāsāfirṭha's refutation of DS is a refutation of the doctrine of momentariness. Vyāsāfirṭha argues that proponents of DS cannot establish recognition: not only will there not be the knowledge of identity in a single object even for a single moment, but also there will be difference in the subject of experience in different moments.¹⁵

Vyāsāfirṭha's understanding consequently affects both meanings of *dr̥ṣṭi*. If, by the term *dr̥ṣṭi* constant awareness is implied, then realization is ever-present and no effort for liberation is required. However, if *dr̥ṣṭi* signifies momentary awareness, it would

¹² ... *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭiṣṭīve tattakāryasya pratītimātraśarīratvena nīyatatanatkāraṇājanayave śrutiṣu svargāyartham jyotiṣṭomaḍividher brahmasākṣātkārthaṃ śravaṇādividher akāśāder vāyvādīhetuvoktes cāyogāt* | NA, p. 460, in Yogīndrānanda's edition.

In accepting *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* of everything except the self (*dr̥k*), because each effect has the form [lit. body] of appearance alone, particular effects will not be produced by particular causes, and so the injunction of *jyotiṣṭoma*, etc., for *svarga*, etc., or the injunctions of hearing, etc., for the realization of Brahman, and the statement of the causation of such as sky for air, and so on, would not be established.

¹³ ... *bhinnarvena pratītasya ghaṭapaṭāder abhedo' bhinnatvena pratītasya ghaṭasya pratīkṣaṇaṃ bheda iti dr̥ṣṭahānādr̥ṣṭakalpanāpātīc ca* | NA, p. 466 in Yogīndrānanda's edition.

There would be even the abandonment of what is seen and the imagining of what is not seen by [asserting] the non-difference of a pot, cloth, etc. that is experienced as different, and difference in each moment of a pot experienced as identical.

¹⁴ The ending remark ... *na kalpitaṃ jagat* (the world is not imagined) ... NA, p. 468 in Yogīndrānanda's edition.

¹⁵ ... *pratyabhijñāvirodhāc ca, dīpādaḥ parimāṇādībhedakasyeveha bādhakasyābhāvāt, tadabhāve 'pi bhrāntīve ca ghaṭāder apy ekasminn api kṣaṇe bhedasyātmano 'pi pratīkṣaṇaṃ bhedasya ca prasāṅgāt* | NA, 464.

not exist in the realized state. And the state of liberation, where there is no stream of momentary consciousness, would be comparable to the state of insentient objects, such as a pot.¹⁶

According to Vyāsafirṭha, a subsequent problem emerges when all entities are 'DS only', with illusion not different from reality. This is encountered in the *Ābhāsa*-DS doctrine that accepts two truths. What Vyāsafirṭha demonstrates is the consequence of infinite regress: that entities of illusion are falsely imagined following the maxim of DS, which in itself is falsely imagined. His objection is that, following the same maxim of DS, even DS will be false. If the doctrine of DS itself is a false construction, i.e., DS, then entities will turn out to be everlasting, provided that DS doctrine is itself momentary. This argument is also applied while refuting the Sautrāntika doctrine of momentariness, which suggests that Vyāsafirṭha's arguments against DS are based on the understanding that *dr̥ṣṭi* implies the meaning of momentary awareness.¹⁷

Madhusūdana on the Definition of DS

Madhusūdana paid extensive attention to defining DS.¹⁸ He presents ten possible *prima facie* definitions of DS, all of which he refutes by taking the position of his opponents. Then Madhusūdana presents his own opinion, in which some of the previous definitions are defended, whereas others are revised.¹⁹ It is therefore necessary to know the ten *prima facie* definitions in order to understand his conclusive definition that nonetheless defends multiple interpretations.

First definition:

dr̥ṣṭir eva sṛṣṭiḥ 'creation is nothing but (*eva*) seeing'

¹⁶ ... *mokṣasyāpi dṛganyatvena svāpnamokṣavaḍ dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭimātravūpātūc ca, cinmātrasyaiva ghaṭādi-dr̥ṣṭiive tasya sadā praṣṭyāpattiyā viśiṣṭasya tattive vācyē tasyāpi viśiṣṭasya dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭive 'navasthādi-prasāngāc ca* | NA, 463.

¹⁷ *uktanyāyena doṣājjñānadr̥ṣṭidehendriyādīnām abhāve bhrānṛāyayogena teṣām api dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭive 'navasthāpātūc ca, ghaṭāder iva dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭir ity asyāpi dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭive ghaṭāder adṛṣṭisṛṣṭyāpātūc ca* | NA 464.

¹⁸ These alternative interpretations of DS are presented in the *Dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭyupapatti* chapter of AS, p. 533 (Śāstrī ed.).

¹⁹ The focus on the definition of particular terms to establish a doctrine is typical of the modern Nyāya tradition. In the post-Gaṅgeśa Vedānta literature, the influence of technical Nyāya terms and logical structure is remarkable. Even some Nyāya masters took Vedānta as the final refuge: this becomes apparent in Raghunātha's time (16th Century). This, however, is not the case of classical Nyāya, in which knowing the sixteen categories was the method to achieve *niḥśreyasa*. This diverted the Nyāya from the means of liberation to the means of logical debate.

Objection:

vṛttirūpā caitanyarūpā vā dr̥ṣṭir abhimatā? prathame caramavṛttivīṣayabrahmaṇo 'pi dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭyāpattih | dvitīye sarvadā 'pi sṛṣṭyāpattih |

Is *dr̥ṣṭi* understood as of the nature of mental modifications (*vṛtti*) or of the nature of consciousness [itself]? In the first case, even Brahman, the object of the final *vṛtti*, will have to be DS. In the second [case there is] a consequence that there will be creation forever.

Second definition:

dr̥ṣṭivyatiriktasṛṣṭyabhāvaḥ

[DS is] an absence of creation [different from] perception.

Objection:

caitreṇa sṛṣṭo mayā dr̥ṣṭa iti vailakṣanyena vyavahārānupapattēḥ

'What is created by Caitra is seen by me' cannot be established on account of disparity.

Third definition:

dr̥ṣṭivyatirekeṇa sṛjyābhāvaḥ

[There is] an absence of the entities of creation except for perception.

Objection:

jñāto ghaṭo na jñānam ity anubhavavirodhāt

This contradicts the experience that a pot is known, but not the knowledge [of knowing the pot].

Fourth definition:

dr̥ṣṭisāmāgrījanatvaṃ

[Is it something] generated by the causal complex of *dr̥ṣṭi*?

Objection:

ekasāmāgrīprasūtātvena ghaṭāder dr̥ṣṭyabhinnatvenānantaroktadoṣāt |

There will be the aforementioned flaw, since the pot, and so on, is not separate from *dr̥ṣṭi*, as it originated from the same causal complex.²⁰

Fifth definition:

dr̥ṣṭisamānakālīnasṛṣṭiḥ

Creation [is] simultaneous to perception.

²⁰ The *Gurucandrīkā* (GC) gives the reason that, whatever is made of the same cause has non-distinction; and so to distinguish an object and its knowledge, the distinction in cause is required: *ekasāmāgrījanatvasyābhedavyāpyatayoktadoṣavāraṇāya sāmāgrībhedasyāvaś-yakatvāt* GC 333.

Objection:

*sābdādījñānasamakālotpamaghaṣṭādau siddhasādhanāt, tadvad anyatrā-
rīhāntaratāpateḥ ca |*

Because there is [a logical fallacy of] 'proving what is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*) in that, for example, a pot created simultaneous to the verbal knowledge of 'pot', and because this implies (*āpatti*) the fault of proving an unintended thesis (*arīhāntarā*) for another case (*anyatra*).²¹

Sixth definition:

dr̥ṣṭisattāsamānasattākasr̥ṣṭiḥ

The existence of creation [is] simultaneous to the existence of perception.

Objection:

ubhayasattve 'py upapateḥ siddhasādhanāt |

There will be [the fallacy of] 'proving what is already proved' (*siddhasādhanatā*), because [creation] will be possible even in the case of the existence of both [knowledge and its content].

Seventh definition:

sadasadvilakṣaṇatvam

Distinct from existent and non-existent.

Objection:

asyaiva mithyātvarūpatvena tatsādhanāyaiva tadupanyāsānupapateḥ |

This (distinction from the existent and non-existent) is in itself of the character of falsity, and therefore cannot be brought forward to establish itself.²²

Eighth definition:

trivīdhasattvabahirbhūtaive saty asaadvilakṣaṇatvam

It is distinct from the non-existent under the condition of being out of [the domain of] three degrees of reality.

²¹ *arīhāntarā* is one of the *nigrahassthāna*. For discussion on this category of 'fault' in Indian logic, see Potter 1993, 189-190. Udayana addresses four types of *arīhāntara*: where the irrelevant statement accords with the speaker's own school of thought, or with the opponent's, or with both, or with neither. See, Potter 1993, 359, 362, 409-410.

²² This is one of the fallacies in using definition to establish proof of a probans. Since falsity is not proved, one more interpretation of falsity cannot prove another interpretation of it; a definition of a term cannot be used to establish the term itself.

Objection:

*trivīdhasattvamadye prātibhāsikasattvasyāpy antarbhāvena dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭipakṣe tadvari
jagati tadbahirbhāvānupapateḥ |*

Since even illusory existence is included within the three types of existence, it is impossible to establish that it exists outside, with reference to the world that is endowed with this [illusion], if one adopts the DS view.²³

Ninth definition:

ajñātasattvābhāvaḥ

Absence of the existence of what is not known.

Objection:

tucchasādhāraṇyāt

Since [in this case, DS will be] equal to the non-existent (*tuccha*) [like hare-horn].

Tenth definition:

jñātaikasattvam

The existence of only what is known.

Objection:

sukhādau siddhasādhanāt, tadvad anyatrārīhāntarāc ca

In [an experience] such as pleasure, there will be 'proving what is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*), therefore elsewhere [in external objects], there will be proving an unintended thesis (*arīhāntara*).

Madhusūdana's response

After presenting the aforementioned definitions and highlighting the faults that can occur in those definitions, Madhusūdana defends the following four alternative interpretations of DS:

- 1) *doṣaprayuktatvanibandhanasya jñātaikasattvasya-*
- 2) *ajñātasattvābhāvasya vā,*
- 3) *pratīpannopādhi-dr̥ṣṭijanyajñātaikasattvasya vā,*
- 4) *draṣṭrantarāvedyatve sati jñātaikasattvasya vā vivaḥṣitatvāt |
tathā ca na sukhādyamśe siddhasādhanāḥ, tadvad anyatrārīhāntaraḥ vā |*

What is meant [by the term DS] is:

- 1) The existence of only known [entities] causally connected with the application of 'a defect' (*doṣa*), or,

²³ GC defines 'out of that' as 'devoid of that': *tadbahirbhāveti | tacchūryavety arthaḥ |* GC 333.

- 2) The absence of the existence of unknown [entities], or,
- 3) The existence of only known [entities] originated by the seeing (*dr̥ṣṭi*) [particularized by]²⁴ the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) 'known', or,
- 4) The existence of only known [entities] provided there is nothing to be cognized for another subject.

Thus, there will not be [the fallacy of] establishing what has already been established (*siddhasādhana*) in parts such as pleasure, nor will there be proving an unintended thesis (*arthāntara*) elsewhere [in internal objects].²⁵

It is noteworthy that these instances do not apply *dr̥ṣṭi* as self-aware consciousness. Madhusūdana is aware of the problems if *dr̥ṣṭi* is defined as pure consciousness:

*caitanyamātrasya dr̥ṣṭive yady api tatsamānasattākatayā ghaṭādeḥ sadātanatvāpatih,
tathāpi vṛttypahitacaitanyam eva dr̥ṣṭiśabdārthaḥ | vṛttāv api vṛttir eva svasvarūpā
caitanyopādhir iti nānavasthā |*

Even though, in accepting *dr̥ṣṭi* as pure consciousness, [there will be] a fault that even a pot will last forever, due to the reason that [it has] an equal existence, nonetheless, *dr̥ṣṭi* means the consciousness limited by mental modifications (*vṛtti*). There will not be in-

²⁴ This understanding follows LC: *svapratipativiseṣyadr̥ṣṭijanyavṛtījñātaikasattvasyety arthaḥ | LC (Śāstrī, ed. p. 533-534).*

²⁵ In the first definition, GC defines *doṣa* in three different ways:

1. To have 'a fault' (*doṣa*) is to have 'otherness' (*doṣatvaṃ tāvad anyatamatvam*);
2. To have 'a fault' is being an object of the concept qualified by the property that qualifies error (*bhramatvajātmaddhīviśayatvaṃ vā doṣaprayuktatvam*);
3. GC defines to have fault as: *bhramatvāvachchinnajanakatāvachedakajātir avidyātvaṃ vā doṣatvaṃ* GC 333-334.

GC explains that the clause '*doṣaprayuktatvanibandhanatva*' is connected even with the second definition: *nibandhanasyety antam anuśajyate | tasya ca pūrvatrevātrāpi doṣaprayuktavṛtter ity arthaḥ | GC 334.*

In both definitions, GC proposes ignorance as something that provides 'asattva'. *parokṣaviśayasān-grahāyāsattvāpādakājñānam eva lakṣaṇadvaye 'pi niveśyam | GC 334.*

In the third definition, *pratipannopādhidr̥ṣṭi* (seeing [something] in the limiting adjunct that is perceived) is explained in GC as *svapratipativiseṣyadr̥ṣṭi* (seeing [something] that is particularized by the knowledge of the limiting adjunct {*sva*}) GC 334-335.

In the fourth definition, GC explains that the pleasure of another person is not experienced by the person observing the pleasure of the experiencer, but is mentally constructed within oneself as belonging to another person: *dr̥ṣṭiśīpākṣe puruṣāntarīyasukhādīr na jñāyate, kin tu puruṣāntarīyatvaena svasminn eva kālpayate iti bhāvāḥ | GC 335.*

finite regress, because even in a mode of consciousness, there is the very mode of consciousness that is the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of consciousness.²⁶

Remarkably, while defining DS, Madhusūdana accepts the existence of 'entities of cognition' (*jñāta*), but not of cognition (*jñāna*) alone. Does this lead to the acceptance of objects distinct from cognition? Madhusūdana solves this problem, explaining *vṛtti* as cognition itself in the form of an object. In other words, what is known is not distinct from knowledge. Furthermore, while some writers of DS favor the first of ten possible definitions proposed by Madhusūdana, i.e., *dr̥ṣṭir eva sr̥ṣṭiḥ*, he accepts the ninth and tenth definitions with some modification. Each of the four favored definitions supports the argument that DS refers to the concept that there exist only the entities that are cognized (*jñātaikasattva*).

It is noteworthy that Madhusūdana does not interpret DS with a single understanding. He is aware that *dr̥ṣṭi* can refer to both pure consciousness and to consciousness conditioned by mental modifications. However, it is apparent that he favors the second type of *dr̥ṣṭi*. According to this, the meaning of DS will be confined to 'creation identical with mental modification'. This understanding tallies with his application of DS in his commentary on BG:

*... svapnendrajālādau pratibhāsamātrajīvanāni śuktrūpyādīvan na tu jñānāt
prāg ūrdhvaṃ vā sūhānī dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭyabhyupagamāt |²⁷*

The [bodies perceived] in a dream, or in magic last only contemporaneous to appearance, but neither before [their] cognition nor after, like silver [cognized in] shell, because [the maxim of DS] is accepted.

In this context, Madhusūdana cites GK 2.6 and applies DS to interpret BG 2.28.²⁸ The world, following this understanding, is imagined due to ignorance (*ajñānakalpita*

²⁶ AS p.535, Śāstrī ed. GC explains the phrase, *svasvarūpa* . . . , in such a way that pleasure, which is pure, can be the counter-image of consciousness, and so another *vṛtti* is not accepted. Even accepting another *vṛtti*, the mutually dependent *vṛtti* is asserted, and so there is no infinite regress. Even in accepting the existence of the seen as consciousness limited by that [entity which is] seen, there will not be eternity, not even in regarding the *vṛtti* of ignorance [that GC accepts]; the emergence of a [vṛtti such as a] pot, which is qualified by object-hood qualified by a property, such as visibility.

svacche sukhādau citpratibimbamabhavād vṛtiantarānabhyupagamāḥ, tadabhyupagame 'py parasparaviśayakavṛttidvayasvikārān nānavasthādi | yadi tu tattaddr̥ṣṭyavachchinnā cid eva tattaddr̥ṣṭyasatteti na sadātanatvāpatir iti vibhāvayate, tathāpy avidyāvṛtitanabhyupagame 'py cākṣuṣarvādīdharmaviśiṣṭaviśayavivīṣṭasyaiva ghaṭāder utpatir vācyā, ghaṭam paśyāmītyādyanubhavasyañyathānupapattēḥ | GC 339.

²⁷ BG 2.28, Madhusūdana's Gūḍhārthadīpikā commentary, Śarmā ed., p.84.

²⁸ Nilakaṇṭha, in his Caturdharī commentary in BG, quotes the same passage from GK and explains this as '*pratīsanakālikīm sr̥ṣṭim abhipretya*' (pointing towards creation [that is] contemporaneous to appearance). Remarkably, he quotes KU 4.20 in this instance, the passage most frequently cited while discussing DS. He also cites BĀUBhVā 1.4.371, where Sureśvara identifies ignorance as the material cause of duality, comparing it with magic. See Caturdharī in BG 2.28 in Śarmā ed., p.84-85. Both

Madhusūdana in BG 2.28). Accordingly, whether creation is explained as identical with or contemporaneous to *dr̥ṣṭi*, this term means consciousness conditioned by ignorance instead of referring to pure consciousness.

This study of contrasting understandings of *dr̥ṣṭi* exemplifies how the Advaita philosophers addressed different concepts while using terms such as DS or EJ. This analysis also brings the writings of Sureśvara to prominence in the discussion of DS, with his analysis of *dr̥ṣṭi* following the *Ābhāsa* model. The role of the *Upaniṣads* in the development of these concepts is visible in the writings of exegetes from different historical times, as they exploit these passages in order to establish their arguments. Although Advaita cannot be synthesized as one single thought, it can be identified as an exegetical tradition grounded upon the *Upaniṣads*. This study further demonstrates how text and tradition are interlinked, with subsequent thoughts linked with specific *Upaniṣadic* passages. The pertinent issue here is the association of immediate cognition with *dr̥ṣṭi*, demonstrating the non-dual nature of awareness. This identification of *dr̥ṣṭi* as immediately cognized awareness in itself allows the philosophical investigation of the Advaita understanding of 'seeing'. This issue will be addressed in the second volume of this study.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

This study on *dr̥ṣṭi* brings multiple issues to the surface. First of all, reading particular schools of Indian philosophy as possessing diverse models can provide a distinct framework for finding related and overlapping thoughts within an evolving historical paradigm. The historical analysis of specific streams of thought can demonstrate the selective nature of philosophical issues that emerge and shift during the development of the concept itself in relation to the problems and paradoxes highlighted by opponents of that school. The analysis of the meaning of philosophical terms shows how exegetical traditions exploit the unending possibility of words to provide new meanings, so that the terms themselves subordinate the concepts to which they refer, with their elasticity to signify new meaning.

Investigation into the historical development of DS first identifies the scarcity of *Upaniṣadic* material that can be cited as direct textual evidence. The dream analogy found in the *Kauṣītaki* is the main *Upaniṣadic* passage exploited by all writers on DS. However, this is not to argue that use of the dream metaphor necessarily leads to this philosophy. With its analysis of dream and other related concepts, the philosophy of Gauḍapāda is very close to the DS doctrine, although subsequent writers infrequently utilize GK to establish their arguments. Gauḍapāda neither uses *dr̥ṣṭi* nor explicitly propounds EJ in the process of explaining his thought.

Second, the DS concept emerges from the *Ābhāsa* doctrine. This is to argue that DS is a core argument within *Ābhāsa*, a broader system within Advaita philosophy. In this context, DS primarily addresses the question of creation, examining whether what exists is only that which is under the domain of knowledge. The specific treatment of DS upon the issues that concern existence is epistemological, analyzing the nature of immediate perception in order to explain existence. The concept of 'seeing-in-itself as creation' borrows some basic tenets from Gauḍapāda's doctrine of non-origination (*ajātivāda*) to explain the nature of existence. It would be misleading, however, to reduce DS to the *Ajāti* doctrine of Gauḍapāda.

Most intriguing is the question of the compatibility of Hindu theology with the doctrine of DS. The role of God and divine intervention, the role of gurus and scriptures in the process of liberation, and the law of karma come into question if DS is perceived as strictly following EJ. The only way to explain EJ along theological lines is to accept the Lord as the single self (*jīva*). Interestingly, some authors on DS, including Amarananda and Madhusūdana, emerged from the Vaiṣṇavite background, while Prakāśānanda composed liturgical texts. Furthermore, the textual evidence utilized by most writers discussing DS includes stanzas from VP, a text of the Vaiṣṇava tradition. The conflict in the interpretation of EJ as either the single collective self or the self that is immediately cognized demonstrates the tension between the

Nilakantha and Madhusūdana are commenting upon the phrase: '*adṛṣṭadr̥ṣṭapranasṭabhrāntibhūteṣu bhūteṣu*'. The commentary of Śaṅkara on BG 2.28.

first position that supports the theological argument of the single collective self identified with the divinity, and the next understanding that culminates with defending uncompromising solipsism.

An essential goal of this study has been to historically trace the concept of DS, finding its nuances in the writings of the classical Advaita philosophers. The evidence that can align DS with the early philosophers can be seen when comparing the definition of DS found in the later scholastic writings with the parallel concept in the early Advaita literature. Whether 'constant awareness free from modifications' or 'consciousness conditioned by mental modifications' is understood by the term *dr̥ṣṭi*, the core understanding of DS remains as the doctrine that supports the existence of awareness only. Regardless of the ways the term *dr̥ṣṭi* is analyzed, the fundamental understanding of *dr̥ṣṭimātra* remains as 'awareness only,' with the application of 'seeing' synonymous with 'awareness'. In light of this, the following statements can be compared:

- 1). *na vastv ajñātam asti hi*
(there exists no entity [which] has not become an object of cognition),
- 2). *pratītimātram sattvam*
(the existence of appearance only), and
- 3). *jñātaikasattva, or ajñātasattvābhāva*
(the existence of only that which is known) or (the absence of the existence of that which is not known),

Corresponding sequentially to Sureśvara, Prakāśānanda, and Madhusūdana, these expressions hardly differ in their content. These definitions explicitly support the specific understanding of DS where this doctrine confirms the simultaneity of cognition and existence. However, when *dr̥ṣṭi* and the related terms such as *jñāna* or *pratīti* are interpreted as the awareness free from modification, this understanding tallies with DS as the doctrine of the existence of pure awareness which is never conditioned by mental modifications.

Between the two models of DS suggested by Appayya, the *samakāla*-model that accepts simultaneity of perception and the existence of external phenomena posits a plurality of *jīvas*, with an acceptance of Hiraṇyagarbha as the meta-subject. With regard to this specific issue, this model is in alignment with the Maṇḍana and Vācaspati model of Advaita, as well as that of MUŚ/YV. The model of Hiraṇyagarbha as the single *Jīva* is also congruent with other theological assumptions.

Opponents of Advaita, especially Vyāsaśrītha, relate DS to a doctrine of momentariness. However, this attempt to align DS with the *Sautrāntika* doctrine results in its misrepresentation. Actually, Advaita philosophers endeavored to refute both the doctrine of momentariness and the doctrine of simultaneous perception (*sahopalambha*). The Advaitins tend to divide awareness into two strata of momentary and constant awareness, with the first identified as unreal.¹ The momentary cognition, caused due to ignorance, is neither self-aware nor of the character of the self. These characteristics do not tally with the momentary awareness proposed by the Sautrāntikas.

¹ Sureśvara utilizes the terms such as *kaṣaṇapradhvānsinī* or *kaṣaṇabhaṅgī* - NS 2.69, 78 - in order to identify the momentary appearance.

Central elements of the EJ concept can be found in Śaṅkara's US. Śaṅkara did not pay much attention to the arguments later identified as DS, except for identifying subjective experience as singular. This volume examining the different streams within Advaita reveals that all the proponents of the EJ doctrine did not necessarily advocate DSE. Arguably, the doctrine of EJ first emerged independent of DS, and the adherents of the *Ābhāsa* doctrine supported the subsequent identification of both these models as one. Accepting the singularity of the individual self results in the existence of 'seeing only', as there is no other self to cognize the world in order to verify its independent existence.

Central to Advaita philosophy is the acceptance of ignorance as a category. This position has remained controversial, with contrasting factions within the school of Advaita itself as well as its opponents sharply criticizing this position. The DSE position is one consequence of accepting ignorance. When ignorance is accepted, both its locus and object need to be explained. The mechanics of DSE are operative when the Brahman itself is considered to be the locus as well as the object of ignorance.

DS cannot be fully comprehended as a doctrine without placing it within the Advaita framework. The distinction between SD and DS and their identification as the two poles of Advaita emerged in later classical writings. This distinction was not established by adding new philosophical concepts, but through framing the existing arguments into specific models. In addition to offering insightful epistemological analysis on the nature of 'seeing as such', the proponents of DS provided instruction in a liberative praxis for advanced practitioners.

Investigation into the meaning of DS, in the same way, identifies different issues. First of all, since most Advaita writers agree on the meaning of *dr̥ṣṭi* as awareness, the concept of DS needs to be understood in light of this definition. However, the diversity of meaning that the term provides in classical Advaita literature suggests the necessity of examining the contexts in which this term has been used. A corollary issue is that DS was not developed at one specific time by one single thinker, as the historical analysis herein reveals. Technical terms become complex when meaning shifts from its usage by one writer to another in a different time period. As in the case of the Advaita doctrine, when contrasting ideas commingle in a single identity, terminal meanings acquire further complexity.

Along with a change in understanding the nature of the self and its relationship to the world, the meaning of particular terms that directly impact these concepts has shifted to accommodate the changing environment. The term *dr̥ṣṭi* has been shown to express a multiplicity of meanings in different contexts: 'seeing in itself', 'seeing pertaining to the witnessing consciousness', 'seeing as a linguistic act', 'perceiving in a dyad of subject and object', 'false appearance', 'different viewpoints' or 'fancies'. These understandings cover wide range of idealistic thought, as upheld by monistic thinkers, and linguistic and subjective non-dualists. The resulting plurality in meaning and attribution demonstrates that interpreting one specific term cannot be separated from a history of the literature in which it appears.

When DS is interpreted with the meaning of *dr̥ṣṭi* as 'awareness-in-itself', this model rejects creation-as-such, rather than confirming it. In other words, the following statements, 'there is no creation but only consciousness' and 'creation is consciousness itself,' merely propound the absolute consciousness, rejecting its modification. With this understanding, this model can be compared with Gaudapāda's *Ajātivāda*, although Gaudapāda did not adopt a direct instruction of 'awareness only', but rather stressed 'illusion only' as the nature of the world. However, his demonstration of the illusory nature of entities does not confirm their illusory 'existence', but rather negates their independent being. The interpretation of *dr̥ṣṭi* with a dyadic meaning utilizes the same strategy of teaching from both the perspective of reality as well as from the perspective of commonsense experience.

Even though Śaṅkara uses *dr̥ṣṭi* as both 'seeing-in-itself' and 'appearance', he prefers the first meaning in his independent text, US. In one model addressed therein, 'seeing' or 'immediate awareness' is considered the true nature of the self, and this understanding dismantles the hierarchical structure given by other philosophers to their definition of consciousness, by which they differentiate between phenomenal experience and awareness-in-itself.

Sureśvara establishes his philosophical doctrine of *Ābhāsa* with a multiplicity of meanings for the term *dr̥ṣṭi*. In some instances, Sureśvara uses the term *dr̥ṣṭi* to express the true nature of the reality, while at other times, this very term demonstrates momentary awareness. Nonetheless, he confirms that these momentary instances of awareness are, in reality, not distinct from the ever-witnessing consciousness. Whenever Sureśvara uses the terms *dr̥ṣṭi-mātra*, or *saṃvinmātra*, it is always in the meaning of 'awareness only'. On the basis of Sureśvara's understanding of *dr̥ṣṭi*, DS can be understood as identifying 'consciousness only' as the true nature of reality, rather than addressing the empirical world. A similar semantic expansion occurs with Vimuktātman's application of *dr̥k* as 'awareness-in-itself'.

Dr̥ṣṭi refers to instances of perception as well. This understanding results in *dr̥ṣṭi* meaning the mere perception of entities, presupposing a triad of subject, object, and knowledge. Sureśvara frequently explains a dyad of subject and object as 'simultaneously emerging'. Nevertheless, *dr̥ṣṭi* cannot be confined within this dyadic meaning alone, as this term is also used for 'mental construction' or 'fancy'. No Advaita text, however, utilizes *dr̥ṣṭi* with a meaning of a 'fancy' devoid of a substratum.

There is a greater linguistic connection between *dr̥ṣṭi* (seeing) and *ābhāsa* (appearance) than with *pratibimba* (reflection) or *avaccheda* (limitation). Derived from the verbal roots *dr̥ś* and *bhāś*, both, in 'terminations of the middle voice' (*ātmanepada*), express the meaning of 'shining' or 'appearing', allowing the passive appearance of entities grounded on the substrate of consciousness. The term *bhāśate*, 'appears', does not presuppose objects other than the very subject to be an object of 'shining' or 'appearing'. In the same way, the term *dr̥ṣṭi*, when interpreted as 'false appearance', does not accommodate the independent existence of entities separate from the perceiving self.

The meaning of *dr̥ṣṭi* as 'consciousness alone' occurs only infrequently in MUŚ, although the text is full of the instruction of 'consciousness only', using other terms. Whether there are two *dr̥ṣṭis*, one being real and the other being false, or whether there are many *dr̥ṣṭis*, 'viewings', or illusory appearances, all these are simultaneous to perception, and so the second model of DS, that creation is contemporaneous to perception, is most congruent with the use of *dr̥ṣṭi* in MUŚ. If the application of *dr̥ṣṭi* in this text is recognized as instances of awareness, with these instances accepted as the inherent nature of awareness-in-itself, this understanding aligns with the philosophy of Bhartṛprapañca, as found in citations discussed earlier in this text. It is noteworthy that both Bhartṛprapañca and the author of MUŚ accept 'seeing' as 'potent', with the autonomy of consciousness unfolding in 'difference'. Adopting the illustration of waves and the ocean, both philosophers demonstrate that difference inheres to the singular reality of consciousness alone.

The application of *dr̥ṣṭi* as 'momentary instances of cognition' is congruent with the model of DS that accepts creation simultaneous to perception. Even though some Advaita texts, including VSM, do not favor this meaning, several authors understand the term *dr̥ṣṭi* used in the compound DS as referring to momentary false perception. It is noteworthy that Madhusūdana, who is closer to the Vivaraṇa school, interprets DS with the term *dr̥ṣṭi* meaning 'consciousness conditioned by ignorance', whereas Prakāśānanda, who is comparatively closer to Sureśvara, applies *dr̥ṣṭi* to refer to pure consciousness. The model of DS that accepts creation simultaneous with perception can accommodate a plurality of individual selves, and so can be aligned with the philosophy of Maṇḍana. However, to identify DS completely with any of these particular models remains problematic, as certain elements differ in each of these doctrines.

As demonstrated in this study, Advaita contains multiple concepts within a single philosophy, with the nuances of different models preserving older forms of monistic and non-dualistic thought. Early Advaita developed in a dialogue with Mīmāṃsā that advocates agency of the self, and the understanding of *dr̥ṣṭi*, according to Bhartṛprapañca, is more congruent with this concept. Subsequently, Advaita engaged in a dialogue with Buddhist philosophers, and the interpretation of *dr̥ṣṭi* in this phase cannot be separated from this exchange. The focus upon the illusory nature of *dr̥ṣṭi* or the application of *dr̥ṣṭi* in order to interpret the phenomena whose existence is negated in the absolute sense are the nuances that indicate the Buddhist influence. Finally, the dialogue with Vaiṣṇava thinkers dominated the later philosophical discourse, affecting the reinterpretation of particular terms. The defense of the Hiranyagarbha model of EJ exemplifies this tendency.

While examining one specific model of Advaita thought, this investigation brings to light complex exegetical positions. Elementary thought found in the form of different narratives lies at the foundation of these differing conclusions. For example, the story of the prince assuming himself to be a hunter inspires a complete doctrine in the later scholastic period. Reading MUŚ and YV in light of the narratives these texts use supports various models of Advaita thought, one being the model examined in this study. Subtle internal differences, as found in the philosophy of Maṇḍana and Sureśvara and addressed in this study, demonstrate how some historical problems can be resolved by addressing these internal conceptual differences and similarities. The

fundamental argument of this work has remained to demonstrate that the meaning of texts has remained fluid in classical Hindu thought, allowing diverse positions even within a single school.

This study has also demonstrated how classical philosophers have embodied contradiction within their thought, addressing certain issues with one specific model in mind while treating other issues by adopting a different model. This open-ended thinking, we argue, is the *upāyic* approach in treating philosophical concepts: the same issue can be understood differently, depending upon the level of an aspirant. Rather than being 'the' approach to determine ontological truth, the concept of DS or other similar Advaita thoughts appear to be different methods applied in order to transform subjective awareness.

The historical analysis herein has also demonstrated how issues shift within one school of thought in different periods. One of the arguments of this study has been that specific concepts found in one school of classical Indian thought can be read in relation to the criticism the school faced from its opponents. This approach of reading philosophical positions in light of different streams of thought rather than giving credit to one independent thinker brings 'tradition' to prominence as a mechanism that allows thoughts to evolve in new forms. Classical arguments that defend solipsism while establishing 'seeing only' as the non-dual nature of immediate self-awareness demand a separate treatment.

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
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INDOLOGICA HALENSIS

SEEING AND APPEARANCE

STHANESHWAR TIMALSINA

GEISTESKULTUR INDIENS. TEXTE UND STUDIEN



Although Advaita Vedānta, one of the most prominent Indian philosophical traditions, considers Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi (seeing as identical with creation) as one of its main doctrines, there has been no study on this doctrine so far. The present study fulfills this need, exploring the development of this thought through analysis of its classical exegetical tradition. It also examines the intricate relationship among various monistic philosophical traditions in India concerning the nature of consciousness. Central to this doctrine is the idea that consciousness is non-dual seeing itself and that the very Brahman is conceived as transmigrating, assuming bondage or liberation, although this seeing in reality is free from transformation.

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